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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to present and explain Greece's foreign 
policy towards former Yugoslavia within the context of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) during the period of June 1991-December 1992. This asp ect of 
Greece's foreign policy was primarily defined by the dispute with the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), that essentially constituted the more 
recent manifestation of the Macedonian Question.
The analysis of Greek foreign policy within EPC will be based on the 
theory of institutionalism, which claims that international regimes can influence 
state behavior towards cooperative actions. The application of institutionalism 
requires the existence of common interests and the presence of at least one  
regime. This thesis shows the significant interests shared by G reece and FYROM, 
as well as how EPC can be viewed as a  regime. Crucially, EPC was primarily 
responsible for dealing with issues arising from the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
during the months covered in this thesis. It will be demonstrated that until mid- 
January 1992, the Greek government pursued politics of cooperation and 
flexibility, often contrary to perceived national interests. These politics were 
primarily regime-produced and related, and hence explained by the theory of 
institutionalism. After 17 January 1991 however, G reece practised politics of 
limited cooperation within EPC and confrontation against FYROM. The issue of 
the new republic's exact name gradually becam e of paramount importance, 
provoking popular passions and subordinating all other issues and concerns 
connected  to former Yugoslavia. Such developments were ultimately the result 
of domestic and partisan politics that were entirely unrelated to EPC, thus 
causing the decline of institutionalism's explanatory power.
Given this record, the thesis will argue that the specific expansion of the 
conditions required for the application of institutionalism would allow the theory 
to retain its explanatory and predictive relevance. Finally, specific lessons on 
the conduct of Greek foreign policy will be discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Macedonia has evidently lost none of its power to excite. 
-Mark Mazower, Introduction to the Study o f Macedonia. 1996.
The disintegration of Yugoslavia has been the most violent event in Europe 
since the conclusion of the Greek Civil War in 1949.’ The dissolution and destruction of 
a country resulting in the death of more than 3 0 0 ,0 0 0  people '6 8 ,0 0 0  wounded 
[and] 3 million refugees,' the practice of 'ethnic cleansing,' the establishment of 
concentration camps and numerous instances of unimaginable brutality, constitute 
central aspects of a  conflict that shocked world opinion.^
Its resolution eventually required the active involvement of several states, 
organisations and institutions. However, beginning in the summer of 1991 and for a  
significant period of time, it was European Political Cooperation (EPC) that was 
primarily responsible for addressing the many problems emanating from the war. As 
an EPC member that actually neighboured Yugoslavia, G reece had undisputed and 
significant security and foreign policy interests in the region, as well as the power to 
veto all EPC decisions.
Despite the seriousness of the Yugoslav crisis and its importance to G reece, the 
actions of the country's government have been portrayed as extremely non- 
cooperative and counter-productive, ultimately endangering the efforts to contain and
’The total loss of population, by death or long-term exile, resulting from [the Greek] Civil War seems 
to..have been over 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 '  (Close, 1993a 10).
^Tlme. 26 July 1993: 22 The numbers concerning wounded and refugees refer only to the war In Bosnia- 
Hercegovlna. The estimate of 3 0 0 ,0 0 0  dead Is taken from Newsweek. 20  April 1998: 53, and refers to 
fatalities of the 'wars of the Yugoslav succession' during the period of 1991-1995. This estimate Is 
generally accepted. See for example, Holbrooke, 1998: xv. Particularly good accounts of the Yugoslav 
War are Cohen, 1993; Crnobrnja, 1994; Glenny, 1992 and Woodward, 1995. An Important analysis of the 
International response to the conflict can be found In Gow, 1997.
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end the Yugoslav Wor.^  Most criticisms revolve around the dispute with the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)/ At issue were the new republic's name, 
actions, certain constitutional provisions, various propaganda claims and ultimately its 
identity and survival. This dispute constitutes the most recent developm ent in the more 
than century-old Macedonian Question, which (as will be explained in the relevant 
chapter) has played a crucial and often fateful role in the international politics of the 
Balkans since at least 1870. The geographic region of M acedonia has been the apple  
of discord am ong many states and in order to gain eventually its larger part, the Greek 
people have fought a  number of costly and traumatic wars. This historical record partly 
explains their sensitivity and reactions that will be presented in this thesis.
Despite the widespread perception to the contrary, a  closer examination of 
Greece's behaviour will actually reveal that the country's government also pursued 
substantial politics of cooperation, moderation and flexibility towards former 
Yugoslavia and FYROM, especially between June 1991 and 17 January 1992. For instance, 
the possibility of a compromise on the new republic's name was maintained, bilateral 
talks sponsored, and decisions of a  confrontational nature against FYROM were 
avoided almost entirely. Further instances of cooperation included agreem ent to EPC's 
recognition of Croatia and Bosnia, the imposition of an arms embargo and a  trade 
embargo on all Yugoslav republics, as well as the eventual maintenance of the latter 
only against Serbia and Montenegro.
F^or example, see The New York Times. 5 April 1992 E16; Gow, 1997: 78 fn 32; The Guardian. 5 May 1992 8; 
The Economist. 9 May 1992 41; Time. 1 June 1992 72; international Herald Tribune. 24 November 1992 8 
and Financial Times. 9 December 1992 3.
F^or the purposes of this thesis, the term FYROM will be utilised. It must be admitted that the use of any 
term concerning the new republic is susceptible to attacks of bias. However, this approach has the 
advantage of conforming to the 1993 UN Security Council Resolution 813, according to which 'this state 
[will be] referred to for ail purposes within the United Nations 'the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia' pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the state.' 
Resolution 813 can be found (in English) in Vaienakes and Dales, 1994:147.
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Significantly, Greece's foreign-policy record incorporates ttie endorsement of 
decisions ttiat were regarded by key decision-makers as négative for ttie region and 
contrary to at least some national interests. Hence, it will be stiown ttiat EPC was 
allowed to establisti an Arbitration Commission witti responsibility to advise on wtiettier 
any Yugoslav republics merited recognition, ttius allowing ttie possibility of a  
favourable ruling concerning FYROM. Furttiermore, ttie decisions to recognise Croatia 
and particularly Bosnia (botti signed by Greece), were seen as serious EPC mistakes 
ttiat would contribute to ttie escalation of ttie war in Yugoslavia. Also, ttie Greek 
government endorsed unfailingly EPC's singling out, condemnation and penalisation of 
Serbia as the state primarily responsible for the war in Yugoslavia, despite the 
existence (as will be analysed), of a special Greco-Serbian relationship.
The process of the decline of the politics of cooperation began on 17 January 
1992, when a  restrictive but negotiable position was adopted according to which the 
word Macedonia had to be excluded from FYROM's name. In order to comprehend 
and trace this process, it will be necessary to make a  boundary change and 'plunge' 
into an account of Greek domestic and partisan politics.^ Crucial events such as the 
huge Thessaloniki demonstration of 14 February 1992, and the high-stakes cam paign of 
Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras against his government will be discussed. It will be  
shown that the ultimate result was the pursuit of a  non-negotiable restrictive policy 
concerning the new republic's name, and the subordination of all other decisions 
regarding former Yugoslavia to this name-issue. Subsequently, limited cooperation was 
practised within EPC, while confrontational politics were pursued against FYROM. This 
strategy found expression in decisions such as the imposition of an oil embargo on the 
new republic, the story of the labels,' the rather creative dual name formula, as well as 
the rejection of som e major EPC mediative efforts. Greece's foreign poiicy record 
towards former Yugoslavia and FYROM will hence prove to be rather mixed,' exhibiting
 ^ See Clark end White. 1989; 7-8.
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serious cooperative efforts, as well as confrontation and discord It will be the purpose 
of this thesis to present and explain precisely this record.^
The period that will be analysed in detail begins with EPC's early efforts towards 
a  Yugoslavia that was sliding towards war, and ends with the Decem ber 1992 Edinburgh 
European Council meeting. There is consensus among experts and decision-makers 
that the latter date signals the end of EPC being the most significant and influential 
actor dealing with Greek foreign poiicy towards Yugoslavia and FYROM.^  After 
Decem ber 1992, the UN and the US becom e far more important, while EPC recedes to 
the background. Hence, the examination of this period provides the opportunity to 
analyse the effect of EPC on Greek state action, when there was the minimum possible 
influence and interference by other actors.
The attempt to explain Greece's foreign policy, and especially its cooperative  
aspects will be based on the insights of the theory of institutionalism. The theory's core 
arguments are provided by the 'functional' approach to international regimes.^ After 
defining international regimes, it will be explained that according to the functional 
logic, regimes can promote cooperation by helping create econom ies of scale, 
institutionalise reciprocity, link the present with the future, increase reputational 
concerns, reduce transaction costs, provide reliable information, and facilitate 
bargaining by creating linkages and increasing issue density.
‘^ Admittedly, otfier states also pursued policies towards former Yugoslavia. However, it must be stressed 
ttiat it is not ttie goal of ttiis ttiesis to explain ttie decision-making record of states sucti as FYROtvt or 
Germany. Neverttieless, attention will be paid to ottier actors and countries wtien ttiey. b ecam e  
important in eliciting Greek reactions.
^See for exam ple Kofos, 1994c; 18 and Tarkas, 1995. Furttiermore, ttiis argument was never disputed during 
any of ttie interviews ttiat were conducted for ttiis ttiesis.
®ln ttiis thesis "functional' [will] refer to a particular form of explanations, and should be distinguished 
from earlier functional and neofunctional theories of international organization (Haggard and Simmons, 
1987: 5 0 6  fn 55). Of course, other approaches to international regimes also exist. For the best and most 
succinct overview of the major ones, see Hasenclever et al, 1997. Various applications of these 
approaches to specific case-studies can be found in Krasner, 1983,
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By accepting ttiis analysis, ttie ttieory proclaims that institutions can influence 
state behaviour. Thus, an institutionalist explanation of Greek foreign policy would 
concentrate on the effects of EPC, viewed as an international regime. In other words, 
the theory would ultimately attribute instances of Greek cooperation to the influence 
of the relevant international regime.
As will be shown, the application of institutionalism requires the prior satisfaction 
of certain conditions. Most importantly, the theory claims relevance only when som e  
mutual interests exist among actors. This condition will be satisfied by the thesis' c a se -  
study, since the desire that the war in Yugoslavia be contained and not spread to the 
new republic was shared by Greece, FYROM, as well as all EPC member states. 
Although this constituted the most important common interest, others also existed. For 
exam ple, a resolution of the dispute would have allowed FYROM's international 
recognition and the securing of much needed aid. On the other hand, G reece would 
have avoided serious reputational costs, and gained an opportunity to exploit its larger 
econom y and comparative advantages by penetrating FYROM's market.
Any fruitful and meaningful application of the theory of institutionalism also 
requires the active presence of at least one regime. Flence, the demonstration of how 
EPC can be viewed as an international regime becom es necessary. This will be  
undertaken in the relevant chapter, which will contain an analysis of EPC's principles, 
norms, rules, decision-making procedures, organisational form and scope.^
In assessing the explanatory power of institutionalism, it should be stressed that
The proper test of a functional theory is not the mere existence of a  regime, 
but the demonstration that actors' behaviour was motivated by benefits 
provided uniquely, or at least more efficiently, through the regime, or by 
reputational concerns connected to the existence of rules. °^
Proving the theory's relevance requires an attempt
I^t should be explained that an account of the formation of the regime EPC is not pertinent to this 
study, and will not be attempted.
’^ Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 508.
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To identify issues on which regime ruies conflicted with the perceptions of 
self-interest held by governments...We could then ask whether the 
reputational and other incentives to abide by regime rules outweighed the 
incentives to break those rules. How much impact did the regime rules have? 
Only by examining internal debates on such issues could the analyst go  
beyond the self-justificatory rhetoric of governments.’’
While following such an approach, the danger of counter-factual arguing must 
be both appreciated and avoided. This was missed by Keohane and Nye who argued 
that empirical studies, in order
To ascertain the impact of the regime...must trace internal decision-making  
processes to discover what strategies would have been followed in the 
absen ce of regime rules.’^
It is however impossible to know with any sufficient or satisfactory degree of 
certainty what might have happened, though it can be investigated why and how 
certain events did take place. Thus, this thesis will attempt to explain the actual 
influence that an international regime had on Greece's foreign policy within the 
context of EPC.
The proposed case-study may be considered a  difficult one for institutionalism, 
since many scholars have claimed that it has greater explanatory power when applied  
to issues of the environment or of political econom y.’^  Nevertheless, studies have also 
claim ed that institutionalism is relevant and applicable to foreign affairs and security 
issues.’"’ What is essential for its application is not the issue area examined, but that the 
theory's conditional nature is satisfied; and this will clearly be accom plished in this 
thesis.
’’Keohane and Nye, 1989; 259.
’2|bid.; emphasis added.
’^ See Axelrod and Keohane. 1993: 92-3; Upson, 1993 and Mearsheimer, 1995: 345-6 and fn 54. 
’"’See for example Keohane et al, 1993 and Keohane and Martin, 1995: 43-4.
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Furthermore, there is considerable virtue in presenting a  'difficult' case-study  
To quote Kenneth Waltz,
We should [try to] make tests even more difficult. If we observe outcom es 
that the theory leads us to expect even though strong forces work against 
them, the theory will command belief.^ *^
On the basis of its empirical research, this thesis will eventually dissect,' and 
analyse Greek foreign policy towards former Yugoslavia within the context of EPC 
during the period of June 1991-December 1992. The final sections will present an 
assessm ent of the relevance of the theory of institutionalism to this study. Significantly, 
certain specific amendments expanding the theory's conditional nature will be  
proposed. Such an expansion will allow the theory of institutionalism to retain its 
explanatory relevance and power by avoiding application to issues in which it almost 
certainly exhibit poor' theoretical results, regardless of the existence of common 
interests,.
This thesis' conclusions will also include a  discussion of EPC as an international 
regime. More specifically, it will be shown that on the basis of the case-study  
examined, EPC performed as a regime, thus allowing the application of institutionalism, 
and hence gaining the theory's insights. Further conclusions will be reached concerning 
this approach, and especially on the breakdown of EPC in its various principles, norms, 
rules, decision-making procedures, and scope. Finally, the study will end with a  series 
of lessons concerning the conduct of Greek foreign policy.
'^See Eckstein, 1975:113-32 
*^^ Waltz, 1979:125. See also ibid: 123.
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CHAPTER 1
THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONALISM
Do regimes hove independent influence on state befiavior, and, if so, hiow? 
-Steptien Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, Theories o f International Regimes, 1987.
A. Defining International Regimes.
Institutionalism ties em erged as one of ttie major ttieories aimed at explaining 
state betiaviour and cooperation in world politics. '^  ^ Ttie purpose of ttiis ctiapter will be  
to present ttie ttieory s basic assumptions, arguments and conditions, as well as some 
of ttie more important criticisms ttiat tiave been levelled against it. At ttie centre of 
institutionalist ttieory lies ttie argument ttiat institutions may tiave important effects on 
state betiaviour. In order to understand its development and various aspects, an 
analysis of ttie functional approacti to international regimes ttieory is necessary. 
However, regimes will first be defined.^^
Ttie term international regimes was coined by Jotin Gerard Ruggie in tiis 1975 
essay International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends!'  ^ He noted ttie 
problems ttiat tiad been created by recent scientific and tectinological developm ents 
and argued ttiat ttieir solution required collective response.^o Collective response 
'refer[s] to ttie international institutionalization of certain aspects of national betiavior.'^i 
Ruggie argued ttiat international regimes comprise a form of collective response, and
^^ The theory of institutionalism has been tremendously influential in most social sciences. For a  discussion 
of its influence, see Young, 1994; 1-7.
^^ This will be attempted despite warnings that arguments about definitions are often tedious' (Keohane, 
1983:158).
% uggie, 1975.
20See ibid.: 557.
2’lbidj 568.
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called  for both the creation and fuller theoretical understanding of them. In doing so, 
he m anaged to set the tone and agenda for the subsequent meteoric rise of 
academ ic interest in the study of r e g im e s .2 2
The most influential and important examination of international regimes can be  
found in the volume International Regimes, which was edited by Stephen Krasner.23 It 
is noteworthy that all the contributors to the volume accep ted  a  common definition.^'' 
Concerning definitions, it might actually be the case  that they
Can...be refined, but only up to a point...Ultimately...the concept of regimes, 
like the concept of "power," or "state," or "revolution," will remain a  
contestable concept .25
22|t seems that Ruggie Is aware of both the Importance and limits of his essay. For his Interesting 
comments, see Ruggie, 1992 565 fn 17.
2^See Krasner, 1983. The volume Is composed of articles that had appeared In previous Issues of the 
journal International Organization. Discussion, quotations and page numbers from these articles will 
refer to the edited volume. The same method will be applied to articles that are contained In Baldwin 
1993; Brown et al, 1995; Kegley 1995; Keohane, 1986 and Keohane, 1989.
2^Thls appears as a remarkable achievement for academia. However, during a conversation on 2 
September 1995, Mr Krasner explained that he considers the use of a single definition as a mistake. For 
him, the definition of an International regime must be dependent on the theoretical approach that 
som eone Is adopting. In other words, a theoretical orientation must be chosen first. This Is the strategy 
that will be adopted In this thesis, as regards the functional approach to International regimes. Perhaps 
Krasner's new position Is a result of the fact that despite the use of a common definition, the adoption 
of various theoretical perspectives resulted to authors having essentially different understandings of 
what regimes actually are. This was noticed In the same volume by Susan Strange, who attacked the 
concept of International regimes as being woolly' (Strange, 1983: 342) and pointed out that despite 
Krasner's 'consensus' definition. It was still being used In either very restricted or too general ways. 
Thus, she complained about a concerted effort to stretch the elasticity of meaning [of International 
regimes] to._extremes' (Ibid.: 343) and concluded that 'there Is no fundamental consensus about the 
answer to Krasner's._questlon 'What Is a regime?" (Ibid.). For an excellent discussion of definition- 
related Issues and arguments that are central to non-functlonallst approaches to International regimes 
theory, see Hasenclever et al, 1997:14-21.
^^Kratochwll and Ruggie, 1986: 763-4.
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Nevertheless, and despite this pessimistic warning, an attempt wiii be m ade to define 
international regimes, based on the discussion and evaluation of various other 
definitions provided by theorists who primarily follow the functional approach to 
international regimes.
in their study P ow er and Interdependence. Keohane and Nye define regimes as 
'sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . ' ^ ^  
Interdependence is defined as 'mutual d e p e n d e n c e . ' ^ ' ^  This is a  rather unsatisfactory 
and confusing definition, mainly because it fails to specify the nature of these 
arrangements: the degree of their formality, or the importance of principles and norms 
are simply not a d d r e s s e d . ^ ^
The most widely used and influential definition of regimes is Stephen Krasner's, 
according to which international regimes are
Sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a  given area of 
international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. 
Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. 
Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making 
procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective  
choice.29
This definition has received a  number of criticisms. Oran Young cautions that
Part of the problem with the definition that Krasner sets forth is that...we must 
cop e  with another set of ambiguous terms in the form of beliefs, standards, 
prescriptions, and practices, in addition to the original set consisting of 
principles, norms, rules, and procedures.3o
‘^^ Keohane and Nye, 1977; 19.
2^lbld: 8.
2^ For further criticisms of this definition, see Aggcrwol, 1985:17.
^^Krasner, 1983a: 2  This is also the definition that Robert Keohane uses in After Hegemony. See Keohane, 
1984: 57.
Young, 1989:195.
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Vinod Aggarwal attempts to overcom e ttiis confusion 'by distinguistiing 
betw een rules and procedures, on ttie one tiand, and norms and principles, on ttie 
ottier, and terming 'ttie principles and norms underlying ttie developm ent of regimes 
[as]...'meta-regime.'"3i It stiould be clear ttiougti, ttiat ttie definition of regimes as 
multilateral system[s] of rules and procedures to regulate  national actions' to wtiicti 
meta-regimes' are added, does not depart from Krasner's in any significant wayP^ 
Furttiermore, Aggarwal fails to indicate at wtiicti point and in wtiat ways norms and 
principles are to be examined and incorporated into ttie analysis of international 
regimes. Ultimately, tils definition fails to overcom e confusion, and it is not surprising 
ttiat it tias won no a d t ie r e n t s . ^ ^
tviore recently, Keotiane tias defined international regimes as institutions witti 
explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, ttiat pertain to particular sets of issues in 
international r e l a t i o n s . ' ^ ^  institutions are 'persistent and connected sets of rules (formal 
and informal) ttiat prescribe betiavioral roles, constrain activity, and stiape 
e x p e c t a t i o n s . ' ^ ^  Possibly, 'ttiis definition of an institution is a  somewtiat simplified and 
less demanding edition of ttiat of a r e g i m e . ' ^ ^  Furttiermore, in ttiis definition principles 
and norms (as well as decision-making procedures), tiave been abandoned. Ttiis tias 
taken place, despite Keotiane's earlier assertion ttiat
Wtiat is important [about a  definition] is not wtiettier [it is]..."correct,' but ttiat 
principles and norms are integral parts of many, if not all, of ttie 
arrangements ttiat we regard as international r e g im e s . ^ ?
^'Aggarwal, 1985; 18.
^^ ibid.; emphasis in the original.
^^ For Aggarwal's rather confusing framework of analysis, see Aggarwal, 1985: 20. 
^^Keohane, 1989a: 4.
35|bidJ 3.
36$uhr, 1997:103.
^^Keohane, 1983:158.
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'Rules may in fact be the most important elem ent of international regimes or 
institutions.'^® However, a  definition concentrating on explicit rules risks the chargé of 
formalism—a charge which has plagued the study of international law.'®’ This emphasis 
on rules also excludes the possibility that principles, norms and decision-making 
procedures, explicit or implicit, may be of importance in defining and explaining 
international regimes. Hence, although Keohane's most recent definition reduces the 
scop e  for confusion, this simplification is purchased at the price of considerable- 
explanatory and theoretical poverty.
Given the problematic nature of the alternatives, Krasner's definition will be  
utilised for the purposes of this thesis. It is certainly the most comprehensive and 
perhaps the most sophisticated one as well. In following it, warnings that it may lead to 
som e confusion or vagueness are not avoided or ignored. The quest to define and 
examine terms such as norms and principles though must not be abandoned a priori. 
It is not necessarily beyond our human faculty to observe and analyse them in a  
precise and satisfactory way.
A more comprehensive and accurate description of regimes also requires that 
a  number of additional concepts be introduced. These will be of assistance in the 
subsequent chapter, when the definition of international regimes will be applied to 
European Political Cooperation, which will subsequently be viewed as one. Thus, 
regimes may incorporate som e kind of 'organizational form.'^^ At this point, it is 
crucial to distinguish organisations from institutions and international regimes. More 
specifically, organizations are
Material entities possessing physical locations (or seats), offices, personnel, 
equipment, and budgets. Equally important, organizations generally possess
®®Grieco, 1990: 23. It is noteworthy that Grieco is supportive of Keohane's recent emphasis on rules. See 
ibidj 23-5.
®’Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 495. Keohane is aware of this criticism: 'Defining regimes simply in terms of 
explicit rules and procedures risks slipping into the formalism of some traditions of international law' 
(Keohane, 1993a: 27). For the reasons that he ultimately opts for such an approach, see ibid.: 26-8. 
40|bid.: 496.
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legal personality in the sense that they are authorised to enter into contracts, 
own property, sue and be sued, and so forth i^
Finally, regimes may vary in scope, which 'refers to the range of issues [that a
regime]...covers.'42
B. The Functional A pproach  to  International Regimes.
The functional, 'modified-structural,' or 'contractualist' approach to international 
regimes provides the central insights and arguments of the theory of institutionalism/^ 
This approach seeks to account for causes in terms of their effects,' and argues that 
cooperation is possible even under conditions of anarchy, egoism and lack of 
hegemony.44 For contractualist theorists, cooperation occurs 'when actors adjust their 
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a  process of 
policy coordination.'^^ jn order to reach and substantiate its arguments, m odified-
"^ Y^oung, 1989: 32 As examples of organisations. Young provides 'the United States Steel Corporation (now 
USX), the Red Cross, the New York State Highway Department, and the corner grocery store' (Young, 
1994: 4).
^^Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 497.
^^Krasner, 1983: 7 and Keohane, 1993a: 36 fn 6. These terms wiii be used interchangeably in this chapter.
^"'Keohane, 1984: 80. On anarchy see the subsequent brief discussion in this chapter. For a brief account 
of the possible importance of a hegemon and of hegemonic stability theory, see footnote 58 in this 
chapter.
^^Keohane, 1984: 51 This definition 'is now [the] consensus_definition of cooperation' (Milner, 1992 467) and 
will be used throughout this thesis. It is important to note that 'cooperation should not be viewed as 
the absence of conflict, but rather as a reaction to conflict or potential conflict. Without the spectre 
of conflict there is no need to cooperate' (Keohane, 1984: 54). Furthermore, 'it is also worth stressing 
that it is not interests._that are adjusted when states cooperate, but policies' (Hasenclever et al, 1997: 
32). As regards policy coordination, it is defined as follows: a set of decisions is coordinated if 
adjustments have been m ade in them, such that the adverse consequences of any one decision for 
other decisions are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, or counterbalanced or 
outweighed' (Lindblom, 1965: 227; cited in Keohane, 1984: 51). It is also important to distinguish 
cooperation from harmony. Harmony refers to a situation in which actor's policies (pursued in their
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structuralism borrows but also supplements and synthesises insights from gam e-theory, 
the problem of collective action and microeconomic theory.
According to functionalism, international regimes have an impact when Pareto- 
optimal outcomes could not be achieved through uncoordinated individual 
calculations of self-interest. The Prisoner's Dilemma [PD] is the classic gam e-theoretic  
example,' and the most relevant to the functional approach.^*  ^ The extent, value and 
limits of the important connection between the functional and gam e theoretic 
approaches, will be examined first.^ ^
PD becom es a  much better model of international relations when viewed not 
as a  single event, but rather as an extended series of encounters.'^^ In order to illustrate 
this point, a  well-known gam e tournament that considered the possibility of 
cooperation emerging in an environment lacking central authority and governed by 
iterated PD logic will be utilised.^’ The surprise winner of the tournament was TIT FOR 
TAT, 'the policy of cooperating on the first move and then doing whatever the other 
player did on the previous move.'^ o^
own self-interest wittiout regard for ottiers) automatically facilitate ttie attainment of otiier's goals' 
(ibid.: 51; emptiasis in ttie original).
'•‘^ Krasner, 1983a: 7. A situation is defined as Pareto optimal, wtien 'in any given situation, it is found to be  
impossible to make any ctiange wittiout making some individual In ttie group worse o ff (Buctianan 
and Tullock, 1962 172; emptiasis in ttie original). For an excellent and more detailed discussion of 
Pareto optimality, see ibid.: ctiapter 12 PD presents a case 'in wtiicti narrow self-maximazation betiavior 
leads to a  poor outcome for all...Hence ttie dilemma. Individual rationality leads to a worse outcom e 
for both than is possible.' (Axelrod, 1981: 306). On PD, see also Table L 
^^References to the game-theoretic approach and to the PD gam e will be used interchangeably in this 
chapter.
^^ Behr, 1981: 290.
'^ F^or a presentation of the rules, entries and results of both rounds of the tournament, see Axelrod, 1980a 
and Axelrod, 1980b.
Axelrod, 1984:13. Interestingly enough, TIT FOR TAT was also the simplest among all the rules that were 
submitted. See ibid.: 31. In explaining the success of this rule, its clarity must be pointed out, since it 
allowed the other player to easily understand its intentions and strategy. Furthermore, TIT FOR TAT was 
nice [i.e. it cooperated first], provocable into retaliation by a  defection of the other, and yet forgiving 
after it took its one retaliation' (Axelrod, 1981 310).
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Further analysis of the success of TIT FOR TAT and of the tournament results, led 
to the conclusion that cooperation in an anarchic world which lacks a  hegemonic 
power can both emerge and thrive given the existence of two key requisites...that 
cooperation be based on reciprocity and that the shadow o f  the future is important 
enough to m ake this reciprocity stable.'^’
The shadow of the future' becom es important when 'it requires that the players 
have a  large enough chance of meeting again and that they do not discount the 
significance of their next meeting too greatly.'^2 Reciprocity
Refers to exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of 
each  party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a  way 
that good is returned for good and bad for bad.^^
It becom es of great consequence for the fostering of stable cooperation, if the 
interaction will last long enough to make the threat [that is implicit in the concept of 
reciprocity] e f f e c t i v e . ' ^ ^
However, any attempt to explain international regime dynamics that is 
exclusively based on PD related gam e theory would be flawed. The reason is related 
to som e of the major problems and shortcomings of this approach. For example, 
Robert Axelrod admits that a  list of 'examples of what is left out by [the PD] formal 
abstraction...could be extended indefinitely.'^^ Some of these omissions are particularly 
important, since PD as well as gam e theory in general.
Cannot always adequately incorporate other important available 
information—including relevant historical details about the context of the
^^Axelrod, 1984: 73; emphasis added. 
52ibid.: 174.
^^Keohane, 1986a: 8; emphasis in original.
Axelrod, 1984:126.
^^Axelrod, 1980a: 5.
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interaction, insigtits into the personalities and behavior of decision makers, 
and understandings of the diplomatic or foreign policy process.^^
PD has also been criticised for failing to consider the possible importance of 
relative gains. It is noteworthy that TIT FOR TAT can't possibly score more than the 
other player in a  game.'^"  ^ Rather, it won the tournaments by accumulating a  
sufficiently high number of points on every single game. It is not impossible though, to 
conceive of occasions when defeating the opponent is more important than 
maximizing one's own p a y  o f  f.'^ ^
The functional approach to international regimes learns from gam e-theory that 
under certain circumstances, cooperation may take p lace in an environment of 
anarchy by rational egoists. Modified-structuralism also incorporates and utilises the PD 
gam e-theoretic conclusions concerning the importance of reciprocity and of the 
shadow of the future.' However, as will be shown, by arguing that international regimes 
may help enlarge the shadow of the future,' identify the nature and extent of 
responses and promote reciprocity, modified structuralism provides a useful 
supplement' if not solution to some of the gam e-theoretic problems outlined aboveA?
•^^Snidal, 1985b: 26. For a discussion of some recent (albeit somewtiot inconclusive), game-ttieoretic 
efforts to incorporate to an extent in their analysis some of these factors, see Kydd and Snidal, 1993. 
Other problems of the game-theoretic approach are related to the fact that it assumes the existence 
of two clear choices: cooperation and defection. In reality though, we should [perhaps] think not of a 
dichotomy, but of a continuum' (Jervis, 1988: 329). Also, 'states often co-operate in part and defect in 
part' (Kydd and Snidal, 1993:117). Furthermore, the issue of accurately detecting behavior is of extreme 
importance, since 'if defection cannot be reliably detected, the effect of present cooperation on 
possible future reprisals will erode' (Oye, 1985: 16). Additional criticisms of the PD gam e-theoretic 
approach exist, though inclusion of all of them would simply be impossible within the confines of this 
chapter. See however Cohen, 1990: 276-78; Gowa, 1986; Jervis, 1988: 321, 324, 329 and 340; Snidal, 1985b: 
5 0  and 53 and Wagner, 1983: 344. For a  brief but excellent discussion of various other gam es utilised 
by theorists within the functional approach to international regimes, see  Hasenclever et al, 1997: 44-53. 
Nevertheless, PD remains of central importance to functional logic and theory.
Axelrod, 1984:137. 
s^Behr, 1981: 299.
^^Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 506.
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The functional approach to international regimes also derives important lessons 
from Mancur Olson's analysis of the problem of collective action.^o The problem both 
assumes and stresses the rational selfishness of individuals, and is essentially a  PD-like 
problem.6i According to Olson, it occurs when selfish but rational individuals, despite 
their obvious interest, fail to participate in collective action aimed at obtaining certain 
public goods.62
For Olson, the size of the group that seeks to obtain certain public goods is of 
central i m p o r t a n c e . ' ^ ^  |_ie argues that in small groups
Each of the members, or at least one of them, will find that his personal gain 
from having the collective good exceeds the total cost of providing som e  
amount of the collective good...[Thus] the good is provided, even if he has to 
pay all of the cost h im s e l f . ^ ^
Olson calls these groups 'privileged.'^^ Given the incentives that such groups have to 
cooperate, cooperation among them is both possible and likely, even in the absence  
of hegemony.
60See Olson, 1965/1971.
^^See Hardin, 1982 chapter 2, especially pages 25-30.
*^2see Olsen, 1965/1971; 2  'Public goods are defined by two properties: jointness o f supply and 
impossibility o f exclusion (Hardin, 1988: 17; emphasis in the original). See also Kindleberger, 1981: 243; 
Olson, 1965/1971:14-6 and Snidal, 1985: 590-5.
"^ F^or a  critique of the importance that Olson places on the size of groups see  Hardin, 1982 chapter 3. 
However, Hardin's criticisms are not entirely persuasive. For example, his illustration of an enormous 
privileged group involves the case of billionaire Howard Hughes buying a  TV station, in order to enjoy 
late night western and aviation movies. Hardin points out that almost 2 5 0 ,0 0 0  people benefited from 
this move, and hence all of them constitute a  privileged group. See ibid: 42 Leaving aside the 
extreme rarity of such an instance, it can be pointed out that this privileged group is clearly not 
consistent with Olson's definition of groups, namely 'the kinds of organizations that are expected to 
further the interests of their members' (Olson, 1965/1971 6; emphasis in the original). Clearly, a potential 
television audience that has not attempted to organise in any way, and almost certainly does not 
even care about 3:00 A.M. movies, does not fall under the definition of the groups that Olson 
examines in his study.
64oison, 1965/1971 33-4.
^^ See ibid: 49-50.
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Exactly the opposite logic applies to very large groups, which Olson calls 
'latent'66 They have substantial organisational problems and their members are 
apathetic to whether any member does, or does not attempt to provide the collective  
good.67 Olson argues that cooperation is possible even among latent groups. What is 
required is an incentive that operates...rather selectively  toward the individuals in the 
group.'^  ^ Such an incentive could be the result of coercion, in which case  the analysis 
is rather simple, in the sense that in essence the option of not cooperating is denied or 
incurs an extreme cost. Perhaps more significantly, it may also be the result of 
organisations offering important by-products of a  private (i.e. non-collective), nature.^^
Olson also presents a  third category of groups, called intermediate in which no 
one has an incentive to provide the public good  by herself, but 'which does not have  
so many members that no one member will notice whether any other member is or is 
not helping to provide the collective good."^° Although there is uncertainty about 
whether intermediate groups will be conducive to collective action, clearly Olson 
considers them to be closer to the privileged ones."^ !
The functional approach to international regimes learns from the logic of 
collective action that when small or intermediate groups are involved, cooperation 
am ong rational egoists is possible and likely even in the absence of hegemony. 
Furthermore, in the case  of latent groups, important incentives to cooperate may be  
created through the provision of private goods. Adherents of the functional approach  
point out that 'international regimes frequently do the sam e thing."^  ^ in order to explain 
how this conclusion is reached, the important connection of the functional approach 
with microeconomic theory must be examined.
66|bidJ 50.
*^ S^ee ibid.
‘^ ®lbid.: 51; emphasis in the original. 
69see ibid: 139-41.
70|bid: 50.
^^See ibid.: 57 and 134.
^^Keohane. 1984: 77.
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Economists have contemplated about the likely effects of institutional 
arrangements on econom ic efficiency. They have first of all pointed out that such 
arrangements may range from being voluntary to being entirely imposed, usually by 
governments.'^^ Following these distinctions, functionalist theorists have applied the 
language of supply and demand to international regimes. They a ccep t the contention 
of hegem onic stability theory that a  hegemon may play an instrumental role in the 
establishment or imposition of various international regimes.'^  ^ To quote Vinod 
Aggarwal: 'the supply  of regimes is affected by the presence or absence of a  
hegem onic state."^  ^ functional approach though, emphasises that 'fluctuations in 
dem and  for international regimes are not taken into account by the theory [of 
hegem onic stability]; thus it is necessarily incomplete."^^
In order to demonstrate the reasons that may lead to the dem and for 
international regimes, the concept of externalities and the C oase theorem must be  
examined. Externalities refer to
Some costs or revenues [that] are external to the decision-making unit. 
Whenever these external costs and revenues exist it is possible that unaided 
the market will not yield the most efficient result.'^ '^
^^See Davis and North, 1971; 10-11.
^^According to hegemonic stability theory, cooperation and a  weil-functioning world econom y are 
dependent on a certain kind of political structure, a  structure characteristic by the dominance of a  
single actor' (Grunberg, 1990: 431). This single actor has been called a  hegemon, a  'stabilizer' 
(Kindleberger, 1973: 305) or a leader' (Kindleberger, 1976: 32). Proponents of hegemonic stability theory 
disagree on who stands to gain the most in a  hegemonic system. For the 'malign' version of the 
theory, see  Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 502; Gilpin, 1975: 150-3; Gilpin, 1977: 55; Gilpin, 1981 144; 
Kindleberger, 1976: 32 and Krasner, 1976: 322 For the benign' version of the theory, see  Kindleberger, 
1976: 34; Snidal, 1985a: 582 and Stein, 1984: 358. For some empirical tests of the claims of hegemonic 
stability theory, see Cowhey and Long, 1983; Gowa, 1984; Keohane, 1989c: 94; Krasner, 1976: 335 and 
tvlcKeown, 1983.
Aggarwal, 1985: 21; emphasis added. See also Keohane, 1984: 49-51.
‘^^ Keohane, 1983:142; emphasis added.
^^Davis and North, 197115.
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Government intervention has often been advocated  on the basis of being able to 
confront and alleviate the negative impact of externalities. In a  celebrated article, 
Ronald C oase argued that direct governmental regulation will not necessarily give 
better results from leaving the problem [of externalities] to be solved by the market or 
the firm.'78
C oase demonstrated that efficient cooperation is possible in the absence of 
government intervention, despite the problems caused by externalities. Importantly,
C oase specified three crucial conditions for his conclusions to hold. These 
were: a  legal framework establishing liability for actions, presumably 
supported by governmental authority; perfect information; and zero 
transaction costs (including organization costs and the costs of making side- 
payments). It is clear that none of these conditions is met in world 
politics...Thus, on inversion of the Goose theorem would seem  more 
appropriate to our subject.??
Functional regime theorists argue that the conditions that are assumed by 
C oase and that are absent from world politics can be provided, with various degrees  
of success and efficiency, by internationai regimes. Subsequently, a  dem and is 
created for both their creation and maintenance.®^ Modified structuralists admit that 
regimes are rather weak in estabiishing clear and enforceable frameworks of legal 
liability. Nevertheless, regimes may still create 'bits and pieces of law,' thus having at 
least som e positive effect.^i
International regimes may also affect transaction costs by creating econom ies 
of scale: once a  regime has been established, the marginal cost of dealing with each
?®Coase, 1960:18. In doing so, Coase attacked the predominant pro-government intervention school that 
was primarily influenced by the work of economist A. C. Pigou. For Goose's discussion of Pigou's 
arguments see  Coase, 1960: 28-39. These pages also include a  fascinating argument on the possible 
existence and effects of a Pigovian oral tradition.
^?Keohane, 1984: 87; emphasis in the original.
®°The following discussion is primarily based on Keohane 1983 and Keohane, 1984: chapter 6.
®keohane, 1984: 88.
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additional issue will be lower than it would be without a  regime.'^: Transaction costs 
would b e  significantly reduced when the issue density in a  regime, which 'refer[s] to the 
number and importance of issues arising within a  given policy area,' is high.*^
The fact that various agreements tend to be nested' within regimes may also 
a ffect transaction costs.®"* This can occur
By making it easier or more difficult to link particular issues and to arrange 
side-paym ents, giving som eone something on one issue in return for help in 
anottier. Clustering of issues under a regime facilitates side-paym ents am ong  
these issues: more potential quids are available for the quo^^
As regards the functions and value of information, economists have explained  
that it is often costly and subject to increasing r e t u r n s . ^ ^  They have also pointed out 
that
The lower the cost of information...the better the markets will operate..[and 
that] it is likely that substantial profits are to be earned from increasing 
information flows that reduce uncertainty.^?
The argument of the functional approach is that international regimes can 
provide information at a  lower cost, given the existence of econom ies of scale. 
Furthermore, regimes may provide information concerning the reliability and reputation 
of governments or actors
By providing standards of behavior against which performance can be  
measured, by linking these standards to specific issues, and by providing
®^Keohane, 1984: 90. For a brief discussion concerning the concept of economies of scale, see  Davis and 
North, 1970:12-4.
®®Keohane, 1983:155.
®"*The concept of nesting was originally coined by Vinod Aggarwal. For an explanation and examples 
see  Aggarwal, 1985: 27 and Keohane, 1984: 90.
®^Keohane, 1984: 91. See also the discussion of contextual issue-linkage in Axelrod and Keohane, 1993:101. 
®*^ See Davis and North, 1971 20-3.
®7|bid: 21.
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forums, often ttirough international organizations, in whicti these evaluations 
can be made.Bs
Hence, regimes will effect the ability of governments to monitor others 
com pliance and to implement their own commitments—hence their ability to make 
credible commitments in the first place/89 Finally, institutionalist theory anticipates 
[that] the rules of institutions constrain the bargaining strategies of states and therefore 
m ake their actions more predictable.'^
To summarise, according to the modified-structural approach, international 
regimes may foster cooperation by performing certain important functions. Functional 
regimes provide reliable information, monitor behavior and reputation, increase the 
costs of violating agreements and help create an (admittedly imperfect), legal liability 
framework. They also help enlarge the shadow of the future,' since their
Principles and rules...make governments concerned about precedents, 
increasing the likelihood that they will attempt to punish defectors. In this 
way, international regimes help to link the future with the présentai
Although regimes do not substitute for reciprocity ...they reinforce and 
institutionalise if by identifying defection and by often 'incorporating the norm of 
reciprocity' in their rules.92 Also, by reducing transaction costs, producing econom ies 
of sca le  and providing information, regimes may provide the kind of by-products that 
foster cooperation among latent groups.
Turning very briefly to som e of the more important criticisms of the functional 
approach, James Rosenau has claimed that if states a c c e d e  to [regimes], their 
com pliance derives from autonomous acts and not from responses to control effects.'^^
®^Keohane, 1984: 94.
®^Keohane, 1989a: 2
'^^Keohone and Nye, 1993:15. See also Keohane and Hoffmann, 1993: 397 and 399. 
’^Axelrod and Keohane, 1983: 94.
92|bldj 110.
"^^Rosenau, 1986: 881
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This criticism may perhaps apply to a  state's accession to a  regime. However, it 
certainly fails to predict, or provide any sophisticated or useful analysis as to why states 
may act in a  specific way within a  regime, following their accession,
O'Mearas has accused  modified-structuralists for failing to transcend the 
traditional, state-centric, power-politics paradigm.'^^ Despite the various other 
problems of his criticisms, this observation is correct to the extent that both the 
functional approach and the theory of institutionalism do not deny the central 
importance of states in world politics.’^
The functionalist approach has also been criticised for the 'strong liberal bias 
[that] operates in [it].'96 The extent and nature of the connection with liberalism will be  
analysed in detail in the subsequent section examining institutionalist theory. Finally, it 
must b e  stressed that the functional approach to international regimes neglects the 
importance of domestic politics. This is somewhat surprising, given their significance in 
the account of events provided by modified-structural theorists.’  ^ Helen Milner 
suggests that this neglect is explained by
9^0'Meara 1984: 256.
^^O'Meara has the tendency to use strong words in attacking modified-structural theorists. For example, 
he regards Keohane s analogy with microeconomics analysis' (ibid: 255) as 'dubious' (ibid.), though he 
fails to explain precisely why. Furthermore, he derides 'the ease with which a "straw man' Realist 
position can be systematically constructed and subsequently destroyed' (ibid: 251), and then proceeds 
to do exactly that in the following pages. See ibid.: 251-3. For example, he criticises the realist 'belief 
that states are the on/y actors in world politics' (ibid: 251; emphasis added). However, any 
sophisticated realist would argue that states are the most important actors and not the only ones. 
O'Meara's mistreatment of realism is important, because the crux of his criticism of the functional 
approach is that it fails to establish a radical and clear break with realist concepts and assumptions. It 
should also be pointed out that Keohane eventually relaxes the unitary state-centric assumption, 
through the introduction of concepts such as 'bounded rationality' and 'myopic' and 'farsighted' self- 
interest. See Keohane, 1984: 67, 99 and 110-16.
'^^Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 508. See also Keohane, 1984:10-11 and Rosenau, 1986: 891-3.
^^ For example, in discussing the failure of the US Senate to ratify the International Trade Organization 
(ITO), Keohane asserts that 'domestic politics constituted a crucial factor affecting this outcome' (ibid.: 
140; emphasis added). See also ibid: 144, 147 and 150; Keohane, 1993a: 35 and Milner, 1992, 481-95.
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Two reasons...the centrality of onarcfiy as the condition for differentiating 
between domestic and international politics...[and] ttie use of gam e ttieory 
witfi its assumption of unitary, rational actors.^^
Ttie empirical testing ttiat will be undertaken in this thesis will provide an evaluation of 
the effects that the neglect of domestic politics has on of institutionalist theory.
C. Institutionalist Theory.
The central argument of the theory of institutionalism is that 'variations in the 
institutionalisation of world politics exert significant impacts on the behavior of 
governments.'^^ in making this claim, the theory com es close to identifying institutions 
as an independent variable that helps explain the dependent variable of state action. 
In order to substantiate this claim, institutionalism accep ts and incorporates into its 
analysis the previously presented modified-structural arguments concerning the 
importance and functions of international regimes. They are applied to institutions in 
general, which in addition to regimes may also include 'formal intergovernmental or 
cross-national nongovernmental organizations [and]...conventions.'^oo These distinctions
More recently, Keohane has noted that 'domestic politics is neglected by much gam e-theoretic 
strategic analysis and by structural explanations of international regime change (Keohane, 1989d: 173), 
and called for the 'use [of] gom e theory [in a heuristic way] to analyze the 'two-level gam es' linking 
domestic and international politics, as Robert Putnam [in Putnam, 1988] has done' (ibid.). He has also 
admitted that 'in seeking to account for the increase in the number of international regimes, the 
contractual theorist will not ignore the structure of world power or domestic politics' (Keohane, 1993a: 
37). However, the fact remains that domestic politics are not, and in a sense can not be incorporated 
in any significant, clear or sophisticated way into the functional analysis of international regimes, since 
the theory focuses 'on states as unified rational actors (Martin and Simmons, 1999: 98) whose 
preferences and options are exogenously given and thus taken for granted.
9®Milner, 1992 489; emphasis in the original.
^'^Keohane, 1989a: 2
'•^ I^bid.: 3-4; emphasis in the original.
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are 'not as clear in actuality as ttiis stylization migtit seem  to i m p l y . ' i o i  This observation 
ought to be kept in mind, since the subsequent chapter will view EPC as an 
international regime, albeit one with important intergovernmental aspects.
Institutionalist theory is often called neoliberal because of its connection with 
classical liberal theories. This connection will prove to be rather weak, since 
institutionalism rejects or ignores som e important liberal assumptions and variants. As 
regards liberalism.
There is no canonical description...What we tend to call liberal resembles a  
family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain 
characteristics—for example, individual freedom, political participation, 
private property and equality of opportunity—that most liberal states share, 
although none has perfected them all.^ ^^
The analysis and classification of the various political and econom ic liberal 
characteristics has allowed the theoretical developm ent of three closely related 
variants of liberalism: commercial, republican and r e g u la t o r y . ^ 0 3  Republican liberalism 
is based on Kant's argument that republics (defined as polities in which the legislative 
and executive branches of government are separate), are prone to peace.^^"  ^
Institutionalism does not concentrate on republican liberalism, as this variant of
Abid.: 5.
^°^Doyle, 1986: 1152; emphasis in the original. For a  somewhat more assertive statement concerning the 
principles, rights and institutions of liberalism, see Doyle, 1993:173-4.
•^^ S^ee Keohane, 1990:175-82
^°^See Kant, 1795/1983:113. Given the many wars that democracies have fought (including colonial wars), 
the argument of republican liberalism has now been qualified to one that asserts that dem ocracies do 
not fight with each other. For a justification of this argument, see  Doyle, 1986:1156 and Appendix 2 and 
Russett, 1993. For excellent critiques of this qualified argument, see  Gowa, 1995; Laynard, 1994 and 
W eede 1984. Kant's 1795 essay To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, is crucial to all variants of 
liberalism. For an early examination of Kant's importance to international relations, see Waltz, 1962 For 
an excellent discussion of Kant's seminal essay, see Doyle, 1986:1155-63; Doyle 1993:186-93 and Doyle, 
1995: 94-100. For a more expansive reading of Kant that claims to differ from Doyle's analysis, see  
MacMillan, 1995.
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liberalism is essentially a  second image' ttieory, wtiicfi concentrates on dom estic 
p o l i t i c s .^05 As will be analysed next, institutionalism is a  ttiird image' ttieory.
Commercial liberalism argues ttiat ttie spread of capitalism and free trade is 
conducive to p ea ce  and cooperation among nations. To quote Montesquieu:
Ttie natural effect of commerce is to lead to p eace. Two nations that trade 
with each  other becom e reciprocally dependent; if one has an interest in 
buying, the other has an interest in selling, and all unions are founded on 
mutual needs.iO'^
Regulatory liberalism emphasises the importance of rules and regulations in promoting 
and fostering cooperation. It argues that we have to specify the institutional features 
of world politics before inferring expected  patterns of b e h a v io r . ' ^ o ?
Institutionalism learns from liberal theories the importance of 'tak[ing] political 
processes s e r io u s ly . '^ o s  it accepts the liberal belief that progress in human affairs is 
possible and indeed often desirable, and takes notice of the potential beneficial 
impact on cooperation and p ea ce  among nations of institutions, rules, and the spread 
of capitalism. Ultimately, it creates a  'sophisticated' or neo-version of liberalism, which 
consists of
A synthesis of commercial and regulatory liberalism...[which] does not posit 
that expanding comm erce leads directly to p e a c e  but rather...[argues] that 
conditions of econom ic openness can provide incentives for peaceful rather 
than aggressive expansion. This is only likely to happen however, within the 
framework of rules and institutions that promote and guarantee o p e n n e s s .^09
lo^see Keohane, 1990:177. Theories usually tend to look for explanations 'within man, within the structure 
of the separate states, [and] within the system_These three estimates of cause..[are] referred to as 
images of international relations, numbered in the order given, with each image defined according to 
where one locates the nexus of important causes' (Waltz, 1959:12). See also Powell, 1994: 315. 
lo^Montesquieu, 1748/1989: 338. For an incisive analysis of the importance of com m erce in the political 
philosophy of Montesquieu, see Pongie, 1973: chapter 7. For further elaboration of the argument 
connecting commerce and peace, see Schumpeter 1959: 69: cited in Fukuyama, 1992 260.
'^^Keohane, 1990:181 
io®lbldj 175. 
lo’ ibid: 183.
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This version of liberalism emphatically rejects liberal utopianism and 
unmitigated optimism, according to which a  harmony of interests exists between 
stotesT^o Finally, institutionalism is not concerned with individual liberty. Institutionalist 
liberalism is
An em asculated liberalism, shorn of its normative concerns with the liberty 
and well-being of individuals, focusing on econom ic variables, using the 
utilitarian discourses and theories of liberal economics, and making states the 
agents in international relations...Liberalism s goals of individual emancipation  
and personal development, the ethical values that are central to liberalism, 
disappear.il I
It can be concluded that the connection of institutionalism with som e of the 
major assumptions and variants of liberalism is weak, and in som e cases non-existent. 
Institutionalism ignores republican liberalism and concerns about individual liberty. It 
rejects the existence of a  harmony of interests, and unlike classical liberalism, is only 
guardedly optimistic. Nevertheless, a  connection between liberalism and institutionalism 
does exist, given the latter's accep tance of a  synthesis of commercial and regulatory 
liberalism. Subsequently, the theory of institutionalism can b e  referred to as neoliberaU’^
iiosee Carr, 1939/1964: 24-5.
%ong, 1995: 496.
ii^Subsequently, the theory of institutionalism can perhaps be referred to as neoliberal. 'Keohane 
[however,]-.has [recently—see Keohane and Martin, 1995] withdrawn the term neoliberal from the self­
description of his theory and now prefers merely "institutionalism" (Long, 1995: 494). This approach will 
be followed in this thesis. It is also interesting to note that Moravcsick, 1997 approves of such an 
approach, bur argues that institutionalism can not be termed neoliberal because 'it has little in 
common with liberal theory...[since] most of the analytic assumptions and basic causal variables by 
institutionalist theory are more realist than liberal' (ibid: 536). This is a correct assessment, but the fact 
that institutionalist theory has an (admittedly weak) connection with liberalism remains; and although 
institutionalism is not a ciear-cut fully fledged liberal theory, to ignore this connection allows the risk of 
diminishing the scope and potential explanatory power of the theory of institutionalism.
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Turning to another aspect of institutionalism, it must be pointed out that it 
presumes That states are the principal actors in world politics and that they behave on 
the basis of their conceptions of their own self-interest.'^^^ The existence of anarchy is 
also accep ted , though institutionalism cautions that while anarchy is an important 
condition in world politics it is not the only one...An exclusive focus on anarchy may be  
overly reductionist.'^i^ ^ot surprisingly, the effects of anarchy are mitigated by the 
effects of institutions: To understand world politics, we need to know about institutions, 
not merely about the existence of anarchy' defined as the lack of common
government.'! 15
Institutionalism is a  systemic theory, in which
The actors' characteristics are given by assumption, rather than treated as 
variables; changes in outcomes are explained not on the basis of variations 
in these actor characteristics, but on the basis of changes in the attributes of 
the system itself.n^
Finally the conditional nature of institutionalism must be stressed. In order to 
claim relevance, it demands that two conditions be satisfied. First, that actors...have 
som e mutual in terests;'!an d  secondly that 'institutionalisation [be] a  variable rather 
than a  constant in world politics.'!!^ The latter condition is important in order to m ake 
any meaningful comparisons and evaluations, it also implies (as would had been  
logically expected), that the presence of at least one institution is essential for the 
application of institutionalist theory.
ü^Keohane, 1993b; 271 See also Keohane, 1984: 29 and 63. 
ü^Milnrer, 1993:167. 
ü^Keohane, 1989a: 11.
!!*^Keohane. 1983:143. See also Keohane, 1984: 29 and Keohane, 1989b: 40-1  Subsequently, it com es as no 
surprise that the neorealist emphasis on the importance of the constraints imposed by the structure of 
the international system is appreciated. See Keohane, 1984:25. 
ü l^bidj 2  See also Keohane, 1984: 6, 9 and 79; Keohane 1993b: 275 and Krasner, 1983a: 8.
™Keohane, 1989a: 3.
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Despite its explicit conditionality, critics have claimed that institutionalism 
overestimates the role played by institutions, and ultimately fails to present an 
accurate understanding and explanation of the process of cooperation in international 
relations.119 The reason is primarily related to what is considered to be the erroneous 
and misleading institutionalist assumption that 'the preferences of actors in world 
politics are based on their assessments of their own welfare, not that of o t h e r s . ' 120 
Critics charge that states are actually constantly preoccupied with concerns over the 
relative distribution of gains. According to such an understanding, anarchy means more 
than just the absence of common government. It also means that states operate in an 
environment that can never offer permanent reassurance or s e c u r i t y . ^ ^ i
The ultimate result of anarchy is that relative gain is more important than 
absolute gain.'i22 Hence the fundamental goal of states is to prevent others from 
achieving advances in their relative c a p a b i l i t i e s . ' ^23 Failure to do so may lead to the 
curtailment of a  state's independence, or even to its enslavement or destruction. 
Awareness of such a  possibility
Generate[s] a  relative-gains problem for cooperation: a state will decline to 
join, will leave, or will sharply limit its commitment to a  cooperative  
arrangement if it believes that gaps in otherwise mutually positive gains favor
p a r t n e r s . 1 2 4
Stephen Krasner in addition has highlighted the importance of distributional 
gains. In an essay examining global communications, he explains that the 
establishment of international regimes in this issue area would be Pareto optimal for all
Grieco, 1990; Grieco 1993a; Grieco 1993b; Krasner 1993 and Mearsheimer, 1995.
'20Keohane, 1984: 66.
2^iQn anarchy, see also Rousseau 1917: 78-9; cited in Waltz, 1959: 180. Anarchy should not be confused 
with com plete disorder' (Wight, 1979/1986:105).
^22waltz, 1959:198; cited in Powell, 1993: 209. See also Gilpin, 1975: 35.
^23Grieco, 1993a: 127; original in emphasis. For an excellent analysis of Grieco's approach to internationai 
regimes, see Hasenclever et ai, 1997:113-25. 
i24Grieco, 1990:10.
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participants.125 jp, this case, the problem would be one of coordination and not 
collaboration, and the Battle of the Sexes a more relevant theoretical game. Thus, 
Krasner concludes that
There are...many points along the Pareto frontier: the nature of institutional 
arrangements is better explained by the distribution of national power 
capabilities than by efforts to solve problems of market failure.^^e
Keohane concedes that he m ade a  major mistake by underemphasizing 
distributive issues and the complexities they create for international c o o p e r a t i o n . ' ^ ^ ?  
Nevertheless, the criticisms concerning the institutionalist neglect of the importance of 
relative gains are hotly contested. Keohane maintains that whether relative gains are 
important is not a  matter of dogma, but is conditional on the opportunity and incentive 
to use them against others.'^ »^ The validity of these opposing claims concerning the 
significance of relative gains will be evaluated in subsequent chapters.
To conclude, the theory of institutionalism follows the logic of the functional 
approach to international regimes, and argues that institutions may have an important 
impact on state behavior. It neglects domestic politics, considers rational egoistic 
states to be the most important actors in world politics and accep ts the existence of
^^ ^Krasner, 1993.
'2‘^ lbicl.: 235. On collaboration and coordination, see Hasenclever et ai, 1997: 48, Martin and Simmons, 1999: 
104 and Snidal, 1985c. On ttie Battle of ttie Sexes, see Krasner, 1993: 237-9. For an analysis of Krasner's 
approach to regimes theory, see Hasenclever et ai, 1997:104-13.
^^^Keohane, 1993b: 292 For an interesting argument, attempting to explain that Keohanes and Krasner's 
analyses complement each other, see Powell, 1994: 340.
'^^Keohane, 1993b: 283. Some empirical studies on the importance of relative gains have been conducted. 
For example, Keohane cites as evidence for his position an examination of US actions towards 
Japanese industrial policy. See Mastanduno, 1993. The study concluded that relative gains do matter 
significantly, but not unconditionally' (ibid: 251; cited in Keohane, 1993b: 281). In addition to concerns 
about relative gains, Mastanduno identifies os important factors ideology, the institutional setting and 
the ability to mobilise members of the US Congress. See Mastanduno, 1993: 261-3. For a  different 
reading of Mastanduno's study, see Grieco, 1993b: 315-6.
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anarchy. The theory has a  somewhat benign view of the consequences of anarchy, 
and claims that concerns about the relative distribution of gains are conditional.
Institutionalism has an affinity with liberalism, since it appreciates the potential 
importance of processes, rules, institutions and free trade. The connection though is 
rather weak, since the theory rejects liberalism's optimism, as well as the existence of 
any harmony of interests among states. It also ignores republican liberalism and 
concerns about individual liberties.
Finally, institutionalism is a  conditional theory which (most importantly), requires 
the existence of som e mutual interests among actors When its conditionality is 
satisfied, it claims to have considerable theoretical relevance. This claim will be  
evaluated on the basis of this thesis' case-study. However, before any empirical 
testing is undertaken. Chapter 2 will present EPC as an international regime, according 
to the definition that was adopted.
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CHAPTER 2
EPC AS AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME
The European Community Is condemned to be, at best a  success in the econom ic realm, but a fiasco in 
'high politics'
-Stanley Hoffmann, Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate o f  the Nation State and the Case o f  Western 
Europe. 1968.
A. The R oad to  EPC.
Attempts for European cooperation In ttie field of 'tiigti politics' have a  long 
and interesting history, in the early 1950's,
Because of the outbreak of the Korean War, the American government 
feared that its military resources might b ecom e overstrained, and it 
dem anded that Germany be permitted to rearm in order to strengthen the 
western military posture in Europe...Unable to resist the request of their 
powerful ally, the French suggested an integrated army.i29
The army was to be controlled by a European Ministry of D efence, in order to 
keep fears of a rearmed Germany to a  minimum.^30 This plan culminated with the 
signing of the European D efence Community (EDO) Treaty in May 1952. However, it 
was never implemented, since it failed to win ratification by the French Parliament. 
General de Gaulle and his supporters abhorred its supranational elements, while French 
communists denounced it as being anti-Soviet. Thus, a  remarkable Gaullist and Stalinist 
alliance halted in late August 1954 the effort to create integrated European defen ce  
policies, and also fatally w eakened the ambitious attempt to create a  European
^^ '^ Gilbert, 1970/1984; 415. See also Cordozo, 1987: 50-1 and Jopp, 1997:153. 
^^°See Urwin, 1991: 63.
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Political Community.131 pursued during the years of 1952-54, the latter was intended 'to 
em brace such highly sensitive areas of national sovereignty as foreign policy, defen ce  
and the establishment of a  common market.
The failure of these European integrative efforts was mitigated to an extent, by 
a  British proposal for the creation of a  Western European Union (WEU) which would 
allow for the discussion of security issues. The WEU was intended to operate am ong 
strict intergovernmental lines, since unanimity was to be required for the taking of any 
decision. Until the 1980's though, the WEU did not play any particularly important role, 
since security affairs were almost exclusively discussed within the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATOV^s
The next major effort for a  common European foreign policy was carried out 
by France between 1960 and 1962. What becam e known as the Fouchet Plan proposed 
procedures and institutions that would lead to the coordination of the foreign policies 
of the EC member states.,’^  ^ The plan was consistent with d e  Gaulle's aim to create "a 
European Europe,' less bound to the United States...[and] able to defend its own 
interests.'i35 However, fear that this initiative would undermine NATO and the drive 
towards a  closer and more integrated Europe, as well as d e  Gaulle's hardening stance  
during the final stages of negotiations, led to the ultimate failure of the Fouchet Plan.
These failures generated considerable pessimism. Nevertheless, the members 
of the European Community (EC) m anaged to successfully launch a new foreign policy 
cooperative effort. This was achieved with the 1970 Luxembourg Report that
Cardozo, 1987:71. 'The European Political Community was-to be..nothing iess than the beginning of a 
comprehensive federation to which the [European Coal and Steel Community] and EDC would be  
subordinated. The draft Treaty of the Political Community, with 117 articles, was presented on 10 March 
1953' (Urwin, 1991: 64). For an excellent and comprehensive account of the European Political 
Community project, see Cardozo, 1987.
^^ I^bid: 49.
^^ T^he existence of NATO and of a separate European security organisation, partly explains why all 
aspects of security issues were completely absent from EPC's scope for a significant period of time.
^^ F^or a detailed account of the proposals and negotiations of the Fouchet Plan, see  Gerbet, 1987. 
i35|bid: 108.
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established European Political Cooperation.’^  ^ EPC was further develop ed  by the 1973 
Copenhagen Report, the 1981 London Report, and the 1986 Single European Act (SEA). 
More recently, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) transformed EPC not least by 
changing its name: it declared (almost certainly too optimistically), that a  common  
foreign and security policy [CFSP] is hereby established. ’ ?^ This chapter though will not 
include any discussion of the TEU's CFSP provisions, or any subsequent developments, 
since the events that will be covered in this thesis took place before the Treaty cam e  
into effect.’38
During its existence, EPC m ade numerous contributions (with different degrees 
of importance), to various international events and issues.’”’ It also d evelop ed  an 
elaborate structure, which was 'less than supranational, but more than 
intergovernmental.'’^  It will be the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate how EPC 
can be viewed as an international regime on the basis of the definition that was 
adopted  in Chapter 1. In order to achieve this, EPC's principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures will be presented. Furthermore, its scop e  and 
organisational form will be discussed, thus allowing for EPC's more comprehensive 
understanding.
’”‘’’The Luxembourg Report is also referred as the Davlgnon Report, after the name of its author.
’”^ Title V. Article J. The TEU is commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty.
’”®The TEU cam e into force on 1 November 1993. For an excellent account of its ratification problems, see  
Duff 1994.
’”’This chapter will not include an analysis of EPC's record on major international events. For the best 
general account of this record, see Nuttail 1992a. For other excellent, though iess extensive and 
comprehensive accounts, see Hill 1992; Nuttail 1988 and Wallace, 1983. For an analysis of EPC's actions 
towards the Yugoslav War, see Salmon 1992 and Tziampiris 1992 For EPC and the Middle East, see  
Ifestos, 1987. An excellent account of EPC actions towards South Africa is contained in Holland, 1995. 
Martin, 1995 and Stavridis and Hill, 1997 cover EPC's responses to the Falklands War, while Salmon, 1992 
covers EPC's reactions to the Gulf War.
’"’^ Wessels, 1982 15; cited in Ifestos, 1987: 209. Hence, it is perhaps not surprising that EPC has caused  
considerable theoretical confusion and controversy. For the plethora of theoretical approaches that 
have been applied to EPC, see Holland, 1991 and Wesseis, 1988.
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It is also important to clarify that there will be no explicit or implicit argument 
that the concept of international regimes should be applied to the EC as a  whole. 
Such an application would almost certainly
Underestimate the significance and influence of the EC's legal framework 
and the normally high rate of national com pliance with frequently detailed  
Community legislation, especially when political attention is concentrated on 
an area like monetary policy where the degree of commitment to common 
policy-making is variable.
The Community is probably 'even more than [a regime], owing to the historical 
circumstances in which it was created, the particularity [and complexity] of its 
structures and its evolutionary c h a r a c t e r .'^42 However, the application of the concept of 
international regimes to the sectoral level' of foreign policy cooperation will prove to 
have certain important advantages.^^ 3
B. Principles.
Principles, defined as beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude' play a  crucial 
role in the operation of EPC.^ 44 perhaps the most basic principle is that of 'parallelism 
between accession to the Communities and participation in [EPC.p^ Full participation in 
EPC requires first that a  state be admitted to the European Community. EPC also 
operates on the principle that no military confrontation of any kind is conceivable  
am ong member states. As a  result, it can be argued that EPC members constitute a  
pluralistic security community. According to Karl Deutsch, such a  community is one
i% eb b , 1983: 36.
^^ i^festos, 1987: 58. See also Ginsberg, 1989:12; Wallace, 1983: 409-10 and Wesseis, 1991: 73-4. For attempts 
to view the European Community as a  regime, see Hoffmann, 1982 and especially Moravcsik, 1994. 
i43webb, 1983: 36.
'^ '^ Krasner, 1983a: 2
^^^Nuttall, 1992a: 43. See also Dehousse and Weller, 1991:136 and Nuttail, 1992a: 260.
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'within which the expectation of warfare has been abolished, together with all specific  
preparations for it.'^ e^
Another important principle is connected to the realisation that the international 
role of Europe is not commensurate to its capabilities.’^  ^ To quote the Preamble of the 
London Report;
[The Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the European Community] note 
that, in spite of what has been achieved, the Ten are still far from playing a  
role in the world appropriate to their combined influence. It is their 
conviction that the Ten should seek increasingly to shape events and not 
merely to react to them.’^’^
The role of Europe would be substantially strengthened if politics of scale could 
b e achieved.
Politics of scale refers to the benefits of collective over unilateral action in 
the conduct of civilian foreign policy. Politics of scale enables members to 
conduct joint foreign policy actions at lower costs and risks than when they 
act on their own. Members generally perceive that they carry more weight in 
certain areas when they act together as a  bloc than when they act
separately.’49
For such politics of scale to be utilised, EPC members must m anage to act on the 
principle of solidarity, which would guarantee cooperation.’^  ^ If solidarity in all 
instances was achieved, a  more important role in world affairs would almost certainly 
ensue.
’'’^ Deutsch, 1979:180. See also Deutsch, 1968/1978: 244-5.
’"^^References to 'Europe' will refer to the states constituting the European Community.
’^ ^See also the Preamble of the SEA and Ifestos, 1987:125 and 150.
’^ ’Ginsberg, 1989: 3.
’^ *^ The connection between politics of scale and the principle of solidarity is also m ade by Christopher 
Hiil (see Hiil, 1992 122). Hill states that 'the Twelve are concerned to exploit the economy o f  scale 
avaiiabie to them' (ibid.; emphasis added). Aithough he does not use Ginsberg's term of politics of 
scaie, the meaning is essentially the same.
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The importance of the principle of solidarity is recognised in the Luxembourg 
Report, which calls for member states 'to increase their solidarity by working for a  
harmonisation of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears 
feasible and desirable.'^^  ^ Similar calls are also m ade In the Copenhagen Report, the 
London Report as well as in the SEA.^ 52
EPC also operates on the principle of consultation, which is mentioned in all of 
the documents that have led to EPC's development. According to the Copenhagen  
Report:
Governments will consult each other on all important foreign policy questions 
and will work out priorities, observing the following criteria:
(i) the purpose of consultation is to seek common policies on practical 
problems;
(ii) the subjects dealt with must concern European interests whether in Europe 
itself or elsewhere where the adoption of a common position is necessary or 
desirable.
On these questions each state undertakes as a  general rule not to take up 
final positions without prior consultation with its partners within the framework 
of the political cooperation m a c h i n e r y . ^ ^ s
The SEA also states that The High Contracting Parties undertake to inform and consult 
each  other on any foreign policy matters of general i n t e r e s t .'^54
It has been claimed that the principle of consultation, aided by the 
developm ent of a  telex system (COREL!), has led to the creation of a  'communauté 
d'information . ' E P C  members provide to each other reliable and constant 
information on the positions that they are adopting on various issues. 'Surprises' are 
[thus] minimised, and it is quite possible that a  socialisation effect on all participants
Two. L b.
Part LII of the Copenhagen Report, the Preamble of the London Report and the Preamble of the
SEA.
’^ ^Part II11; cited In Holland, 1995: 21. 
is^itle III Article 30. 2  a.
^^^Regelsberger, 1988: 34. The number of COREUs sent during the years 1985-6 and 1990-4 can be found 
in Regelsberger, 1997: 68. More specifically, in 199110,184 COREUs were sent, while for the year 1992, the 
number was 11,394. See ibid.
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has been  creoted^^e The success of the consultation principle though, does not 
necessarily mean that common positions are actually adopted.
In the operation of EPC importance is also p laced on the principle of 
confidentiality. This is clearly expressed in the London Report:
The success of the process of Political Cooperation depends to a  large 
degree on its confidentiality; certain particularly delicate matters need to be  
handled in a  way which guarantees that the required level of confidentiality 
is maintained. In such cases, papers will be transmitted to the' Foreign 
Ministries via Embassies, and distributed within Foreign Ministries by the
European Correspondent.^^?
Certain problems arise from the enforcement of this principle, given the right of the 
European Parliament (EP) to submit questions pertaining to EPC matters.
C. Norms.
Norms are standards of behaviour defined in [relatively general] terms of rights 
and obligations.'!^® EPC's fundamental and defining norm is that of diluted' 
intergovernmentalism, which is sustained by the fact that states are the most important 
actors, having reserved for themselves crucial rights and privileges. Flowever, states 
have also accep ted  certain obligations towards the Commission and the European 
Parliament. As a  result, EPC's intergovernmentalism is 'diluted' and not as strict as some 
had envisioned originally. This section will present in general terms this norm, while the 
specific ways in which it operates will be demonstrated in the section devoted  to EPC's 
rules. This analysis will also permit the fuller understanding of the actions of EPC's 
intergovernmental bodies, as well as of the EP and the Commission, that will be 
witnessed in the following chapters.
Nuttail, 1992a: 312 See also Ohrgaard, 1997:18-20.
Article 6; cited in Ifestos, 1987: 239.
!^ ®Krasner, 1983a: 2  The point that concerns the generality of norms is taken from Keohane, 1984: 58.
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The central role and important rights exercised by the member states is evident 
in all EPC documents. The 1970 Luxembourg Report assigns the major responsibility for 
seeking cooperation to the intergovernmental Council of Foreign Ministers, which since 
then has constantly played a  significant role in EPC affairs.^ ^^  The Report also created  
the intergovernmental Political Committee, with responsibilities for preparing Ministerial 
meetings.
The Luxembourg Report did not impose any stringent requirements on EPC 
members. For example, they had to ensure greater mutual understanding with regard 
to the major issues of international politics' or increase their solidarity by working fo r  a  
harmonisation of views.'^^o ifestos correctly observes that the Report contains no 
definite obligation [or] commitment to agree or to comply with any issue where views 
appear to converge.'^^i The sam e applies to the subsequent Copenhagen Report, 
which also upgraded the role of the intergovernmental Presidency.^^  ^ Assumed every 
six months by one of the member states, the Presidency was m ade responsible for 
initiating and coordinating EPC actions.i63
During the Paris Summit meeting of 1974, the European Council was established. 
An additional intergovernmental body comprised by the Heads of Government of the 
member states, it stands at the apex of EPC. The rationale behind its creation is stated  
in the Paris communique:
Recognising the need for an overall approach to the internal problems 
involved in achieving European unity and the external problems facing 
Europe, the Heads of Government consider it essential to ensure progress and 
overall consistency in the activities of the Communities and in the work on
political cooperation.164
^^ P^art Two. II The Council of Foreign Ministers is also referred to as the General Council.
*^^ °Part Two. I a. and Part Two. L b; emphasis added. 
i6i|festos, 1987:154.
"^^ T^he Presidency is only briefly mentioned in the Luxembourg Report that limits its responsibilities to 
consultation and information. See Part Two. II c; Part Two. Ill 1 and Part Three. 4.
*^^ P^art II 8. The rotation of the Presidency takes place according to the alphabetical order of the names 
of the member states. For an example of how this operates, see  Hill, 1992 115.
I'^ ^Cited in Nugent, 1989/1991:194.
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th e  1981 London Report created the intergovernmental Troika, consisting of the 
previous, current and subsequent holders of the Presidency, and also retained to a 
large extent the rights enjoyed by member states.^65 in the sam e spirit, the 1986 SEA 
revealingly states that: The High Contracting Parties, being members of the European 
Communities, shall endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a  European foreign 
policy/^66 It-also
Makes it abundantly clear that the member states have not renounced the 
sovereign right of determining their own foreign policy—which is exactly the 
difference between merely cooperating and, on the other hand, building an 
effective common p o l i c y . ^ ^ ?
Thus, it can safely be concluded that in accordance with EPC's norm of 
'diluted' intergovernmentalism, member states have important rights. They are entitled 
to hold the Presidency and participate in the European Council, the Council of Ministers 
and the Troika In addition, the operation of EPC is based on the rule of consensus: 
states have the right to veto any decision that they oppose. Subsequently, it is not 
surprising that they have accep ted  no obligation to actually reach common positions 
or participate in common actions.’^®
Nevertheless, member states have accep ted  som e obligations. Their 
a ccep ta n ce  is partly related to the failed attempts to maintain an absolute form of 
intergpvernmentalism for EPC. An interesting episode reveals the flawed logic behind 
such attempts. '^^9 on  23 July 1973, the Foreign Ministers met in Copenhagen for EPC 
business, and then flew to Brussels in order to discuss EC matters on the very sam e day.
Article 10.
'‘^ ‘^ Title III Article 30. 1; emphasis added. The use of the words 'High Contracting Parties' implies the 
intergovernmental nature of the SEA's EPC provisions. 
i67lerme, 1992 276.
'<^ ®However, member states cieariy recognise that common positions and actions would confer benefits 
to them. On this point, see the discussion of the principle of solidarity in this chapter.
*^^ '^ For additional accounts of this episode, see Ifestos, 1987; 172 and Nuttaii, 1992a: 75.
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This took p lace because of the French desire to emphasise the distinction between the 
somewhat supranational Community and the strictly intergovernmental EPC. The French 
action backfired, and m ade evident that some degree of reform was necessary. It 
primarily took the form of member states granting responsibilities and assuming 
obligations towards the European Parliament and the Commission. The subsequent 
brief discussion of their powers will not only allow a  comprehensive understanding of 
EPC's norm of 'diluted' intergovernmentalism, but also explain the reasons that 
permitted their actions that will be presented and analysed in this thesis.
Significantly, since 1979 the European Parliament has been the only 
democratically directly elected  Community body. Possibly recognising the importance 
of this fact, EPC's members have accep ted  the obligation to provide the EP with 
information concerning EPC affairs. The occasions and ways in which such information 
is provided, have both increased and improved since the Luxembourg Report. The SEA 
expressly recognised the obligation that the EP be informed, stated that the EP 'is 
closely associa ted  with European Political Cooperation,' and noted that it's views...are
duly taken into consideration.'i'^o
In practice, the EP's role in EPC affairs has been rather limited. It has 
consistently complained about the vogue and poor quality of information that it has 
received. To an extent, this is the result of the fact that foreign policy actions often 
require a  degree of confidentiality. The accurate provision of information has also 
been hampered by the fear that it could show 'the divergences am ong member states 
[thus embarrassing them and] prevent[ing] the adoption of more substantial positions.'’^  ^
Ultimately though, it has probably been the EP's relative lack of any substantial powers
^ °^Title ill Article 30. 4; emphasis added.
^^ N^uttall, 1992b: 59. For further discussion of the problems that arise the process of informing the 
European Parliament, see de Schoutheete, 1988: 81
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over foreign policy matters ttiat tics allowed member states to limit ttie quality and  
extent of obligations towards itJ^ ^
Unlike ttie EP, ttie Commission tias su cceeded  in obtaining more important rigtits 
in EPC affairs. Having always been more than an observer in political cooperation but 
less than a  full participant,' the Commission lacks any voting rights but participates in 
all EPC proceedings, is generally consulted, and helps ensure consistency between  
Community and EPC actions.i'^  ^ The Commission though was not granted this 
enhanced role immediately. The Luxembourg Report devoted merely one sentence to 
it, noting that it 'will be consulted i f  the activities of the European Communities are 
a ffected  by the work of the Ministers; 'and it would be the latter who would decid e  
when such instances arose. Furthermore, it should be added  that the limited right of 
consultation did not necessarily guarantee for the Commission any substantial 
influence in EPC affairs.
The Copenhagen Report expressed the desire that consultation with the 
Commission should continue. '^^  ^ interestingly, the annex of the report specifically 
mentioned examples of consultation that were related with the Commission's 
participation in Ministerial meetings, as well as in discussions of econom ic issues related 
to the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The latter reference 
reflected its important contribution to the process in which it had proved that it could 
offer valuable assistance based on its substantial technical expertise on econom ic  
affairs.’^ *^ The sam e proved to be the case  with the Euro-Arab dialogue of the early
1970's.i77
is noteworthy that the SEA required the assent of the Parliament for the accession of new members, 
and the conclusion of association agreements. 
i73Nuttall, 1988:104.
’^ "'Part Two. V; emphasis added.
7^5part II12 i.
^^‘^ For an excellent account of the Commission's involvement with CSCE, see Nuttall, 1992a: 58,110-11 and 
Nuttall, 1994a: 289-91. 
i^^See Nuttall, 1992a: 97-100.
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The successful involvement of the Commission in these instances was 
acknow ledged and in a  sense rewarded in the 1981 London Report, which stated that 
within the framework of the established rules and procedures the Ten attach  
importance to the Commission of the European Communities being fu lly  a ssocia ted  
with political cooperation, at all l e v e l s / The full participation of the Commission in 
EPC proceedings was retained in the SEA, though it did not grant it any of the powers 
of initiative, execution, and control which it possessed on Community issues/’^ ’
As a  Treaty, the SEA probably created legally binding obligations for the 
member states, and thus decreased the extent of their rights/®  ^ Also, the Commission's 
and the EP's rights were given a legal basis for the first time. However, the legal 
obligations and implications of the SEA should not be overestimated, since it was 
specifically mentioned that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) would not have any 
jurisdiction over EPC proceedings; and no enforcement mechanisms were provided, in 
cases of member state non-compliance.’®’
C. Rules.
Rules in international regimes are difficult to distinguish from...norms; at the 
margin they merge into one another. Rules are however, more specific/'^^'^ Hence, this 
section will concentrate on the specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action' that
”'®Article 12; emphasis added.
’^ ^Ohrgaard, 1997: 11. The Commission was also given (together with the Presidency), the right and 
responsibility of ensuring consistency in EPC and Community affairs. See Title III Article 30. 5. The 
relevant article In the SEA also stated that the Presidency and the Commission were to act 'within 
[their] own sphere of com petence' (ibid.). 'This proviso was introduced at the request of Denmark to 
make it clear that the Commission did not hereby acquire any new powers in EPC' (Nuttaii, 1994a: 293). 
For further analysis of consistency as it appears in the SEA, see Lak, 1992 48-51 and Wessels, 1991:153-4.
’®°For a persuasive argument of why the SEA created legally binding obligations for the member states, 
see Dehouse and Weiler, 1991 128-31.
’®’See Title IV. Article 31.
’®^Keohane, 1984: 58; emphasis added.
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allow and determine the operation of EPC's defining norm of diluted'
intergovernmentalism.^83
The important rights in EPC that are enjoyed by member states ultimately 
depend on specific rules that govern the operation of the European Council, the 
Presidency, the Troika and the Council of Ministers. The most important rule is that of 
consensus: member states have the right to veto any EPC decision. This obviously 
affects the efficiency of EPC, although it has been argued that EPC policies [manage 
to] follow the median line, not the lowest common d e n o m i n a t o r . ' Wh e t h e r  this is 
actually the case  will be discussed in the final chapter.
In addition to the fundamental rule of consensus, there are rules that govern the 
frequency of meetings for the Council of Ministers and the European Council. The 
latter, according to the 1974 Paris communique meets three times a  year, and, 
whenever necessary, in the Council of the Communities and in the context of political 
cooperation.185 As regards the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Luxembourg Report 
specified that it would m eet twice annual ly.^This was increased to four times a  year 
in the Copenhagen Report, while the SEA realistically stated that the body should 
convene 'at least four times a year within the framework of European Political
Cooperation.'187
Rules governing the operation of the Presidency are somewhat more 
complicated. The major rule arranges the holding of the Presidency by a  member 
state every six months. Further rules ensure that the holder of the Presidency is in a  
position to exercise considerable influence in EPC proceedings. Importantly, each  step 
in the developm ent of political cooperation has been marked by an increase in 
powers and responsibilities for the Presidency.'i^s The Luxembourg Report included
i8^Krasner, 1983a 2  
ifi^Nuttall, 1992a 314.
'Seated in Nugent, 1989/1991:194.
Fart Two. ILI o.
i®^See Part IL 1 of ttie Copentiagen Report and Title 111 Article 30. 3.a of ttie SEA. 
'®®De Scouttieete, 1988: 75.
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rules that gave It the power to convene meetings of the Foreign Ministers and the 
political committee, organise consultations for crisis meetings, inform the EP, and 
provide information to possible applicant states.’®’
The Copenhagen Report enhanced the role of the Presidency by adding the 
rule that it would also be in charge of the implementation on a  collegiate basis of 
'conclusions adopted at meetings of Ministers and of the Political Committee,' while the 
London Report inserted rules that m ade the Presidency responsible for informing the 
press and coordinating activities with the Community.’’  ^ The SEA gave  the Presidency 
the right to initiate EPC actions, and m ade it responsible for 'the m anagem ent of 
Political Cooperation, and in particular for drawing up the timetable of meetings and 
for convening and organising meetings.'’’ ’ Thus, it becom es clear that through rules 
that greatly allow the setting of EPC's agenda, the initiation of actions, the convening 
of meetings, as well as responsibility for the implementation of EPC decisions, the 
periodic holding of the Presidency substantially increases the rights of EPC member 
states.
Specific rules also determine the extent and nature of the obligation of the 
member states to provide the EP with information concerning EPC affairs. In the 
Luxembourg Report it was agreed to inform the EP in bi-annual informal sessions.”  ^ The 
subsequent Copenhagen Report increased somewhat these obligations, deciding that 
four colloquies were to be held each  year, at which the Ministers would m eet with 
Members of the Political Committee of the European Parliament.'”  ^ Furthermore, the 
Foreign Minister holding the Presidency would submit an annual report dealing with EPC 
a f f a i r s . T h e  London Report acknowledged the democratic legitimacy of the directly
’®’See the following sections of the Luxembourg Report: Part Two. 111 a; Part Two. III c; Part Two. Ill 1; Part 
Three. 4, Part Four a.
” °Part 11 8. i of the Copenhagen Report and Articles 1 and 12 of the London Report.
’’ ’Title III Article 30. b.
” 2see Part 2  VI 
” ®Part II10.
” 4bid.
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elected  EP, and stated ttiat 'ttie Ten envisage the possib ility  of more frequent 
reference to resolutions adopted by P a r l i a m e n t ' i t  js obvious ttiougti, ttiat no sucti 
specific commitment was undertaken. More significantly ttiougti, ttie member states did 
d ecid e  to introduce informal meetings between ttie Council of Ministers and ttie EP. In 
ttie 1983 Solemn Declaration on European Union, EPC's members also undertook to 
respond to oral or written questions...but also to "resolutions concerning matters of major 
importance and general concern."'^^ 6 Finally, ttie SEA obliged ttie Presidency to 
regularly inform ttie European Parliament' and ttie member states to take under 
consideration ttie positions of ttie EP.^ ?^
As regards ttie Commission, certain rules guarantee its role as an important EPC 
participant, wtiicti is also responsible for ensuring consistency witti Community actions. 
Pertiaps ttie most significant rules are ttie ones ttiat allow ttie presence and 
participation of Commission representatives in all EPC meetings. Wtien ttie European 
Council is convened, ttie Commission is represented by its President. Ttie Commission 
also receives all COREUs and can send its own. Its presence in ttie Troika is of 
particular importance, since given ttie Troika's rotating system ttie Commission is ttie 
only permanent dialogue partner on ttie European side.'^^s Consultation of member 
states witti ttie Commission also extends to ttieir foreign representations and 
international organisations.^’^
Ttie Commission's importance and mission to ensure consistency are also 
entianced by rules ttiat allow it to draft ttie preliminary version of ttie Community 
Budget. In addition, it is ttie Commission ttiat is solely responsible for ttie execution of 
ttie Budget.'2oo Furttiermore, its com petence over ttie Community's commercial policy.
’^^Artlcle 11; emptiasis added.
’’^Nuttall, 1992Œ 190. 
l’^TItle III Article 30. 4. 
l’^NuttclI. 1992b: 64.
'” See SEA Title III Article 30. 9. The Commission has more than 100 diplomatic representations around 
the world. See Regelsberger, 1991171 
200Nuttall, 1994a: 292
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based  on Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome, allows it to be involved in the 
administration of sanctions and aid. However, these econom ic instruments of policy 
belong to EPC's decision-making procedures, which will be discussed next.
E. Decision-M aking Procedures.
Decision-making procedures have been defined as prevaiiing practices for 
making and implementing coilective c h o i c e . ' ^ o i  epC's decision-making procedures 
include the imposition of sanctions or the granting of aid, conference diplomacy, as 
well as a  crisis management procedure. The most frequently em ployed decision­
making procedure invoives the issuing of declarations. Not surprisingiy, the pubiication 
of such statements often fails to make an impact or achieve any important goals in 
international relations. However,
A common deciaration of intent, although [it can not often be implemented] 
immediately, may very well have long run effects. Such a  declaration may, 
for instance, lay the foundation for the tacit co-ordination of the policies of 
the [member states] in reiation to some other international actor.202
Potentially more effective procedures involve the imposition of econom ic  
sanctions, or the granting of aid, both of which wiil appear in the case-study of this 
thesis. The latter is often based on politicai, as weil as on humanitarian considerations. 
For exam pie, aid has been directed towards various countries including South Africa 
during apartheid, or Nicaragua during the Cold War.^ o^  As regards sanctions, they were 
originally applied on a strictiy national level. The leap forward was m ade in February 
1982, when they were appiied [on a  Community level] to the Soviet Union following the 
imposition of martial law in Poiand'^o^ Since then, sanctions have been  collectiveiy
20iKrasner, 1983a: 2
202sjostedt, 1977: 48; cited In Ifestos, 1987: 234. 
203see Nuttall, 1992b: 72 
20^Nuttall, 1992a: 262
57
applied on several occasions, and aiways on a  Community level, though they have 
not always proved decisive in achieving their goals .205 Nonetheless [they] do have a  
useful symbolic function; they can signal to third parties...the sincerity of the common 
European stance beyond the purely declaratory level;'^06 and at any rate, punitive 
econom ic measures m ake at least some specific and concrete contribution towards 
the implementation of EPC's collective choice.
Turning to another decision-making procedure, it is noteworthy that EPC lacked  
any specific arrangement to quickly confront an important international crisis. This 
b ecam e painfully apparent during the 26 December 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, when it took EPC members more than two weeks to arrange for a  meeting 
in order to discuss the issue and try to agree on a  common reaction. In the words of 
the British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, the situation was 'frankly.„a bit of a  
mess.'207
Having learned from this rather spectacular and public failure to hold a  
m eeting promptly, EPC members agreed to introduce a  crisis management procedure. 
Thus, the 1981 London Report stated that
The Political Committee or, if necessary, a  ministerial meeting will convene  
within forty-eight hours at the request of three Member States. The sam e 
procedure will apply at the level of Heads of M is s lo n .^ o s
This procedure actually failed to operate properly during the subsequent 
(Decem ber 1981) imposition of martial law in Poland. Since then though, it has operated  
smoothly, at least as regards the holding of meetings under the provisions of the 
London Report. However, 'the main difficuity is not the lack of procedure, but rather
205por a summary of cases between 1967 and 1990 in wtiich EPC applied sanctions or granted aid, see  
Rtiein, 1992 33-4. See also Nuttall, 1992a: 260-65 and Nuttall, 1992b: 69-73.
206pijpers, 1988:156.
207cited in Ifestos, 1987: 230.
20® Article 13.
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the lack of commonality of view and of confidence among the member states
themseives/209
In order to Implement its collective choice, EPC has also utilised a  decision­
making procedure that evolves around the organisation of conference diplomacy. 
Such diplomacy may bestow certain important advantages to EPC, since it 'prevents 
the marginalization of individual member countries and reduces the possibility of 
international bargaining process...producing outcomes that adversely affect Western 
Europe.'2io
F. Scope.
The scop e of an international regime refers to the range of issues [that]...it 
covers.'2ii EPC's scop e has expanded significantly throughout the years, to the extent 
that it was possible to deal with the issues that arose from the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia that are covered in this thesis. More specifically, the Luxembourg Report 
stated that EPC would deal with 'the major issues of international p o l i t i c s . ' ^ A n  
attempt for expansion was m ade in the Copenhagen Report, which in accordance with 
the spirit of the previous Report noted that 'Governments will consult each  other on all 
important foreign policy questions.'2i3 it also specified that the subjects dealt with 
must concern European interests whether in Europe itself or elsewhere where the 
adoption of a  common provision is necessary or desirable.'^i^
209RummeL 1988:123. For some further comments on EPC's emergency procedure, see  Regelsberger, 1997: 
69.
2 iO |b id J  121.
2i^Hoggard and Simmons, 1987: 497.
2i2part Two. L b.
2i3part II11.
2^ "*Part II11 ii; emphasis added.
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The 1981 London Report expanded the scope of EPC in a  somewhat 
conservative way, by including the first reference to security issues:^ ^^
As regards the scop e of European politicai cooperation, and having regard 
to the different situations of the Member States, the Foreign Ministers agree to 
maintain the flexible and pragmatic approach which has m ade it possible to 
discuss in political cooperation certain important foreign policy questions 
bearing on the p o litica l aspects o f  security.
The subsequent SEA solidified the security connection by stating that the member 
states were 'ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and 
econom ic aspects of s e c u r i t y .
Thus, it becom es clear that EPC's scope is broad, flexible and somewhat 
ambiguous, although it does not incorporate defence matters and includes only certain 
aspects of security issues.2’8 These limitations are of particular importance, since in the 
words of Christopher Hill:
If a  state's security consists in its ability to preserve from threat its core 
elements and interests, and foreign policy is the sum of a state's official 
actions towards a  potentially dangerous outside world, we can see  that the 
two concepts are inherently related. Security concerns will be at the heart of 
foreign policy, even if the latter also encourages a  much wider range of
issues.219
G. O rganisational Form.
The organisational form of EPC is rather limited. It took some 17 years for EPC to 
acquire a  poorly staffed and under funded Secretariat. The reason for this substantial
London Report also states correctly in its preamble ttiat EPC's scope has 'continually broadened' 
since its beginning.
2i*^Preambie; emphasis added. For comments on the diplomacy behind the adoption of this reference to 
security issues, see Nuttaii, 1992a: 178.
2’7Tltie III Article 30. 6. a
2i®The London Report, as well as the SEA, deliberately did not contain any references to the coordination 
of d efen ce policies. See Wessels, 1991157.
2%ii, 1992 136.
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delay is related to ttie debate concerning ttie nature of EPC. Proponents of a  more 
supranational approacti viewed witti considerable suspicion and ultimately opposed  
ttie creation of a  strong and intergovernmental Secretariat. On ttie ottier tiand, 
advocates of a strictly intergovernmental EPC opposed any plans for wtiat could tiave 
been perceived as a  pro-integrationist S e c r e t a r i a t .220 However, ttie need for some 
organisational form, especially to assist ttie President-in-Office was evident. Ttius, ttie 
Copentiagen Report stressed ttie considerable duties bestowed upon ttie Presidency, 
and called for at least som e administrative assistance from ottier member s t a t e s .221 
Ttie London Report attem pted to remedy ttie problem by assigning to ttie Presidency 
a small team  of officials seconded from preceding and succeeding p r e s i d e n c i e s .  222 
A Secretariat was eventually created by ttie SEA. Located in Brussels, it was to 
assist ttie Presidency in preparing and implementing ttie activities of European Political 
Cooperation, and in administrative m a t t e r s .  223 A subsequent meeting of ttie Council of 
Foreign fvlinisters tield on 28 February 1986, furttier specified its duties. Ttiey included:
-assisting ttie Presidency in ttie organization of political cooperation 
meetings, including ttie preparation and circulation of documents and ttie 
drawing up of minutes;...
-assisting ttie Presidency in ttie preparation of texts to be publistied on 
betialf of ttie member states, including replies to parliamentary questions; 
-maintaining ttie European Political Cooperation arctiives;
-preserving ttie rules according to wtiicti political cooperation is used; 
-assisting ttie Presidency in its contacts witti ttiird c o u n t r i e s .224
Ttie Secretariat was assigned a staff of only seventeen and no budget of its 
own.225 Clearly, it lacked autonomy and, according to ttie SEA, tiad to carry out its
220fof som e useful comments on ttie debate concerning ttie creation of an EPC Secretariat, see  
Bonvicini, 1988: 58 and especially Nuttaii, 1992a 19.
2 2 ise e  Part il 8.
222 Article 10.
223Titie ill Article 30.10. g.
224ec Bull. 2/1986; cited in da Costa, 1988: 93.
225pcr an account of ttie interesting and revealing process by whicti ttie first tiead of ttie Secretariat, tvtr 
Giovanni Januzzi was selected, see da Costa, 1988: 87.
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duties under ttie authority of the P r e s i d e n c y /226 wisely 'It concentrated on making 
Itself useful and threatening no one /227
On the basis of all of the above. It can be concluded that EPC Is a  particularly 
com plex International regime that operates on the principles of confidentiality and  
consultation. No warfare among members states Is expected  and It Is understood that 
EPC membership parallels EC membership. Concerning the potentially consequential 
principle of solidarity, In the following chapters It will be viewed In action and Its 
Importance and Impact evaluated..
As will also be shown, EPC Is defined to a great extent by the norm of 'diluted' 
Intergovernmentalism. This norm allows member states to enjoy Important rights, such 
as holding the Presidency and participating In the European Council, the Council of 
Ministers and the Troika. However, member states have also accep ted  the obligation 
to Inform the EP, consult with the Commission, and allow It to participate In all EPC 
proceedings, as well as help ensure (together with the holder of the Presidency), 
consistency between Community and EPC actions. Furthermore, It should be noted that 
as a  Treaty, the SEA created legally binding obligations for member states, though 
enforcement mechanisms are absent and the ECJ has no jurisdiction over EPC.
The Important role enjoyed by member states In EPC Is solidified by the rule of 
consensus, which allows them to veto any undesirable EPC decision. Other rules 
determine the significance and character of EPC's Intergovernmental bodies, and  
especially of the Presidency that sets EPC's agenda. Specific rules also guarantee the 
full participation of the Commission In all EPC meetings. The Commission Is assisted In 
Its role of ensuring consistency by rules that allow It to m ake the Initial budgetary 
proposals, and be the sole executor of the Community budget. Specific rules also  
oblige member states to Inform the EP, though the quality of the Information provided 
Is often poor.
226Title III Article 30. 8. g.
227Nuttall, 1992a; 20.
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The scop e of issues covered by EPC has considerably expanded throughout 
the years to include all foreign policy issues, as well as the political and econom ic  
aspects of security, though defence matters (and hence a  military option), are 
excluded. However, EPC can utilise a variety of other decision-making procedures in 
order to implement its collective choice. They include the issuing of declarations, 
conference diplomacy, a  crisis procedure, the imposition of sanctions, and the granting 
of aid. Most of these procedures, as well as certain innovations, will be discussed 
subsequently in this thesis. Finally, as previously explained, EPC's organisational structure 
includes a  small, and understaffed Secretariat.
Based on the case-study that will be presented in the following chapters, it will 
be shown that EPC operated as an international regime, and the theoretical 
implications of this finding will be presented and evaluated. Furthermore, conclusions 
will be reached concerning the nature and importance of EPC's principles, norms, rules, 
decision-making procedures and organisational form. However, before plunging into an 
in-depth examination of Greek foreign policy towards former Yugoslavia within the 
context of EPC, the next chapter will provide a brief but necessary account of the 
controversial and complicated Macedonian Question. An analysis of the often 
neglected  but crucially important interests that were shared by G reece and FYROM, will 
also be included.
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CHAPTER 3
'One of the Most Explosive Topics in the Universe.'^ :'
That nothing changes in the East is a commonplace which threatens to becom e tyrannical. Assuredly 
there is something in the spirit of the East which is singularly kindly to survivals and anachronisms. The 
centuries do not follow one another. They coexist. There is no lopping of withered customs, no burial of 
dead ideas.
-K N. Brailsford, Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future, 1906.
A. The Im portance an d  Origins of the M acedonian Question.
The Macedonia Question has played a  central and often defining role in the 
international politics of South-Eastern Europe. Any attempt to discuss it, is greatly 
com plicated by the fact that it
presents...a m edley of jarring races, iong standing animosities, and ever- 
recurring atrocities [as well as]...a jumble of ethnographical uncertainties, 
unreliable statistics, assertions and counter-assertions flatly contradictory on 
every point.229
Nevertheless, the fact remains that there was an almost continuous struggle 
am ong most of the states of the Balkan Peninsula for control of Ottoman Macedonia, 
during the period of 1870-1949. As this chapter will demonstrate, the Greeks contested  
developm ents in this region through educational and guerrilla activities during 1895-1912, 
and fought for parts of Macedonia in two Balkan Wars, two World Wars, as well as in 
the Greek Civil War. Macedonian territories were lost to Bulgaria as a  result of the 1878 
San Stephano Treaty, and In the First and Second World Wars; and they were almost
228jhe phrase refers to the Macedonian Question, and is taken from Robert Legvold's brief review of 
Danforth, 1995. See Foreign Affairs. Vol. 75, No. 2, (March/April 1996): 161 
229palmer and King, 1971 vii; cited in Economides, 1990:131
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lost again because of the policies pursued by the Greek Communist Party (KKE) during 
the Civil War. Furthermore, brutal occupations were suffered during the two World Wars. 
After 1949, contentious arguments over the falsification of history, minority issues and 
the practice of propaganda replaced considerations of warfare.
The appreciation of this long-standing, turbulent, controversial and traumatic 
historical record is essential, in order to understand the dispute between G reece and 
FYROM, and the reactions of the Greek people and government that will be described  
in the following chapters of this thesis and which essentially constitute the most recent 
developm ents of the Macedonian Question. As will be shown, Greek reactions included 
demonstrations with more than one million participants, passionate feelings and 
arguments concerning the new republic's exact name, and even a  spontaneous 
popular boycott of products originating from countries whose foreign policy was 
judged unfriendly to Greek positions. This chapter will also present a  discussion of the 
common interests between G reece and FYROM, thus partly satisfying institutionalism's 
conditional nature, but also offering an often neglected perspective to subsequent 
developments.
As with every aspect of the Macedonian Question, any argument concerning its 
precise origins would almost certainly be controversial and disputed. Nevertheless, it is 
probable that the beginning of the modern phase of the Macedonian Question is 
connected with the establishment of the autocephalous Bulgarian Orthodox Church 
(Exarchate) in 1870.230 in order to comprehend the significance of this event, it must be  
kept in mind that the peoples residing within the borders of the Ottoman Empire were 
organised in various millets, according to their faith.23i The m illet comprising the 
Empire's Orthodox Christian population was under the supervision of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate, located in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e .232 Thus, the Orthodox Christian Church was a
230|n agreement with this starting point for the modern phase of the Macedonian Question are Barker, 
1950: 7; Mazarakis-Ainian, 1992 30  and Karakasidou, 1997b: 78.
23'For further analysis of the millet system, see Poulton, 1995: 35-7.
232por the role and power of the Ecumenical Patriarchate within the Ottoman Empire, see  Daikin, 1972 11-2
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kind of supranational organisation, responsible for ttie religious (and also educational) 
requirements of all Ctiristians; regardless of race or language.
Ttie ecumenical community of Balkan Orttiodoxy' was seriously w eakened wltti 
ttie 10 tvlarcti 1870 firm an  (decree) ttiat establistied ttie Exarctiate.^^s Alttiougti ttie 
Ottoman government was pressured by Russia, ttiis decision also included an important 
elem ent of a  'divide and rule' s t r a t e g y . ^^ 4 Article X of ttie fiirman stated ttiat territories 
would fall under ttie control of ttie Exorctiate, given ttie request of at least two ttiirds of 
ttie population.235 jtiis stipulation initiated ttie struggle for Macedonia by religious, 
educational and eventually military means, between Bulgarians, Greeks and to a  mucti 
lesser extent, Serbs. Ttie firm an's strategy proved stiort-sigtited, since as will be  
explained, it allowed ttie unleostiing of competing forces ttiat ultimately overttirew ttie 
Ottoman yoke from ttie Balkan Peninsula.
After ttie establistiment of ttie Exorctiate, Bulgarians proved particularly 
troublesome for ttie Sublime Porte. In April 1876, ttiey rose in a  rebellion ttiat was 
brutally crustied.236 Ttie atrocities committed against ttie Bulgarian population m ade an 
impression in Europe. Gladstone's condemnation was ctiaracteristic:
Ttiere is not a  cannibal in ttie Soutti Sea Islands, wtiose indignation would not 
arise and overboil at ttie recital of ttiat wtiicti tias been done, wtiicti tias too 
late been examined, but wtiicti remains u n a v e n g e d . ^ 3 7
Following ttiis outrage, a  conference was tield in Constantinople in 1876, in wtiicti 
Europe's Great Powers proposed ttie creation of two Bulgarian provinces wittiin ttie
^%itromilides, 1989; 156. For ttie text of ttie firman, see Vacalopoulos, 1989: 53-6. As expected, ttie
Patriarctiate in Constantinople declared ttie Exarchate schismatic.
234see Mertzos, 1992 49-50.
235|However, some territories were explicitly named in the firman as being under the control of the
Exarchate. For Article X, see Vacalopoulos, 1989: 55-6.
236see Crampton, 1987:19.
Jenkins, 1995: 403.
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Ottoman Empire, governed by Ctiristians.^^  ^ Ttie Ottoman refusai to a ccep t sucti a  
plan led to ttie Russian-Turkisti War of 1877-8. The victorious Russian troops reached the 
outskirts of Constantinople, and thus m ade possible the 1878 San Stefano Treaty which 
effectively created Great Bulgaria, encompassing an enormous territory.239
The Treaty of San Stephano provoked an armed but unsuccessful Greek 
uprising in M a c e d o n i a .240 i t  also threatened to upset the European balance of powers, 
primarily because it was perceived as a  unilateral Russian settlement of the 'Eastern 
Question."24i A correction' subsequently took place in the 13 June-13 July 1878 
Congress of Berlin, and the Bulgarian state was limited to almost half its original size.^^  ^
Despite this setback, Bulgarians continued to entertain national goals in 
Ottoman Macedonia, which were originally pursued through educational means with 
the founding of many Bulgarian schools in the last quarter of the nineteenth c e n t u r y .2^3 
The ultimate aim of these educational efforts (and rivalries) was to inculcate a  specific  
national identity to s t u d e n t s .244
238see Kofos, 1964; 16. It must not be assumed ttiat mere moral outrage produced ttiis conference. Russian 
pressure on betialf of a potentially important and fellow Slav ally was also significant.
239see Map II for ttie San Steptiano territorial settlements.
2^°See Kofos, 1969 and Mertzos, 1992 52-60.
24iKofos, 1964:17.
'^^^see Map II for ttie Treaty of Berlin territorial settlements. Bulgaria was somewtiat com pensated with the 
1885 annexation of Eastern Rumelia. See Kofos, 1964:18-9.
2")^ They eventually rivalled the numbers and quality of Greek schools. For an excellent study of 
educational rivalries and policies in North-Western Macedonia during the period of 1870-1904, see  
Vouri, 1992 See also Vacalopoulos, 1989:134, for an interesting table showing the number of Bulgarian 
and Greek schools in the Thessaloniki vilayet (administrative unit), in 1885. See also ibid: 131-47. The 
numbers of Bulgarian, Greek, Romanian and Serbian schools, pupils and teachers in the vilayets of 
Thessaloniki and Monastir in 1900 can be found in Mazarakis-Aenian, 1992 31.
'^^ '^ See Perry, 1988: 28 and Vouri, 1992 182-3. According to Anthony D. Smith, the 'fundamental features of 
national identity [are]: I an historic territory, or homeland. 2  common myths and historical memories. 3. 
a  common, mass public culture. 4. common legal rights and duties for all members. 5. a common 
econom y with territorial mobility for members' (Smith, 199114). On the other hand, ethnic communities 
(on which ethnic identities are based), have the following 'main attributes_l a  collective proper name. 
2  a myth of common ancestry. 3. shared historical memories. 4. one or more differentiating elements
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On 3 October 1893, the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) was 
founded in Thessaloniki, aiming at 'furthering Bulgarian plans in Macedonia'245 During 
the following years, IMRO exhibited a  preference for violence, and played a  crucial 
role in preparing a  rebellion in Ottoman Macedonia.246 it must b e  noted however, that 
IMRO's goals were never clearly defined, since it was...divided...between protagonists of 
Macedonia for Bulgaria, and of a  separate Macedonian state, existing either within 
som e form of federation, or independently.'247
B. Arm ed Struggle in M acedonia.
After 1895, armed Bulgarian guerrilla groups {com itadjis) began to operate in 
Macedonia. Following increased guerrilla activities in 1902, IMRO decided  to organise 
an uprising, which was declared on 2 August 1903 on Saint Elijah's day ( l l i n d e n ) . ^ 4 8  j h e  
initially successful Bulgarians captured the town of Krusevo and proclaimed the short­
lived 'Krusevo R e p u b l i c . '2 4 9  Eventually, faced  against superior Ottoman forces, it
of common culture. 5. an association witti a specific 'homeland'. 6. a  sense of solidarity for significant 
sectors of the population' (ibid: 21). These are the definitions that will be mostly in mind when referring 
to national and ethnic identities in this thesis. Admittedly though, a separate thesis could have been  
written contesting or validating these definitions. The interested reader could begin an Investigation 
with Connor, 1994.
245viasidis, 1997: 65-6.
246||v|RO's subsequent history and mutations are of unusual complexity. See Perry 1988 and especially 
Vlasidls, 1997. For an account of some of IMRO's more spectacular terrorist acts, see  Kofos, 1964: 31-3.
247poulton: 1995: 53-4. See also Barker, 1950:16-7 and Jelavich, 1983: 93.
248The decision to organise the llinden uprising was taken on 17 January 1903. See Perry, 1988:121-4 for a 
discussion of this fateful meeting. The brief account of the llinden uprising is based on Brailsford 1903 
and Brailsford, 1906:111-71; Council for Research into South-Eastern Europe, 1993: 50-2; Daikin, 1966: 92- 
107; Kofos, 1964: 33-6 and Perry, 1988: 127-40. See also the fascinating collection of diplomatic 
documents in Gounaris et al, 1993.
2 '^^Whether the llinden uprising was the work of Bulgarians or Slavs with a national 'Macedonian' 
consciousness has been disputed. For an important publication arguing for the latter interpretation, see  
Council for Research into South-Eastern Europe, 1993. Significantly however, K N. Brailsford who
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b ecam e impossible to maintain military momentum and ttie uprising began to falter 
after just ttiree'weeks. It ended officially on 3 November at a  significant cost: villages 
and crops lay dam aged or destroyed, probably more than four thousand people were 
killed, and many more were left h o m e le s s .2 5 o
IMRO's leaders were aware that it was impossible to overthrow by militarily 
means the Ottoman rule in Macedonia. Rather, the brutal strategy behind the failed 
llinden uprising was based on the expectation that it would provoke Turkish atrocities, 
and thus produce a  European public outcry and a direct Great Power intervention in 
the region.251
llinden represented the culmination of Bulgarian efforts in Macedonia, and 
demonstrated their vitality and strength. In this sense, it provoked Hellenism's ultimately 
successful counterattack.252
Hellenism, in the widest sense of the term [was] a  force which in Macedonia 
was not to be identified solely with the Greek language or race. Hellenism 
derived largely from the Patriarchal Church; from the flourishing Greek 
schools; and from a  class which enjoyed in som e measure an econom ic  
superiority, a  class which was conservative, which had everything to 
lose...Hellenism was a way of life, of which the outward manifestation was the 
a ccep tan ce  of the Greek Orthodox Church.^ s^
eyewitnessed the events, devoted a chapter in his book Macedonia Its Races and Their Future to the 
llinden uprising, that was titied 'The Bulgarian Movement.' See Brailsford, 1906: 111.
^^°For the destructive resuits of the llinden uprising, see ibid: 158-65; Daikin, 1966:104; Gounaris et al, 1993: 
185-97 and Perry, 1988:140.
25iSee Dragoumis, 1907/1992 22 and Perry, 1988:124-5 and 138.
2^2par-sighted Greeks were able to understand that the Bulgarians represented their most serious and 
long-term adversaries in Macedonia. Hence, the fact that Greeks aided the Turks in their struggle to 
quell the llinden uprising becom es understandable. For accounts of Greek actions against Bulgarians 
during llinden, see Brailsford, 1906:129-30 and Perry, 1988:137-8. See also Karavangelis, n.d: 189-92 for 
examples of Greek cooperation with the Ottoman authorities. Karavangelis was the Patriarchicai 
bishop of Kastoria during the 1900-7 period. Fearless and something of an organisational genius, he 
was primariiy responsible for the Hellenic effort in the region. Karavangelis' memoirs of this period are 
strikingly straightforward and make fascinating reading. For Braiisford's account of his interview with 
Karavangelis, see  Brailsford, 1906:191-3.
253Daikin, 1966:117-8.
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The struggle of Hellenism was carried out by small armed bands, which 
essentially received no aid from the Greek government, and only limited from private 
sources.254 This situation began to change after the death of Pavlos Melas, an army 
officer, prominent citizen and organiser of guerrilla activities in Ottoman Macedonia.255 
News of his fate had a  profound effect on public opinion.256 in the words of the patriot 
Ion Dragoumis: 'Pavlos Melas died...and the Greeks woke up/257 The result was a  more 
determined, organised and better funded Hellenic effort in Macedonia, aim ed at 
weakening Bulgarian military activities.258 The Greeks also attempted to persuade (or 
force), villages to abandon the Exarchate, as well as protect and support Greeks who 
were not afraid to claim a  Greek national identity and to inculcate it into those who 
felt only a  Greek Orthodox  identity.'259 By 1908 these activities had su cceed ed , at
a letter ttiat Pavlos tvlelas sent to Germanos Karavangelis, tie poignantly asserted wtiile referring to 
ttie Greek fvlinistry of Foreign Affairs ttiat 'ttiey are asleep.' Ttiis passage is cited in Karavangelis, n.d: 
42 Concerning ttie Greek struggle in Macedonia, ttie best account is probably Daikin, 1966. For on 
excellent analysis of ttie various studies of ttiis topic, see  Gounaris, 1997a.
2^ i^t was Melas' direct involvement in sucti activities ttiat caused tils violent deatti. An important and at 
times moving biograptiy of Melas was written by tiis wife, wtiicti is primariiy based on a  series of letters 
ttiat tier tiusband tiad sent to tier. See Mela, 1964. it stiouid also be noted ttiat Melas is considered a 
national tiero. His name is often given to streets, and tiis statue can be found in many cities. Patricia 
Storace tias correctly noted ttiat Melas' 'image is as famous in G reece as Davy Crockett's is in ttie 
United States' (Storace, 1996; 350).
2^ '^ ln Attiens, 'ail work stopped...everyone walked about mournfully in ttie streets and squares; and ttie 
ctiurcti bells toiled ttie passing of a national tiero' (Daikin: 1966:191). For an account of Melas' deatti 
and funeral, see Karavangelis, n.d: 60-71 
^^^Dragoumis, 1907/1992 9. For an exceptionally perceptive analysis of ttie life, ctiaracter and ultimately 
soul of Ion Dragoumis, see Evrigenis, 1961 See also Karakasidou, 1997b: 9 0 -2  
2^®See ibid: 103. For an important and illuminating collection of diplomatic documents from Greece's 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that refer to Greece's counterattack in Ottoman Macedonia during the years 
of 1905-6, see  Mouseio Makedonikou Agona, 1997.
^^^Koiiopouios, 1989: 209; emphasis in the original.
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least to the extent that they had prevented what later b ecam e Greek Macedonia 
from being lost.'26o
In July 1908, the Young Turk revolution took place. Carried out by army officers 
in Thessaloniki, it achieved the securing of a  constitution for the Empire, and this 
produced a  wave of optimism and much rejoicing in Macedonia. Significantly, the 
various guerrilla groups ceased  their activities, though hopes were soon met with 
disappointment. The Young Turk revolution turned out to be essentially nationalist in 
character, since its ultimate goals were not only to modernise the Empire, but also to 
'Ottomanise' it 'through the com plete abolition of the rights and privileges of the 
different ethnic groups.'^^i Soon after, guerrilla activities resumed.
The Young Turk revolution, far from arresting the disintegration of the Empire...at 
once accelerated  it.'262 Eventually, the Balkan states embarked upon the signing of 
bilateral alliances.^^s Serbia and Bulgaria signed one in March 1912, while G reece and 
Bulgaria followed in May.264 Finally, Montenegro joined in alliances with Serbia and 
Bulgaria in O c t o b e r . 2 6 5  Montenegro also started the First Balkan War by initiating armed 
hostilities in Macedonia in which Ottoman forces were outnumbered and eventually 
almost com pletely thrown out from the Peninsula. G reece m anaged to capture 
Thessaloniki, and Bulgaria was consoled with A d r ia n o p l e . 2 6 6  The May 1913 London 
Conference formalised the new status
260Dalkin, 1966: 475.
2'^^Carnegle Foundation, 1914/1993: 35.
262Kinross, 1964: 31
2<^ F^or an account of events In Macedonia between ttie Young Turk Revolution and ttie First Balkan War, 
see  Daikin, 1966: 382-421.
‘^^ '’See Map III for ttie territorial agreements included in ttie alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria. 
Significantly, the agreement between Greece and Bulgaria did not cover post-victory territorial 
settlements.
"^^ F^or an account of these alliances, see Jelavich, 1983: 97 and Vacalopoulos, 1992 347.
2^ *^ ln 1919 Adrianople was occupied by Greece. Since the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the city has belonged  
to Turkey. See Pettifer, 1997:182
‘^^ ^See Map IV for the London Conference territorial settlements.
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The victorious Balkan alliances were m ade possible because a  unifying 
common goai did exist; the overthrow of the Ottomans from the Peninsula. 
Nevertheless, there was considerable uncertainty and vagueness as regards the ways in 
which the newly liberated territories were to be divided am ong the victors. George F. 
Kennan has astutely observed that 'never...did any coalition of powers launch a  war on 
the basis of flimsier understandings among them about what it was they were fighting
f0r/268
Thus, despite the military victory in the First Balkan War and subsequent 
negotiations, 'the great problem of the division of Macedonia r e m a in e d . '2 6 9  Desiring a  
favourable resolution of this contentious issue, Bulgaria decid ed  to attack its former 
allies, and thus initiated the 1913 Second Balkan War. Without the support of any Great 
Power and facing a  variety of problems, Bulgaria had actually committed one of the 
greatest political and military blunders in modern history, and was thus soundly 
defeated.220 The August 1913 Treaty of Bucharest gave  G reece and Serbia 51,5 and 
38,4 per cent of Macedonia respectively; Bulgaria received a  paltry 10,1 per cent .221 
This was undoubtedly disappointing for a state that had once encom passed a  huge 
part of Macedonia, and had actively contested developments in the region for more 
than four decades.
The treaty of Bucharest created a  revanchist mentality amongst 
Bulgarians...for those in the territories now alienated who showed any sign of 
affiliation with Bulgaria or Bulgarian culture were dealt with harshly. This 
naturally complicated relations with Bulgaria's immediate neighbours and  
exposed  the Greek communities in Bulgaria itself.272
‘^^ ^Carnegie Foundation, 1914/1992 5.
Jelavich, 1983: 99. It should be noted that 'by the end of May 11913] the Greeks and Serbs had signed a 
secret agreennent to divide Macedonia west of the Vardar and to allow the fate of the areas east of 
that river to be determined by the principle of effective occupation' (Crampton: 1987: 61).
^^°See Crampton, 1987:61-2 and Jelavich, 1983: 99. It is also noteworthy that 'the Second Balkan w arxost 
more [Bulgarian] lives than the campaign against the Ottoman empire' (Ibid: 62).
^^^These figures are taken from Kofos, 1964: 44. See Map IV for the Bucharest Treaty territorial settlements.
2^2crampton, 1987: 63.
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Bulgaria's revisionism aimost certainiy influenced its siding witti ttie Central and Axis 
Powers in ttie two World Wars.
During ttie First World War, Bulgaria succeeded  in regaining parts of Greek and 
Serbian Macedonia, as well as Western Ttirace.^^^
Ttie Bulgarian occupation auttiorities in Greek eastern Macedonia...betiaved 
towards ttie Greek population witti brutality singulariy inappropriate in 
supposed liberators...30,000 people...died of tiunger, blows, and disease  
during ttie occupation...42,000 [were] deported to Bulgaria, and...l6,000...fled 
to Greece.2'74
After ttie defeat of ttie Central Powers, Bulgaria was once again forced to 
abandon its Macedonian conquests, a  development confirmed by ttie November 1919 
Treaty of Neuilly.^ '^  ^ A Greek-Bulgarian Convention was also signed, wtiicti allowed for 
ttie voluntary exctiange of populations between G reece and Bulgaria. As a  result, by 
1926 only som e 7 7 ,0 0 0  Bulgarians were ieft residing in Greek M a c e d o n ia . ^ 7 6
Map V for Bulgaria's conquests during the First World War. For an account of the events and 
consequences of the First Worid War in the Balkans, see Jelavich, 1983:106-33. For an exceilent analysis 
of Bulgaria's foreign policy concerning Western Thrace during the years 1919-23, see Stavrinou- 
Paximadopoulou, 1997.
Barker, 1950: 29-30; cited in Kofos, 1964: 41.
27®See Map VI for the boundaries of the Balkan states after the Treaty of Neuiily territorial settlements, as 
well as after the end of the First Worid War.
2^ *^ This number was provided by the League of Nations. According to the sam e source, there were 
119,000 Bulgarians (the national classification belongs to the League of Nations), residing in Greece in 
1912 See Kofos, 1964: 47. Other accounts put the number to 2 0 0 ,0 0 0  (Close and Veremis, 1993: 98), or 
even 2 4 0 ,0 0 0  (see Rossos, 1991 285). However, Kofos probably concludes correctly that Greece [was] 
the most homogeneous state in the Balkans, if not of the entire Eastern Europe' (Kofos, 1964: 47). This 
was aided by the fact that more than one million Greeks had left their ancestral homes in Asia Minor, 
following the conclusion of the 1922 Greek-Turkish War, and the signing of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. 
Almost half a million refugees relocated in Greek Macedonia. See Karakasidou, 1997b: 145; Koiiopoulos, 
1997: 51 and Voutira, 1997:119.
73
c. The Communist Factor.
The interwar years saw the rise in importance of communist forces, who quickly 
m oved to exploit national antagonisms and tensions in Macedonia.277 in March 1924 
the Balkan Communist Federation passed a  resolution declaring that a  united and  
autonomous Macedonia is now the slogan of the Macedonians in all corners of their 
Fatherland, which is covered in ruins/^ s^ This resolution was approved after the 
exercise of heavy Bulgarian pressure, and despite the misgivings of the Greek and 
Serbian communist parties.
The Balkan Communist Federation's position on Macedonia was endorsed at the 
May-June 1924 Fifth Comintern Congress, and was praised as wholly correct and truly 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y . '2 '7 9  Furthermore, the policy implications were clarified:
The Communist Parties and the Balkan Federation must support to the utmost 
the national-revolutionary movement of the oppressed nationalities of 
M acedonia and Thrace fo r  the creation o f  independent republics?^^
In other words, the territorial settlements reached in the Treaty of Bucharest were 
directly challenged, which in turn helps to explain the Bulgarian attempt to persuade 
the Comintern to accep t such a  revisionist (and of course revolutionary) p o l i c y .
The KKE's agreem ent to the Comintern's policy on Macedonia amounted to 
calling for the loss of Greek territory, and caused a  major split within the party's
interwar years also witnessed IMRO's decline. Ttie reasons for its decline are succinctly and 
expertly summarised in Barker, 1950: 45.
2^®Cited in ibid.: 52  On ttie Balkan Communist Federation, see Kofos, 1964: 69.
2^^Cited in Barker, 1950: 58.
2®0|bid.; emptiasis added.
2®’Apparently, Bulgarian communists utilised several arguments in order to persuade ttie Comintern. See 
Kofos, 1964: 76.
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ranks.282 it also reduced its popular appeal and prompted tlie intensification of state  
anti-communist p e r s e c u t i o n . : ^ ^ ]  Ttie pligtit of Greece's communists was only alleviated  
in 1935, when the Comintern was almost exclusively preoccupied with the rise and 
dangers of Europe's Nazi and Fascist regimes. Thus, as regards Macedonia, the KKE 
introduced the slogan of 'com plete equality for the minorities" which would remain 
the party's policy until the final and dramatic stages of the Greek Civil War.^ s^
The Civil War was preceded by the Greek-ltalian war, and the 6 April 1941 Nazi 
invasion and subsequent occupation of Greece.^ss Although the origins and history of 
the Greek involvement in the Second World War are well-known and docum ented, of 
relevance to this study is that following the Nazi conquest, Bulgaria (which had joined 
the Axis Powers), was awarded parts of Greek Macedonia and Thrace.286 Bulgaria's 
King Boris III declared triumphantly:
Thanks to this cooperation [with the Germans and the Italians] M acedonia 
and Thrace, these lands which have been so loyal to Bulgaria, which have  
been unjustly detached from her, and for which Bulgaria has been com pelled
protracted debate and power struggle took place wlttiin ttie KKE, before the Comintern's policy on 
f/tacedonia was accepted. A comprehensive and definitive account of this struggle can be found in 
Dangas and Leontiades, 1997:11-91.
2®3see Kofos, 1964.: 78-84.
2®"’Cited In Ibid: 91.
2®^Some parts of Greece were occupied by Italy.
2®'^ See Map VI! for Bulgaria's territorial conquests during the Second World War. For Mussolini's decision to 
conquer Greece, see Averof-Tositsa, 1996: 52 and Jelavich, 1983: 227-8. For an analysis of Metaxas' 
statesmanship during this period that culminated with the rejection of an Italian ultimatum on 28 
October 1940, see ibid.: 228-9 and especially Koliopoulos, 1994: 137-245. The latter study, based  
primarily on British sources, corrects many misperceptions and myths. Concerning the resistance of 
Greek forces to the Nazi Blitzkrieg, it must be stressed that they exhibited tremendous valour. Thus, 
the Germans, 'in token of respect to the enemy had insisted that the Greek officers should keep  their 
swords. That was to be almost the last gesture of chivalry between warriors in a war imminently fated 
to descend into barbarism' (Keegan, 1989: 158). For an excellent study of occupied Greece, see  
Mazower 1993. The damages caused to Greece's economy and infrastructure as a result of the Nazi 
occupation are succinctly summarised in E Kathimerini. 14 December 1997: 24.
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to m ake innumerous sacrifices in the span of three generations, have now 
returned to the fold of the Bulgarian Motherland's^
importantly, Bulgaria's occupation forces exhibited again tremendous brutality. 'A 
German report of the time described the Bulgarian occupation as 'a  regime of terror 
which can only be described os Balkan."2ss
In occupied Greece, a  resistance movement was soon organised. Some groups 
were right-wing (most notably- the National Democratic Greek League-EDES), though it 
was the KKE that becam e the major resistance force. The party took advantage of the 
political vacuum, utilised its experience from operating in a clandestine way and 
su cceed ed  in setting up EAM (National Liberation Front), and its military wing ELAS 
(National Popular Liberation Army).2S9 Although not everyone associated with EAM was 
a  communist, the organisation was ultimately controlled by the KKE^ o^
Within EAM/ELAS, os Evongelos Kofos has analysed, there were also
Slavophones, not only of the Greek faction, but also persons who distanced  
themselves both from the Greek and the Bulgarian factions...[Thus] the 
traditional dichotomy of Slavophones [pro-Greek and pro-Bulgarian] 
gradually grew into a  trichotomy.^^i
In order to exploit this situation, the KKE established the Slav Macedonian 
Popular Liberation Front (SNOF) in November 1943.292 There were important reasons why 
SNOF's creation was considered advantageous for ELAS' armed struggle. First of all, it 
allowed the recruitment of additional forces, particularly from Western Greek 
Macedonia. Recruitment was also increased by the fact that SNOF operated as a  way
287cited in Kofos, 1964:100.
288poulton, 1991/1993:177.
289King George 11, as well as many leading politicians had left Greece.
290see Averof-Tositsa, 1996:168 and Koliopoulos, 1995a: 102-3. EAM did not openly espouse or promote a 
Marxist revolutionary agenda. See Smith, 1993: 59-60. Significantly, none of the words contained in EAM 
suggested Marxist goals or ideology.
29iKofos, 1989b: 7.
292on the SNOF, see Barker, 110-2; Kofos, 1964:123-27 and Koliopoulos, 1995a: 113-38.
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of ' r e b a p t i s e m e n t / 2 9 3  Compromised individuals who had fought or collaborated with 
the Bulgarians, were given a  chance to enter the communist struggle via SNOF, and 
thus save themselves from r e t r i b u t io n s . ^ 9 4  Furthermore, SNOF's creation was in 
accordance with the wishes of the leadership of Yugoslavia's communist partisans, who 
under the guidance of Josip Broz {nom de guerre Tito), had at that point b ecom e the 
most powerful communist force in the Balkans.295
As regards Macedonia, Tito aimed at the very least to maintain the part that 
belonged to Yugoslavia. Fie also entertained thoughts of uniting parts of Bulgarian and 
Greek Macedonia 'under his own aegis,' a fact that once again demonstrates the 
importance that Macedonia has played in the international politics of the Balkans.296 
Tito's intentions were partly expressed in the 2 August 1943 creation of the Anti-Fascist 
Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM).^ ?^ on  that day, ASNOM 
declared; Macedonians under Bulgaria and Greece! The unification of the entire 
Macedonian people depends on your participation in the gigantic anti-Fascist f r o n t . '^ ^ s  
ASNOM's declarations form part of the basis on which the Socialist Republic of 
M acedonia (and subsequently FYROM), was founded. Significantly, they clearly reveal
293Koliopoulos, 1995a: 127.
interesting example of Tebaptisement' at work is given in a 1944 report of a  British officer. He 
refers to a  komitadji who had brutally murdered at least one Greek civilian, and then essentially 
received immunity by joining ELAS. In this particular case however, it is probable that some sort of 
'justice was eventually enforced. See Rossos, 1991 301
295see Barker, 1950:110. Apparently, Tito's emissary Tempo was instrumental in the creation of the SNOF. 
As regards Tito, numerous books and articles have been published. Of the more recent ones, the 
interested reader should consult Pavlowitch, 1992 who offers a brief and highly critical appraisal of 
Tito's career. West, 1994 is written in an engaging style and is particularly good in covering Tito's 
Second World War years. For a  somewhat conventional though comprehensive and well-written 
biography, see Ridley, 1994.
2%Barker, 1950: 83.
297The date was significant, since 2 August is llinden. ASNOM was created by 'the 'Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of Macedonia' (promoted from the former 'Regional Committee for Macedonia 
of the Yugoslav Communist Part" (ibid.: 93).
298cited in Poulton, 1995:105-6.
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ASNOM's irredentist ctiaracter and goals. For exam ple, on 4 August 1944 ASNOM 
proclaimed ttie following:
People of Macedonia!
In the course of three years of combat you have achieved your unity ...With 
the participation of the entire Macedonian nation against the Fascist 
occupiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece you will achieve unification of 
ail parts of Macedonia, divided in 1915 and 1918 by Balkan im p e r ia l i s t s . 2 9 9
These irredentist goals eventually cam e to represent a  significant aspect of 
the dispute between G reece and FYROM. Suspected adherence to these goals also 
caused friction between ELAS and SNOF during the final stages of the Second World 
War. As liberation approached, the KKE felt that SNOF forces had adopted  a  
secessionist policy on Greek Macedonia that was not consistent with the party's 
position. SNOF was also suspected for being more loyal to Tito than to the KKE As a  
result, ELAS and SNOF clashed militarily, and the letter's forces were expelled from 
G reece in October 1944.^ 00 By November, the Germans had also left the country.
In December, there were bloody clashes in Athens between communist and 
government supporters.3oi The KKE was defeated, primarily because of the intervention 
of British forces. The February 1945 Varkiza agreement provided for the demobilisation 
of all armed units.^02 Despite it however, the country did not m anage to avoid the 
descent into civil war.^ o^
299citecl in ibid.: 106. See also ASNOM's 29 November 1949 declaration at ttie Jajce Conference. Ttie 
crucial passages can be found in Kofos, 1964:117.
^°°See Close, 1995: 75. Some limited clasties between EAM and SNOF also took p lace In November 1944.
^°^Ttiese events are known as the Dekemvriana (the December events). For an account, see Baerentzen 
and Close, 1993: 84-92; Close, 1995: 137-49, as well as the somewhat idiosyncratic and certainly 
controversial analysis in Mazower, 1993: 340-54. See also Winston S. Churchill's intriguing remarks on 
Stalin's stance during the December events that can be found in Churchill, 1953: 369.
302see Jelavich, 1983: 283.
^^^Numerous books have been written on the Greek Civil War. Of particular merit are Close, 1993; 
latrides, 1981 and Woodhouse, 1976.
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As was the case  with the two Balkan and World Wars, the Macedonian Question 
also proved of central significance to the Greek Civil WarP^ Its importance was 
initially related to the creation by Tito in April 1945 of the National Liberation Front 
(NOF).305 It was comprised primarily by former SNOF members, and acted  as the 
instrument of the Yugoslav plans in Greek M a c e d o n i a / ^ o e  n q f  d i d  not honour the 
Varkiza agreem ent and engaged in periodic guerrilla activities in Greek Macedonia. In 
November 1946, NOFs forces were integrated with those of the KKE's military wing, the 
Democratic Army of Greece (DSE).^ 07
During the Civil War, the DSE m anaged to control various villages and 
mountainous regions, though almost all cities and towns remained under constant 
government control. Despite Tito's backing of the KKE, government forces received  
substantially more aid from the Eventually, during the 1948/9 winter, communist 
activities were essentially limited to parts of Western Greek Macedonia.
Facing an acute recruitment problem, the DSE was forced to rely heavily upon 
Slav-Macedonians. It has been estimated that they represented som e 14 ,000  out of 
the DSE's total of 2 0 ,0 0 0  s o ld ie r s . ^ 0 9  Given their important role, the KKE's General 
Secretary Nikos Zachariades proceeded to change his party's policy on Greek 
Macedonia. At the KKE's Fifth Plenum on 31 January 1949, the following resolution was 
passed:
Kofos, 1989b: 3.
the NOF see Barker, 1950:118-8; Kofos, 1989b: 17-21 and Koliopoulos, 1995b: 25, 31 and 146-69. 
306Kofos, 1964:107.
°^^For the text of the agreement that integrated NOF with the DSE, see Sfetas, 1996: 220-1.
^°®See Close and Veremis, 1993:108.
^°^See Woodhouse, 1976: 262 In agreement with this estimate are Close and Veremis, 1993: 120; 
Koliopoulos, 1995b: 221 and Rossos, 1991: 307 fn 54. Richard Clogg however, states that 'by 1949 as 
much as 4 0  per cent of the [DSE] was com posed of Slav Macedonians' (Clogg, 1992 141). Sfetas 
estimates the by the end of 1948, half of the DSE fighters were Slav-Macedonians. See Sfetas, 1996: 228. 
Despite these different estimates by various scholars, there is essentially consensus that a  substantial 
and crucial percentage of the KKE's fighting force was comprised by Slav-Macedonians.
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The Macedonian people are distinguishing themselves, and there must be no 
doubt that after the liberation, they will find their national restoration as they 
wish it. Various elements which are trying to break the unity between the 
Slav-M acedonia and Greek peoples should be guarded against. This unity 
should be presented as 'the pupil of the eye' and should be reinforced and 
strengthened firmly and continuously.
Any ambiguity was clarified in a statement that was broadcast by the KKE's 
radio station 'Free Greece':
The Second Conference of the NOF...will declare the union of Macedonia into 
a  com plete, independent, and equal Macedonian nation within the Popular 
Democratic Federation of the Balkan peoples.^u
This policy advocated  the secession of national Greek territory, and was thus viewed 
by government forces as t r e a s o n o u s . ^ ^ ^  However, it was never implemented, since in 
August 1949 the DSE was soundly defeated in the mountainous battlefields of Grammos 
and Vitsi.
D. The Contentious Em ergence of FYROM.
The People's (subsequently Socialist), Republic of Macedonia b ecam e a  part of 
the Yugoslav Federation in 1944. in the years after the end of the Greek Civil War, a  
passionate and sensitive debate emerged between Greece and Yugoslavia (and later 
FYROM), concerning human rights, propaganda and irredentist claims. Evaluating the 
validity of all the various charges is beyond the scope and intentions of this thesis. The 
aim of this section will simply be to present (at their proper dimension), som e of the
^^ *^ Cited in Barker, 1950:119. Important passages from Zachariades' speech at the KKE's Fifth Plenum that 
both preceded and provided the guideiines for the passage of this resolution can be found in Sfetas, 
1996: 231-2 For Zachariades' expianation of this decision after the conciusion of the Civil War, see ibid: 
234.
^^ ^Cited in Barker, 1950:120.
’^^ The KKE eventually abandoned and condemned this poiicy. See Kofos, 1964: 221-3.
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most contentious issues that heip expioin the dispute between FYROM and G reece that 
will be covered in the following chapters.
One of the greatest issues of contention has centred on the numbers, treatment 
and national identity of Slavophones residing in Greek Macedonia. Some have claim ed  
that a  minority of one million 'Macedonians' [i.e. people with a  FYROM national identity] 
reside in Greece, though other reports reduce this number s u b s t o n t i a l l y . ^ i ^
At this point, it should be stressed that it is generally accep ted  that
The nation-state building process [in Greek Macedonia] has been enormously 
successful. Most of the inhabitants today, regardless of their ethnic 
background and how they or their ancestors might have defined themselves 
one hundred or even fifty years ago, conceive themselves now as nothing 
less than Greek.^i^
There are important reasons why this is the case. First of all, many Slavophones lacking 
a  Greek national identity abandoned Greece after the end of the Second Balkan War. 
Secondly, during the Metaxas dictatorship (1936-41) a  series of repressive measures 
aiming at forced assimilation were token, and there was further repression during the 
Colonel's dictatorship (1967-74), though oil Greek citizens suffered from it. i^s
the million-strong estimate, see Poulton, 1995:171 The US Department of State alleges the existence 
of only 2 0 ,0 0 0  to 5 0 ,0 0 0  Slavophones, and Is furthermore silent on their national identity. See US 
Department of State, 1991:1166-1175. See also MRG Greece et al, 1994:14-5 for other estimates. It should 
also be stressed that an Internationally binding definition of the concept of minority still does not exist' 
(Stavros, 1995: 9). Perhaps the most commonly accepted  definition is the one by Francesco Capotorti. 
He defines a  minority as a  group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of the State, in a 
non-dominant position, whose members—being nationals of the State—possess ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population, and show, if only implicitly, a  
sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language (Ibid.). The 
major weakness of this definition is its failure to give a more precise indication about the numerical 
strength required in order for a group to constitute a minority.
’^^ Karakasidou, 1993a: 5. See also Danforth, 1995:116; Karakasldou, 1997a: 92 and Karakasidou, 1997b: 21-2 
'^^ For repressive measures during the Metaxas dictatorship, see Carabott, 1997; Close, 1995: 51; Gounaris, 
1997b: 104 and Karakasidou, 1997b: 187. For example, Slavophones were sometimes harassed for not 
speaking Greek, and there was also compulsory night schooling In Greek history and language. For the 
general repression during the Colonel's dictatorship, see Kofos, 1992 274.
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The consequences of the Greek Civil War must also be analysed. As previously 
stated, many Slavophones had been associated with the KKE and the NOF. Following 
their defeat, and fearing retributions, some 3 5 ,0 0 0  left Greece.^i^ Thus, the 1951 Greek 
census indicated that 'Slavophones had diminished from 86,086 [in 1940] to 41,017.'3i? 
Finally, the practice of intermarriage has also contributed to the Greek national identity 
of the country's Slavophones.^is
The exact number of Slavophones residing in G reece today and having a  pro- 
FYROM national identity is almost impossible to e s t i m a t e .^ |p  the 1993 elections for the 
European Parliament, the Rainbow Party (with a  heavy emphasis on human rights issues) 
that was close to representing such a  viewpoint received 7,263 votes, representing an 
insignificant 0,1 per cent of the total vote.^^o in the 1996 general election, the Rainbow 
Party fielded common candidates with a  party called the Organisation for the 
Reconstruction of the KKE (OAKKE), and received 3,485 votes (0 ,0 5  per cent of the 
total), 2 ,0 0 0  of which in Greek Macedonia.32i It is possible that these voters 
constitute the "hard" electoral core of [their party].'322
Kofos, 1964:186 and MRG Greece et cl 1994:13. Almost certainly Implausibly, FYROM sources claim 
ttiat tlie exodus Involved some 213,000 people. See Human RIgtits Watch/Helsinki, 1994: 8.
^'^Close, 1993a: 10. Significantly, many of ttie Slavophones who remained in Greece had cooperated with 
the right-wing authorities against the KKE and supported the maintaining of a  unified Greek state. See 
Theodoropoulos et al, 1995: 45.
^^ ®See Angelopoulos, 1997.
^'^See Gounaris, 1997b: 107.
^20see MRG Greece et al, 1994:16.
32’se e  Mihailidis, 1997: 141 fn 21 and Eleftherotypia. 24 September 1996: 25. It is interesting to compare 
these numbers with the some 2 0 ,0 0 0  Filipinos and 5 0 ,0 0 0  Poles residing in Athens alone. See E 
Kathimerini. 25 May 1997: 27.
^22Mihailidis, 1997:141 fn 21 This is certainly a far cry from claims of a million-strong group. Thus, it can at 
least b e concluded that 'it is debatable whether this group (although a  vocal one) is numerically so 
strong as to warrant the creation of separate educational Institutions; according to international 
standards, a minority population needs to be sufficiently numerous for such a  demand to b e justified' 
(Roudometof, 1996: 272). It should be pointed out however, that Roudometof is not explicitly referring 
to the Rainbow Party and its supporters.
82
In addition to numerical disagreements, ttie Greek government tias been  
consistently accused  of tiuman rigtits violations.^^  ^ One of ttie most frequent 
accusations refers to a  law passed in 1982 ailowing ttie return of all Greeks by genus 
[origin] wtio during ttie Civil War of 1946-1949 and because of it tiad fled abroad as 
political r e f u g e e s / 3 2 4  jtiis stipulation forbids ttie return of people wtio declare a  non- 
Greek nationality .325
Ttie Greek government tias also been accused for not permitting special 
minority educational arrangements, as well as for rejecting an application to create a 
'Centre for Macedonian C u l t u r e . '3 2 6  Furttiermore, there have been som e four cases of
323por a more com plete presentation of accusations against the Greek government, see Danforth, 1995: 
108-41; Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1994; Karakasidou 1993a; MRG Greece et al, 1994; Poulton, 
1991/1993:173-92 and Poulton, 1995:162-71 See also Pollis 1992 and Stavros, 1995.
324ihis translation of the Greek law is cited in Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1994: 27. See also Danforth, 
1995:122 and Eleftherotypia. 17 May 1997: 26-7.
325Apparently, this law has recently been relaxed. During my visit to Skopje, 1 met a woman who had 
left her village in Greece in 1949 at the age of ten. She was sent by forces ioyal to the KKE to Hungary, 
while her parents were sent to Poland and Romania. After years of efforts, the family managed to re­
unite in the Soviet Union. This woman was first allowed to visit Greece again in April 1997. A somewhat 
ingenious solution (which I witnessed), was practised at the Greek border. A temporary visa was given 
to her, in which she wrote her name not in Slavic as it appeared in her passport but in Greek. It also 
happened that this was the name with which she was born, and was used by her until she left Greece 
in 1949. At any rate, the result was that the woman was allowed to go and visit a  relative in Athens. It 
is also worthwhile reporting that some prominent Greek politicians suggested to me that the 1982 law 
might change in the near future. However, the country's government has recently altered the border 
visa arrangements, and m ade them somewhat tougher. Visas will now have to be obtained at the 
Greek mission at Skopje, and not at the border. See Exousia. 9 October 1997: 6. More than 1 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0  
visas have been granted to FYROM citizens wishing to visit Greece since October 1995! See 
Eleftherotypia. 23 December 1998: 4.
326por the rejection of the centre's creation, see Danforth, 1995:128-9 and Human Rights Watch/Heisinki, 
1994: 20-1  For the adjudication of this cose by the European Court of Human Rights, see  Exousia. 11 July 
1998: 6. Concerning accusations for not permitting minority educational arrangements, see  Human 
Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1994: 37-44. The issue of whether a Macedonian language exists constitutes an 
important part of this debate. For a discussion of this issue, see loannidou, 1997.
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human right activists who have been brought to trial on various chargesP^? However, 
with one exception, charges have either been dropped, or the courts have issued
acquittals.328
While denying accusations of human rights violations, the Greek government 
has charged Yugoslavia (and then FYROM), for falsifying ancient Greek history, 
conducting hostile propaganda and making irredentist claims.329 As regards the 
Greeks, probably the most infuriating practice involves what is considered to b e  the 
unjust appropriation of the history of the ancient Macedonians. In numerous FYROM 
publications, maps and school textbooks, the claim has been m ade that they were not 
Greek.330 This issue is not merely of historical significance, since the seriousness of the 
Greek reaction which will be described in this thesis, possibly intends 'to proclaim that
^27see Danforth, 1995: 116-25 and Vlosidis and Karakostanoglou, 1995: 165. Many of these human rights 
activists are actually considered by the Greek government to be foreign agents. For example, in an 
interview on 23 December 1996, Papaconstantinou pointed out that a prominent activist (Mr 
Sidiropoulos), while virtually penniless, has managed to continually travel around the world expressing 
his views. The implication was that he was receiving funding from sources (or countries), that do not 
share Greece's Macedonian policies.
^28see Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1994: 23-4. The exception that is often mentioned, is that of Father 
Tsarknias. See ibid: 53 and MRG Greece et al, 1994:17. The source of some of his legal troubles was 
that he was defrocked. However, he was not defrocked because of any human rights activities, but 
was actually 'convicted in an ecclesiastical court on charges of homosexuality and disobedience to 
his superiors' (Danforth, 1995: 133). Importantly, the critical to the Greek government Human Rights 
Watch/Helsinki report concludes that the organisation does not know of any ethnic Macedonian who is 
currently serving a prison sentence for the peaceful expression of his or her views' (Human Rights 
Watch/Helsinki, 1994: 25). See also Phaedon John Kozyris' brief but extremely critical review of Human 
Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1994 in the Journal of Modern Greek Studies. Vol. 14, No. 2 (October 1996): 358-61.
2^9por an account of several instances of friction between Greece and Yugoslavia over Macedonia, see  
Mertzos, 1992 403-46.
^ °^For an impressive analysis of FYROM's school textbooks dealing with this issue, see  Kofos, 1994a: 14-20. 
See also Kofos, 1976:14-7. Perhaps the most popular Greek response is Mortis, 1983. For a  more scholarly 
and comprehensive effort, see  Sakelariou, 1994: 30-191.
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the nam e [and history] of Macedonia is an integral part of Greek identity and that no 
one can claim to be a Macedonian without being Greek/^^i
FYROM has further been accused  for irredentist propaganda (usually taking the 
form of maps depicting a Macedonian state that includes parts of Greece), that have 
appeared in schoolbooks, calendars, and even labels on alcoholic drinks-^ z^ jh e  Greek 
government also considered as containing possible irredentist claims several articles of 
FYROM's constitution that was adopted on 2 0  November 1991.333 More specifically, the 
constitution's Preamble was contentious because it claimed to rest (among various 
events), upon the statehood-legal traditions of the Krusevo Republic and the historical 
decisions of the Antifascist Assembly of the People's Liberation of Macedonia 
[ASNOM].'334 The Krusevo Republic was related to the llinden uprising that partly took 
place in territories that comprise contemporary Greek Macedonia. As regards ASNOM, 
its irredentist character was analysed previously.
G reece also objected to Article 3 because it implied that 'the only changes 
that can take place in the territory of [FYROM] are changes of annexation of new 
territories.'335 in other words, it was presumed that Article 3 provided legal sanctioning 
to any future annexations. Finally, there was Greek disagreement to Article 49, which 
stated that the republic takes care of the status and rights of the members of the 
Macedonian people in neighbouring countries.'336 This was perceived as a  call to 
interfere with Greek domestic politics, and was considered even more provocative 
given the fact that the government and all major political parties do not recognise the 
existence of such a  minority in their country. Eventually, as will be shown in the next
33iRoudometof, 1996: 284. See also Kofos, 1986:168.
332$ee Appendix L
333por a comprehensive analysis of FYROM's constitution, see  Tzonos, 1994. See also Hayden, 1992 659-60  
and Kofos, 1994b.
33^Cited in ibid: 48.
335see ibid.: 48.
336|bidj 49.
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chapter, Greek pressure and criticisms resulted to both Articles 3 and 49 being 
am ended by FYROM's Parliament's^
E. G re ec e  an d  FYROM: An Account of Common Interests.
Despite the controversies and contentious issues between G reece and FYROM, 
it is crucial to present also the common interests that are shared by both countries. 
More specifically and for obvious reasons, FYROM's government did not want the war 
that had broken out in Croatia and later in Bosnia to spread within their republic's 
b o r d e r s . s 3 8  it is of extreme importance that the Greek, as well as all ERG governments, 
shared precisely the sam e d e s i r e . s s 9  This probably constitutes the most important 
common interest between the two states.
Thus, Greece's President Konstantinos Karamaniis explained in a  letter to EC 
leaders on 24 November 1992 that his country has an interest in the maintenance of 
[FYROM's] independence and territorial integrity.'s^o |n an interview, the then Prime 
Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis noted that his country had absolutely nothing to gain 
from FYROM's dissolution, especially since G reece had 'no [geopolitical and economic] 
conflict of interests' with the young republic.s4i Former Foreign Minister Michalis 
Papaconstantinou in agreement with this analysis, pointed out that had there been a  
war in FYROM, the results would have been disastrous for Greece.s^^ Similarly, former 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs loannis Tzounis declared that 'if this state did not
ss^The amendments were inserted on 6 January 1992, and can be found in ibid.
ss^Ttiis point was stressed in all ttie interviews that were conducted with FYROM officials for the purposes 
of this thesis.
ss^This fact concerning EPC's member states was readily acknowledged in almost ail of the interviews 
that were conducted for this thesis. 
s^°This passage from Karamaniis' letter can be found in Valenakes and Dales, 1994:109. 
s^nterview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997. 
s^^ i^nterview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996.
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exist, we should have invented it;'343 and in a  previously unpublished address to his EPC
counterparts on 17 February 1992, former Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras stated that 
It is in our interest to have a  small, but truly independent state as a  
neighbour, than a  big and powerful one. Such a  state would serve our 
concern, and the concerns of the Community, for stability in the region.344
There are several reasons that explain this unusual level of agreem ent between  
Greek p o l i t i c ia n s . 3 4 5  Perhaps most importantly, they feared that a  war in FYROM could 
have eventually escalated into a  Third Balkan War.^ ^^  Apparently, the then leader of 
the Opposition Andreas Papandreou was also fully aware of this potential scenario. He 
later succinctly summarised its implications by stating that the 'irony of this [dispute] is 
that we have every interest that [FYROM] does not disintegrate because this will mean 
a Balkan War.'^ ?^
Misha Glenny has pointed out that Greeks were particularly apprehensive 
about the consequences of such a  war, fearing that
The eventual outcom e (after fighting more bloody than in Bosnia) would 
probably be the consolidation of a  Greater Albania and a Greater Bulgaria 
on Greece's northern border and a  concomitant increase in Turkish influence 
(via Albania) in the region.^^s
^^^Interview with Mr Tzounis on 14 Aprii 1997.
^ '^^See Appendix IV.
'^^ S^imilar arguments concerning Greece's interest in the war not spreading to FYROM were m ade in 
interviews with Ms Damanaki on 30  January 1997, Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997, Mr Lengeris on 27 August 
1997, Mr Papayannakis on 10 January 1997 and Mr Skilakakis on 15 April 1997.
"^^ "^ The possibility of a Balkan War was also accepted  by FYROM's former (until late November 1998) 
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Dimovski, during an interview on 29 September 1997. His ultimate 
argument was that FYROM's existence was in Greece's interest.
^"•^Cited in Kyrkos, 1994; 19. Papandreou's statement was m ade on 13 January 1994. When asked to 
comment on this statement, Mitsotakis said that he was in com plete agreement, and suggested that 
he had also summarised the dangers from the war spreading to FYROM in a  very similar, if not identical 
way. The implication was that Papandreou had 'borrowed' this analysis from Mitsotakis (interview with 
Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997).
^^^Glenny, 1996:143.
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The possibility of a  war taking place within FYROM's borders (with all its 
potential results), was not considered by the Greek government a  mere theoretical 
possibility. In an interview, Papaconstantinou revealed that contingency plans had 
been prepared, in order to deal with what was exp ected  to be a  w ave of refugees 
from FYROM and possibly Albania.349
Another area of common interests between FYROM and G reece involves the 
realm of economics. The resoiution of the dispute with Greece would have produced 
substantial financial benefits for FYROM, since as a  recognised republic it would have 
been allowed to receive much needed assistance from various international 
organisations such as the international Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This is 
proved by the fact that after the dispute with G reece was partially resolved with the 
signing on 13 September 1995 of an Interim Agreement, FYROM m anaged to secure 55 
million US dollars from the IMF and 99 million US doilars from the World Bank.^ o^
Being a  land-locked country, FYROM would have also been able to use the 
strategically located port of Thessaloniki.^^i In the words of FYROM's former Vice 
President of the government Mr Risteski: 'we have no access to the sea...Close 
econom ic relations with G reece are a must...Greece is an ideal area for trade.'^^z 
FYROM could have benefited from Greek investment and perhaps even used its 
neighbour as a  market for surpius iabour. Furthermore, given the resolution of the 
dispute, the costs associated with the various trade restrictions and the oil embargo 
that were imposed by Greece (and will be analysed in subsequent chapters), would 
have cea sed  to exist.
^^9|ntervlew with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996.
^^°These figures are taken from Doudoumis, 1996:123. See also Perry, 1992a: 44; Perry 1992b: 12 and Perry, 
1997: 263. The Interim Agreement can be found and is analysed in Rozakis, 1996.
35isee Economides, 1995:114.
2®2|nterview with Mr Risteski on 29 September 1997. Essentially the sam e argument was m ade in interviews 
with all FYROM officials. More recently, FYROM officials were quoted characterising Greece as a  
'strategic investor' and a 'strategic ally' as regards the realm of economics. See Eleftherotypia. 23 
December 1998: 4.
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Normalised relations between ttie two states would have also produced 
econom ic benefits for Greece—a fact that was recognised by most major Greek 
declslon-makers.353 it has even been argued by Papaconstantinou that his state's 
econom ic penetration could potentially be of such a  magnitude, that FYROM could 
fall within [Its] sphere of lnterest'354 it must be explained that trade with FYROM has a  
particular significance for the econom y of Northern GreeceP^^ Furthermore, Greek 
products have a comparative advantage, as a  result of factors such as
Geographic location and reduced transportation costs. This advantage Is 
further strengthened from the considerable recognition and accep tan ce  that 
Greek products have from [FYROM's] c o n s u m e r s .3 5 6
Greece's relatively large and consistent trade surpluses with FYROM can  
perhaps be submitted as further evidence of Its comparative advantage over 
FYROM.357 Greek companies have also exhibited Important econom ic activity In the 
new republic. It has been estimated that since September 1995, their Investments have 
been worth 250  million US dollars.^^» As a  result, G reece has becom e the largest direct 
Investor In FYROM.'359
^^^Interviews with Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1996, Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantinou 
on 23 December 1996, Mr Papathemelis on 11 January 1997, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996 and Mr 
Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
^^^Interview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996.
^^^See Valden, 1996:198.
^^ "^ Saritza, 1996: 239. The same argument was m ade almost verbatim by the Director of FYROM's Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Directorate of Economic Affairs Ms Vasileva, during an interview on 29 September 
1997. Perhaps more significantly, FYROM's current Prime Minister Ljupco Georgievski concurred with this 
analysis during an interview in which he invited Greek investment, stating as advantages '[geographic] 
proximity...low labour costs_[and] access [via FYROM] to the markets of neighbouring states' (To Vimo. 
2 0  December 1998: A36).
^^^See Table II
^^®See E Kathimerini. 23 December 1998:1.
359ibid.
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More specifically, Greek companies have bought one of FYROM's biggest 
tob acco  companies, are attempting to buy FYROM's biggest bank, and have begun 
establishing a  supermarket chain.^6o Furthermore, they have invested in the fields of 
mining, m eat processing, beer brewing and cem ent p r o d u c t i o n . ^ ^ i  More recently, there 
have been  negotiations and discussions concerning the construction of an oil pipeline 
connecting Skopje with Thessaloniki, cooperation in the production of electricity, as 
well as the expansion of certain railway lines between the two countriesP^^
On the basis of the above analysis, it can be concluded that important 
econom ic interests were shared between the two neighbouring states. Furthermore, 
both G reece and FYROM (as well as all EPC member states), shared the desire to avoid  
the war from spreading to the new republic. The existence of these common interests 
satisfies institutionalism's most crucial condition and hence allows the theory to be  
applied to the events that will be analysed next. These common interests also add an 
interesting perspective to what eventually b ecam e a  particularly contentious dispute.
Eleftherotypia. 9 October 1996:11; Exousia. 9 May 1997:1; Exousia. 13 May 1997: 31 and Ependytis. 25 
October 1997:15. For a brief account of investment plans that Greek companies have for FYROM see  
Eleftherotypia. 2 November 1996: 4 and To Vima. 13 October 1996: D15.
See E Kathimerini. 27 December 1998: 5.
•^^ S^ee ibid.
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CHAPTER 4
THE POLITICS OF GREEK COOPERATION; 
June 1991-January 1992
This is the hour of Europe.
-Jacques Poos, Luxembourg's Minister of Foreign Affairs, 27 June 1991.
A. Y ugoslavia D isintegrates, EPC M ediates and  G reece  C ooperates.
The end of the Second World War found Marshall Tito and his communist 
partisans in control of Yugoslavia, which consisted of six republics: Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Siovenia.363 in addition to outright 
suppression and propaganda, Tito attem pted to bridge ethnic differences by creating 
a  state with a  strong centralised government (untii 1974, when more powers passed to 
the republics), and by allowing a somewhat liberalised economy. His break with Stalin 
and the subsequent pursuit of a  high profile non-aligned foreign policy m ade him 
popular at home, and won sympathy (and financial aid) from the West. Yugoslavia 
b ecam e particularly prosperous (by socialist standards), with an average annual 
econom ic growth [for the years 1965-89] of 6,3 per cent.'^ ^^
Despite its apparent affluence and stability, the country was actually travelling 
along a  perilous path. Although an analysis of its demise belongs to a  different inquiry, 
it can b e  mentioned that contributing factors include the death of Tito in 1980 and the
Map L 'Serbia [also] contained_the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the autonomous region 
of Kosovo-Metohija' (Singieton, 1985: 209). For a  general history of Yugoslavia, see Pavlowitch, 1971 and 
Singleton, 1985. The origins and first years of the state are best analysed in Ivo Banac's magisterial The 
National Question in Yugoslavia (Banac, 1984). For developments during the years 1962-1991, see  
Ramet, 1984/1992 For some interesting reflections on the history of Yugoslavia, see  Pavlowitch, 1988. 
list, 2 February 1991 45.
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rise of the Serbian politician Slobodan Milosevic.^^  ^ Since the mid-1980s', Milosevic had 
begun 'garnering mass support, both within the party and among the Serbian 
population at large by openly playing the nationalist card' and especially by stressing 
both perceived and actual Serb grievances over the fate of Kosovo (a region in Serbia 
populated by 9 0  per cent ethnic AlbaniansV^*  ^ in doing so, Milosevic brought 
nationalism and its accompanying passions to the forefront of Yugoslav p o l i t i c s . ^ ^ ?  
Furthermore, the end of the Cold-War and the dissolution of the Soviet empire largely 
discredited the socialist ideology and created a  situation in which Yugoslavia ceased  
to have the sam e international and strategic importance. Subsequently, the resurfacing 
of old nationalistic aspirations, enmities and traumas was accelerated. During the 1990 
elections, nationalists cam e to power in all of the republics and tensions intensified
greatly.368
Given the prospects for instability, EPC adopted a  stance advocating a  'united 
and democratic Yugoslavia.'^^? However, this chapter will demonstrate that EPC's
a succinct and important discussion of ttie reasons that led to the demise of Yugoslavia, see  
especially Holbrooke, 1998: 21-9. As regards Milosevic, see Zimmermann, 1995 for a scathing critique of 
his actions and character. Zimmermann was the last US Ambassador to Yugoslavia. For a perceptive 
profile of the Serbian leader, see Djilas, 1993. Many episodes of Milosevic negotiating that are 
particularly revealing of his character, soul and intentions are presented in Holbrooke, 1998. Milosevic's 
rise to power is analysed in Ramet, 1984/1992 chapter 11. Ramet's chapter also includes an important 
account of the seminal episode that elevated Milosevic into being the key proponent and 
representative of Serbian nationalism. See ibid: 229-30, as well as Holbrooke, 1998:114.
•^^ •^ Glenny, 1990:121. For two excellent, informative and in a sense complementary histories of Kosovo, 
see Malcolm, 1998 and Vickers, 1998. See also Kofos, 1998, The New Republic. 8 June 1998: 34-40 and 
Veremis and Kofos, 1998.
•^^ O^n nationalism, see Anderson, 1983/1991; Gelner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Hutchinson and Smith, 1994; 
Kedourie, 1970 and 1960/1993; Mayall 1990 and Smith, 1991. For particularly perceptive reflections on 
Greek nationalism that arose from the country's dispute with FYROM, see Mouzelis, 1994.
368Montenegro was possibly the only exception. For an analysis of the 1990 elections, see Woodward, 
1995:117-25. For the election results in the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, see  Valenakes and Dales, 
1994: 32-3.
369epc Press Release P. 35/91, 26 March 1991; emphasis added. See also EPC Press Release P. 42/91, 8 May 
1991.
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members eventually sanctioned Yugoslavia's dissolution, and were confronted witti ttie 
issues of recognising ttie country's former republics, as well as witti a  series of ottier 
problems. In attempting to deal witti ttiem, EPC utilised a  variety of its decision-making 
procedures. As will be stiown, particular emptiasis was placed upon imposing sanctions 
and promising aid for ttie cooperating repubiics. Furttiermore, numerous declarations 
were issued and conference diplomacy was practised. Innovative decision-making 
procedures included ttie creation of an Arbitration Commission (AC), and ttie sending 
to Yugoslavia of monitoring missions.
Initially attempting to bolster ttie chances of a  united Yugoslavia, at the 
beginning of June 1991 the Commission's President Jacques Delors went to Belgrade and 
informed the Yugoslavs that 'financial support of between $4 and $5 billion would be  
m ade available.'^^° On 24 June, the Third Financial Protocol between the Community 
and Yugoslavia, worth ECU 730 million for the period ending on 3 0  June 1996 was 
signed.371 Despite the utilisation of these econom ic decision-making procedures, the 
process of Yugoslavia's disintegration soon becam e irrevocable.
On 25 June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence^^ The war 
in Yugoslavia began two days later, when the Serb-controlled Yugoslav National Army 
(JNA) attacked Slovenia. On the sam e day, EPC's Foreign Ivlinisters were meeting at 
Luxembourg and it was immediately decided that the intergovernmental Troika be  
dispatched to Yugoslavia.^^  ^ It proposed a  plan that included the suspension of all
and Freedman, 1992 99. Ttie position for a  united Yugoslavia coincided with that pursued by the 
United States. In his visit to Belgrade on 21 June 1991, US Secretary of State James Baker declared that 
his country would not recognise the would-be breokawa[y republics] 'under any circumstances" (The 
Economist. 29 June 1991 41). For Baker s account of his Belgrade visit, see  Baker, 1995: 478-83. His effort 
to downplay the fact that the US' official policy was advocating a united Yugoslavia, is particularly 
noteworthy. For a strict assessment of the consequences of this visit, see  Holbrooke, 1998: 27.
^^ Vor the terms of the protocol, see Official Journal of the European Communities (hereafter OJ), No C 
134/6, 24.5.91.
^^ F^or details, as well as for the reactions of various countries, see Financial Times. 26 June 19911
2^^See Bull. EC 6-1991 8. The Troika was comprised by Gianni de Michelis, Jacques Poos and Hans van den 
Broek, Foreign Ministers of Italy, Luxembourg, and Holland respectively.
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declarations of independence for three months, the return of the JNA to its barracks, as 
well as other measures that aimed at solving the country's constitutional crisis.^ '^' 
Although all sides agreed to these measures, none of them was impiemented. The 
Troika was thus forced to go back on 30  June, this time threatening the suspension of 
aid.3^^
While hostilities continued in Slovenia, the republic's army proved surprisingly 
successful in its operations against the JNA.^ ^^  In order to increase the pressure and 
achieve a  meaningful settlement, the Extraordinary EPC Ministeriai meeting of 5 July 
1991 decid ed  that EPC would impose an arms embargo on all Yugoslav republics, and 
urged the members of the international community to follow suit.^ ^^  G reece endorsed 
this decision, as well as the warning that uniess agreem ent was reached, the Second  
and Third Financial Protocols with Yugoslavia would be suspended. These protocols 
constituted 'the largest aid package which the EC has ever given to an individuai 
state,' worth som e $1 billion.378
On 5 July, the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe accep ted  the EPC plan, which primarily called for 
the cessation of hostilities.^^^ j^js accep tan ce aiso signalled the fact that the CSCE 
was essentially relinquishing its responsibiiities for the resolution of the war in Yugoslavia.
Gow and Freedman, 1992 102
3^^0n the sam e day, the Presidency of the Community passed to the Netherlands. As a  result of this 
change, d e Michelis’ p lace in the Troika was taken by Portugal's Foreign Minister Joao d e Deus Pinheiro.
3^ '^ For accounts of the 'ten day war' in Slovenia, see Cohen, 1993: 224-5; Crnobrnja, 1994: 160-3; Glenny, 
1992 96-7 and Owen, 1995: 34. For an interesting appraisal of the various arguments seeking to explain 
the JNA's lacklustre performance in Slovenia, see Woodward, 1995:166-8.
^^^See EPC Press Release P. 61/91, 5 July 1991.
3^ I^he Times. 6 July, 1991:10. See also Weller, 1992 573. It is noteworthy that '40 per cent of Yugoslavia's 
trade was with the Community' (Gow and Freedman, 1992 99), a fact that further m ade Yugoslavia 
vulnerable to EC pressure.
^^ F^or an account of the CSO's powers and mandate, see Weller, 1992 573. For further details of the EPC 
plan, see  Gow and Freedman, 1992 105-6.
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Perhaps for the first time in several d ecad es, EPC's members were being assigned the 
leading and almost exclusive role in dealing with an important internationai crisis^^o
EPC efforts to reach a  settlement seem ed to culminate with the signing of the 
Brioni Accord on 7 July.^ ®’ The agreem ent provided for the withdrawal of the JNA 
forces from Slovenia, and thus marked the end of a limited war that had lasted ten 
days. There was also agreement to begin negotiations on all aspects of the future of 
Yugoslavia before 1 August. Finaliy, it was decided to introduce EPC observers. 
Unarmed and known as the ice-cream  men because of their white uniforms, their
role, and value...was to improve by their presence the chances of fragile 
cease-fires holding...[though] the greatest threat that they could m ake was to 
withdraw their services, which was regularly done when they met with 
particularly serious obstacles.^^^
As a  resuit of the Troika missions and the Brioni Accord, a  brief period of time 
was bought, the war having ended in Slovenia and not having yet m oved to any other 
of the Yugoslav republics. Nevertheless, it had becom e apparent to most observers 
that, in the words of Jacques Delors: 'the Yugoslav federation in its present form has 
had its day.'^Gs on  13 July the Dutch Presidency sent a  telegram to the other EPC 
members, suggesting that they m ove towards the voluntary redrawing of internal 
borders as a  possible s o lu t i o n . '^ ^ ^  The Greek government disagreed, but its negative
^®°According to the memoirs of the then US Secretary of State James Baker, 'the Bush administration felt 
comfortable with the EC's taking responsibility for handling the crisis in the Balkans' (Baker, 1995: 636). 
Baker cites as the main reason for this policy the absence of vital US interests, in contrast to 'European 
interests [that] were directly threatened' (ibid.), and furthermore argues that the EC was seen as a 
potentially successful mediator with long experience in dealing with the region.
®^'For the text of the Brioni Accord, see European Political Cooperation Documentation Bulletin (hereafter 
EPCDB), Vol. 7, 1991 334-8. See also Financial Times. 8 July 1991:1; Gow and Smith, 1992 10; Silber and 
Little, 1996: 201; cited in Holbrooke, 1998: 29; Weller, 1992 573-4 and Woodward, 1995:168-72
^^^Nuttall, 1994b: 21. Several observers were actually killed.
^®^Delors m ade this statement on 9 July 1991 during a debate in the European Parliament on the situation 
in Yugoslavia. See OJ No 3-407/68, 9.7.91.
^^ '’The text of the telegram can be found in Owen, 1995:2-3.
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assessm ent did not cause any problems. The Dutch proposal to tinker with borders prior 
to recognition failed to win any EPC adherents, and was thus not pursued any further.^ ®^  
During the month of August, war broke out In Croatia, where the JNA proved 
more efficient than In Slovenia, achieving control of almost a  fourth of the republic by 
early September. Faced with this unwelcome development, G reece agreed that the 
Ministerial meeting of 27 August express EPC's dismay, and m ake perfectly clear that 
the Serb Irregular forces In Croatia and the JNA were being considered as responsible 
for the outbreak of violence In Croatia.®®'^  The Greek Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras 
also decid ed  together with his EPC counterparts to establish a  Peace Conference and 
an Arbitration procedure within Its framework.®®  ^ According to Germany's Foreign 
Minister Hans-Dletrlch Genscher, the Idea for this procedure (which represents an 
Innovative declslon-making procedure of the regime EPC), em anated from France, 
though at the EPC meeting I t  was presented as a  joint Franco-German I n i t i a t i v e . ^ » »  The 
procedure was supposed to consist of a  five member Arbitration Commission, with two 
members being appointed by the Yugoslav Federal Presidency. The Yugoslav 
representation failed to materialise, and the AC eventually consisted solely of EPC 
member state appointees, who were also Presidents of their country's Constitutional 
Court, it was chaired by the French Robert Badlnter, who was joined by colleagues
®®^ For a counter-factual d efen ce of the Dutch proposal, see Owen. 1995; 33-4 and Telloglou, 1996: 27. 
Both fail to properly appreciate the telegram's acknowledgement that any voluntary redrawing of the 
borders 'wouid entail daunting problems' (cited in Owen, 1995: 32).
®®‘^ For the declaration on Yugosiavia produced by this meeting, see EPCDB, Vol. 7,1991 389-90. For the 
response by FYROM's Assembly to this declaration, see  Baikan Forum. Vol. 1, No. 1, (November 1992): 
169-70. See also Genscher's account of this meeting in Genscher, 1997: 786-8.
®®^ The Peace Conference com m enced at the Flague on 7 September 1991, and was chaired by former 
British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. Former US Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
Canadian Affairs Richard Flolbrooke has characterised Carrington as 'an urbane man of legendary 
integrity' (Holbrooke, 1998: 30).
®®®See Genscher, 1997: 787.
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from Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain.389 The Importance of the fact that there was 
no Greek representative will be discussed and analysed subsequently.
During the 27 August EPC meeting. Samaras expressed his government's 
concern over what eventually becam e an extremely contentious issue, by submitting a  
Memorandum on Yugoslav Macedonia^^o since the beginning of the war in 
Yugoslavia, this was the first official Greek attempt to raise awareness and present 
within EPC a  position on the name and implications of an independent Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia.
The Memorandum began by suggesting that Kosovo and Yugoslav M acedonia 
might require different EPC approaches than the ones pursued in Slovenia and Croatia. 
In an academ ic-like, diplomatic but ultimately alarmist tone, it argued that a  
declaration of independence by Yugoslav Macedonia would create serious problems. 
The state would not be economically viable, while its huge Albanian minority would be  
a  source of instability and perhaps even war. Such a new state would most likely be  
involved in serious disputes and confrontations with Albania, Serbia and Bulgaria. 
Hence, the warning that 'there seems to be a  clear danger of a  triangular, if not of a  
quadrangular conflict in the region.'^’!
Given this perception of a  potentially explosive situation, it becom es evident 
that the Greek government did not welcom e a declaration of independence. 
However, since such an action was imminent, the Memorandum did not propose 
attempts to block or postpone it. Rather, it endeavoured to clarify possible actions 
that would have been considered unfriendly and provocative by Greece. Thus, the 
issue of the new state's name cam e to the forefront:
®^^ This is why the Arbitration Commission is often referred to as the Badinter Commission, 
sfopor the text of the Memorandum (in English), see Skilakakis, 1995: 258-60. It should be noted that 
unless otherwise indicated, all references are to documents, articles or books written in Greek and 
translated into English by me.
39'lbid.: 260.
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The Greeks also strongly contest the use of the traditionally Greek nam e of 
Macedonia for identifying a Slavic p eo p leJ h e  Greeks believe that the 
Macedonian name is part of their own historical heritage and should not be  
used to identify, in an ethnic sense, another nation.392
Although the sensitivity surrounding the name Macedonia was m ade evident, 
the Memorandum did not indicate a  precise position on the name issue. The objection 
to the ethnological use of the name Macedonia, together with the fact that the 
document describes five times the inhabitants of Yugoslav M acedonia as Slav- 
Macedonians, possibly suggested that Greece might have been flexible to a  
compromise name that would have included the word M a c e d o n ia . 3 9 3
B. The Intensification of G reek C ooperation.
On 8 September 1991, the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia held a  referendum 
on its independence, with a  turnout (according to the official results) of 72,16 per 
cent.394 Of those voting, 96,44 per cent expressed their support for a  sovereign and 
independent state of Macedonia, with the right to enter in a future union of sovereign
392|bid; emphasis added.
393see Skilakakis, 1995: 42-3. Skilakakis suggests that the name Northern Macedonia might have been  
acceptable under the arguments made in the Memorandum. This is a correct assessment, to which 
names such as Upper Macedonia, Vardar Macedonia and perhaps Slavomacedonia could be added.
394jhey can be found (in English) in Valenakes and Dales, 1994: 38-9. The voting procedure is generaily 
considered to have been fair. For a forcefuliy argued contrary view, see a speech delivered by the 
Greek MEP Mr Nianias that can be found in OJ No 3-408/91, 10.9.91 It should also be noted that the 
leaders of the Albanian and Serbian minorities had urged the referendum's boycott. Furthermore, the 
referendum was unusual for permitting non-FYROM citizens to participate, though their votes were 
counted separately and did not contribute towards the official result. This measure aimed at 
conflat[ing] the categories of nationality and citizenship_and contributed powerfully to the 
construction of a transnational national community of Macedonians who identify with the newly 
emerged republic of Macedonia' (Danforth, 1995:100). In an interview on 11 April 1997, FYROM's Head 
of Mission to Greece Mr Arsovsky, explained that this arrangement was m ade after intense pressure 
from FYROM's nationaiist party, the Internai Macedonia Revolutionary Organisation-Democratic Party of 
Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPNE).
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states of Y u g o s l a v i a  395 on  the basis of this referendum, the Assembly of the Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia declared the state's independence on 17 S e p t e m b e r . 3 9 6
Greece's Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis responded to these results in a  
rather moderate way, by emphasising that the position of [his] government, as regards 
the name that [the inhabitants of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] use is given, 
self-evident and shared by the entire Greek nation.'397 This statement sent a  strong 
m essage about the importance of the new republic's name, though it did not entail 
any specific proposal, thus allowing substantial scope for negotiation and a  possible 
compromise.398 Mitsotakis' statement represents an early exam ple of his flexibility on 
the nam e issue, which would eventually lead to a  confrontation with Samaras.
Despite the use of diplomatic and calm language by the Prime Minister, it soon 
b ecam e evident that his government was deciding to abandon...the low key policy [on 
the Macedonian Question which was practised] since the time of the Civil War'.399 
During a  CSCE meeting in Moscow on 27 September 1991, Creek Ambassador Stathatos 
denied accusations m ade by Yugoslav representatives, and also distributed a  copy of 
his country's position on the Macedonian Question that was m ade during the 25 June 
1990 Copenhagen CSCE meeting. Together, these two interventions represent an 
outburst against what was considered to be the falsification of history, the twisting of 
facts and the ills bestowed upon G reece by Slavomacedonians (significantly, the term 
is used in the Moscow docum ent^oo Accusations vary from what is considered to be  
the unjustified appropriation of the ancient Creek Macedonian heritage of Alexander
395cited In Valenakes and Dales, 1994: 38.
396For the text of FYROM's declaration of Independence (In English), see Valenakes and Dales, 1994: 4 0 -2  
397skllakakls, 1995: 46. This statement was m ade during a press conference In Thessaloniki on 8 
September 1991.
398Mltsotakls m ade several similar statements until the 4 December 1991 Cabinet meeting. For an account 
of the more Important ones m ade In mid-November 1991, see Lygeros, 1992 104-5 and Tarkas, 1995: 64. 
399Kofos, 1996: 3.
'^ ^^ For the text of the Greek statement In the Moscow CSCE meeting, see  Valenakes and Dales, 1994: 43- 
6. For the Copenhagen CSCE statement, see Valenakes, 1992 345-52
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the Great and Aristotle, to the kidnapping of 2 8 ,0 0 0  children after the conclusion of 
the Civil War/®’ Thus, the international community was given evidence of the 
resentment and determination of G reece to follow closely and possibly contest 
developm ents in the Yugoslav Republic of M acedonia
Nevertheless, Greek cooperation within EPC both continued and intensified, 
being m ade manifest in three key issue areas. The first involved the singling out and 
verbal condemnation of the Serbian side as responsible for the atrocities and the 
spreading of the war to Croatia Instances of Greek cooperation on this issue are 
numerous, and include the 6 October 1991 informal meeting of the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs that condem ned the JNA, as well as the 27 October EPC declaration on 
Dubrovnik which consisted of a  strongly worded and largely justified attack on Serbian 
military actions.^^^ epC's frustration, anger and condemnation of the Serbs (endorsed  
by Greece), are best illustrated by the declaration on the situation in Yugoslavia that 
was issued on the following day:
an evaluation of the rather sensational charge that concerns the kidnapping of children, the 
interested reader should consult Lagani, 1996. In her Important study, Lagani objectively analyses this 
particularly complicated Issue, and confirms that In the final stages of the Greek Civil War, thousands 
of children left Greece. Estimates range from 2 5 ,0 0 0  to 3 0 ,0 0 0 . This largely forced exodus was 
primarily carried out by forces loyal to the KKE, though a few of the children left war-ravaged Greece 
voluntarily and accom panied by their parents (most of them were subsequently and dramatically 
separated). About 11,000 children were relocated to Yugoslavia. This number was admitted in a  letter 
written by Tito as well as by a high ranking Greek diplomat (see ibid: 64 and 117). Although all children 
were Greek citizens, som e were also Slavophones. Those who were not, originally received education 
in Greek, although this practice ended abruptly following the Tito-Stalin break. Eventually, fewer than 
6 0 0  children returned to Greece; and after 1951, the Greek government ended the 'Internationalisation' 
of the issue and stopped pressing for their return Fear of 'brainwashed' children having adopted  anti- 
Greek positions and pressure from the US and UK accounted for Greece's new position. See also 
Baerentzen 1987 and Poulton, 1991/1993: 180, in conjunction however with Lagani, 1996: 107. Some 
interesting but regrettably brief comments on this topic can be found in Koliopoulos, 1995b: 213-9.
^°^See the statement m ade by EPC's Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 6 October 1991, that can b e  found in 
EPCDB, Vol. 7, 1991: 476-7. For the EPC's declaration on Dubrovnik, see EPC Press Release P. 105/91, 27 
October 1991
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The European Community and its member States are appalled at constant 
violations of [the] principles [of no unilateral change of borders, and 
protection of human rights, and rights of ethnic and ^national groups]. In this 
context they refer to the Serbian position in the Conference, the coup d etat 
by four members of the Federal Presidency and their announcement of a  
plan aimed at the establishment of a  greater Serbia. The statements and  
actions of JNA, which were condem ned in the Declaration on Dubrovnik of 
27 October 1991, should also be seen in this light.^ o^
EPC's condemnation of the Serbs was not only limited to EPC's decision-making 
procedure of declaratory diplomacy, as it soon incorporated the application of 
additional econom ic sanctions, while simultaneously giving preferential treatment to 
the cooperating republics, including FYROM. These developments constitute a  second  
area in which G reece cooperated constantly without creating any problems to its EPC 
partners.
Thus, on October 6 1991 EPC's Foreign Ministers threatened to terminate the 
Cooperation and Trade Agreement with Yugoslavia/^'* and on 8 November, there was 
an EPC decision on the imposition of the following measures:
-im m ediate suspension of the application of the trade and cooperation  
Agreement with Yugoslavia and a  decision to terminate the sam e  
Agreement,
-restoration of the quantitative limits for textiles,
-rem oval of Yugoslavia from the list of beneficiaries of the General System  
of Preferences,
-formal suspension of benefits under the PHARE programme. Yugoslavia has 
not been invited to take part in the next Ministerial meeting of G-24 on 11 
November 199^05
EPC's intention to request the imposition of an oil embargo by the UN's Security Council 
was also stated. Again, it was m ade perfectly clear that these punitive actions would 
be taken only against the parties that were not cooperating 'in a  peaceful way 
towards a  comprehensive political solution on the basis of the EC proposals.''*^^
Press Release P. 106/91, 28 October 1991 
'^^^See EPCDB, Vol. 7,1991; 476-7. See also Woodward, 1995: 468 fn 104. 
'*°®EPC Press Release P. 109/91, 8 November 1991.
*^°4bid.
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The cooperating republics were eventually rewarded in the 2 December 
General Affairs Council meeting, which decided  a  series of positive measures that 
reversed most of the 8 November sanctions. They included:
- a  Regulation reinstating, as from 15 November 1991, most of the preferential 
trade arrangements under the pre-existing Co-operation Agreement with 
Yugoslavia;
-reinstatement of PHARE programme coverage...with the proviso that 
humanitarian aid is to continue for the benefit of all of the population of 
Yugoslavia;
- a  request to the European Investment Bank that it agree to the use of the 
ECU 100 million balance under the 2nd EEC-Yugoslavia Financial Protocol, 
denounced by the Community, to finance projects in the Republics 
concerned and that it resume payments for ongoing projects, where the 
situation permits it.^ o^
On the sam e day, a  Council Regulation was issued concerning the
arrangements applicable to the import of products originating in the Republics of
Bosnia-Herzegovinia, M acedonia, Slovenia and Croatia'^o® Given Greece's
Memorandum on Yugoslav Macedonia and subsequent actions, it is striking to se e  that
the phrase Republic of Macedonia is used in an official Council document. This did not
suggest an intention to recognise the state with this name, since Foreign Minister
Samaras had m ade his agreement to these measures conditional upon the
incorporation of the following statement: the Twelve [are] anxious to point out that the
adoption of these measures was entirely without prejudice to the question of
recognising the Republics.'^^’
The use of the phrase Republic of Macedonia in this document subsequently
proved an embarrassment for Samaras. There seem s to have been at least one
attempt on his behalf to imply that the person responsible for this Council decision was
his country's Permanent Representative to the European Community, Ambassador
^^^Councll of the European Communities General Secretariat (hereafter Council) 9558/91 (Presse 220-G), 
21291. For further positive measures that also included Montenegro, see Council 4392/92 (Presse 12-G), 
3.292
No L 342/1,121291; emphasis added, 
lo^councii, 9558/91 (Presse 220-G), 21291
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Vagenas/^0 However, efforts to suggest that he was not present at the meeting can  
not stand close scrutiny, since the published account of the decisions of the 1539th 
Council meeting reveals that Greece was represented by 'Mr Antonio [sic] SAMARAS, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs.' ’^^ Furthermore, in an interview on 24 Decem ber 1996, he did 
not deny his presence at that meeting.
Regardless of the subsequent political controversy, the decision to a ccep t  
these positive measures for the 'Republic of Macedonia' does not constitute an 
incomprehensible blunder. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, it was a  
deliberate decision that fitted exceedingly well with Greece's cooperative strategy.
A third area of cooperation involved decisions that encouraged various 
Yugoslav republics to request Community recognition. On October 6, G reece with its 
EPC partners
Agreed that a  political solution should be sought in the perspective of 
recognition  of the independence of those republics wishing it, at the end of 
a negotiating process conducted in good faith and involving all parties.^’^
A similar statement was included in the EPC Declaration of 28 October 1991.'‘^ 3 
Undoubtedly, they paved the way for FYROM to request recognition, though G reece  
did not attempt to utilise this early opportunity in order to express concerns or insert 
conditions regarding a  possible application by FYROM.
On 7 December 1991 the AC published its first opinion, which concluded that 
'the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution.'^^  ^ Consequently, it
Eleftherotypia. 22 October 1992 12 
Council, 9558/91 (Presse 220-G), 21291 
"*^ 2see EPCDB, Vol. 7,1991: 476; emphasis added. See also Genscher, 1997: 792-3.
^^ S^ee EPC Press Release P. 106/91, 28 October 1991
^^ I^nternational Legal Materials (hereafter ILM), Vol. 31, No. 6, (December 1992): 1494. As the journal 
suggests, subsequent references to this issue will be cited as 31 ILM, followed by the relevant page  
number, (1992). It should also be noted that the opinion was actually written on 29 November 1991
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was becom ing increasingly difficult for the EPC member states to avoid facing the 
issue of recognising at least som e of the Yugoslav republics.
C. The Issue of Recognition.
The issue of recognition was confronted by the Greek government during the 4 
Decem ber 1991 Cabinet meeting.^’^  According to the minutes, there was a  decision to 
support the continuation of a  united Yugoslavia.'"'  ^ Furthermore,
The government set three conditions to the Skopje Republic [FYROM], which 
must be accep ted , if recognition is wanted; First, [it must] change the name 
'Macedonia' which has a geographic but not an ethnic basis, second, [it 
must] acknow ledge that it has no territorial claims against our country, and, 
third, [it must] acknowledge that no Macedonian Minority' exists in Greece.'^ ^^ ^
It is noteworthy that the condition regarding the republic's name was suggested  
in the Cabinet meeting by the internationally renowned composer (and Minister Without 
Portfolio) Mikis Theodorakis.^^^ Thus, the issue that would com e to dominate the 
country's politics in the following months, was first formulated by a  former active  
member of the KKE, and not by any leading right-wing politician or by those who 
subsequently m ade it the centrepiece of their rhetoric and foreign policy preferences.
That the Cabinet's decision under the heading Policy in the Balkans' is mostly 
devoted  to FYROM, suggests that Greek policy towards the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
was becom ing preoccupied with this state; it would soon be obsessed, devoted  and in 
a sense taken hostage by the issue of its name. Some major cooperative decisions 
were to precede these developments.
'"^ For important accounts of this meeting, see Skilakakis, 1995; 62-3 and Petridis, 1997: 391 
'*^ '^ The minutes can be found in Fapaconstantinou, 1994: 419.
'*^ l^bid.; emphasis added.
'"^see Petridis, 1997: 391.
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As the Maastricht Summit approached, German pressure for the recognition of 
Croatia and Slovenia intensified. On 27 November 1991, Chancellor Kohl promised to 
recognise the two republics before Christmas/^i^ and on 14 December, Kohl's 
spokesperson Dieter Vogel confirmed Germany's intention to m ove towards 
recognition, regardless of 'whether any, all, or none of the European states join us.'^ 2o
It was under these developments that an Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting 
was convened in Brussels on 15 December 1991.^21 n ^qs dramatic, lasted for ten hours, 
and the agreem ent that was reached early in the morning signalled the official and 
irreversible end of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The meeting also 
provides an exam ple of the importance of the intergovernmental part of EPC's defining 
norm, since the most important decisions about the future of Yugoslavia were reserved 
for discussion and were m ade by an intergovernmental body. More specifically, EPC's 
Ministers adopted a  common position on the conditions whose satisfaction would have 
to preced e recognition of the various republics.'^^  ^ Applications were to be submitted 
by 23 December, and it was agreed that the AC would provide advice concerning the 
merits of the various applications.
The stance of the German Foreign Minister was instrumental in determining 
these decisions. According to Samaras, it amounted to a  de facto coup d'état.
Genscher, 1997: 796. Genscher points out that the date of recognition that was promised by Kohl 
was actually two weeks later from the one suggested by Hans van den Broek. The Dutch Foreign 
Minister had mentioned as a possible time limit the date of 10 December 1991 He did so in a 
statement given to an Austrian newspaper on 18 October 1991. See ibid: 793. However, he was talking 
about a  common EPC decision, and not unilateral action.
^^°The New York Times. 15 December 1991: A1
'^ ’^The account of this meeting is partly based on interviews with Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997, Mr Mitsotakis 
on 10 April 1997, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996 and 3 February 1997 and Mr Skilakakis on 15 April 
1997, as well as on Genscher's account, that can be found in Genscher, 1997: 797-9. See also 
Holbrooke, 1998: 31; Skilakakis, 1995: 63-4 and Tarkas, 1995: 67-9.
"•^ S^ee EPC Press Release P. 128/91, 16 December 1991 These conditions were also to apply for the 
recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
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com plete with a  grand theatrical gesture/^23 j-ie is alluding to Genscher's leaving the 
room and calling twice Chancellor Kohl, only to eventually explain that Germany 
remained adamant in its position and thus determined to unilaterally recognise at least 
som e of the Yugoslav republics ^ ^4 Given this development and in order to at least 
preserve a  sem blance of the principle of solidarity, EPC's Foreign Ministers accep ted  
Germany's position.
Samaras has never denied that he had serious misgivings about the 
consequences of the 16 December decisions. Because of the circumstances however, 
the Greek Foreign Minister believed that vetoing all of the meeting's decisions would 
have been counter-productive. In order to adequately address his country's legitimate 
concerns, he forcefully insisted that a  paragraph stating additional conditions that 
would apply to FYROM's probable application for recognition be inserted. According 
to Genscher, 'Samaras...was afraid that the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia could 
lead Macedonia to pursue its independence and make demands on Greek territory,
including Thessaloniki.'^^s
Italian Foreign Minister de Michelis insisted that FYROM be recognised but was 
rebuffed by Samaras who thus becam e the target of an undiplomatic verbal assault. 
The former Greek Foreign Minister claims that de Michelis angrily yelled at him: You are 
a pirate and a  blackmailer! This is p i r a c y i ' ^ 2 6
Eventually, there was agreement on the following three conditions:
^^ I^nterview with Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997.
^24jhat two phone calls were m ade to Chancellor Kohl is accep ted  by Genscher in his memoirs. See 
Genscher, 1997: 798.
"'^ Sibid. Genscher states that he considered the possibility of FYROM making territorial claims against 
Greece to be rather remote. See ibid.
'^26|nterview with Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996. Significantly, according to Samaras FYROM's Foreign 
Minister was waiting in the building. After the meeting's conclusion, he immediately had a  meeting with 
de Michelis, who in a sense hod assumed at that point the role of championing the republic's claims 
within EPC. There also seems to have been some sort of antagonism between Greek and Italian 
diplomacy, dating back to at least 1990, when Greece had managed to essentially exclude Italy from 
a meeting of Balkan Foreign Ministers. See Glenny, 1997:74.
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The Community and its member States also require a Yugoslav Republic to 
commit itself, prior to recognition, to adopt constitutional and political 
guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims towards a  neighbouring 
Community State and that it will conduct no hostile propaganda activities 
versus a  neighbouring Community State, including the use o f  a denomination  
which implies territorial claims
Of these conditions, the first two proved somewhat less contentious. FYROM 
possibly understood that the blatant conduct of hostile propaganda and the making of 
territorial claims against Greece, was contrary to the expectations and standards 
required of states aspiring to EPC recognition. As a  result, some important (though not 
necessarily sufficient), alterations to the state's constitution were subsequently 
i n s e r t e d .4 2 8  However, the third condition that required the applicant state not to use a  
'denomination which implies territorial claims,' proved controversial.
The former Foreign Minister believes that the phrasing of the third condition 
clearly implied the word Macedonia. He has often pointed out that prior to Yugoslavia's 
break-up, the official name used for the republic was the Socialist Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia. Since the words Socialist, Yugoslav, or Republic could not possibly 
imply territorial claims. Samaras concludes that one is necessarily left with the name
Macedonia.'‘29
The argument is both logical and persuasive as regards the name Macedonia, 
although it is significant that the phrasing of the third condition did not include this 
term. Samaras insists that the actual phrasing covered everything' including any 
subsequent inventive or ingenious FYROM proposal.^^o ^hat would happen if they 
decid ed  to call their republic Thessaloniki?' he asked rhetorically during an interview.^^i
Press Release P. 128/91,16 December 1991; emphasis added  
^28see Kofos, 1994b: 49.
'*29For an interview transcript (15 April 1992) where Samaras makes this argument rather passionately, see  
loannou, 1992 110-1. The former Foreign Minister also m ade the same point during an interview on 24 
December 1996.
'^Anterview with Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997. Thessaloniki is the largest city in Northern Greece, 
""interview with Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997.
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Samaras also insists that during the 16 December meeting, he fuifiiied his 
government's 4 December instructions about yhis claim is accurate as
regards the new republic's name: the phrasing of the third condition is consistent with 
both the 4 December Cabinet meeting decision and the Memorandum on Yugoslav 
Macedonia. The possibility though that according to these documents, a  name in the 
line of Upper Macedonia or Vardar Macedonia was at the very least debatable, if not 
accep tab le  was however underestimated or misunderstood.433
News of the 16 December agreement on the three conditions was met with 
enthusiasm in Greece. The government announced a great national success,' while the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) which was the main opposition party, declared  
that the agreement constituted a  positive event.'^34 Mitsotakis telephoned the 
subsequent Foreign Minister Michalis Papaconstantinou and urged him to go  to the 
airport in order to welcome Samaras.^35 Former conservative Prime Minister Georgios 
Rallis, while listening to the Greek Foreign Minister explain his accomplishments in a
3^2This is how Samaras justifies the fact that he did not contact his Prime Minister during the marathon 16 
December 1991 meeting. In an interview on 10 April 1997, Mitsotakis expressed his indignation and 
frustration for not having been contacted by his Foreign Minister. According to Samaras, the 4 
December Cabinet decision requiring FYROM to denounce claims about the existence of a 
'Macedonian minority' in Greece, was covered by the clause in the EPC decision that required the 
applicant state not to conduct hostile propaganda (interview with Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996).
3^3por example, the 4 December 1991 Cabinet meeting had decided that the name Macedonia has a  
geographic-basis' (Papaconstantinou, 1994: 419). This wording clearly permitted the discussion of 
names such as Upper Macedonia. Furthermore, in an interview on 5 January 1997, Mr Kofos explained 
that after being informed about the third condition, no member of the Greek delegation that was in 
Brussels for the 15 December meeting and was also affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had 
considered at that point an interpretation that would have had excluded entirely the word Macedonia 
from FYROM's name.
'^34jhe official government announcement is quoted in Tarkas, 1995: 70. PASOK's statement can be 
found in Eleftherotypia. 18 December 1991: 4. For other celebratory comments by leading Greek 
politicians and academ ics, see ibid: 4-5.
'^^Sjnterview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1997. Papaconstantinou who was then the Minister 
of Justice, claims to have accepted  Mitsotakis' urging with a 'heavy heart,' since he believed that 
given its ambiguity, the third EPC condition could not have possibly constituted a  national success.
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radio Interview on 17 December, 'felt remorseful for tiovlng In ttie post doubted tils 
abllltles'/^'^
Ttie official and celebratory Greek statements did not Include a  restrictive  
Interpretation of ttie third EPC condition, according to which the use of the word 
M acedonia would have been excluded In every possible way from FYROM's name. 
Prime Minister Mitsotakis somewhat vaguely stated that the third condition obliges 
FYROM to change Its name so that no misunderstandings will be created as regards the 
historical continuity [of M a c e d o n la ] . ' ^ ^ ^  Samaras stressed that the three conditions 
constituted a  national victory against those who 'unhlstorlcally wanted to falsify the 
historical meaning of the word M acedonla'^^s
These statements Illustrate that both the Greek Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister m ade no effort to argue In a  coherent and clear way that FYROM's name 
should not Include the word Macedonia. This was left to Stellos Papathemells and 
loannis Charalambopoulos, who as prominent PASOK MPs and former Ministers declared  
that the decision of the Twelve, If It subtracts entirely the name Macedonia from 
Skopje, [It then] corresponds to the consciousness of Hellenism and Indirectly settles the 
historical truth.'^ 39 At that point, they merely represented their personal opinions, though 
things were about to change."^
1995: 30. Rallis claims that on reading the foilowing day the actual EPC decision, he concluded 
that names such as Slavomacedonia or New Macedonia were permissibie under the third condition. 
See ibid: 31.
^^ M^akedonia. 18 December 19911.
'*^ ®lbid.
^39|bid: 7.
'^ '^ T^heir opinions however, carried particular weight. Charalambopoulos was a former Foreign Minister 
and Papathemelis was a former Minister of Macedonia-Thrace. As Mr Kofos explained during an 
interview on 5 January 1997, the iatter was also PASOK's ideologue' and educator' on the Macedonian 
Issue. His knowledge of the history, various aspects and complexities of this issue is impressive, and 
b ecam e evident during an interview on 11 January 1997. In addition, Papathemelis was Papandreou's 
chief advisor on this issue. His prominent role within his party at that point as regards foreign policy, is 
iliustrated by the fact that he was chosen by the Leader of the Opposition to represent PASOK in an
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A significant incident took place on 22 December 1991. Nikos Marakis, one of 
Greece's most respected and knowledgeable journalists, asked ttie Foreign Ministry's 
press spokesperson ttie following question: if our [EPC] colleagues pressure us for a  
synttietic name [i.e. one including ttie term Macedonia], will we deny it?'^ "*^  Ambassador 
Kalamidds replied ttiat it is self-evident, ttiere is no issue of us retreating. Wtiat does a  
synttietic nam e mean?''*'^ ^
Ttiis exchange is of particular importance, because it constitutes the first 
indication of a  possible restrictive interpretation of the third EPC condition. However, 
there was an element of vagueness in Kalamidas' response. Furthermore, such an 
interpretation could not have possibly been deduced from any document. Cabinet 
decision or statement that the Prime Minister had m ade following the 16 December EPC 
meeting. In other words, this was not the official position of the Greek government. 
Nevertheless, in the following months it was precisely this restrictive interpretation that 
gradually b ecam e official policy, as well as the cornerstone of Greece's foreign policy 
towards former Yugoslavia.
Meanwhile, FYROM had applied for Community recognition on 2 0  December, 
announcing its intention to satisfy all necessary conditions.^^^ jh e  new republic's 
Parliament inserted two amendments to the constitution on 6 January 1992, the first of 
which denied that FYROM harboured any territorial ambitions towards neighbouring 
states, while the second promised that 'the Republic shall not interfere in the sovereign 
rights of other states and their internal affairs.'^^  ^ In addition to these amendments, a  
series of answers and documents were provided to the Badinter Commission.^^^
official briefing given by Samaras about foreign policy developments. See Makedonia. 28 December 
1991:1.
"^"^’Cited in Tarkas, 1995: 77.
^^ 2|bld.
"•"^ S^ee Makedonia. 21 December 1991: 20.
^^^See 31 ILM-1511 (1992).
'^ ^^ For FYROM's answers (in Englisfi), to ttie most important questionnaire that was sent by the AC, see  
Valenakes and Dales, 1994: 54-62
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While the AC was deliberating, G reece gave further indication of the 
importance that was being placed on FYROM's name. In a  3 January 1992 letter to the 
Community Heads of Government, Greek President Konstantinos Karamanlis wrote that 
the republic's name was of 'fundamental importance to Greece...This republic has 
absolutely no right, neither historical nor ethnological, to use the name Macedonia'.^^*  ^
Significantly, this phrasing did not clearly endorse a  restrictive interpretation of the third 
EPC condition.
On the sam e day, representatives of FYROM's and Greece's Foreign Ministries
met in a  central Athens Hotel.^ ''^  It was the first instance of the two states talking
directly and publicly since the disintegration of Yugoslavia had begun, and was related 
to the 16 December 1991 EPC meeting where Samaras had agreed that his country 
would m ake an effort, at a  bilateral level, to resolve the dispute with FYROM.^  ^ The 
decision to hold this meeting can be viewed as another exam ple of the politics of 
cooperation and moderation that were being pursued by Greece.
During the discussions. Ambassador Ailianos stressed that his government would
be willing to cultivate bilateral econom ic relations, as well as help improve the new
republic's relations with the EC—a scenario though that largely depended on the name 
that FYROM would adopt. Ailianos stressed that this was for G reece 'conditio sine qua 
non.^ "^^  Ambassador Kofos gave a  lengthy and well-docum ented presentation.
Karamanlis' letter, see loannou, 1992 101-2; emphasis ad ded
"^•^ PYROM was represented by Mr Tounte, a diplomatic advisor to President Gligorov, Mr Arsovski, a 
diplomat and Mr Merchev, a  Professor of Constitutional Law. Greece was represented by Ambassador 
Ailianos, Head of the Greek Foreign Ministry's Division for Balkan Affairs and Ambassador Kofos, the 
leading Greek expert on Balkan affairs and history. The account of this meeting is based on interviews 
with Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997 and Mr Arsovski on 3 February 1997. Both of whom were present at the 
meeting. Interviews with Mr Samaras on 23 December 1996 and Mr Papayannakis on 10 January 1997 
were also utilised. Of particular assistance was To Vima. 5 January 1992 A15, that contains a  summary 
of what took place, including several crucial leaked passages from the various presentations. See also 
Tarkas, 1995: 83-4.
^^®lnterviews with Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997 and Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997.
^^ T^o Vima. 5 January 1992 A 15.
I l l
covering the historical aspects of the Macedonian Question."*®® Using forceful 
language/ he accused  FYROM for practising 'cultural imperialism' and usurping the 
nam e Macedonia."*®’ According to Kofos, the adoption of this name suggested  
territorial ambition, given the fact that FYROM holds 'only 39% [of the geographic 
region of Macedonia].'"*®^
To this barrage of 'name-centred' criticisms, FYROM's representatives countered 
that they had no authorisation to discuss this issue. For them, the meeting was viewed  
as merely the first in a  series that would aim at discussing various bilateral problems 
and disputes. The fact that they had specific instructions not to address the third EPC 
condition, reduced significantly the substantive value of the meeting. Ambassador 
Kalamidas who was also present (but not a direct participant), called Samaras to 
inform him of developments, and then proceeded to give a  press conference  
announcing that because of the inability to discuss the new republic's name, talks were 
being abandoned."*®^
A few days later (11 January), the AC ruled that FYROM fully complied with EPC's 
guidelines for recognition, and emphasised the republic's undertaking to refrain from 
the conduct of hostile propaganda."*®"* Most importantly, it took the view
"*®®Arsovski seems to have resented the length end manner In which Kofos gave his presentation, in an 
Interview on 3 February 1997, he argued that 'diplomats do their preparation at home. In negotiations, 
they discuss.'
"*®*To Vima. 5 January 1992 A 15 and Interview with tvtr Kofos on 5 January 1997.
"*®^To Vima. 5 January 1992 A 15.
"*®®ln an Interview on 3 February 1997 Arsovski maintained that the members of his delegation were rather 
resentful of the way In which the meeting broke down. Interestingly enough. In an Interview on 5 
January 1997, Mr Kofos agreed that It was done In a non-dlplomatic and almost suspicious way.
®^"*For the AC's opinion, see  31 ILM 1507-12 (1992). The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticised the AC's 
ruling for relying only on documents and arguments provided by FYROM. For the text of the 
announcement of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see  Eleftherotypia. 15 January 1992 4. The 
announcement also condemns the AC for Ignoring the arguments presented by FYROM's various 
minorities. In an Interview on 3 February 1997, Samaras was particularly upset that a lengthy meeting 
between Greek Ambassador Lyberopoulos and Mr Badinter produced no positive results for Greece. 
For a scathing critique of the AC's ruling on FYROM, see loannou, 1992 35-8. See also Sarlls, 1993:139-41
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That the Republic of Macedonia has, moreover, renounced all territorial 
claims of any kind in unambiguous statements binding in international law; 
[and] that the use o f the name "Macedonia” cannot therefore imply any 
territorial claim against another State.^ ^^
Fortunately for Greece, the Badinter Commission also ruled against the 
recognition of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, a  development that presented Greek 
diplomacy with an opport uni tyThus ,  seeking EPC support, Mitsotakis flew to Rome 
and Bonn on 14 January, and during his meetings with Prime Minister Andreotti and 
Chancellor Kohl argued that the recognition of FYROM under the name Macedonia 
would represent a  tremendous defeat to his government, imperilling its slim 
parliamentary majority of two/^^ This could have led to the return to power of the 
much more 'troublesome Leader of the Opposition, Andreas Papandreou. As a  result of 
such arguments, Mitsotakis gained German and Italian support, to the extent that there 
would b e  no recognition of FYROM unless the republic complied with EPC's three 
conditions. Crucially, he also seems to have pledged his government's support for the 
recognition of Croatia. Eventually, on 15 January 1992 EPC's member states decided  to 
largely ignore the advice of the AC and recognise Slovenia and Croatia, but not 
FYROM."^ ® Given the events and diplomatic efforts that had preceded these decisions, 
it appears (and will subsequently be analysed), that EPC's principle of solidarity was 
probably not operational in this instance.
These recognitions mark the end of a period during which the Greek 
government practised politics of cooperation and moderation towards former 
Yugoslavia and FYROM. Between June 1991 and 17 January 1992, it cooperated fully and
45531 ILM; 1511 (1992); emphasis added.
456por the AC's opinions on Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, see ibid: 1501-7 (1992).
457$ee Lygeros, 1992 117 fn 64.
458see EPC Press Release P. 9/92,15 January 1992 One of the most critical public reactions to Greece's 
insistence that EPC should not recognise FYROM under the name Macedonia cam e from the Danish 
Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. See The Independent. 21 January 1992 4.
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com pletely within EPC on almost all the issues that arose from the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia The country's veto power was not utilised and essentially never even  
threatened with use. G reece supported the June 1991 position to maintain a  united 
Yugoslavia but also signed the 16 December 1991 EPC declaration that formalised the 
a ccep ta n ce  of Yugoslavia's dissolution. There was also cooperation on the verbal 
condemnation of Serbia on the selective application of sanctions that primarily 
targeted the Serbs, as well as in the establishment of the Peace Conference, the 
creation of the Arbitration Commission and the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.
As regards Greece's policy towards FYROM, it was marked by moderation and 
a  willingness to cooperate and reach a  compromise. On the most contentious issue 
that involved the republic's name, the disagreement on the name Macedonia was 
m ade evident. Nevertheless, the possibility of a  compromise name such as Upper 
Macedonia or Vardar Macedonia was consistently left open in almost all major Greek 
decisions, documents and statements. They include the 27 August 1991 Memorandum 
on Yugoslav Macedonia, Mitsotakis' response to FYROM's referendum on independence, 
the intervention in the Moscow CSCE meeting, the 4 December 1991 Cabinet meeting 
decisions and Karamanlis' 3 January 1992 letter to the Community's Heads of 
Government. Significantly, the possibility of a  compromise on FYROM's name was 
allowed under the conditions agreed in the 16 December 1991 EPC meeting. These 
conditions further dem anded that FYROM refrain from the conduct of hostile 
propaganda and the making of territorial claims against its larger neighbouring 
country, though such demands can only be judged as fair and reasonable. Finally, 
G reece organised a  bilateral meeting between Foreign Ministry representatives of the 
two states on 3 January 1992, and even signed a  document that referred to the 
Republic of Macedonia on 2 December 1991.
The nature, extent and scope of these politics of flexibility, moderation and 
cooperation began to alter in a  substantial manner after mid-January 1992. Eventually, 
the nam e-issue cam e to dominate not only responses towards former Yugoslavia and 
FYROM, but Greek domestic politics as well. However, before analysing these
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developm ents, ttie politics of Greek cooperation will be explained In a  way that is 
largely consistent with the theory of institutionalism.
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CHAPTER 5
THE POLITICS OF GREEK COOPERATION: 
Explanation and Decline
Greece has ceased  to be a  protagonist in the Macedonian-theatre, and has contended herself to 
playing second fiddle. Still, Greek attitudes toward Macedonian developments are so emotional that 
Greeks tend either to magnify well out of proportion events or situations connected with Macedonia, or 
keep a  discreet silence.
-Evangelos Kofos, The Macedonian Question: The Politics o f Mutation. 1986.
A. The Problem atic N ature of the Politics of G reek C ooperation.
The Greek government practised politics of cooperation, moderation and 
flexibility during the June 1991-January 1992 period. However, as will be shown in this 
chapter, these politics included som e decisions that are of a  rather problematic nature, 
since they were contrary to perceived national interests, or were exp ected  to produce 
negative results for the region.
During the early stages of the Yugoslav disintegration and war, Greek 
cooperation was helped by the rejection of the Dutch Presidency's proposal to 
consider the redrawing of the internal borders of the various Yugoslav republics. Had 
its a ccep ta n ce  been seen as a  realistic possibility, G reece would probably have 
adopted  a  more interventionist stance, since discussions on the borders of Yugoslav 
Macedonia would have been on the agenda.'*^^
Nevertheless, even in this early phase, certain problematic Greek cooperative  
decisions can be found, centring on the unwillingness to either block the creation, 
attempt to impose a  national representative, or limit the jurisdiction of the Arbitration 
Commission. That the AC would consider the case  of recognising the Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia was if not absolutely certain, at least extremely likely. Hence,
^^^Samaras argued that this would have indeed been the case during an interview on 24 December 1996.
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the possibility of a  favourable AC ruling for FYROM was risked—an outcom e that was 
probably m ade more likely by the fact that there was no Greek representative on the 
commission. Furthermore, the likelihood that such a  favourable ruling would influence 
actors outside EPC could not have easily been ignored. This outcom e was admitted by 
Samaras in a  letter sent to his EPC colleagues on 17 January 1992, which noted that
The announcement [of the AC's ruling on FYROM]...had an immediate 
negative impact on the region. Bulgaria sought to capitalise on the 
opportunity offered...[and] rushed to recognise Skopje [on 15 January 1992].'^ '^ °
The excuse that he agreed to the AC's creation because its rulings would only 
constitute recommendations that could have been vetoed subsequently merely states 
the obvious: G reece could veto any EPC decision. <^ i^ However, it is rather peculiar that 
there was agreement to the creation of the AC, if the ultimate intention was to simply 
veto its rulings. Such a  course of action does not only incur the political cost of 
blocking a  probable EPC decision, but also incurs the costs associated with opposing 
the views of people who ore supposed to be by profession, disinterested and 
objective arbiters of Justice; and it allows the party that has received a  favourable 
ruling to appear as a  victim.
Turning to the period during which cooperation intensified, it is important to 
explain the several occasions on which Greek decision-makers consciously 
participated in actions that they regarded as unfair, catastrophic and contrary to at 
least certain national interests. Crucially, such examples include the full cooperation 
within EPC in the condemnation and penalisation of Serbia, the proper appreciation of 
which requires a  brief discussion of what amounted to a  special Greco-Serbian 
relationship.
official English translation of this letter is published for the first time in Appendix 11 It should also be 
noted that Turkey recognised FYROM on 6 February 1992 
"^“^ 'ihis excuse or explanation was argued by Mr Samaras during an interview on 24 December 1996.
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Serbs and Greeks shore the sam e Christian denomination (Eastern Orthodox), 
and have not fought against each other in a  war for several centuries. This is a  rare 
record for Balkan or even for many Western European peoples. Despite the occasional 
differences of opinion and points of friction, ties between the two nations have been  
reinforced in the Twentieth Century by fighting on the sam e side in both Balkan and  
World Wars, a  fact often stressed by politicians.^^!
At the time of Yugoslavia's disintegration, Greek-Serbian relations were 
perceived by most decision-makers in Athens as particularly valuable for determining 
the new balance of power in the region.'"'^  ^ The two states were supposed to have a  
similar geopolitical outlook, since both view[ed] Turkey's aspirations in the region as a  
possible threat,' and both were apprehensive about developments in Albania.^64
Serbia had also signalled its intention not to antagonise Greece's concerns and 
actions towards FYROM. During a  visit to Athens on 16 April 1991, Milosevic diplomatically 
hinted that he was at the very least agnostic about Greek positions on the Yugoslav
interesting and important example of potential conflict between Greece and Yugoslavia (thougti 
not exactly Serbia, alttiougti Serbs probably played ttie dominant role in Yugoslavia's politics) 
occurred on 28 October 1940. On that day, 'the Yugoslav Government-debated, and for a moment 
appeared to favor, entering Greece at the rear of her fighting Army in Albania, in order to take 
possession of Thessaloniki. Only Greece's ability to drive back the Italians seems to have saved the 
city at that time' (Kofos, 1964; 96).
'^ ‘^ ^Interviews with Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997, Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997 and Mr Samaras on 3 February 
1997.
464Kn3use, 1995: 55. Serbia had to contemplate the possibility of a nationalist uprising in its predominantly 
Albanian region of Kosovo. As events that occurred in 1998 demonstrated, these fears were not 
unfounded. See for example. The Economist. 14 March 1998: 43; ibid., 20  June 1998: 31; ibid., 4 July 1998: 
28; 25 July 1998: 32; ibid., 8 August 1998: 23; ibid., 15 August 1998: 23; ibid: 19 September 1998; and 
International Herald Tribune. 1 October 1998:1 As regards Greece, it has been claimed that 'hav[ing] a 
history of strained relations with Albania..[it] would certainly side with Serbia [in case  Albania was 
drawn in the Yugoslav War' (Crnobrnja, 1994: 242). See also Austin, 1993. The most important reason 
behind Greece's strained relations with Albania is related to the existence of a  Greek minority in that 
country. For an analysis of the history, politics and treatment of this minority, see  Veremis et al, 1995.
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Republic of Macedonla^*^® jp f^e subsequent months, Serbia adopted a  mush more 
supporting stance. Characteristically, on 3 0  April 1992 Milosevic stated that 'Serbia was 
not going to make any movement on the Skopje issue, that could hurt or dam age  
Greece's interests.'^ *^ *^
The degree of affinity between the two countries was demonstrated during an 
interview with Samaras, who proudly declared that he often informed Milosevic of EPC 
developm ents and even had meetings with him in Belgrade before flying to Brusseis."**^  ^
Significantly, the former Foreign Minister also claims that Milosevic proposed in early 
November 1991, that a  large number of Serbs move' to FYROM, thus essentially taking 
over the state and ending any possible problems for Greece. Serbia's proposal only 
vaguely disguised the fact that it would have included a  military attack against 
FYROM, which would have been the necessary consequence of a  huge Serbian 
population transfer to a  neighbouring republic that had already declared Its 
independence*^
The Serbian leader further suggested to Mitsotakis that their states pursue such 
an attack jointly and then partition FYROM! The making of this proposal was a ccep ted
‘^ '^ T^his was Milosevic's first official foreign visit os President of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia The fact 
that he chose Greece was probably not coincidental, and aimed to underscore the special 
relationship and ties between the two states. This was not missed by Mitsotakis who was pleased by 
this choice, and used it as an opportunity to recount some of the historical Greco-Serbian ties. For 
Milosevic's and the Greek Prime Minister's comments, see  Makedonia. 17 April 1991:13.
"^^ "^ Quoted in Doudoumis, 1996: 20. Serbia eventually recognised FYROM as the Republic of Macedonia on 
8 April 1996 This decision was considered in Greece as nothing less than a betrayal. For the almost 
furious responses of the government, political parties and the press, see  Makedonia. 9 April 1996:1 and 
5. However, Greek indignation did not take into account the numerous instances in which their country 
had participated in EPC's condemnation of Serbia during the previous years. For an analysis of the 
decision for mutual recognition between Serbia and FYROM, see especially Krause and Markotitch, 
1996. See also Tarkas, 1997: 204-11 and 472-3 and Woodward, 1997:121
^^ I^nterview with Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997.
'*‘^ ®Both Mitsotakis and Samaras accep ted  in interviews on 10 April 1997 and 3 February 1997 respectively, 
that a Serbian population transfer would have almost certainly also entailed a  military attack against 
FYROM
119
by Mitsotakis in on interview on 10 April 1997 and is also confirmed by ttie minutes of 
• an official meeting witti tiis Italian counterpart Andreotti, during wtiicti tie bluntly stated 
that in the beginning of the crisis, Serbia had proposed that we divide Skopje'/^^
Prudently and wisely, Greece's Prime Minister refused to pursue such 
Machiavellian and opportunistic plans. Having done otherwise would have ensured 
international condemnation, and would have probably brought his country perilously 
close to becom ing a  direct participant in the Yugoslav War. Nevertheless, the mere 
fact that these proposals were discussed suggests a  special relationship between the 
two states.
Given this relationship, the consistent participation in EPC's condemnation and 
penalisation of Serbia is surprising, since it resulted to the weakening of a  state with 
which history, religion, fears, interests, geopolitical outlook and information were shared. 
Hence, an explanation of why G reece unfailingly approved and never vetoed  EPC's 
anti-Serb decisions is required and will subsequently be provided.
Explanation is also required for the series of Greek actions that amounted to a  
rather moderate, flexible and gentle' treatment of FYROM. Although there were 
strenuous objections to FYROM being recognised with the name Macedonia, this 
position was more than counterbalanced by several cooperative and moderate 
decisions. Most importantly, the Greek government consistently maintained a  stance 
allowing a  compromise name such as Vardar Macedonia or Upper Macedonia, and did 
not try to block any attempt by FYROM to request Community recognition.
In order to appreciate these actions, it must be kept in mind that FYROM was in 
a very precarious position. With war raging in other ports of former Yugoslavia, there 
was no certainty that it would not spread to this republic os well.^ '^ o Also, the fact that
'•'^ ’Tarkas, 1995: 91 See also Perry, 1997: 232 In an interview on 3 February 1997, Samaras confirmed that the 
population transfer and partition proposals were essentially the same. See however Tarkas, 1995: 36.
^^°The intense fear of the war spreading to the repubiic during that period, was confirmed in an 
interview with Mr Risteski on 29 September 1997. Similar points were m ade in interviews with Mr Arsovski 
on 3 February 1997 and Mr Dimovski on 29 September 1997.
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FYROM's Albanian and Serbian minorities had boycotted the referendum for 
independence, suggested the possibility of ethnic tension and strife/^  ^ Furthermore, 
FYROM was essentially defenceless, having a  negligible army and a  virtually non­
existent air-force/72
Taking into account these realities, it is surprising that a  more forceful and 
confident strategy towards the new state was not pursued by Greece. Given FYROM's 
uncertain situation, the timing would have probably been opportune. A strategy among 
these lines might have involved a 'stick' option, such as the threat of an econom ic  
em bargo .^^3 question of why despite grievances and apprehensions, the Greek 
government pursued a  gentle' approach towards FYROM will be answered 
subsequently.
Another puzzling instance of Greek cooperation involves the recognition of 
Croatia. First of all, this decision was contrary to the 4 December Cabinet meeting 
decision that had advocated a unified Yugoslavia. Secondly, the m ove towards 
recognising Croatia constituted yet another blow to Serbia. This is because Serbia's 
enem y would have been entitled to all the benefits enjoyed by a recognised 
sovereign state, while Serbia would remain unrecognised.
Most importantly, EPC's decision was considered to be premature, with negative 
effects for the region. Lord Carrington's 2 December 1991 warning that recognition 
would undoubtedly mean the break-up of the [Hague Peace] Conference and might 
well b e  the spark that sets Bosnia-Herzegovina alight,' was widely shared by Greek 
decision-makers.474 it is noteworthy that the author has found almost no person in
47iFor subsequent accounts of strife among FYROM's ettinic groups, see The Economist. 26 July 1997: 28 
and Eleftherotypia. 26 February 1997:14.
4^2see Perry, 1992 16 and Perry, 1997: 267.
473Embargoes were eventually imposed by Greece on FYROM, though under different circumstances. For 
example, when Greece imposed its most severe embargo in February 1994, the threat of the war 
spreading to the new repubiic had receded substantially.
47^Woodward, 1995:184.
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G reece who has expressed a favourable opinion of this decision. Comments about the 
recognition of Croatia typically range from criminal' to 'unfortunate'.^^^
On the basis of the above, the problematic nature of a  series of Greek 
cooperative decisions becom es apparent. Explanations are required for the country's 
faiiure to seriousiy pressure a vulnerable FYROM, its participation in EPC's condemnation 
and penalisation of Serbia, as well as for the decisions to recognise Croatia and ailow 
the creation of the potentially damaging AC.
The desire to provide answers for such a  record of decision-making almost 
invites the appiicotion of the theory of institutionaiism. As was analysed in Chapter 1, 
the theory argues that regimes affect state behaviour by creating important incentives 
for cooperation, despite conflict[ing]...perceptions of self-interest heid by 
governments.'''^^ It wiil be shown that regime influence does offer an explanation to 
most of the Greek cooperative decisions, including the problematic ones. However, a  
brief examination of the Greek government's most significant foreign policy objectives 
wili be presented first, because it was these regime-related goals that determined to a  
considerable extent the country's EPC foreign poiicy towards former Yugoslavia and 
FYROM.
B. G reek  Foreign Policy O bjectives.
During the period of June 1991-January 1992, Greece's government had 
formulated in a  coherent and pragmatic way a  hierarchy of foreign policy goals. More 
specifically, the geographic proximity to warring Yugoslavia had a negative impact on 
the national economy: 'With 4 0  percent of...trode passing through Yugoslavia, Athens
characterisation criminai' was m ade during an interview with Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1996. In 
an interview on 10 January 1997, Mr Papayannakis described the decision as 'unfortunate.'
''^^Keohane and Nye, 1977/1989; 259. See aiso Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 508.
122
estimates losses up to $18 million per day.'^^  ^ As a  result of tfiis situation, an important 
objective was to actiieve an EPC decision providing monetary compensation.^'^^
Thus, after a  period of sustained cooperation, the 8  November 1991 annex of 
the EPC Declaration on Yugoslavia stated that
If the econom y of a  member State is seriously a ffected  by Yugoslav 
counter-measures, then the Community and its member States will show their 
solidarity by taking effective and concrete corrective measures towards the
member State concerned/^^
This declaration amounted to an EPC commitment to com pensate Greece.
An exam ple of the granting of such aid can be found in a  25 February 1992 
Council regulation.'(8o it accepts the arguments m ade by the Greek government about 
the negative results on sectors of the national econom y that used the Yugoslavia route 
for the export of products; and it specifically offers ECU 4 million as 'temporary 
compensation for the consequences of the situation in Yugoslavia on transport of som e 
fresh fruit and vegetables from Greece.'^ ^Gi
Another major goal that was to be achieved during the Maastricht Treaty 
negotiations, was to obtain an increase of structural funding towards Greece.482 This
New York Times. 9 November 1991: Al. It stiould also be noted ttict in a 17 January 1992 letter to tiis 
EPC colleagues. Samaras claimed that almost 60% of the total Greek exports are exported from 
northern Greece via Yugoslavia, to Central and Western Europe.' See Appendix II 
'^^®lnterviews with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996, Mr Skilakakis on 15 
April 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
479gjc Press Release P. 109/91, 8 November 1991. On 4 November 1991, The Council had asked the 
Commission to submit at the earliest opportunity proposals in favour of Greece, which is the Member 
State most affected by the proposed measures and generally by the econom ic consequences of the 
Yugoslav crisis, based on the notion of 'disproportionate dam age,' as the Twelve have assured 
Greece of com plete solidarity' (Council 8943/91 Presse 187-G 4.1191).
^80See OJ No L 58/1, 3.3.92
"^ ®feid. For the subsequent Community implementation of this policy, see  OJ No L 187/28, 7.7.92; OJ No L 
350/1,1.1292: OJ No L 96/22, 224.93 and OJ No L 154/4, 21.6.94.
^^ i^nterviews with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996, Mr Samaras 
on 24 December 1996, Mr Skilakakis on 15 April 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
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objective, which is related to the Community s regional policies, was of immense 
importance for the state's decision-makers and hence a  brief explanation is required 
Regional problems are accentuated by a  process of econom ic and monetary 
integration, partly because it ultimately deprives from countries the ability to use as an 
econom ic tool the revaluation of their c u r r e n c i e s / ® ^  Furthermore,
Economic integration may encourage concentration of new industry and 
relocation of existing industry in certain areas of the econom ic union which 
give superior infrastructure, lower transport costs and availability of skilled 
labour/®'^
Following years of discussions and planning, the Community eventually 
m anaged to initiate a  regional policy in 1975, with the creation of the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The Community's policy, aiming at reducing 
regional disparities and problems, reached a  new and more important plateau as a  
result of the Single European Act (SEA)/85 its admonitions of the SEA were implemented 
in 1988 with a  series of reforms which resulted to the doubling of the Structural Funds for 
the 1987-93 period/®"  ^ It was estimated that by 1993, structural appropriations would 
increase to ECU 14 billion...or about 25 percent of the total Community budget.'^®  ^ The 
practical implications of those reforms for a  country like Greece were immense. For 
exam ple, funds were targeted to what were called Objective 1 regions, defined as 
areas in which the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was less than 75% of the
'^ ®®See Hannequart, 1992a 1; Hitiris, 1988/1991: 233 and O'Donnell, 1992 29. Regional problems refer to 
'disparities in levels of income, in rates of growtti of output and employment, and in general in levels 
of econom ic inequality between ttie geographic regions of a country' (Hitiris, 1988/1991: 232).
"^ ®"Hitiris 1988/1991: 234.
"*®^ See Article 130,a  These policies were to be implemented through the Structural Funds, which included 
the ERDF, the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF). The European Investment Bank (EIB) was also to be involved. See SEA, Article 130b.
®^*For an account of the reforms, see Commission, 1989.
^®^ Marks, 1992 192
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Community average."*^® G reece as a whole fell under this category, and thus Objective 
1 appropriations for the period 1989-1993 were ECU 6,667 million, which represented 69,4 
ECUs per Inhabitant, as well as 18,4% of all such allocations/®^
The advent of the Maastricht Summit was seen by Greece, as well as by the 
other 'poor' EPC members, as an opportunity to achieve an Increase In structural 
allocations. Their desire for such an Increase was clearly communicated. Eventually, the 
TEU reaffirmed the goal of strengthenlng...economlc and social cohesion' and 
furthermore established the Cohesion Fund which was an entirely new fund unrelated to 
ERDF or to the other Structural Funds.^^ As described In the Protocol on Economic and 
Social Cohesion that was attached to the Maastricht Treaty, the Cohesion Fund was to 
provide funding for environmental and Infrastructure projects to Community members 
with GNP per capita of less than 90% of the Community average. In the words of the 
Commission, the Cohesion Fund given the go -ah ead  at Maastricht will be to...Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spaln...what the structural policies are to the regions.''*’! Its 
creation was clearly considered by MItsotakIs as an Important victory
Probably the most Important foreign policy objective of the Greek government 
was to achieve the country's accession to the WEU during the Maastricht Summlt.'^ s^ As 
mentioned In Chapter 2, the WEU was born In 1955 from the ashes of the failed attempt 
to create EDC.'*’'*
'*®®Other objectives were also Included, though Objective 1 was the most Important to Greece In terms of 
monetary allocations. For a brief discussion of the other Objectives, see  Ibid: 206-10.
'*®’These figures are taken from UrzalnquI and de Andres, 1992 93.
4’OTItle XIV. Article 130a.
'*’ !C0M(92) 2 0 0 0  final: 23.
'‘’^During an Interview on 10 April 1997, Mr MItsotakIs could hardly contain his pride while referring to the 
establishment of the Cohesion Fund.
'*’®Based on Interviews with Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997, Mr MItsotakIs on 10 April 1997, Mr 
Papaconstantlnou on 23 December 1996, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996, Mr Skllakakis on 15 April 
1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
'*’ '*The aim was to 'make the WEU an active consultative body for the Europeans In security policy 
matters, a  kind of_EPC In the field of security' (Wegener, 1991: 272). The WEU remained dormant between
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G reece applied for WEU membership in 1987, primarily because of its Article V, 
according to which
If any of the High Contracting Parties shouid b e  the object of an armed 
attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with 
the Provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the 
Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their
power/95
It was believed that Article V would provide G reece with important security 
guarantees against a  possible attack by Turkey—guarantees that were impossible 
under NATO rules where both countries are members.^^^ Andreas Papandreou who was 
in 1987 the socialist Prime Minister, summarised this logic during a  parliamentary debate, 
by succinctly stating that our interest in applying to join the WEU was in order to be  
able to fa ce  Turkey as a  non-ally.'^??
1973 and 1984. The declarations signalling and confirming the reactivation of the WEU were m ade in 
Rome on 27 October 1984 and in Bonn on 23 April 1985. They can be found in Bloed and Wessels, 1994: 
53-60  and 61-4 respectively. The fact that Denmark, Greece and Ireland were not WEU members was 
considered an advantage, as these countries often posed particular challenges to EPC decision­
making. For additionai reasons that led to the WEU's reactivation, see  Cahen, 1989: 6-7 and Wegener, 
1991: 272-3.
495For the text of the entire Treaty that includes Article V, see Bloed and Wessel, 1994:1-6. Article 51 of 
the UN Charter states that 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international p ea ce  and security. 
Measures taken by Member in the exercise of this right shall be immediately reported to the Security 
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibiiity of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such actions as it deem s necessary in order to maintain or 
restore international p ea ce  and security' ([UN] Department of Public Information, 1989: 27-8).
'^ '^^ In interviews with Mr Papaconstantinou on 10 January 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997, it was 
stressed that the ianguage used in the WEU's Article V in support of a member that is being attacked  
is stronger than that which is provided by NATO. However, its importance is lessened by the fact that 
the WEU lacks NATO's integrated command, organisationai structure and experience. See Cahen, 1989: 
27 and Wegener, 1991: 273-4.
'^ ^^ The debate took place on 20  December 1991. Papandreou's speech can be found (translated into 
English), in Couloumbis and Veremis, 1992 283-5. This speech is stressed and commented in
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By the time of the Maastricht Summit, WEU membership was also viewed as an 
opportunity to participate in what was becoming a  potentially more important actor in 
international affairs/^a Arguments that the WEU should assume a  larger role in the 
Western institutional landscape dealing with security and foreign policy issues, were 
increasing in both volume and weight/^? Greek decision-makers undoubtedly wanted 
their country to be part of an enhanced in significance WEU.^ oo
The importance bestowed upon gaining WEU membership is also illustrated by 
the fact that Prime Minister Mitsotakis had communicated to his EPC partners that 
accession  to the WEU was essential in order for G reece to sign the Maastricht Treaty.^oi 
This strategy was publicly (if somewhat misleadingly), admitted by Samaras during a  
Parliamentary debate on 2 0  December 1991, when he stated that we declared that we 
were not going to sign the entire Maastricht package unless we signed at the same 
time the WEU agreement in its e n t i r e t y Maastricht Treaty did not actually 
involve any such signing ceremony, though an attached declaration included the 
invitation leading to guaranteed membership that had eluded Greece since 1987. It 
plainly stated that 'States which are members of the European Union are invited to 
a c c e d e  to the WEU...or becom e observers if they so wish.'
The insistence to join the WEU also seem ed vindicated by the fact that the 
Maastricht Treaty created the potential for the organisation to assume in the near 
future an important role as regards defence issues. According to Article J.4.2
Tsakaloyannis, 1996: 205 fn 27, who also presents an excellent discussion of additional reasons and 
developments that prompted the Greek socialists to apply for WEU membership in 1987. See ibid: 191-2 
"*^ ®See for exam ple van Eekelen, 1991 for an account of the WEU's reaction to developments in the Gulf in 
1987 and especially in 1990, though prior to the outbreak of war. Van Eekelen was the then Secretary- 
General of the WEU.
"^ ^^ See for example the passages of a 1987 speech by Jacques Delors, cited in Cahen, 1989:15. 
^°°lnterviews with Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
^°^lnterview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997. In the same interview, Mitsotakis explained that he never 
actually used the word veto; nor was he ever forced to threaten its use.
^^^Samaras was responding to a question asked by Maria Damanaki, the then leader party Synaspismos. 
Their exchange can be found (translated into English), in Couloumbis and Veremis, 1992 289.
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The Union requests the Western Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the 
developm ent of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and 
actions of the Union which have defen ce implications.
G reece officially a cced ed  to the WEU on 2 0  November 1992, although the 
importance of membership had by then decreased d r a m a t i c a l i y . ^ o ^  jh e  19 June 1992 
Petersberg Declaration had provided the Greek government with a  bitter 
disappointment, since it
Stressed that the security guarantees and d efen ce  commitments in the 
Treaties which bind the member States within Western European Union and 
which bind them within the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and will 
not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration 
in disputes between member States of either of the two organisations.^O'^
Given the fact that Turkey was a  member of NATO (and was also en route to 
becom ing a  WEU associate member), this wording amounted to the suspension of 
Article V in case  of hostilities between Greece and Turkey, thus cancelling the main 
reason that membership had been desired by Greek d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s - ^ o s
the Council of Ministers Communique that announces the accession of Greece to the WEU, see  
Bloed and Wessel, 1994:159-62 
504|bid: 143-4.
^^^Furthermore, insult was added to injury when Article X was suspended in the case  of Turkish associate 
membership. According to Article X, disputes between WEU members should be referred to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague. Most Greek decision-makers consider that an ICJ 
adjudication over Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean would almost certainly lead to a  ruling 
favourable for their country. Subsequently, the WEU concession to Turkey concerning Article X was 
viewed as a further blow to Greek interests. For the WEU's Article X, see Cohen, 1989: 72-3. For the 
decision suspending Article X, see the first paragraph of the minutes of the 20  November 1992 WEU 
Council of Ministers meetings, that can be found in Bloed and Wessel, 1994:165.
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C. Institutionalist Relevance.
Institutionalist theory emphasises the role of institutions and essentially ignores 
dom estic politics. As regards this approach, the theory seem s to be vindicated in 
explaining Greece's foreign policy during the period between June 1991 and 17 January 
1992. In these months, domestic politics simply did not play a  significant role.
More specifically, there were almost no particular domestic developments that 
determined or influenced to any important degree the politics of Greek cooperation 
and moderation. The one major exception is related to Greece's failure to present an 
a ccep tab le  nominee to the AC. The country lacks a  Constitutional Court, and the 
closest equivalent is the Council of the State (Semvouleo tis E p i k r a t e i a s ).^06 jfs President 
Mr Vasilis Botopoulos, although perfectly qualified, was considered to be affiliated with 
PASOK. As a  result, he was side-stepped and Prime Minister Mitsotakis nominated a  
more politically friendly Vice-President of the Council, Mr Konstantinos D e g le r i s . ^ ^ ?
Not surprisingly, given the stipulation of the EPC decision that only Presidents of 
Constitutional Courts were to be nominated, Mr Degleris failed even to be considered 
for appointment, thus depriving G reece of a  chance to have a  national representative 
on the AC. However, even if a proper candidate was nominated, there would have  
been no guarantee of appointment.^o^
In analysing institutionalist relevance, it is crucial to stress that Greek decision­
makers including the then Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, believed that it was 
essential that their state be viewed by its EPC partners as contributing to the solution of 
the Yugoslav conflict. They also desired to portray Greece as a  country with 
legitimate concerns in the region, the ultimate goal being to create a  reputation of
Legg and Roberts, 1997:124.
^^ ^Ttiis account Is partly based on Interviews wltti Mr Lengerls on 27 August 1997, Mr Papaconstantlnou on 
23 December 1996, Mr Papathemells on 11 January 1997, Mr Tarkas on 9 April 1997 and Mr Vrahatls on 30  
August 1997.
"^^ T^tils fact Is often omitted from discussions of this episode. See for example Tarkas, 1995: 91
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trustworthiness and responsibility, as well as a  sense of debt, goodwill and
understanding.509
These reputational concerns and goals were ultimately produced by the 
'shadow of the future cast by the regime EPC Greek officials were fully aware that the 
regime would be responsible for many subsequent decisions that would almost 
certainly be of considerable importance to their country.^^o Such anticipated regime 
decisions covered developments in Yugoslavia, as well as the foreign policy goals 
analysed in the previous section.
Greek decision-makers aimed at ensuring that their country not acquire the 
reputation of contributing, or being a  part of the region's problems, and this prudent 
goal dictated a  series of cooperative decisions.5n Hence, the government never 
considered vetoing the establishment of the Hague Peace Conference, or of the 
Arbitration Commission.
The sam e rationale explains the participation in EPC's condemnation and 
penalisation of Serbia. Despite the existence of common interests and history, G reece  
did not want to be seen as a  close ally actively aiding Serbia, given the perception 
that the republic was primarily responsible for the war and its accom panying atrocities. 
In other words, reputational concerns superseded the Greco-Serbian special 
relationship. As Mitsotakis explained while referring to this issue:
[Within EPC] there exists an interesting balance. No country can actually 
follow exclusively its policies. One must often compromise or even follow
^°^Based on interviews witti Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997, Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1996, Mr Mitsotakis on 
10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantlnou on 10 January 1997, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996 and 3 
February 1997, Mr Skllakakis on 15 April 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997. Ttie degree of agreement 
among ttiem is remarkable.
^^°Based on interviews witti Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997, Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1996, Mr Mitsotakis on 
10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantlnou on 10 January 1997, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996 and 3 
February 1997, Mr Skllakakis on 15 April 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
^^’interviews witti Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997, Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1996, Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 
1997, Mr Papaconstantlnou on 10 January 1997, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996 and 3 February 1997, 
Mr Skllakakis on 15 April 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
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policies with which one disagrees, in order to attain other more important 
goals in the future
Another exam ple of Greek behaviour being influenced by reputational 
concerns and EPC's shadow of the future', was related to the goal of gaining 
Community aid as compensation for the Yugoslav War's negative effects on the 
national economy. The government considered its EPC behaviour and reputation as a  
key test and condition for achieving such aid. It was believed that the securing of aid 
would b e  greatly helped if Greece demonstrated its consistent willingness to cooperate  
even  on issues with negative consequences to some of the country's interests. In this 
way, the existence of the regime EPC with its continuous decision-making function 
created incentives for cooperotion.^i^
The gentle' stance towards FYROM was partly influenced by the fear 
(mentioned in Chapter 3), that the possible descent into war and disintegration of the 
new repubiic could have probably had detrimental effects, possibly producing a Third 
Balkan War. However, EPC's shadow of the future' also influenced the flexibility on the 
issue of FYROM's name, to the extent that a  compromise name in the line of Upper 
M acedonia was at the very least not rejected. Furthermore, EPC's 'shadow of the future' 
helps explain the failure to block FYROM from applying for EPC recognition, or 
attaching conditions prior to 16 December 1991. In interviews with Samaras, the former 
Foreign Minister boasted (with justification), and kept repeating essentially the sam e 
rationale behind these cooperative decisions.
An exam ple is illustrative. Concerning the 2 December 1991 Council document 
referring to the 'Republic of Macedonia,' he emphasised that
I did not want to take what would have been perceived as an extremist 
position. Such a  position could have created the impression that G reece
^^ i^nterview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 Aprii 1997; emphasis added.
^'^Based on interviews with Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997, Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1996, Mr Mitsotakis on 
10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantlnou on 10 January 1997, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996 and 3 
February 1997, Mr Skllakakis on 15 Aprii 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
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could have territorial ambitions against Skop]e...Furthermore, I wanted to 
create a  positive climate [for Greece] with our European partners; and there 
were also our goals at Maastricht.^’^
Thus, it can be concluded that the institutionalist prediction that regimes link 
the future with the present,' create reputational concerns and thus ultimately increase 
pressure for cooperation, stands vindicated.^’^  Considerations of reputational concerns 
and the shadow of the future' though, do not suffice to explain entirely the politics of 
Greek cooperation. An analysis of the 2 December 1991 document suggests additional 
regim e-related reasons of crucial importance. More specifically, it has already been  
mentioned that Samaras referred in an interview to his government's goals at 
Maastricht. A telegram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also explained that 'although 
G reece d id  not agree with this [2  D ecem ber 1991] decision, it w ould not block a 
decision, because o f  the upcoming M aastricht Summitl^^^ The stated link between  
cooperation and Maastricht deserves examination.
Institutionalist theory argues that goods provided uniquely by a  regime, high 
issue density and the possibility of side-paym ents help achieve and foster 
cooperation. All of these regime-produced incentives were present at the Maastricht 
Summit. WEU membership and the establishment of the Cohesion Fund were goods' 
that could have been provided uniquely by the regime EPC. In addition to the support 
of the other 'poor' Community countries, the Greek government also believed that the 
reputation of a  cooperative state would increase the chances of achieving greater 
monetary allocations from the Structural Funds. Furthermore, it was hoped that a  
positive reputation and a  cooperative stance on Yugoslavia and on other issues, would 
assist accession to the WEU.^ ^^
^^ I^nterview with Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997.
Axelrod and Keohane, 1993: 94.
^ •^^Skilakakis, 1995: 57; emphasis added. This telegram was sent by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
the Greek Embassy in Belgrade on 3 December 1991 In an Interview on 1 April 1997, Mr Skllakakis 
revealed that although not In quotation marks in his book, this is the exact wording of the telegram. 
^^^Based on interviews with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997 and Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997.
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The granting of Greece's Maastricht foreign policy goals can be viewed as an 
important side-paym ent which facilitated the signing of the TEU.^ ’s According to Greek 
decision-makers, it also represented a  reward for their country's cooperation on 
Yugoslavia.5’9 institutionalism predicts that the existence of high issue density facilitates 
such side-paym ents and thus increases the chances for cooperation.^^o j^js was 
undoubtedly the case  prior and during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, when issue 
density reached a  peak.
Furthermore, institutionalist theory emphasises the importance of reciprocity. 
This concept is helpful in explaining Greece's agreem ent to EPC's 15 January 1992 
decision on the recognition of the former Yugoslav r e p u b l i c s . ^ ^ !  G reece did not veto  
the recognition of Croatia on the condition that this cooperative action be  
reciprocated by the refusal to recognise FYROM, in this instance, the state of Greek 
dom estic politics was used as an additional argument by Mitsotakis, who warned his 
German and Italian counterparts that the recognition of FYROM with the name 
M acedonia would imperil the survival of his government.
Reciprocity can perhaps also b e  used in explaining Samaras' agreem ent to sign 
the 16 December 1991 EPC decisions. For endorsing a  document that he believed would 
produce negative results for the region. Samaras achieved the three EPC conditions on 
the recognition of FYROM. The former Foreign Minister claims that he was essentially 
presented with a  fa it  accom pli because of Germany's intransigence, and argues that 
vetoing the declaration would have bestowed upon his state the reputation of a  non-
'^®The signing of the TEU by Greece could not have been considered as a foregone conclusion. This is 
because there was little doubt that some of the Treaty's articles, and especially those referring to 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), would produce strains and hardship to the Greek econom y and 
society.
^'^Interviews with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantlnou on 10 January 1997 and Mr Samaras 
on 3 February 1997.
520por example, see Keohane, 1983:155 and Keohane, 1984: 91
^^'See EPC Press Release P. 9/92,15 January 1992
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cooperating member, and would have also Incurred the wrath of Germany 522 Possibly 
then, reputational concerns played a role in this decision as well.
On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that Greek cooperation is 
largely explained by the theory of institutionalism. Institutionalist concepts such as the 
shadow of the future,' high issue density, side-payments, reciprocity, goods offered 
uniquely by regimes and regime-related reputational concerns, are central in 
understanding Greek foreign policy towards former Yugoslavia and FYROM. The degree  
of regime influence even superseded concerns that a  series of cooperative decisions 
would have had consequences that were contrary to perceived national interests. 
Also, the fact that domestic politics played only a  marginal role, further contributes to 
the vindication of institutionalist analysis.
D. The Decline of the Polttics of G reek C ooperation.
The decline of the politics of Greek cooperation begins with the 17 January 1992 
letter that Samaras sent to his EPC counterparts, the official English translation of which 
is published here for the first t i m e .^23 |fs tone is alarmist and the possibility that the war 
in Yugoslavia might spread to the other Balkan states is suggested several times. The 
tone of the letter is also very aggressive: Samaras accuses the AC for considering only 
FYROM's arguments and criticises Bulgaria for the decision to recognise FYROM.
The most sustained and fierce attack is reserved for the new republic, or 
'Skopje' as it is repeatedly called.^^  ^ FYROM is described as an artificial state which 
Tito created in order to satisfy his imperialist goals against Greece and Bulgaria. The 
country's government is presented as engaging in hostile propaganda and making
^22|nterview with Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997.
^23see Appendix II Mitsotakis claims that he was not informed about this letter at the time that it was 
sent, although there was no subsequent public denunciation. More certain is the fact that the Greek 
Cabinet was not informed of the letter immediately after it was sent (interviews with Mr Mitsotakis on 
10 April 1997 and Mr Skllakakis on 15 April 1997).
^24see Appendix II
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territorial claims against Greece. Importantly, ttie Foreign Minister concluded ttiat 
FYROM tiad failed to comply with EPC's 16 December 1991 conditions. ’
As regards FYROM's name, EPC's Foreign Ministers were reminded that
For 45 years, the Macedonian name b ecam e the major vehicle for territorial 
and cultural expansionism encroaching upon Greek territory. Because of the 
continued use and abuse by Skopje of the hellenic civilization and traditions 
in order to promote expansionist aims, any further use of the Macedonian 
nam e by an independent state would ipso facto imply territorial claims
against Greece.^^s
Given this argument, the letter concluded that
The term "Macedonia", i f  used in the denomination o f  the Skopje Republic, 
is unacceptable as it contains by itself an expansionist notion...Thus. the 
adoption of the Macedonian name...carries the clear m essage that the 
Republic's jurisdiction extends over the Macedonian provinces of all 
neighbouring states.526
This passage contains a  restrictive interpretation of EPC's 16 December 1991 third 
condition, thus signalling the abandonment of the flexible policy on the name issue. 
Despite the attacks on FYROM, the letter also m ade it clear that G reece was
Prepared to help create a regional arrangement to m eet the security needs 
of Skopje, as well as those of its neighbours...ln addition, G reece could 
extend to the new Republic special econom ic privileges, open prospects for 
an all round econom ic cooperation, and set in motion the process for a  
solution to all bilateral issues.®^ ?
On 21 January 1992, Karamanlis sent a  letter to Italy's Prime Minister Andreotti, in 
which he objected to FYROM being named Macedonia, though there was no clear 
adoption of the restrictive position on the name issue.528 Importantly, Karamanlis
2^5|bid.
^26|bid. The underlined section of this quotation is also underlined in the original document; emphasis 
added.
2^7|bid.
^28The letter is published in Valenakes and Dales, 1994: 83-4.
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attem pted to explain Greece's 'vital national interest' in ttiis dispute. More specifically, 
ttie President accep ted  thiat ttie new republic did not pose a  direct military ttireat, but 
emptiasised ttiat a  combination of forces' [i.e. neigtibouring countries] in addition to 
FYROM, could constitute a ttireat for Greece.529
Andreotti replied on 27 January, noting ttie importance bestowed upon 
maintaining ttie EC's coliesion,' and pointing out ttiat Greece's national interests were 
taken into consideration to the extent that the AC's recommendation was m ade  
subject to a  necessary political e v a l u a t i o n . ' ^ ^ o  jp other words, it was essentially 
ignored. Andreotti also m ade an important reference to the issue of recognising the 
"Macedonian Republic of Skopje,' thus suggesting a  possible (and creative) 
compromise name, aiming at ending the d i s p u t e . ^ ^ i
The accep tan ce of a  name am ong the lines suggested by Andreotti would 
have required the abandonment of the restrictive position on the name issue. However, 
it was the hard-line stance that actually received a  major boost as a  result of the huge 
demonstration that took place on 14 February 1992 in Thessaloniki, Greece's historic 
second largest city.^ s^ it was organised by the Macedonian Committee, a  non­
governmental organisation.533
529ibid: 83.
^^°Svolopoulos, 1997: 616, Vol. 12
^^ I^bid. in a memorandum that was written on 14 April 1993, Mr Kofos analysed the advantages and
disadvantages for Greece of the various names with which FYROM could have been recognised. He
considered the name Macedonian Repubiic of Skopje to have the advantage of allowing FYROM's 
citizens to be called Skopjans. Kofos' memorandum which is of exceptional quality is published in 
Tarkas, 1997:171-4.
^^2jhe account of events related to the Thessaloniki demonstration is based on interviews with Ms 
Damanaki on 30 January 1997, Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997, Mr Kosmopouios on 5 February 1997, Mr 
Lengeris on 30  August 1997, Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1997, Mr Mitsotakis on 10 Aprii 1997, Mr
Papaconstantlnou on 23 December 1996, Mr Papayannakis on 10 January 1997, Mr Samaras on 23
December 1996, Mr Skllakakis on 15 Aprii 1997, Mr Tsohatzopouios on 3 August 1997, Mr Tzounis on 14 
Aprii 1997 and Mr Vrahatls on 30 August 1997. Of particular assistance was also the videotape Eimaste 
Edo [We Are Here], produced in 1992 by Thessaloniki's local administration TV station, TV 100. This
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The committee's founding declaration that was issued on 17 January 1992, 
em phasised the Greek history and culture of Macedonia and Thessaloniki, and also 
attacked  the AC's ruling.534 significantly, FYROM was called several times the Republic 
of Skopje'535 The arguments and goals of this declaration set the tone and provided 
part of the rationale for the decision to organise the Thessaloniki demonstration. One 
of the committee's major goals was to demonstrate that its positions on Macedonian 
history and politics enjoyed tremendous popular support.
The decision to hold the demonstration was taken unanimously by the 
Macedonian Committee. Earlier, Nikos Mertzos (a committee founder and 
demonstration supporter), attempted to inform Mitsotakis that such a  decision was 
imminent. As a friend and advisor to the Greek Prime Minister for Macedonian-Thrace 
issues, he felt that it was his duty to do so. However, Mitsotakis was on holiday in Italy, 
and it proved impossible for Mertzos to get in touch with him.s36
The undertaking of the demonstration was publicly announced on 7 February 
1992 by the Mayor of Thessaloniki, Mr Kosmopouios. It appeared somewhat misleadingly 
as an initiative of Thessaloniki's local administration, though in a  press conference Mr 
Kosmopouios did acknowledge that the Macedonian Committee had played an
tape, full of interviews and covering the entire event, is essential to an analysis of the Thessaloniki 
demonstration.
^^ I^ts membership was comprised of some of the most prominent and respected citizens of Thessaloniki. 
Among them were Thessaloniki's Mayor Mr Kosmopouios, the Aristotle University's Chancellor Mr 
Trakatellis, former Ministers Zartinides, Papathemells and Tzitzikostas, as well as many successful and 
important businessmen, such as Mr Bakatselos. They were affiliated with all the major Greek political 
parties, with the exception of the KKE though the overwhelming majority had close ties with the then 
governing party of New Democracy.
^^ "^ The privately published and hard to obtain declaration is reproduced in Appendix III It was written by 
Mr Mertzos and includes a list of the committee's members.
®3^See Appendix III
According to Mertzos, this was both unfortunate and unacceptable: 'Greece does not go on holiday' 
he poignantly stressed in an interview on 18 December 1996.
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important role.^ '^^  it also becam e known that during the demonstration, the city's 
universities, all public and private sector businesses, as well as all schools would remain 
closed. Finally, a  scathing declaration was released, which included the following 
passage:
M acedonia is Greek...Righteous wrath is produced...[by FYROM's] insistence to 
be internationally recognised with our name...The usurpation is evident, and 
even more evident through this [usurpation] is imperialism. They take away 
our nam e and...demand the international legitimisation of their crimeP^^
Mitsotakis met with the demonstration organisers in early February at the 
Thessaloniki airport.^ ?^ During their meeting, he expressed som e concerns and 
o b j e c t i o n s . 5 4 0  According to Mayor Kosmopouios, the organisers eventually m anaged to 
secure [the Prime Minister's] silent agreement's^^ Publicly, Mitsotakis announced that the 
planned demonstration constitutes a national contribution.'S42
In addition to not having been informed in time of the decision to hold the 
Thessaloniki demonstration, Mitsotakis was also not informed about its various details. 
Most importantly, he was never aware of the exact phrasing of the resolution that the 
organisers intended to pass.s43 Mayor Kosmopouios though, had called Samaras and 
read to him over the phone the text of the resolution. The Foreign Minister expressed no 
objections.^ "^ ^
], 8 February 1992 1. The role of the Macedonian Committee In organising the Thessaloniki 
demonstration was much more crucial and central than what Mr Kosmopouios implied in his press 
conference, a fact that he accep ted  during an interview on 5 February 1997.
^^ M^akedonia. 8 February 1992 7.
^ '^^Mitsotakis was en route to Athens, returning from Davos in Switzerland.
540Based on interviews with Mr Kosmopouios on 5 February 1997, Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1996, Mr 
Papathemells on 11 January 1997 and Mr Tsohatzopouios on 3 August 1997.
^4nterview with Mr Kosmopouios on 5 February 1997.
^^ ^Makedonia. 11 February 1992 1 
"^^ I^nterview with Mr Skllakakis on 15 April 1997.
Based on interviews with Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996 and Mr Kosmopouios on 5 February 1997.
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On 14 February, the demonstration took p lace and Its size and passion surprised 
everyone, even the most optimistic of the organlsers. '^^  ^ It Is estimated that about one 
million people participated, a  fact that at the very least suggests the sensitivity of the 
Greek people for the Macedonian Issue which Is probably not unrelated with the 
tumultuous and traumatic historical events In the region that were presented In Chapter 
3. The overwhelming majority of the participants cam e from Thessaloniki and the 
neighbouring provinces. Present were also officials representing the Greek Orthodox 
Church, all the political parties, professional groups and local administration bodies. 
The only notable absence was that of the KKE, which refused to be associated with the 
event.
The KKE Ignored any considerations of political cost. Furthermore, It resented 
the fact of not having been consulted about the demonstration's planning and content, 
and condem ned the organisational role played by the Macedonian C o m m l t t e e . 5 4 6  
Although the party castigated the propaganda practised by FYROM against Greece, It 
concluded that the demonstration would probably concentrate on the republic's name, 
and would ultimately amount to a  'nationalistic, chauvinistic, antl-Communlst
dellrlum.'547
^"'^Samaras' reaction and interest in ttie Ttiessaloniki demonstration was described by Mr Kofos in an 
interview on 5 January 1997. More specifically, Kofos says that he was in a meeting in Samaras' office 
preparing for the 17 February Lisbon General Council meeting. A secretary informed them that the 
demonstration was taking place in Thessaloniki. The various experts. Kofos included, did not pay 
particular attention. The politician Samaras however, reacted differently: he abandoned the meeting 
and stayed glued in front of a television set, appearing very pleased.
'^^ '^ The analysis of the position taken by the KKE is based on Rizospastis. 9 February 1992 3 and on an 
interview with Mr Lengeris that was conducted on 27 August 1997. Mr Lengeris is a member of the KKE's 
Central Committee, and is partly responsible for the party's international relations section. During the 
interview, it was explicitly and repeatedly clarified that all the views that he expressed, also 
represented in an exact and accurate way, the views of the KKE's General Secretary Ms Aleka 
Papariga As I was told while trying to arrange KKE-related interviews: there is only one view in the 
partyp]'
"^^ R^izospastis. 9 February 1992 3.
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Despite such predictions, there was almost something mystical about the 
demonstration.548 As people flooded Thessaloniki's central square, many were in tears, 
and most seem ed to be declaring their Greek identity which they feit was being 
threatened, usurped and falsified by FYROM.^ 'i^  it should also b e  stressed that the 
demonstration was entirely peaceful.^^o The crowd heard speeches from the bishop of 
Thessaloniki, and the mayor of the historic nearby town of Véroia. The keynote 
speaker Mr Kosmopouios provided in his address an eloquent summary of the 
arguments used to prove that Macedonia has a  Greek history spanning more than 
three thousand years. Furthermore, what he considered to be the conduct of hostile 
propaganda by FYROM was clearly condemned. A special plea was reserved for 
Greece's EPC partners, who were urged to act according to the principle of solidarity. 
Towards the end, Kosmopouios asked both rhetorically and emphatically: If they are 
nam ed Macedonians, then what are we going to b e  named?'^^^ Nevertheless, no 
specific policy recommendations were contained in the speech.
The demonstration culminated with the reading and passing of a resolution 
which condem ned what was considered FYROM's attempt to usurp the Greek name of 
Macedonia.^52 pYROM was also castigated for 'hostility and expansionism against 
[ G r e e c e ] . '5 5 3  At its very end, the Thessaloniki resolution contained a  passage that 
proved consequential:
The [Greek] government is called upon to stand by the spirit and m essage of 
[this] resolution and demonstration. The people of Macedonia and 
Thessaloniki request from  the Foreign M inister that he continues to fight.
an interview on 24 December 1996, Mr Samaras called ttie demonstration a Dionysian expression of 
the Greek people.'
'^^ ’Having talked to many friends and relatives, I am am azed to report that most admit having cried at 
least at some point during the demonstration.
^^^Characteristically, a huge banner read: 'Peace, Security, Cooperation in the Balkans.'
^^^Based on the viewing of TV lOO's Eimaste Edo. 1992
^^^The resolution had been coliectively written and approved by the Macedonian Committee (interview 
with Mr Kosmopouios, 5 February 1997).
^^ ^Makedonia. 15 February 1992 5.
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an d  not accept the recognition o f  the state o f  Skopje with a name or 
designation that w ill include the name MacedoniaP^^
This phrasing clearly coincided and provided support for the position on FYROM's name 
that was Included In Samaras' 17 January letter to his EPC counterparts.
The Thessaloniki mass demonstration linked the Issue of FYROM's name with the 
passion, patriotism and nationalism that only one million demonstrators could provide. 
Prior to that date, all diplomatic efforts and positions were reached by diplomats and 
politicians. The Thessaloniki demonstration however, courted and achieved the 
participation and backing of almost a  tenth of the country's population on a  particular 
position. In effect, the people becam e Important and active actors In Greece's 
diplomatic efforts. After 14 February, foreign policy, domestic politics and nationalism 
begin a  process of conflation.
Following the demonstration. Samaras flew to Lisbon for a  General Council 
meeting. EPC member states had pledged that the Greek government would be given 
one opportunity to present Its case on the dispute with FYRCM at the Intergovernmental 
Council, regardless of any time constraints. Thus, the 17 February 1992 meeting 
demonstrates once again EPC's strong Intergovernmental aspects. Many experts and 
diplomats In the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs had worked on this presentation 
(published here for the first time.) for several weeks,
Samaras' address lasted for more than half an hour and was well researched 
and argued. He explained that hl& country was not afraid of a  smaller and essentially 
unarmed republic, but rather was concerned that If FYRCM was given recognition In Its 
own terms lt...wlll create great Instability In the reglon.'^s  ^ The possible sources of this
emphasis added. The specific mentioning of Greece's Foreign Minister and not of Greece's Prime 
Minister or government Is noteworthy. It Is perhaps explained by the fact that Samaras had been  
Informed of the resolution's precise phrasing, and had explicitly expressed his support and approval. It 
Is doubtful whether Mitsotakis would have passed a similar judgement.
^^^See Appendix IV.
556|bld.
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instability would be the ensuing strife among FYROM's various ethnic groups, or Serbian 
attempts to dominate the new republic. Also de-stabilising would be a  possible 
Bulgarian bid to 'embrace FYROM, given the country's past territorial claims for the 
region and recent position that a Macedonian nation does not exist.^ ^^
Greece's Foreign Minister attacked FYROM for failing to m eet EPC's three 
conditions and explained in detail that the various constitutional amendments, passed  
with the e a se  and speed  of a  simple government decree' did not satisfy the condition 
that FYROM refrain from making territorial claims..®^ ® Furthermore, Samaras presented a  
series of important examples of hostile actions and propaganda being conducted by 
FYROM against Greece. Perhaps most sensational was the decision of FYROM's 
Parliament to establish a  navy, despite the fact that it is a  landlocked country!
As regards the third condition, he argued that the name Republic of Macedonia 
implied territorial ambitions against his country, as well as an assault on our Flellenic 
cultural heritage.'^^’ Samaras then proposed several possible names that if adopted, 
would have been consistent with his restrictive interpretation of the third EPC condition:
There are many good options. Prior to the Communist era, the administrative 
nam e of the region...was Vardar Banovina. Immediately before that, during 
the last phase of Ottoman rule, it was known as Skopje Sanjak. The Slav 
insurgents of 1903 proclaimed it, the Trusevo Republic' and there is much in 
the name to unite its inhabitants without disturbing its neighbours.^^^
The Foreign Minister stressed that unlike other neighbouring countries, Greece  
harboured no territorial ambitions against FYROM. Fie also emphasised that if the 
dispute was resolved, his government would be willing to assist financially the new 
republic, as well as guarantee its security.
Towards the end of his presentation. Samaras m ade references to popular 
passions and opinions, pointing out that the Thessaloniki demonstration was the
^^ I^bid.
‘^^ '^ Ibid.
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'biggest demonstration ever held in Greece/^^i At the beginning of the meeting, he 
had distributed to his counterparts an envelope which included photographs 
documenting what was considered to be the provocative propaganda practised by 
FYROM. Most importantly, the package included a  copy of a  Greek newspaper 
featuring on its front page a  splendid aerial photograph of the huge Thessaloniki
demonstration.5<^2
According to Mr Evangelos Kofos who was present at the meeting, EPC's 
impressed Foreign Ministers concentrated on the newspaper to such an extent, that 
they seem ed to simply ignore the first parts of Samaras' presentation.^^^ The Greek 
Foreign Minister's ultimate m essage, both visual and verbal, had thus been m ade clear: 
in addition to having justice on its side, popular passions were of such magnitude that 
it meant 'that to grant Skopje recognition as Macedonia...[was] politically impossible for 
any Greek government's'^^
Following Samaras' presentation, it was decid ed  to postpone any decision on 
the recognition of FYROM, and also agreed that the Portuguese Presidency would 
undertake an initiative aiming to resolve the dispute between FYROM and Greece. This 
is the origin of what eventually b ecam e known as the 'Pinheiro Package.' As is 
customary, the meeting's decisions were m ade public through an EPC Press Release, 
which in its original version acknowledged that there was discussion on the recognition 
of the Republic of Macedonia. When Samaras was informed of this, he returned from 
his way to the airport, protested and secured a  change in the wording, as well as an 
oral apology from the Portuguese Presidency, which was announced through
^*^2samaras distributed ttie 15 February 1992 copy of ttie newspaper Makedonia.
‘^^ ^Interview witti fvir Kofos on 5 January 1997. Kofos believes that more that 5 0  per cent of the impression 
produced by Samaras on 17 February 1992 was not caused by the elaborate and lengthy research and 
work undertaken by the tvtinistry of Foreign Affairs experts. Rather, it was produced by the copy of the 
newspaper that was distributed, since it m ade explicit the degree of popular passion on the dispute 
with FYROM.
'^^ '*See Appendix IV.
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speakerphones in the place where the meeting was held. The final version simply 
mentioned that The Community and its member States will continue to follow very 
closely all developments concerning the possible recognition of other Republics.'^^  ^ In 
G sense, this episode signals Samaras' adoption of a consistent, consequential and 
often public hard-line strategy on the issue of FYROM's name that will be analysed in 
the following chopter.^ <^ ^
565gjQ pcess Release P. 8/92,17 February 1992
‘^^ ‘^ The Greek press was informed of Samaras' intervention in aitering ttie text of tlie EPC declaration. As 
expected , his actions received favourable coverage. See Makedonia. 18 February 1992 12
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CHAPTER 6
THE CHALLENGE OF SAMARAS 
February-April 1992
A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and 
divines.
-Ralph Waldo Emerson.
A. The Political Parties Respond to  Popular Discontent.
After returning from Lisbon, Samaras participated on 18 February 1992 in an 
unusual meeting of ttie leaders of ttie Greek political parties ttiat were represented in 
Parliament.567 j^js meeting was ttie first in a  series of events that followed the 
momentous 14 February Thessaloniki demonstration that belong firmly to the realm of 
Greek dom estic and partisan politics, and ultimately determined the country's EPC 
foreign policy towards former Yugoslavia and FYROM
The 18 February First Council of the Political Leaders was chaired by the 
President of the Hellenic Republic, Konstantinos Karamanlis. Participants included Prime 
Minister Mitsotakis, the Leader of the Opposition Andreas Papandreou, Maria Damanaki, 
leader of the small leftist party Synaspismos, and Aleka Papariga, General Secretary of 
the KKE. This meeting, as well as the subsequent Parliamentary debate on 24 February 
1992, represented the initial responses of the political parties to the rise of popular
*^^ T^his was not the first time in modern Greek history that a  Council of Political Leaders had been held. 
For exam ple, a  similar Council had taken place in 1951, with the aim to achieve agreement on a  
national strategy that was to be followed on Cyprus. In that instance, the Greek leaders exhibited a  
high and unusual degree of prudence, moderation and agreement. See Lagakos, 1996: 44-6.
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emotions and to the Thessaloniki demonstration, in a  sense, the Greek people had 
su cceed ed  in preceding and upstaging their elected  representatives.
At the beginning of the meeting. Samaras gave  an account of what had taken 
place at the Lisbon General Council.^ *^ ® In the following four hours, all major foreign 
policy issues were discussed in a  civilised and calm manner. As regards the dispute 
with FYROM, the Prime Minister suggested that a  compromise on the name might 
b ecom e n e c e s s a r y .^69 Importantly, Karamanlis, Papandreou and Mitsotakis pronounced 
the third EPC condition vague, thus indirectly criticising Samaras.
In the official announcement of the Presidency, it was noted that 'convergence  
of views was ascertained on vital national issues [however there] remain differences on 
others.'57o On the dispute with FYROM though, there was unanimous agreem ent that 
G reece ought to pursue a  settlement on the basis of the 16 December 1991 EPC 
conditions. That there was agreement on this point, was m ade perfectly clear in the 
press conferences given by the leaders after the meeting's conclusion. Mitsotakis 
declared that as regards the Balkans and [our] policy towards Skopje, there was 
agreement.'^^i Papandreou noted that there was agreem ent on the "Macedonian" 
[issue] and on Balkan p o l i c y .'^^2 similar statements were m ade by Maria Damanaki and
'^^ ®The account of this meeting is based on interviews with Ms Damanaki on 30  January 1997, Mr Lengeris 
on 27 August 1997, Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996 and 3 February 
1997 and Mr Skilakakis on 15 April 1997. Of particular assistance were Papandreou's hand-written notes 
of the meeting, published in Papandreou, 1997: 516-30 and also the account given in Skllakakis, 1995: 
93-6. It is allegedly based on an 'analytical presentation' (ibid: 93) that Mitsotakis m ade to Skilakakis 
and has largely been corroborated in interviews. On the importance of Skilakakis' account of the 
meetings of the Council of the Political Leaders, see footnote 651.
^^^Further evidence on this point is provided by Papandreou's hand-written notes of the meeting. See 
Papandreou, 1997: 518.
^^°loannou, 1992 79. The 'others' referred to Greek-Turkish relations.
^^ M^akedonia. 19 February 1992 1.
572|bidj 12
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Aleka Popariga^^s \\ ^qs also decided that given extraordinary situations,' a  similar 
meeting could be held In the future.^ "^*
The leader's views on foreign policy issues were discussed publicly during a  
Parliamentary debate on 24 February 1992, the tone and conduct of which was 
uncharacteristically serious, moderate, calm and non-demagogic.^^s The agreement 
on Greece's policy towards its dispute with FYROM was reiterated by all the speakers. 
Mitsotakis emphasised this fact and could not resist the temptation to tease the KKE's 
representative for his participation in this agreement (the KKE is usually a  lonely and 
contrarian voice in Parliament).
Despite any personal misgivings or privately expressed doubts, Mitsotakis also 
declared that the Foreign Minister did [on 16 December 1991] in Brussels a  wonderful 
job.'s^  ^ Furthermore, the Prime Minister completely overlooked the Thessaloniki 
resolution's argument that FYROM's name should not include the word Macedonia, 
judging the demonstration significant only to the extent that it informed the world 
community about Greece's arguments and disagreements with FYROM. This 'public 
relations' interpretation of the Thessaloniki demonstration ignored what appeared to be  
genuine popular concern about FYROM's name.
Papandreou's reference to the sam e event was rather vague. Fie stated that 
G reece can not recognise the name Macedonia to Skopje. The enormous Thessaloniki 
demonstration proved this. It was a  reawakening of the nation.'^^? Although 
Papandreou paid lip service to what had happened in Thessaloniki, he was not clear 
as to whether he actually accep ted  the contents of the Thessaloniki resolution. It can
ibid.
^^ I^bidj I
speeches of Mitsotakis and Papandreou are reproduced in their entirety in Makedonia. 25 
February 1992 1, 8, 9 and 14. The newspaper's coverage also includes important sections from the 
speeches of Maria Damanaki and Mitsos Kostopoulos, the KKE's representative.
576|bid.: 8.
^^ I^bidj 9.
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only b e  ascertained with certainty that he would have been opposed to FYROM simply 
being nam ed Macedonia.
In his speech, Papandreou criticised the Greek government's agreem ent in the 
16 Decem ber 1991 EPC meeting. His criticism though, only passingly implied that the 
three conditions were inadequate. Rather, he primarily argued that Samaras shouid 
have utilised his veto power and thus blocked a  decision that essentially sanctioned  
Yugoslavia's break-up. Finally, the Leader of the Opposition condem ned the 
government's decision to allow the creation of the Arbitration Commission, as well as its 
failure to ensure that the country was represented on it.
This Parliamentary debate revealed broad agreem ent on Greece's strategy 
and goals in the dispute with FYROM. The various dissensions that were expressed  
concerned primarily tactics. Mitsotakis never defended or even presented the Greek 
position on FYROM's name that was included in Samaras' 17 January 1992 letter to his 
EPC counterparts; and the opposition's representatives were either vague or silent 
about supporting a  maximalist position on the name issue. Nevertheless, and despite 
not being advertised, the official Greek stance on FYROM's name remained maximalist. 
It remained so though more os a diplomatic manoeuvre than a  position cast in 
stone.'s^B Mitsotakis com m ented on the potential flexibility of this position during on 
interview, by stressing that a  country does not enter a  dispute arguing for the minimum 
of its demands.'^^’
Greece's governing and opposition parties had thus responded to popular 
concerns without resorting to populism, nationalistic rhetoric, or even a  clear adoption 
of the restrictive position on what FYROM ought to be named. In doing so, they 
underestimated the radicalism and passion of at least a  certain segm ent of the 
population; and at any rate, their positions and discourse soon changed in a  dramatic, 
undisputed and consequential way.
^^®Based on interviews with Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997, Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr Samaras on 23 
December 1996, Mr Skilakakis on 15 April 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
^^^Interview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997.
148
Perhaps more in accordance with the people's feelings was the official 
sanctioning of som e limited trade difficulties against FYROM, that provide the first 
indication of what eventually becam e the politics of Greek confrontation. More 
specifically, the Greek border authorities created a  number of bureaucratic 
obstructions in an attempt to prevent or delay goods from being brought into FYROM 
via Greece. Their actions delayed or halted cargoes of food, oil, medicine and other 
imports bound for Skopje.'^^o 7 ^ 0  consequences were potentially harmful for the new 
repubiic, since the totality of its oil requirements, as well as many other vital products, 
were imported from Greece. However, as would have probably been exp ected  of any 
such enterprise undertaken in the Balkans, even these limited measures were 
implemented in a less than full-proof and exemplary way.^®’
On 26 February, Karamanlis responded privately to developments by sending a  
note to Samaras that referred to the situation in the Balkans and to Greece's dispute 
with FYROM.5®2 7 ^ 0  |(0 y paragraph and argument (which is subsequently elaborated in 
the note), stated that
Reason thus demands that all the measures that will avert major disturbances 
in the Balkans, be taken; and at any rate nothing should happen which could 
deteriorate the situation; and what would certainly undermine stability and 
perhaps even p e a c e  in the Balkans would be the recognition of Skopje with 
the name Macedonia. Such an action would not only constitute the 
falsification of history ...Above all it would undermine security and p e a c e  in 
the region.^ ®®
Samaras says that he often utilised the arguments presented in this note, which 
he regarded as supportive of his position on FYROM's name. A closer examination 
though, reveals that Karamanlis' wording does not coincide with an endorsement of the 
Thessaloniki resolution and Samaras' preferred stance. The President only states his
^®°The New York Times. 1 April 1992 A18. See also The Economist. 8 February 1992 56.
®®¥or revealing documents that strongly suggest that this was the case, see Tarkas, 1995:140-5. 
5®2see ibid.: 120-3.
5®®lbidj 121.
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opposition to FYROM being named Macedonia, wtiile tie maintained an ambiguity on 
names such as for exam ple Vardar Macedonia. By doing so, Karamanlis seem s to 
have been signalling his support, or at least was not rejecting the possibility of a  
compromise name that would had resolved Greece's dispute with FYROM. During an 
interview. Samaras conceded  that this is the correct interpretation based on the actual 
phrasing of the note. Flowever, he stressed that the period when it was written must 
also be taken into account, and hence 'one must necessarily conclude that the note 
must be interpreted as something that denies a  synthetic name for FYROM.'^ ^^
On the day that Karamanlis was communicating his note to Samaras, George 
Trangas, an important journalist, judged that Denmark, Italy and Holland were rather 
unresponsive and unfriendly to Greece's positions and concerns over FYROM's name. 
He thus urged the listeners of his morning radio show to boycott imported products 
from these countries. His recommendation was taken seriously, and a  spontaneous 
nation-wide boycott began to take place. One of Greece's largest supermarket 
chains facilitated the boycott by placing signs that indicated products originating from 
the targeted countries. At the som e time, one of the best private hospitals proudly 
and very publicly declared that it would seize having any sort of transactions with 
Holland.^^5 It was estimated that in less than two days, dem and for Italian and Dutch 
products had decreased by 25 per cent.^^ô
The boycott represents the clearest possible indication that the dispute with 
FYROM elicited passionate popular reactions. For the second time in the month of
^® l^ntervlew with Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996. Samaras also gave a  football analogy to support his 
Interpretation of Karamanlis' note. Although obscure to anyone not familiar with Greek football, I have 
decided to report It. More specifically. In emphasising the Importance of the period that the note was 
written. Samaras told me: It Is like saying that Panathlnalkos [a popular Athens football club] Is not 
playing well. This does not suffice. One has to clarify whether this comment Is being m ade when 
Zaets or Rotsa Is [the club's] manager.'
^®^See Makedonla. 27 February 1992 12
^^See Makedonla. 28 February 1992 11. The boycott began to decline In effectiveness and Intensity In 
early March 1992
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February, the people had preceded and upstaged their political leaders, albeit now in 
a  less than responsible and productive way. The governments spokesperson 
condem ned the boycott by saying that 'these spontaneous initiatives express som e of 
the people's feelings...[However] the government does not agree and recommends self- 
restraint.'587 j^js stand was endorsed by the EP in a  resolution that noted
That it is totally unacceptable for political disagreements between Member 
States to be pursued by econom ic means; [the EP] welcomes the 
condemnation of popular initiatives of this sort by the authorities of the 
Member State concerned.^®®
The fact that the non-intergovernmental EP had expressed its opinion on this issue, 
illustrates that it does play a  certain role, thus ensuring that the defining norm of the 
regime EPC is not that of strict intergovernmentalism.
A contrary opinion was held by Samaras, who was supportive of the boycott. 
In a  letter to the Greek Prime Minister written on 17 March 1992, he described it as 
spontaneous, pure and patriotic.'^®  ^ Samaras considers himself fortunate to have been  
given an opportunity to express publicly his support.^^o j-jg claims that he cam e across 
by chance a  Reuters wire report mentioning that according to sources in the Dutch 
Foreign Ministry, he had condem ned the boycott of Dutch products. This being untrue, 
he instructed that the Foreign Ministry issue the following statement:
The Minister of Foreign Affairs Ant. Samaras expressed to his Dutch 
counterpart that [the boycott involves] spontaneous popular reactions which 
are happening for the first time in Greece. [These] reactions however are 
due to the diffuse perception [concerning] Flolland's total stance on our 
national issues, and especially on the Skopje [onep^i
^®^Cited in loannou, 1992 79.
5®®0J No C 94/295,13.4.92 
5®9skilakakis, 1995: 269.
^90interview with Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996. 
^9i|oannou, 1992 80.
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This statement does not only foil to condemn the boycott, but actually passes 
the blam e to the Dutch government because of Its position on Greece's dispute with 
FYROM, in other words. It accep ts Trangas' rationale for the boycott! Furthermore, the 
difference with the government's official position Is enormous. Thus, an additional 
Indication was provided of the growing rift between Samaras and MItsotakls.
Given these developments, rumours of a  Samaras resignation began to 
circulate, though the Foreign Ministry's spokesperson denied them on 27 February 
]992.592 Samaras' high-stakes campaign to ensure that Greece adopt permanently his 
restrictive stance on FYROM's name was nevertheless being pursued, his strongest 
weapon being the threat of resignation. At this point. It must be explained that such a  
developm ent was exp ected  to have serious political ramifications. Coming from a  
patrician family, charismatic, well educated, eloquent, wealthy, and having attained 
som e of the highest political offices at a  remarkably young age. Samaras was the 
coming man' of the Greek C e n t r e - R lg h t .^ ’ s An Indication that he was at the height of 
his power and popularity Is offered by the fact that a  Samaras speech  at the Athens 
Flllton Hotel was attended by som e seventy government MPs.^ '^ '* Since New 
Democracy's 152 MPs constituted a majority of only two, fears that his resignation 
would bring down MItsotakls' government can be properly a p p r e c l a t e d ^ ’ s
^^^The relevant statements can be found in Tarkas, 1995:126.
593see Seitanidis, 1997: 255-63.
'^^ T^tiis was despite ttie fact that the government urged MPs to attend the Parliamentary session and thus 
ignore Samaras' speech. The speech took place In early April 1992 See Lygeros, 1992 121 fn 69. 
Another indication of Samaras' popularity is that in June 1992, 62,7 per cent of all voters and 86,8 per 
cent of New Democracy voters held a  favourable opinion towards him. In November 1992, the 
numbers were 68,4 per cent and 80,5 per cent respectively. See Loulis, 1995: 397.
^"^^Papandreou's PASOK had governed Greece during the 1981-89 period. Sensing a defeat in the polls, 
the ailing and scandal-ridden socialist leader changed the electoral law, making it considerably more 
difficult for a single party to achieve an absoiute majority in Parliament. This was the case  in the June 
1989 election, which resulted in an unprecedented conservative-communist coalition government. New 
elections were called in November 1989, only to lead to the formation of a short-lived all-party 
government, under the octogenarian Xenophon Zolotas. Eventually, in the April 1990 elections
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B. S am aras A ttacks His Government.
In the beginning of March 1992, the Greek government was facing a  potentially 
explosive situation. Its responses to developments stemming from the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia were rapidly being reduced and dominated by the issue of what would be  
an accep tab le  name with which FYROM should be recognised, while all other 
considerations were becoming of secondary (if any), im p o r t a n c e . 5 9 6  At the sam e time, 
the citizens seem ed to be supporting a  hard-line and passionate stance, demanding 
that the word Macedonia be excluded entirely from FYROM's nama®"^  ^ The 
government's own Foreign Minister considered this to be the only appropriate and 
defensible policy, and began campaigning for its permanent and uncompromising 
adoption, not being covered by the 17 January 1992 letter that represented his country's 
maximum but negotiable position on FYROM's name.^^g on  the other hand, Mitsotakis 
favoured a  compromise on this issue. For Greece's Prime Minister, probably the only 
encouraging developments were that the President and opposition parties had not yet 
a ccep ted  or cam paigned publicly for a  non-negotiable hard-line position.
On 5 March 1992, US Secretary of State James Baker sent a  letter to Samaras 
which is published here in its entirety for the first time.^ ?^ Baker suggested a  meeting
MItsotakls' New Democracy captured 150 seats. A defection from a small rlgtit wing party and an 
Elections Court decision raised ttie number of conservative MPs to 152 
^96jhe existence of ttils situation was explained In many Interviews, Including ttie ones wltti Mr MItsotakls 
on 10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantlnou on 10 April 1997, Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997 and Mr Tzounis 
on 14 April 1997.
^^^Popular passions had many outward manifestations. For example. It was reported that 'the 
Macedonian star, the emblem of the ancient empire, appears In stickers on shop windows and street- 
lamps. Men wear the star In their lapels, and women have them on brooches and earrings' (The New 
York Times. 17 April 1992 A9).
®^ ®Thls was confirmed In an Interview with Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997.
’^^See Appendix V.
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with his EPC counterparts in order to discuss the issue of recognising Serbia and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. He also supported the recognition of Macedonia (he did not use the term 
FYROM):
I must tell you that it is our judgement that failure to recognize what is now 
known as Macedonia in a reasonably timely fashion will contribute to 
instability and encourage other Yugoslav elements to adventurism which 
could rapidly escalate to open conflict. This surely would not be in the 
interest of Yugoslavia's neighbors, the European Community, or the United 
States.<^°°
This letter alarmed the Greek government, and a  meeting chaired by Mitsotakis 
was called on the following day, aiming to discuss how to respond to the new 
development.'!'^^ It must be stressed, that this meeting did not and could not reach any 
definitive conclusions concerning Greece's official policy towards FYROM and its name, 
since such decisions could only be taken by the Cabinet or by the Council of the 
Political Leaders. The meeting's value lies in the fact that it reveals the policy and  
tactical preferences of its most important participants.
Mitsotakis suggested that the possibility of a  compromise on FYROM's name be  
discussed, because his Foreign Minister might be confronted with such a proposal 
during his forthcoming meetings with Baker and Genscher, as well as at the US-EC 
Foreign Minister's meeting. Samaras adamantly opposed any discussion on the basis of 
a compromise, requested that he receive written instructions on how to handle any 
discussions, and argued that an even better solution would involve written instructions 
emanating from a new meeting of the Council of the Political Leaders.
'!'°°lbid. Although Baker favoured FYROM's recognition, he was also aware of Greece's opposition to such 
a decision. See Baker, 1995: 6 4 0 -2  
'!’° ’Aiso present during the meeting were Samaras, Mr Moiiviatls who represented President Karamanlis, Mr 
Tzounis who was a diplomatic advisor to Mitsotakis, Mr Aiiianos, Head of the Greek Foreign Ministry's 
Balkan Affairs Division, Mr Karagiannis, Greek Ambassador to Belgrade and Mr Tsiias, head of the Prime 
Minister's diplomatic office. The account of this meeting is based on interviews with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 
April 1997, Mr Moiiviatls on 9 January 1997, Mr Samaras on 3 February 1996, Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997, as 
well as on the account given in Tarkas, 1995:157-61
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His Insistence on written instructions was calculated to avert ttie translation of 
m oderate views into official policy. Samaras correctly sensed' that given popular 
feelings and passions, advocates of a  more moderate approach towards FYROM's 
nam e would be unwilling to commit their position in an official document providing 
instructions to the Foreign Minister. At the end of the meeting, it was decided  that Mr 
Moiiviatls seek out in writing the positions of Karamanlis and Papandreou on a possible 
compromise. Not surprisingly, a series of meetings and discussions in the following few 
days failed to produce any written instructions for Samaras.< °^2
The Greek Foreign Minister flew to Brussels feeling confident that a  combination 
of his country's veto power and the undergoing Pinheiro initiative would neutralise any 
US pressure for the recognition of FYROM. He was vindicated in his analysis, in the 
words of James Baker: since it was clear that the Greeks would continue to veto any 
EC m ove on Macedonia, I backed off and devoted  my energies to Bosnia'^^  ^ Thus, 
the 10 March 1992 US/EC declaration merely stated
That positive consideration should b e  given to the requests for recognition of 
[Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM], contingent on the resolution of the 
remaining European Community questions relating to those two republics.^O'^
Returning from this meeting. Samaras continued his campaign to commit the 
Greek leadership to a  non-negotiable hard-line course. His next target' was the 
President. Karamanlis was the founder of the New Democracy party and one of the 
greatest statesmen in modern Greek h i s t o r y S a m a r a s '  atternpt to influence such an
"^ ^^These meetings and discussions are described in Tarkas, 1995: 162-71 Incredibly, transcripts of 
teleptione conversations between Samaras and Moliviatis are included in ttiese pages! However, ttiey 
do not contain any information of great importance.
603Baker, 1995: 642
Press Release P. 32/92,10 March 1992 
‘^ ^^Karamanlis served as Prime Minister of Greece longer than any other politician. He was Prime Minister 
during 1955-63 and 1974-80 and also President during 1980-85 and 1990-95. Perhaps the greatest 
achievem ent of his long and controversial career was ensuring his country's accession to the EC. He 
also m anaged the bloodless and exemplary transition to democracy in 1974, establishing for the first
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'Olympian' figure involved a  somewhat audacious action. During a  meeting with 
Karamaniis on 13 March 1992, he forgot' an envelope containing an important and 
critical letter."^ o^
In this letter. Samaras referred to the March 6 meeting and emphasised that all 
the other participants were favourabiy disposed towards a compromise solution on 
FYROM's name. Most importantly, he criticised the President for failing to take a  position 
on such a  course of action.^ o*^  He wrote: 'Mr Moliviatis failed to receive any specific 
view on the burning issue of the name by the President of the Republic or by the 
Leader of PASOK,' and thus implied that Karamanlis possibly favoured a  
compromise.^0®
Samaras dem anded the immediate meeting of the Council of the Political 
Leaders chaired by the President, in order to develop a fin a l  position' on FYROM's 
name." °^9 The use of the word final provides further evidence that the maximalist 
position included in Samaras' 17 January 1992 letter to his EPC counterparts was 
negotiable. This demand also represents an inadvertent and indirect admission that the
time a  truly democratic and republican Greece. Many books tiave been written about Karamanlis. For 
wtiat amounts to an account of tiis soul by an intimate friend and also President of ttie Hellenic 
Republic, see  Tsatsos 1984. Karamanlis' political philosoptiy is analysed in Tzermias, 1990. Useful 
selections of ttie statesman's letters, speecties and documents can be found in Kartakis, n.d. and 
Lambrias 1995. For a collection of important (and favourable), essays analysing Karamanlis' 
statesmanstiip and personality, see Atirweiller et al, 1995. See also ttie brief but extremely perceptive 
and balanced comments in Diamantopoulos, 1996: 52-6. Finally, Karamanlis' recently publistied 
magisterial twelve-volume 'Arctiives' (Svolopoulos, 1997—ttiey are in a sense tiis memoirs), provide 
essential material on ttie statesman's ttiougtits and actions.
‘^ ‘^ ‘^ Ttie text of ttie letter can be found in Tarkas, 1995:177-81.
*^ °^ Ttiis provides indirect confirmation that Karamanlis' 26 February 1992 note was not supportive of a  
restrictive interpretation of the third EPC condition.
‘^ ^ I^bidj 180. Samaras is correct only to the extent that he did not receive any written instructions 
approved by the President. It is misleading though, to imply that Karamanlis was completely silent on 
the Issue of FYROM's name. The previously presented interpretation of his 26 February 1992 note to 
Samaras suggests that he had communicated his views.
<^ °^ lbid: 181; emphasis added.
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third EPC condition was rattier vague, since ottierwise no new meeting would have 
been  required to specify Greece's position on FYROM's name.
The letter ended with a thinly veiled threat of resignation. The Foreign Minister 
warned that unless a stance of no compromise is adoptedJ can not b e  the one who 
represents the country in the imminent crucial meetings.'*^ ^® Samaras was suggesting 
that by failing to take a  clear (and hostile) stance towards a  compromise with FYROM, 
the President would also be held responsible for his resignation. The conveying of this 
m essage was probably the essence of his letter.
The content and consequences of Samaras' preferred policy of 'no 
compromise' were soon elaborated in his lengthy 17 March 1992 letter to Mitsotakis.* ’^’ 
Samaras emphasised that FYROM's name is the key that unlocks and locks the three 
[EPC] conditions.'*^’2 After presenting a  historical analysis of FYROM's provocations and 
dangers for Greece, he urged
The unanimous decision of the Council of the [Political] Leaders to seal and 
m ake official to every direction the weighty m essage that we do not accep t  
a  compromise on the name issue. Hence, it must b ecom e most clear that 
G reece does not discuss any variation, alternation, use, connection, or any 
synthetic finding which will refer to the name Macedonia.*^’^
The meaning and wording of this policy recommendation is similar to the 
Thessaloniki resolution. The Foreign Minister recom m ended that the Council of the 
Political Leaders decision be communicated to the EC states, the US, CSCE members, 
as well as to all UN member states. These states would also be warned that G reece 
would block FYROM's entry to international organisations, by relying on its veto power 
where possible.
Samaras' intended hard-line stance was not limited to such measures. He 
suggested that if the Pinheiro initiative failed, a  series of punitive measures be
6’0|bid.
*^”The letter can be found in Skilakakis, 1995: 264-85.
6’2|bidj 265.
6’3|bidJ 275.
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adopted, that were to include the closing of the border with FYROM A blockade  
though would not be sufficient, and it was hence further recom m ended that the Greek 
government close down its General Consulate in Skopje, and also expel all FYROM 
citizens residing in Greece.
Samaras judged that these measures were both feasible and desirable. They 
would cause the isolation and destruction of FYROM's econom y, and thus force the 
republic's capitulation to Greek demands. Hence, the Foreign Minister's strategy is 
revealed: while threatening to resign, he believed that a  non-negotiabie restrictive 
position on the name issue, supported by tough measures falling just short of a  military 
intervention, would bring victory to G reece in the dispute with FYROM.
C. The Pinheiro P a c k ag e ' an d  the  Break with Sam aras.
On 1 April 1992, Samaras had a  meeting with the Portuguese Foreign Minister 
Joao d e  Deus Pinheiro and Ambassador Jose Cutileiro.^ ^^  He was presented with a  plan 
to end the dispute with FYROM, which has subsequently been  referred to as the 
Pinheiro Package.'^^® Pinheiro's initiative and proposals provide another exam ple of a  
decision-making procedure of the regime EPC, and also offers evidence of the 
important role played by the intergovernmental Presidency.
Following the 16 December 1991 meeting, this was the second major EPC attempt 
to address the dispute. According to the minutes, Pinheiro clarified that his plan was 
being submitted on a  'take it or leave it basis.'^ *^^  It was a  p ack age  deal that FYROM 
and G reece would have to accep t or reject as a  whole.
'^ ’''Ambassador Jose Cutiieiro had been appointed by his country's Presidency as the Community 
Coordinator for the International Conference on Yugoslavia 
“^’^ The main parts of the 'Pinheiro Package' can be found (in English), in Valenakis and Dales, 1994: 87-90. 
'^ ’^ skilakakis, 1995: 282
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In order to satisfy the first EPC condition, the plan envisioned the signing of a  
Treaty between the two states. The main points on which agreem ent was to be  
reached were as follows:
A rticle  1
The two States Parties to this Treaty hereby confirm their common existing 
frontier as an enduring and inviolable international frontier.
A rticle  2
The two States Parties undertake to respect the sovereignty, the territorial 
integrity and the political independence of each other.
A rticle  3
The two States Parties shall refrain from threats or the use of force aimed at 
the violation of the common existing frontier...
A rticle  4
The two States Parties will work together and cooperate to maintain and  
ensure an open frontier for the lawful and free passage of goods and 
persons.' i^^
Samaras was in agreement with this part of the plan, and also viewed positively 
Pinheiro's proposal that FYROM make additional changes to its constitution in 
accord ance with Greek demands. Agreement was then reached on the suggestion that 
the republic receive Community assistance. It was clarified that it would be conditional 
upon friendly relations with Greece, and would furthermore be directed via the 
neighbouring EPC member. In Pinheiro's words: '[we will try] to find ways to help you, so 
that you can help them.'^’^
During the meeting there was disagreement on two areas. The first involved 
Pinheiro's suggestion on exactly how FYROM's government should satisfy EPC's first and 
second conditions. He proposed that it send a legally binding letter, its key part stating 
the new republic's willingness to
Take promptly effective measures in order to discourage any acts of hostile 
activity or propaganda against Greece that are likely to incite violence, 
hatred and hostility against the Greek people and may offend their cultural
*^^^VaIenakes and Dales, 1994: 88-9. 
6i8Skilakakis, 1995: 284.
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and historical values or may place in jeopardy the Greek identity and 
undermine the loyalty of Greek citizens towards the Greek State.^’^
Samaras requested that a  more negative phrasing be included, which would deny in a  
clear and forceful way the existence of a 'Macedonian' minority in Greece. Portugal's 
Foreign Minister agreed to accom m odate this request.
The second area of disagreement focused on Pinheiro's attempt to find a  
solution that would satisfy the third EPC condition, by suggesting that FYROM be named  
New Macedonia. Not surprisingly. Samaras strongly objected to such a  name, arguing 
that it 'was not in accordance with the interpretation that G reece gives to the third 
c o n d i t i o n . '< ^ 2o  Ambassador Cutiieiro in a  rather remarkable exchange with Samaras, 
implied that the Greek Prime Minister was in favour of a  compromise:
M r Cutiieiro: I hope that the decision of Greece's political leadership on the 
issue of the name will eventually be different than yours.
M r Samaras'. You understand why I do not want to comm ent on what you 
are saying.
M r Cutiieiro'. I said it as a jokel^ i^
Pinheiro also insisted that FYROM's and Bosnia-Herzegovina's recognition be  
discussed together in the upcoming 6 April EPC meeting. Samaras wanted to avoid 
such a  development, because it would increase considerably the pressure on the 
Greek side. A persuasive excuse was found, since Mitsotakis was going to be away on 
an official visit to Flungary, and the Greek Foreign Minister thus argued that not enough 
time existed to discuss the proposed package deal and reach a  decision. Pinheiro 
agreed, but pointed out that he would stress in the meeting that a  final decision must 
be reached by 1 May 1992.
‘^ ''^Valenakes and Doles, 1994: 89. 
620skl!akakis, 1995: 284.
62iibld.
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Two days after the meeting. Samaras sent new letters to Karamanlis and 
MItsotakls. In his letter to the President, he argued that his negotiating credibility was 
w eakened because of the lack of a  national position on the Issue of FYROM's nam e .^22 
He urged Karamanlis to undertake an Initiative to call a  second meeting of the Council 
of the Political Leaders on 11 April 1992, suggesting somewhat vaguely that such a  
gathering on that date would allow some twenty days for an extraordinary special 
programme aimed at averting unpleasant developments on our national lssue.'<^ 3^
In the letter to MItsotakls, he pointed out that his position regarding FYROM's 
nam e had been consistent, clear and vocal—unlike the Prime Minister's sllence.'^24 
According to Samaras, MItsotakls' evasive stance had prevented the crucial 
clarification' of the third EPC c o n d l t l o n . ^ 2 5  | f  noteworthy that the vagueness of the 
third condition Is once again Inadvertently Implied and accepted . The Foreign Minister 
then wondered why MItsotakls did not proceed to my Immediate replacement' If he 
held an opposing vlew.^ ô^
The letter ended with a repetition of the proposal m ade to Karamanlis for a  
new meeting of the Council of the Political Leaders on 11 April 1992. The rationale 
remained the same, though In this letter It was linked to an ultimatum:
If this does not happen, Mr President [of the government], you will have to 
agree with me, that my staying at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs beyond this 
date, would be aimless, not to say d e c o r a t l v e . ^ ^ ?
Given the government's slim Parliamentary majority and grim electoral prospects, this 
was a  serious threat.'^ s^
letter is published in Tarkas, 1995: 240-2  
623ibldj 242
*^ 2^ The letter can be found in Tarkas, 1995: 242-6.
625|bld.: 244 
626|bid.
627|bidJ 246.
*^ 28on 30  March 1992, MIkis Theodorakis decided to abandon the ranks of New Dennocracy and sit in 
Parliament as an independent deputy, thus reducing the government's majority to one. The
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The Prime Minister responded on 5 April, explaining that he was astonished' by 
Samaras' letter^^? Despite previous public praise, he accu sed  him for failing to 
ach ieve a  clear and satisfactory condition on FYROM's name.'^^° The Foreign Minister 
was also condem ned for not studying the consequences of a  possible Greek rejection 
of EPC's p ack age proposal, in which case  a  series of undesired unilateral recognitions 
would b e  likely. Most importantly, Mitsotakis rejected Samaras' ultimatum, stressing that 
the. Council of the Political Leaders was not a  constitutionally recognised decision­
making body, though the possibility of a meeting at a  later date was left open. 
Mitsotakis added that he would interpret any premature resignation' as a  cowardly 
attem pt to avoid battle —a stance that he would have to condem n pu blicly .^ ^ i j ^ e  
description of a  possible resignation by Samaras as premature' essentially accep ted  
that such a  development was becoming increasingly likely.
Samaras' request was also rejected by the President in the letter of 7 April 1992, 
in which he pointed out that an initiative to convene the Council of the Political 
Leaders required their unanimous consent;< 3^2 and the consent of at least Mitsotakis was 
clearly lacking. Karamanlis also poignantly suggested that such requests ought to be  
submitted by the Prime Minister himself, and not by mere Ministers. Furthermore, the 
President judged the third EPC condition vague, and implied that given his differences 
with government policy. Samaras should consider resigning.
government's unpopularity tiad becom e manifest in a by-election that took place on 5 April 1992, In 
Greece's largest and bell-weather constituency of B Athens. New Democracy had decided not to 
contest the election, but on a heavy turnout of 68 per cent, PASOK received 66 per cent of the vote— 
almost a  third more than It had received in the previous election. For further analysis, see  Loulis, 1995; 
3 5 0-4  and Lygeros, 1996: 213-5. For the most comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of the decline 
of the popularity of Mitsotakis' government, which begins in November 1991 and ends with the October 
1993 electoral defeat, see Loulis, 1995: 318-73 and 393-475.
'^^^Mitsotakis' letter can be found In Tarkas, 1995: 249-52
630|bid: 249.
63i|bld: 251.
'^32Karamanlls' letter can be found in Tarkas, 1995: 253-4.
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While his confrontation with Mitsotakis and Karamanlis was rapidly reaching a  
crisis point. Samaras travelled to Brussels for an EPC Ministerial meeting on 6 April 1992. 
According to the minutes. Lord Carrington supported the recognition of M acedonia 
(the term is used throughout the minutes).<^ 33 Samaras stated that on M acedonia he 
would only b e  able to a  go a limited way in terms of a  declaration,'^^^ The 
representatives of the UK, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark 
signalled their desire for an early recognition of FYROM. However, they certainly were 
aware that Samaras was equipped with veto power, and that EPC-sponsored 
negotiations were being conducted. Pinheiro suggested that the negotiations would be  
concluded in two weeks; and the Greek Foreign Minister assured his counterparts that 
a  p ack age  deal was possible on or about 1 M a y .'<^35 | f  should b e  pointed out though, 
that this statement did not provide a clear guarantee that the negotiations would be  
com pleted successfully by that date. The meeting's declaration stated that
The Community and its member States also heard a  report from the 
Presidency about its efforts to reach a  solution on the issue of the recognition 
of another republic [FYROM]. They expect these efforts to produce results
soon.'^ ô^
The issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina's recognition was also discussed in the sam e  
meeting. In the previous months, war had subsided in Croatia, where the deployment 
of a  UN p eace-k eep in g  force had begun.^^? However, the situation in Bosnia was 
correctly assessed to be explosive. The most ethnically mixed of all the Yugoslav 
republics, Bosnia had held a  referendum on 1 March 1992, which had ominously been
<^ ^^ They are published in Skilakakis. 1995: 288-90.
634|bid.: 289.
635|bid: 290.
636g)Q Press Release P. 40/92, 6 April 1992
'^ ^^ This force was established by the 21 February 1992 UN Security Council Resolution 743 (see 31ILM 1447- 
9,1992). Its full deployment began on 16 March. For an analysis, see Gow and Smith, 1992 40-6.
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b oycotted  by ttie republic s Serb Population.^^  ^ On a  turnout of 64,4 per cent, 99,7 per 
cent tiad voted for independence&M
Despite ttie prospects for Instability and ttie beginning of tiostilities am ong  
Bosnia's ettinic groups, EPC's Foreign Ministers decided  to recognise ttie republic as an 
independent state.*^ "*® Samaras cooperated in ttiis decision notwittistanding ttie fact 
that he judged such an action premature' and believed that it would produce 
negative consequences for the regioa^^i
Returning to Athens, Samaras sent new letters to Karamanlis and Mitsotakis. To 
the former, he denied that the third EPC condition was vague and argued that given 
FYROM's previous name (Socialist Republic of Macedonia), only the word Macedonia 
could imply territorial threats.*^ ^^  ^s was previously explained, this logic does not 
necessarily apply to names such as Upper Macedonia or Northern Macedonia. 
Samaras also castigated the President for failing to publicly declare his position on 
whether the word Macedonia should be part of FYROM's name.
In the letter to Mitsotakis, the Foreign Minister reiterated his dem and for a  
meeting of the Council of the Political Leaders on 11 April.'^ '^  ^ Most importantly, he used 
language that was unapologetic, rough and offensive, thus almost seeking a  final 
break in their relation.'^ '^^  The Prime Minister was accused  for political hypocrisy' for
an illuminating map of Bosnia’s ethnic distribution by district, see  Woodward, 1995; 226-7. For 
Bosnia's history, see  Malcolm, 1994. Two important books on the war in Bosnia are Rieff, 1995 and 
Vulliamy 1994.
"^^^he data is taken from Cohen, 1993: 237.
'^ '^ ^See The New York Times. 7 April 1992 A3.
‘^ '^ I^nterview with Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997. The characterisation of the decision to recognise Bosnia 
by Samaras as 'premature' has been recorded in the minutes of the 6 April 1992 meeting. See 
Skilakakis, 1995: 289.
'^ ^^ The text of Samaras 8 April 1992 letter to the President can be found in Tarkas, 1995: 258-60.
‘^ '^ F^or the text of the letter, see ibid: 260-7.
'^ '^^ Curiously, in an interview Samaras denied that this was the case. Although he admitted that the 
language was tough, he stressed that it was a private letter. I did not give [the letter] to anyone else 
at that time’ he revealingly added in an interview on 3 February 1997.
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claiming to having supported Samaras.^'’® His interpretation of the third EPC condition 
constituted a  gift to the opposing [i.e. FYROM's] propaganda and is almost laughable,' 
as was the charge that Samaras was attempting to ovoid battle.^^  ^ Furthermore, for 
raising doubts on the feasibility of closing the Greek borders, Mitsotakis was charged  
with putting on the sam e level 'country and counting-office.'^^^
This letter is also significant because it contains one of the most clear and 
succinct explanations of Samaras' hard-line stance bn FYROM's name:
Among the three [EPC] conditions, the commanding guarantee is the 
eradication of the name 'Macedonia', which when eradicated, essentially kills 
the danger of territorial claims, as well as that of propagandas"*^
In his 9 April written reply, Mitsotakis announced his intention to end the 
practice of exchanging letters with Samaras, given their unacceptable tone.'S49 The 
Prime Minister stressed that the government hod not reached a  decision on how to 
respond to developments, urged Samaras to participate and contribute to the 
decision-making process, and resign only if he disagreed with its outcome. He 
reminded his Foreign Minister that Turkey and not FYROM constituted the most 
important security threat to Greece, and maintained his judgement that the third EPC 
condition was vague by stating that otherwise there would have been no need to 
exchange letters today.'^^° Finally, Mitsotakis granted Samaras' dem and for a  new 
meeting of the Council of the Political Leaders (eventually scheduled to take p lace on 
13 April 1992)..
<^ "*5Tarkas, 1995: 262 
6">6see ibid.: 262-6. 
6"*7|bid: 265.
6"*®lbid.: 264. 
6">9Tarkas, 1995: 268. 
650|bid.: 270.
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D. The Point of No Return: 13 April 1992.
The consequences and aftermath of the Second Council of the Political 
Leaders constitute the kind of paradox that makes the study of politics fascinating. On 
13 April 1992, Samaras hard-line view on FYROM's name finally b ecam e Greece's 
official, non-compromising and near unanimous policy. However, on the very sam e  
day of his policy triumph, he was dismissed from office.
The Foreign Minister entered the meeting together with Mitsotakis, ga v e  a  brief 
analysis of recent developments, and then presented the participants with a  document 
containing seven proposals.*^ ’^ The first suggested that the Council issue an
account of tfiis meeting is based on interviews witti Ms Damonoki on 30 January 1997, Mr Lengeris 
on 27 August 1997, Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr Moliviatis on 9 January 1997, Mr Papathemelis on 11 
January 1997, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996 and 3 February 1997 and Mr Skilakakis on 15 April 1997. 
Also of great assistance was ttie account given in Skilakakis, 1995: 133-43, that was completely 
corroborated in interviews and is supposedly based on the notes that Mitsotakis took during the 
meeting. The fact that Ms Damanaki and Ms Papariga (as Mr Lengeris explained) do not dispute a 
single word of these 'notes' is significant. As was hinted in the interviews with Mr Mitsotakis and Mr 
Skilakakis, and was m ade more explicit in the interview with Mr Lengeris, these notes are actually part 
of the meeting's official minutes. Because the participants agreed to keep the minutes unpublished, it 
was impossible for Skilakakis to claim that he was simply quoting from them. The rather ingenious 
solution was to claim that his account was based on notes that the then Prime Minister supposedly 
kept. It Is noteworthy that in the recently published Karamanlis Archives the account of the 13 April 
1992 meeting is almost exclusively comprised from an extensive quotation of Mitsotakis' 'notes' as they 
appear in Skilakakis' book. See Svolopoulos, 1997: 632-4, Vol. 12 Skilakakis also utilised Mitsotakis' 
notes for his account of the 14 June 1992 third meeting of the Council of the Political Leaders. Again, 
not a  word has been disputed, and I strongly suspect that the 'notes' are again part of the official 
minutes. Even if this is not the case, on the basis of the interviews that were conducted for this thesis, it 
must be concluded that Mitsotakis is a gifted and exceptionally accurate keeper of notes. On the 13 
April 1992 Second Council of the Political Leaders, see also Tarkas, 1995: 282-91 Crucially, extensive 
excerpts from Popondreou's hand-written notes from all three meetings of the Council of the Political 
Leaders have been published in his last wife's memoirs. See Papandreou, 1997: 516-39. These are 
normal, brief notes, and they must be contrasted with Mitsotakis', who in comparison com es across as 
a person with the skills of a stenographer. Furthermore, what can be deduced from the excerpts of 
Popondreou's hand-written notes, does not contradict in any way the account given in Skilakakis. As
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announcement making it absolutely clear that 'the name M acedonia is non-negotiable  
under any form.'652 The second proposal recommended that in the case  that Greece's 
dem ands were not met, border passages with FYROM be closed. At the sam e time. 
Samaras urged that G reece utilise its veto power to block FYROM's Community 
recognition, though this policy recommendation ignored the possibility of EPC member 
states recognising FYROM unilaterally.
The remaining proposals aimed at informing important states and actors of 
Greece's position. Mitsotakis was to call an extraordinary meeting of the European 
Council, while an extraordinary session of the Greek Parliament would pass a  resolution 
and distribute it to the national Parliaments of the EC states, as well as to the European 
Parliament. The Greek political leaders were urged to m eet with their EC counterparts 
and Jacques Delors, Cyrus Vance and Lord Carrington would b e  invited to Athens in 
order to receive a  comprehensive briefing. Finally, the President of the Hellenic 
Republic would inform the EC Ambassadors, and Samaras would brief his EC 
counterparts.
Having concluded his presentation. Samaras b ecam e the target of a  verbal 
outburst by Karamanlis. Most likely, the elder statesman considered inappropriate the 
fact that a  mere Minister who was four d ecad es his junior, was giving policy 
recommendations to both him and to the other political leaders. Samaras' proper role 
in the meeting should have been to simply provide information concerning 
developments. Although Samaras claims that he had received permission from 
Mitsotakis, the Prime Minister was not responsible for making such a  decision for a  
meeting that was chaired by the President.'^ ^^
regards the document containing Samaras' proposals, it can be found in Valenakes and Dales, 1994: 
91-2 
652|bid.: 91.
<^^^Samaras m ade the claim that he had received permission from Mitsotakis during an interview on 3 
February 1997.
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After Samaras was excused, the meeting began In earnest. Mitsotakis submitted 
a  'top secret' memorandum written by the 72-year old diplomat ioannis Tzounis which 
exam ined the consequences of three possible scenarios following a  Community 
recognition of FYROM with the name Macedonia.^^^ According to the memorandum, a  
Greek refusal to recognise FYROM both de ju re  and de fa c to  would produce a  series of 
negative consequences, and would certainly fail to alter the position of the other EPC 
member states. Furthermore, qualified majority voting would allow the new republic to 
develop  econom ic relations with the Community, and even decisions subject to a  
Greek veto could eventually be implemented on the basis of a  series of bilateral 
agreements. Tzounis also argued that Greek enterprises located in FYROM would suffer 
considerably, while the closing of the borders would affect negatively tourism and 
Greek trade with the Community.
A decision to deny the de facto  owà de ju re  recognition of FYROM would force 
the closing of the Greek Consulate at Skopje, an important source of information; and 
it would push FYROM towards friendship with countries considered hostile to Greece like 
Turkey. Tzounis argued that ultimately, such a  policy position would degenerate into 
having the fate of the Fiallstein doctrine.'*^ ®^
A de facto  recognition of FYROM would keep  the Consulate open, and 
ameliorate the negative consequences described in the previous scenario. Flowever, it 
would not pressure FYROM to change its name. But even this approach would
‘^ '^’Although the memorandum discusses c  Community [i.e. an EPC] recognition of FYROM, this would have 
been impossible given Greece's veto power. Tzounis was actually referring to the possibility of all EPC 
states recognising FYROM as Macedonia unilaterally. Despite its top secret status, it was leaked to the 
press the following day. The journalists had a field-day asking questions to a  hapless government 
spokesperson, who described the memorandum as a 'working document' containing 'scientific and not 
political appraisals' (see Eleftherotypin. 15 April 1992 6). However, memoranda of such a  nature are not 
labelled 'top secret' and distributed to leaders of political parties at an extremely crucial meeting. The 
memorandum can be found in Eleftherotypia. 14 April 1992 16.
‘^ ^^ Ibid. According to the Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany refused to recognise diplomatically any state 
that had recognised East Germany, with the sole exception of the Soviet Union. See Hanrieder, 1989: 
160.
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eventually have results similar to the long-standing nox\-de ju re  recognition of Israel. 
The final scenario of G reece doing absolutely nothing is dealt with in a  brief sentence  
emphasising its ridiculous and absurd nature.
Tzounis ended his memorandum by arguing that given the existence of 
'nationalistic frenzy' in Greece, FYROM's recognition by the US and the EC states would 
unleash anti-American and Anti-European feelings with unfortunate results.<^ ^^  Given 
the prospect of a  serious diplomatic defeat, he concluded that the persistence in our 
present policy offers no exit and leads to an impasse [and to] total self-entrapment.'<^^^ 
In the discussion that took place afterwards, there was no decision in 
accord ance with the policy implications of the Tzounis memorandum. There was also 
disagreement on what punitive measures should possibly be applied against an 
uncooperative FYROM. Papandreou adopted a hard-line stance, arguing for the validity 
of Samaras' second proposal, but was met with the objections of Mitsotakis, Damanaki 
and Papariga. It was decided  to discuss this issue in a  subsequent meeting of the 
Council of the Political Leaders.'^ ^^
During the meeting, Mitsotakis argued that in ca se  the Greek stance on 
FYROM's name led to diplomatic failure, a  proposal that FYROM b e named 'Northern 
Macedonia' or 'Vardar Macedonia' be submitted and accep ted , but there was no 
agreem ent on this point.659 Furthermore, the meeting's substantive decision seriously 
undermined any such future approach. This was because Greece's
Political leadership, with the exception of the KKE, decid ed  that G reece wilt 
recognise an independent Skopje state only if the three conditions that the
656Eieftherotypla. 14 April 1992 16.
657|bid.
commitment to hold such a meeting was m ade clear in their joint communique. See Valenakes 
and Dales, 1994:93.
•^ ^ '^Northern Macedonia' was Mitsotakis' proposal according to Skilakakis. 1995: 140. On the basis of 
Popondreou's hand-written notes, it was Vardar Macedonia.' See Papandreou, 1997: 539.
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EC set on 16 December '91 Ore kept, witti ttie self-evident clarification that in 
the name o f  this state the w ord M acedonia w ill not exist.^^^
Ttie consequences of ttiis decision were immense. Its ptirosing marks ttie 
official and non-negotiable tiardening of ttie Greek stance towards FYROM's name. 
We can pertiaps even talk of its ossification,' since ttiis position did not change in the 
subsequent years; and this despite EPC's pressure and incentives, the Prime Minister's 
desire to change it, and Greece's international reputation constantly reaching new lows.
A second consequence was the automatic rejection of the Pinheiro Package' 
that had advocated  the name New Macedonia. Finally, the Second Council of the 
Political Leaders signalled the clear and public adoption of a  hard-line stance by 
Andreas Papandreou. Afterwards, he even stressed to reporters that Samaras' positions
<^"^°Valenakes and Dales, 1994: 93; emphasis added. After the meetings conclusion, Papariga managed a 
rambling anti-US and anti-EU tirade. She rhetorically asked 'who has enunciated the EC to the UN of 
the Balkans?' (Makedonla. 14 April 1992 11); and insisted that 'true patriotism is to raise your voice 
against the EC's hegemonic forces, [and] against the United States' (ibid.). The KKE's stance in this 
meeting is explained by a number of reasons. The party's past actions and positions on the 
Macedonian Question, as well as the desire to satisfy party activists in Western Greek Macedonia and 
b e perceived as a progressive party, were certainly important in determining its stance. See 
Karakasidou, 1993b. The KKE has consistently argued that focusing on FYROM's name was a mistake. 
Apparently, it seems that the party concluded that after 16 December 1991, a restrictive position on the 
name issue would ultimately be unattainable. According to Popondreou's hand-written notes of the 13 
April meeting, Papariga had claimed that 'the issue was closed' (Papandreou, 1997: 538). Subsequently, 
as far as the KKE was concerned, Greece should have concentrated on issues of propaganda 
practised by FYROM. This analysis of the KKE's stance (partly explained during an interview with Mr 
Lengeris on 27 August 1997) is mostly devoid of ideological constraints and is primarily based on a 
Realpolitik evaluation of developments. Surprisingly, it is very close to the positions taken by the US 
and other EPC member states. It is also noteworthy that the KKE's consistent adherence to its original 
analysis and positions was praised in interviews with (among others), Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr 
Papaconstantlnou on 23 December 1996, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996, Mr Tzounis on 14 Aril 1997 
and Mr Vrahatls on 30  August 1997. Although most said that the KKE had the correct position for the 
wrong reasons, a feeling of envy was palpable. This is because the KKE was able to stick to Its 
position, ignore considerations of political cost, and not fa ce  any significant internal dissension. As a  
result, the KKE is the only Greek party (albeit a rather small one), that can claim a consistent and 
uniform position on Greece's dispute with FYROM.
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correspondenLto ours, such a  correspondence exists/'^ ’^ By doing so, the Leader of the 
Opposition was essentially declaring that his relative silence and unusual self-restraint 
over the government's handling of the 'Skopje Issue' were coming to an end. He was 
now competing with Samaras on hard-line views, and cleverly positioning himself to 
reap popular dissatisfaction in case of a  compromise or ignominious diplomatic 
defeat. The adoption of this position by Papandreou radically limited Mitsotakis' ability 
for diplomatic manoeuvres, since he was being forced to confront hostility and 
criticism by PASOK, as well as from within his party by Samaras and his allies.
After the meeting's conclusion, Mitsotakis announced that he was personally 
replacing Samaras, while ioannis Tzounis was named second Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs."^ ^^  The Prime Minister implied that Samaras was being removed for posing 
unacceptable ultimatums to the government, and also admitted for the first time 
publicly the existence of more than one policy preferences within his a d m i n is t r a t i o n . ' ^ ^ ^  
In a  sense, this double talk' ended by the adoption of Samaras' policy on the issue of 
FYROM's name. By accepting this view (which was in accordance with popular will but 
contrary to his own), Mitsotakis denied the young politician any pretext to overthrow 
the government.* '^ '^* Given the new popular policy, any such attempt would have been  
perceived as grounded on base personal motives.
‘^ ‘^ M^akedonia. 14 April 1992 10. Papandreou did remain critical of Samaras' handling of a  series of 
decisions, such as the 16 December 1991 EPC conditions and the failure to achieve Greek 
representation on the AC.
'^ ‘^ ^During their meeting, Mitsotakis had informed the other leaders of the political parties of his intention 
to dismiss Samaras. He did not reveal that he was going to replace him personally. Tzounis remained 
on his post until 7 August 1992 The other Deputy Foreign Minister was Mr Papastamkos, who was 
responsible for issues concerning the Hellenic Diaspora.
663por Mitsotakis' comments, see Makedonla. 14 April 1992 1,10.
‘^ ‘^ '^Mitsotakis acknowledged the fact that the Greek people supported the decision of the Second  
Council of the Political Leaders on FYROM's name, during a Parliamentary debate on 27 March 1993. 
See Kyrkos, 1994; 11-2 fn I
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Amazingly given his previous correspondence with the Prime Minister, Samaras 
was surprised by his dismissai *^^  ^ Clearly disappointed, he was reduced to endorsing 
the decision of the Council, and vaguely warning that eventually a  compromise will be  
baptised a  v i c t o r y M i t s o t a k i s '  strategy had worked—for the time being. His 
government was secure, and he won a  Parliamentary vote of no-confidence in the 
following days. The price however was the politics of limited Greek cooperation and 
eventually confrontation.
E. The Beginning Of Institutionciist Breakdown.
The January-Aprii 1992 period is characterised by the gradual decline of the 
politics of Greek cooperation, the rise of popular passions and the dominance in 
importance of the issue of FYROM's name. All other issues arising from the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia becam e of lesser and subordinate significance, or simply irrelevant. 
During this period, the value of institutionalism in explaining Greek foreign policy is 
reduced substantially. The reason is related to the immense rise in importance of 
dom estic and partisan political developments and considerations.
Institutionalism can perhaps make a claim in at least explaining part of the 
policy contained in the 17 January 1992 letter that Samaras sent to his EPC counterparts. 
By adopting a  restrictive position on FYROM's name, this letter signalled the beginning 
of the decline of the politics of Greek cooperation. At that point though, it did not 
represent a non-negotiable podüonA^ According to Greece's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs resident-expert on the Macedonian Question:
'^ ‘^ ^When asked in an interview on 24 December 1996 if he expected  his dismissal. Samaras simply and 
revealingly replied to me: 'Of course not.'
'^ ‘^ ‘^ Cited in Tarkas, 1995: 289.
'^ ‘^ ^Confirmed in interviews with (among others), Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997, Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997 
and Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996.
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No one, but no one, tiad ever thought that it was possible for the name of 
this state [FYROM] not to include the word Macedonia or a  derivative [of this 
name]. No one. I had not even heard such a  thing from Samaras.<^ *^ ®
in addition to the tough but negotiable position on FYROM s name, the letter 
also contained an offer to m eet the republic's security needs and provide financial 
assistance. This seem s to have been influenced by EPC's shadow of the future:' the 
Greek government desired to create a favourable reputation and impression within EPC 
since the regime would certainly be dealing again with disputes or issues related to 
G reece and FYROM.'^ ’^ \\ judged that the offer of assistance would contribute 
towards the attainment of a  reputation of a  reasonable country willing to reach a  
compromise and end the dispute.
Institutionalist theory can also make a  justified claim in explaining the Greek 
vote for the recognition of Bosnia at the 6 April 1992 EPC meeting, a  decision that is 
almost universally condem ned in Greece.<^ °^ Characteristically, Mitsotakis argues that it 
had much worse consequences for the war in Yugoslavia than the decision to 
recognise Croatia.^^’ In an interview. Samaras explained that his government's decision 
was not based on the principle of solidarity. Rather, the aim was to procrastinate in 
reaching [an EPC] decision on the name with which Skopje was to be recognised.''^^^ 
This rationale is consistent with the institutionalist concept of reciprocity: the Greek 
government agreed on a  decision that it considered as being seriously mistaken and 
premature, in order to achieve a  postponement in discussing the name with which 
FYROM was to be recognised. This also provides a  good illustration of how, as far as the 
country's foreign policy was concerned, the issue of FYROM's name had subordinated 
all other issues arising from the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
*^ '^ ®lnterview with Mr Kofos on 5 January 1997. He is referring to the period prior to 17 January 1992 
‘^ '^ I^nterview with Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997.
person whom I have interviewed has expressed a positive opinion of this decision.
*^ '^lnterview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997.
<^^^ lnterview with Mr Samaras on 3 February 1997. Samaras actually used the word procrastinate in Engiish.
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Despite Bosnia's recognition and some of the policy provisions contained in the 
17 January 1992 letter, institutionalist theory proves entirely inadequate in explaining all 
other events and developments, since they are firmly rooted in domestic politics. The 
Thessaloniki demonstration and the boycott of Dutch, Danish and Italian products 
constitute important examples. Both are events whose undertaking and execution was 
com pletely unrelated to any EPC influence. They are crucial however, for 
understanding why the 17 January 1992 hard-line but negotiable position on FYROM's 
nam e b ecam e Greece's official and uncompromising position on 13 April 1992.
Domestic developments showed that there was tremendous and almost 
exclusive popular interest and sensitivity on the issue of FYROM's name. Furthermore, 
the demonstration of popular opinions and passions unequivocally and overwhelmingly 
supported the restrictive view on FYROM's name. Inevitably, the Greek government 
and political parties were forced to bestow particular importance on the position that 
the populace favoured overwhelmingly.
The defining significance of domestic and partisan considerations is also 
evident in the 13 April 1992 Council of the Political Leaders, which adopted the non- 
negotiable hard-line position on FYROM's name, and thus caused the automatic 
rejection of the 'Pinheiro Package.'
Mitsotakis who signed the 13 April decision even though he was in 
disagreement, offers three reasons that purport to explain and justify his action.<^ 73 pj^ st 
of all, a  restrictive interpretation of the third EPC condition was consistent with the will 
of the people. In democratic regimes, politicians ought to respect and take under 
serious consideration popular opinions. Secondly, failure to adopt this position would 
have caused his government's downfall. By sacking Samaras and agreeing with most 
of his positions, he got rid of what he considered a  politically dangerous and over- 
ambitious Minister, while preserving New Democracy's hold on power.
*^^ l^nterview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997.
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The former Greek Prime Minister admits that leadership and convictions often 
require making politically unpopular decisions with negative consequences for 
som eone's political career. However, he argues that there were not enough votes in 
Parliament to pass the Pinheiro Package' and thus honourably end the dispute with 
FYROM. Such an attempt would have also cost him the next general election, in an 
interview, he stressed:
If [my government] fell then, there would be elections, and the elections 
would take p lace with the issue of Skopje open. And the Greek people  
would express themselves. How...? They would express themselves in favour 
of the extreme national position that the word Macedonia must not be in the 
nam e of this young republic. Result not only would I not help the country, 
but I would...capture it in a policy, which would not then be able to change  
for many years.*^ ^^
In other words, Mitsotakis argues that the third reason for agreeing on 13 April was that 
otherwise a  general election would have been fought in an atmosphere of nationalism, 
and would have produced a PASOK government with views at least as hard-line as 
those of Samaras.
History will eventually evaluate the merit of Mitsotakis' apparently sincere yet 
tortured arguments. For the purposes of this study, it will suffice to stress that all of the 
reasons behind Mitsotakis' rationale to endorse the 13 April decision lie solely in the 
realm of domestic and partisan politics. There is not even a  hint of regime influence or 
importance. Furthermore, there seem s to be an almost universal accep tan ce  among 
politicians and decision-makers of the fact that the 'Pinheiro Package' was rejected  
because of domestic political reasons.^^  ^ Interestingly, when asked in an interview why
^^"^Oikonomikos Tachydromos. 5 October 1995: 5. Mitsotakis m ode the sam e argument in a letter that he 
sent to the same magazine on 22 February 1994, and can be found in Valenakes and Dales, 1994: 201- 
2  The former Greek Prime Minister reiterated the same argument during an interview on 10 April 1997. 
*^^ l^nterviews with Ms Damanaki on 30  January 1997, Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1996, Mr Mitsotakis on 10 
April 1997, Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996, Mr Papayannakis on 10 January 1997, Mr 
Papathemelis 11 January 1997 and Mr Skilakakis on 15 April 1997.
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his initiative failed, Pinheiro considered as responsible 'reactions inside G reece, which 
were represented with determination by Antonis Samaras.'*^ ^^
Domestic and partisan considerations also influenced the decisions by 
Papandreou and Damanaki to sign the 13 April decision. PASOK's leader probably did 
not want to be superseded in nationalistic rhetoric by the young and popular Samaras. 
In addition, the restrictive position was extremely popular (at least at that point), within 
his party's ranks. As one of his. closest and most trusted political associates remarked 
during an interview: 'within PASOK, there was virtually no d i s a g r e e m e n t . ' ^ ^ ^  Finally, 
according to perhaps Papandreou's most important advisor on this issue, it was his 
instinct' that showed him the proper (and politically advantageous it should be  
added), way.<^ ®^
Damanaki today is self-critical about her role in the 13 April Council, readily 
accepting that she miscalculated about the possibility that the Council's decision 
would have changed soon. Furthermore, she stresses that I also had to confront my 
intra-party p r o b le m . '^ ^ ?  |p f i^e words of a  leading Synaspismos member: 'Maria's 
[Damanaki] hands were tied. She could not resist.'^ ^^ o goth are referring to the fact that 
many party heavyweights favoured the restrictive position on FYROM's name, thus 
denying Ms Damanaki any room for flexibility.^^’ Also, given the fact that many
676Eieftherotypia. 5 July 1993: 7.
‘^ '^'interview with Mr Tsohatzopoulos on 3 August 1997. The same point was m ade during an interview with 
Mr Papathemelis on 11 January 1997.
‘^ '^ I^nterview with Mr Papathemelis on 11 January 1997.
•^^ I^nterview with Ms Damanaki on 30 January 1997. Ms Damanaki much later managed to change her 
party's position, by publicly declaring that achieving two and a half out of the three EPC conditions 
would suffice (see Kyrkos, 1994: 60  fn 11). What she had in mind, was a name for FYROM that also 
included the word Macedonia. As Damanaki explained to me in an interview, she passionately 
believes that this position cost Synaspismos its parliamentary representation in the October 1993 
elections. Damanaki subsequently resigned her position as Party President.
'^^^Interview with Mr Papayannakis on 10 January 1997.
•^ ’^Such a  position was certainly favoured by Mr Lentakis (who later joined Mr Samaras' party), and Mr 
Androulakis. Ms Damanaki in an interview on 30 January 1997 and Mr Papayannakis in an interview on 
10 January 1997, suggested that the restrictive position on FYROM's name was also supported by
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Synaspismos members (Including Ms Damanaki), were previously affiliated with the KKE, 
it was important that their new party be differentiated from its communist rival, since a  
position coinciding with the one token by Ms Papariga might have created confusion, 
and opened  a  debate about the role and exact ideology of S y n a s p i s m o s . ^ ^ ^
On the basis of the above analysis, it can be concluded that the institutionalist 
explanatory relevance largely breaks down during the Jonuary-April period. 
Institutionalism possibly manages to explain the decision to recognise Bosnia, and 
probably also explains some of the 17 January 1992 positions of the Greek government. 
On the other hand, institutionalist theory can not account for momentous and 
consequential events such as the Thessaloniki demonstration, or the spontaneous and 
popular boycott. Furthermore, it can not explain the 13 April non-negotiable adoption 
of the restrictive position on FYROM's name and thus the rejection of the 'Pinheiro 
Package.' Had Pinheiro's attempts proved successful, substantial evidence would have 
been produced of institutionalist importance and influence. However, it was rejected 
because of considerations based on domestic and partisan politics.
The neglect of such politics is the main reason for institutionalism's reduced  
explanatory power. This 'Achilles Heel' of institutionalism will prove central in the
Synaspismos' subsequent President, Mr Konstcntopoulos. In support of ttiis argument, see  Ta Nea. 25 
November 1997: 7. In an interview on 30  August 1997, Konstantopoulos' Ctiief of Staff Mr Vrahatis, 
argued that no public speech (his emphasis), statement or article exists, in which Mr Konstantopoulos 
m ade a hard-line argument. Although it is impossible to determine with absolute certainty what was 
said in closed Synaspismos meetings during the period covered in this thesis, it is most likely that Mr 
Konstantopoulos had originally adopted, or at least not rejected the restrictive position. His later 
opposition strategy towards Ms Damanaki also included the issue of what party body was responsible 
for taking decisions on foreign policy issues. More specifically, Konstantopoulos argued that the party's 
Parliamentary group should not be responsible for taking decisions on foreign policy issues. At any 
rate, the result was that Ms Damanaki undoubtedly faced  constraints in formulating the party's 
positions because of inter-party opposition.
"^ ^^ This argument was suggested in interviews with Mr Papayannakis on 10 January 1997 and Mr Vrahatis 
on 30  August 1997.
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analysis of the politics of iimited Greek cooperation and confrontation that wiii be  
presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
THE POLITICS OF LIMITED GREEK COOPERATION AND
CONFRONTATION 
April-December 1992
Statesmen are not called upon only to settle easy questions. These often settle themselves. It is where the 
balance quivers, and the proportions are veiled in mist that the opportunity for world-saving decisions 
presents itself.
-Sir Winston S. Churciil, The Gathering Storm. 1948
A. Limited G reek C ooperation: The Rood To Lisbon.
The months following the sacking of Samaras were consequential for Greece's 
EPC foreign policy towards former Yugoslavia As will be analysed in this chapter, a  
series of major EPC decisions in Guimaraes, Lisbon and Edinburgh as well as the O'Neil 
initiative, influenced developments and also proved the crucial significance of EPC's 
intergovernmentalism. At the sam e time, the Greek government pursued politics of 
limited cooperation within EPC and confrontation against FYROM, that were ultimately 
the result of domestic and partisan politics.
In late April, wishing to exploit his enhanced status as the only EPC Foreign 
Minister who was also a  Prime Minister, Mitsotakis had meetings with the Foreign Ministers 
of Germany, Italy, Portugal and the UK. They produced results that were rather 
favourable for Greece. In deference to Greek concerns, d e  Michelis noted that 'there 
is no reason to be in a  hurry.'^ ^^ s Genscher (who was Mitsotakis' personal friend), 
stressed that 'when countries have vital interests...they can count...every time on our 
support.'684 Portugal's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister exhibited an important degree
‘^ ^^ Makedonia. 16 April 1992 1.
‘^ ^^ Makedonla. 17 April 1992 17. This statement was m ade after Genscher had a  meeting with Karamanlis. 
The extremely interesting minutes of their meeting are published in Svolopoulos, 1997: 639-40, Vol. 12
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of understanding for Greek concerns.'^®  ^ After ttieir meeting, Mitsotakis insisted that 
G reece was primarily interested in finding a  solution to the dispute with FYROM, and 
also confirmed the paramount importance bestowed upon FYROM's name: the issue of 
the nam e we separate, in an absolute way' he declared.6®^ Finally, Douglas Flurd 
insisted that 'it was certain that we do not wish to create difficulties for G reece on this 
issue.'^ G? According to the former Greek Prime Minister, this outpouring of support by 
EPC's Foreign Ministers represents an illustration of EPC's principle of solidarity
With these meetings, Mitsotakis prepared the ground for the informal gathering 
of EPC's Foreign Ministers in Guimaraes on 1 and 2 May 1992^ 9^ \\ produced the first EPC 
declaration devoted  solely to Greece's dispute with FYROM, and also provides another 
exam ple of important EPC decisions being m ade in intergovernmental b o d ies.'^ ^ o  During 
the meeting, it was originally suggested by Genscher that FYROM be recognised under 
the nam e Republic of Skopje. As the meeting proceeded, Mitsotakis felt anxious, 
hoping that there would be no alteration of this suggestion. Unfortunately, the French 
and Italian Ministers revisited the issue, raising certain important objections that did not 
centre on the specifically proposed name. They argued that it was inappropriate and 
unacceptable for EPC's Ministers to choose a  name and baptise' FYROM, without 
having first consulted with the republic.
Eventually, the EPC member states decided that they
Are willing to recognise that State [FYROM] as a  sovereign and independent 
State, within its existing borders, and under a name that can be accep ted  by  
a ll p a rtie s  concerned.^^^
Makedonia. 21 April 1992 1.
686|bid.
‘^ ^^ Makedonla. 24 April 1992 9.
"^ ^^ Interview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997.
account of the meeting at Guimaraes is primarily based on an interview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 
April 1997, the important report in Makedonia. 5 May 1992 1 and on Skilakakis, 1995:158.
690See EPC Press Release P. 53/92, 4 May 1992
691epc Press Release P. 53/92, 4 May 1992; emphasis added.
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This constituted a  new EPC position, since for the first time it was clearly stipulated that 
any solution to the name dispute would be conditional upon FYROM's accep tance.
An additional indication of EPC's growing frustration and disappointment with 
G reece was related to the declaration's praising of the Pinheiro Package.' G reece and 
FYROM were urged to do their utmost to resolve the pending questions on [its] basis.'<^ *^ 2 
Given his favourable opinion of the package, Mitsotakis could endorse such language, 
though he was unable and unwilling to alter the decision of the second Council of the 
Political Leaders and thus rescue' Pinheiro's initiative.
After the conclusion of the Guimaraes meeting, it b ecam e absolutely clear to 
Mitsotakis that Greece's reputation and credibility with its European partners had 
reached a  very low point.^ ’^s He thus decided to pursue actions that would allow 
G reece to be portrayed as a cooperative partner, believing that this would help his 
country achieve the best possible result in the dispute with FYRGM.'^ ’'^ In other words, he 
aimed at reproducing the politics of cooperation and moderation that were 
successfully practised during the period between June 1991 and January 1992. Such 
politics now had to take into account the limits imposed by the combination of a  slim 
Parliamentary majority, a  hostile Samaras and Papandreou, and the 13 April 1992 
decision. As a  result, the scope for cooperation was severely restricted.
On 9 May 1992, Mitsotakis sent a  letter to G lig o r o v .^ ^ s  Using language that was 
similar to the 17 January 1992 letter, it offered security guarantees and financial 
assistance. '^ '^  ^ A previously unpublished document reveals the scop e and extent of 
projects and actions that Greece wanted to pursue in a  joint and mutually beneficial
692|bid.
^^^Mitsotakis makes an important reference to ttiis negative climate in a crucial speech that he 
delivered on 21 October 1992 See Makedonia. 22 October 1992 12 He m ade the sam e point during an 
interview on 10 April 1997.
‘^ '^ '^ Interview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997.
"^ ^^ See Tarkas, 1995: 307 and Valenakes and Dales, 1994: 229.
‘^ ‘^^ For the 17 January 1992 letter see Appendix II
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way with FYROM.^ ?^ They included the pursuit of schem es in the Vordar-Axios valley, 
'substantial financial assistance,' and even support for the signing at a  later date of an 
association agreement between FYROM and the Community Mitsotakis' offer though, 
dem anded that FYROM accep t a  name that would be consistent with the restrictive 
Council of the Political Leaders interpretation of the third EPC condition. Not 
surprisingly, it was turned down by Gligorov.
Greece's dispute with FYROM was discussed at the 11 May General Council 
meeting in Brussels.*^ ’  ^ Despite the Guimaraes decision, the Danish and Dutch Foreign 
Ministers suggested that FYROM ought to be recognised in accordance with the 
recommendations of the AC. As was undoubtedly exp ected , the Greek Prime Minister 
objected and the issue remained unresolved.
On 15 May, Mitsotakis sent a telegram to the Greek Embassies in all EC member 
states, as well as to various other countries. This previously unpublished telegram  
provided arguments and guidelines that were to be utilised in discussions concerning 
FYR0M.700 It is important for two reasons. First, it provides further ev idence that the 
Greek position on FYROM's name was non-negotiable: It is not a  simple negotiable  
position of the Greek government, but a demand of all the Greek peopla'^oi
Secondly, the telegram includes an interesting comment by Mitsotakis on the 
Guimaraes decision, in which he states that
The postponement of reaching a  decision does not constitute a  solution. The 
only solution is the recognition [of FYROM] that G reece desires as much as 
[our EPC] counterparts. The necessary prerequisite for this to take p lace is, as 
was decided in GUIMARAES, that Greece agrees on the name of this new
republic. 0^2
Appendix VI
698|bid.
account of this meeting is based on Makedonia. 12 May 1992 15; Tarkas, 1995: 308 and To Vima. 17 
May 1992 A16. The last provides the most authoritative account, which at times is both amusing and 
troubling.
^°°For the text of the telegram, see Appendix VII 
^°^See ibid.
702|bid.
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This appears to be a  somewhat Incredible statement, which seem s to fail to 
grasp the significance of what had taken place in Guimaraes. G reece was always in a  
position to veto any EPC decision, especially one linked to an issue that was 
considered of extreme importance to the country's population and decision-makers. It 
was FYROM, a  non-recognised and non-EPC member state that lacked this capability; 
and it was precisely this capability that was given to FYROM (as regards its name), in 
Guimaraes.
Despite the awkward and misleading phrasing of the telegram, the Greek Prime 
Minister had actually achieved a  victory of sorts. The Guimaraes decision obliged  
FYROM to seek a  name within the EPC framework, where G reece had veto power. 
Hence, the young republic could not simply reject an EPC proposed name and then 
seek  UN recognition under the name Republic of Macedonia^o^
After Guimaraes and the subsequent developments, Mitsotakis decided  that 
G reece should participate in the intensification of EPC sanctions against Serbia and 
Montenegro. During the preceding months, the Bosnian Serbs had embarked on an 
offensive aimed at conquering 65 per cent of Bosnia.^°  ^ This campaign involved som e  
of the worse atrocities perpetrated in Europe since the Holocaust.^o^ Most notable was 
the practice of ethnic cleansing': an orchestrated and murderous effort to drive the 
Muslim and Croat population out of certain areas. Confronted with these events, 
Mitsotakis agreed with his EPC partners that
^°^This explanation of the Guimaraes decision is based on interviews with tvir Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997 
and Mr Skilakakis on 15 April 1997. In an interview on 29 September 1997, Mr Risteski argued that it was 
FYROM's mistake not having abandoned earlier the pursuit of an EPC solution, and suggested that his 
country ought to have requested immediately UN recognition.
70^See Glenny: 1992 167.
^°^For a judicious documentation of crimes committed in Bosnia during this period, see  Helsinki Watch 
Report, 1992
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By far the greatest share of the blame falls on the JNA and the authorities in 
Belgrade which are in control of the army, both directly and indirectly by 
supporting Serbian irregulars/®*^
Serbia was also seen as the main culprit by the UN Security Council, which on 
3 0  May 1992 passed Resolution 757, aiming at imposing a  severe trade embargo on 
Serbia and Montenegro/®^ The most important of the measures that were decided  
included the prohibition of the importing and exporting of all products with these 
republics. An air' embargo was also imposed, prohibiting aircraft from flying to, or 
originating flights from these territories. Exceptions to this strict embargo were m ade  
only for humanitarian flights, as well as for foodstuffs and products related to medical 
purposes.
On the next day, EPC's member states announced their willingness to enforce 
these measures/®® The UN Security Council was additionally requested to adopt an 
em bargo on oil and petroleum products...and to freeze assets, financial transactions 
and payments' with Serbia and Montenegro.^®^ Mitsotakis agreed to all these 
measures, despite the Greco-Serbian special relationship that was analysed  
previously.
Another Greek cooperative decision of this period benefited Turkey. For over 
two years, the Greek government had vetoed
The adoption of the so-called  redirected' or renovated Mediterranean 
policy ...because it wanted to ensure that Turkey would not benefit from the 
letter's 'horizontal aspect' envisaging financial assistance to all the , 
Mediterranean countries linked by association or cooperation agreements 
with the EC/’®
7®6epc Press Release P. 56/92,11 May 1992 
®^^ lt can be found in 31ILM 1453-8 (1992).
7®8epc Press Release P. 63/92,1 June 1992 For the Council regulations implementing this decision, see  OJ 
No L 151/4, 3.6.92; OJ No L 151/7, 3.6.92; OJ No L 151/20, 3.6.92 and OJ No L 166/35, 20.6.92 
7®9council 6774/92 (Presse 99-G), 4 June 1992 
7’®loakimidis, 1996; 77.
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This veto was lifted in late June 1992, and Turkey was m ade eligible for 
receiving som e 3 0 0  million ECUs over five years; that were to be used primarily for 
environmental projects. Nevertheless, even this limited cooperative gesture was 
criticised harshly by PASOK. A party spokesperson declared that G reece appeared as 
a  'totally unreliable [country]...susceptible to all kinds of pressures on all our unresolved 
[national] issues.'^ ^^
Prior to the Lisbon European Council meeting, Mitsotakis m ade one more 
important proposal that he considered as being somewhat cooperative and capable  
of providing a  reasonable solution to the dispute. It involved a  dual name for FYROM: 
the republic would receive an official UN name that would not include the word 
Macedonia, while for internal purposes G reece would allow and tolerate FYROM to use 
any nam e of its choice. The expectation was that the name chosen would be the 
Republic of Macedonia. However, the most significant part of the dual name proposal 
(FYROM's official UN name) was consistent with the hard-line decision of 13 April 1992. 
This undermined considerably the proposal's alleged cooperative intention and 
character.
On 14 June, Mitsotakis informed the participants of the third Council of the 
Political Leaders about his intention to pursue a  solution on the basis of the dual name 
formula.'7i2 j^ e  meeting lacked the drama and consequences of the previous one, no 
decision to alter the restrictive stance on FYROM's name was taken, and the dual name 
formula was not adopted.^^^ only Ms Damanaki spoke in support of it.^ ^^  The new
^^ M^akedonia. 27 June 1992 15.
participants of ttie ttiird Council of tiie Politicai Leaders were the same who were present at the 13 
April meeting, with the exception of Samaras. It should also be added that Mitsotakis had mentioned 
briefly and essentially rejected the dual name formula during the first meeting of the Council of the 
Political Leaders that had taken place on 18 February 1992 According to Papandreou's hand-written 
notes, such a formula was then judged to have only small chances' of success. See Papandreou, 1997: 
518.
^^ T^he account of this meeting is based on interviews with Ms Damanaki on 30  January 1997, Mr Lengeris 
on 3 0  August 1997, Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997 and Mr Skilakakis on 15 April 1997. Of particular
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elem ent in the leader s communique was the declaration of their steady decisionjthat] 
G reece avoid any military entanglement in the Baikans/^^^
Mitsotakis first informed EPC's Foreign Ministers of his intention to propose a  dual 
name formula during the 15 June General Council meeting, by suggesting that FYROM's 
UN name should be Vardar Republic/^^ The republic would then be allowed to select 
for domestic purposes any name that it desired. The French Foreign Minister 
subsequently mentioned this proposal publicly, and thus the Greek press took notice 
and attem pted to get an answer from the Foreign Ministry's spokesperson Mr 
Avramopoulos, who indirectly confirmed the proposal's existence.^^^ Andreas 
Papandreou reacted with a  public and harsh condemnation, emphasising that the 
ridiculous is now added  to the handlings of the government...we will lose any trace of 
authority in the international community with proposals of this kind.' ’^®
Mitsotakis reiterated the dual name proposal in a  letter that he sent to his EPC 
counterparts on 23 June 1992, whose tone was utterly alarmist.^ ^^  j^ e  Greek Prime 
Minister stressed several times the danger of the war spreading to the North of 
Yugoslavia unless the dispute with FYROM was solved before it is too late.'^^o H e  even  
noted that Gligorov had recently admitted the existence of extreme nationalist groups 
in his country that were beyond his government's control. Mitsotakis warned that if 
these groups undertake 'action...l simply tell you that no one will be in a  position to 
control the reaction of the Greek p eo p le .'^ ^ i He had in mind reports that FYROM's
importance was Skilakakis, 1995: 167-70. His account of the meeting was based on 'notes' that 
Mitsotakis kept. For an analysis of the exact nature of Mitsotakis' notes,' see  footnote 651.
^^ I^nterview with Ms Damanaki on 30 January 1997. This point was confirmed by Mr Mitsotakis in an 
interview on 10 April 1997.
^'^Valenakes and Dales, 1984: 96.
'^‘^ Interview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997.
^'^See Makedonia. 19 June 1992 15.
7i®Cited in Skilakakis. 1995:170.
^^ "^ The letter can be found in Valenakes and Dales, 1994: 97-9.
^^Oibid: 99.
72i|bid.: 97.
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nationalist party (VMRO-DPNE) tiad tield meetings to discuss terrorist bombing attacks 
in Ttiessaloniki722
Mitsotakis also indicated som e willingness to compromise, by admitting that a  
decision at the upcoming Lisbon European Council meeting did not have to satisfy 
[the Parties involved] totally/223 Most importantly, he suggested that
IThe Community can simply state that it is ready to recognise Skopje under 
any nam e that this Republic chooses, with the condition that it will not 
include [the name] Macedonia, [or]
2.We can tell to Skopje that we will recognise them with any name that they 
choose, which will not include [the name] Macedonia, but they will have the 
freedom  to call themselves any name that they d e s i r e .^24
The latter option amounted to an official proposal of the dual name formula. 
The Prime Minister stated that given a  speedy decision, he would b e  able to persuade 
the Greek people of the virtues of such a  compromise. By doing so, he essentially 
implied that there was not sufficient public support for a  solution am ong these lines.
On the ev e  of the Lisbon European Council, Papandreou raised the tone of his 
criticisms to the level of demagoguery. He flew to Thessaloniki and announced that 
the government was selling off parts of our country ...The people do not stand any 
more this sell-out and submissive policy.'^^s He also dem anded the immediate holding 
of national elections. A serious defeat in Lisbon would have undoubtedly strengthened 
the impact of such demands and rhetoric.
Somewhat more encouraging to Mitsotakis was an EP resolution on the issue of 
FYROM's name. The resolution, which provides evidence of the actions of the non-
^22|ntervlews with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 Decennber 1997 and Mr Skilakakis on 15 April 1997. 
Significantly, VMRO-DPNE's discussions of possible terrorist attacks were not denied during interviews 
with Mr Arsovski on 3 February 1997 and Mr Dimovski on 29 September 1997. However, it must be 
stressed that FYROM's government never encouraged, endorsed or participated in such discussions. 
^23valenakes and Dales, 1994; 97.
224|bid: 98.
2^5Makedonia. 27 June 1992 1.
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intergovernmental bodies ttiot 'dilute' the intergovernmentalism of the regime EPC, 
declared:
As for the name by which [FYROM] may be recognized internationally, [the EP] 
believes that the conditions set by Greece are aimed at safeguarding 
p ea ce , cooperation and stability throughout the region, and are therefore of 
crucial importance for the European Community7^ 6
However, this resolution did not refer to the dual name formula/^^
The intergovernmental European Council that took p lace in Lisbon on 26 and 27 
June 1992, produced an important declaration on Greece's dispute with FYROM:
The European Council reiterates the position taken by the Community and its 
Member States in Guimaraes on the request of the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia to be recognized as an independent State. It expresses its 
readiness to recognise the republic within its existing borders according to 
their Declaration on 16 December 1991 under a name which does not include 
the term Macedonia. It furthermore considers the borders of this republic as 
inviolable and guaranteed in accordance with the principles of the UN 
Charter and the Charter of Paris.^28
This declaration was interpreted by Mitsotakis as a  great national triumph, who 
explained that it was the 'final and definitive' EPC decision on the dispute. Having 
achieved the main reason for which I becam e Foreign Minister,' he announced his 
intention to resign the post.^29 Despite the fact that the Lisbon Declaration m ade no 
reference to the dual name formula, Mitsotakis seized the opportunity to reiterate 
publicly this proposal. He depicted the decision as the fulfilment of the first (and most 
important to G reece), part of the dual name solution. The Prime Minister then explained
No C 176/201,13.7.92 The resolution was m ade on 11 June 1992 
^27jhe dual name formula also won the backing of the US. Mitsotakis was informed of this support during 
the Lisbon European Council. See Tarkas, 1995: 320.
2^8Buii. EC 6-1992 22; emphasis added.
^29cited in Makedonia. 28 June 1992 40. For the entire transcript of Mitsotakis' speech and press 
conference after the conclusion of the Lisbon European Council, see ibid.
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that the people of FYROM can 'domestically use...any name that they want/ and 
pledged that 'we will help them financially so that they will survive.'^^o
Samaras said that he was full of joy' for this decision. Such sentiments were not 
shared in FYROM, where the republic's Foreign Minister Dr Denko Maleski r e s i g n e d ^ ^ i  
sam e fate awaited the Prime Minister Nicola Kljusev and his Cabinet, who resigned on 7 
July 1992 The only person who seem ed sceptical of the Lisbon decision was Andreas 
Papandreou.732 Responding to the jubilant statements m ade by Mitsotakis, he suggested  
caution, and reminded journalists of the celebrations following the 16 December 1991 
EPC conditions and Greece's WEU accession that had proved painfully unjustified. 
Papandreou's scepticism was vindicated. Celebrations in Athens and despair in Skopje 
proved premature.
The Lisbon Declaration was perceived as a  victory in Athens because it 
seem ed to be endorsing the Greek restrictive and non-cooperative stance on FYROM's 
name. However, one of its key parts stating that the European Council...reiterates the 
position taken...in Guimaraes' was not properly analysed.^^^ This reference amounted to 
an EPC signal that the Lisbon and Guimaraes declarations were to be read in 
conjunction. As previously argued, according to the Guimaraes declaration any 
resolution of the conflict would have required the agreem ent of both FYROM and 
Greece. In other words, although the decision in Lisbon was that the word Macedonia 
should not b e  part of FYROM's name, this provision also had to be accep ted  by FYROM.
On 3 July 1992, FYROM's Assembly rejected the part of the Lisbon Declaration 
that referred to the republic's name.^^  ^ Nevertheless, based on interviews, the claim 
has been forcefully m ade that at that point, Gligorov was sending to Athens strong 
signals that he was ready to compromise on a  name such as New M acedonia or
7%ited In Skilakakis, 1995:175.
Papandreou’s comments, see Makedonia. 28 June 1992 40. See also his subsequent statements in 
Makedonia. 3 0  June 1992 13, in which the attack on the dual name formula should be noted.
733Bu11. EC 6-1992 22
the text of the Assembly's declaration (in English), see Valenakes and Dales, 1994:103-5.
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perhaps even Slovomacedonia/^^ This has also been fully confirmed by the then 
Prime Minister Mltsotakls/^^ At any' rate, the Greek government rejected these  
overtures since they were not consistent with the 13 April decision. The politics of 
Greek confrontation were to follow.
B. G reek Confrontation.
On 3 0  July 1992, President Gligorov sent a  letter to the UN's General Secretary, 
requesting that the organisation recognise his country/^^ qnd on 11 August, FYROM's 
Parliament passed a  law endorsing a  new national flag. Its design depicted the Star of 
Verglna,' which was found In Philip the Second's tomb and Is considered to have been  
the emblem of the Macedonian d y n a s t y Crucially, no Slavs lived In the region during
^^^Interviews with Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1996, Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996, Mr 
Samaras on 3 February 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997. Mr Kotos, in an interview on 5 January 1997 
further stressed that President Giigorov was on record saying that the gam e of the name was at times 
almost lost. Kotos argues that such a possibility was faced by FYROM after Lisbon, (as well as after 16 
December 1991).
^^ “^ Interview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 Aprii 1997. The former Greek Prime Minister acknowledged Gligorov's 
overtures, but did not mention the exact compromise names that had been suggested. In an interview 
on 29 September 1997, Mr Risteski characterised the Lisbon Declaration as 'useful but not fully 
accepted ' (emphasis added). The use of the phrase 'not fully accepted' in this carefully worded 
comment, suggests that a compromise name that included the term Macedonia was at the very least 
contemplated by FYROM's government. This is probably why Mr Risteski did not state that the Lisbon 
Declaration was rejected at that time in its entirety. If this is indeed the case, his comment provides 
further (though indirect), evidence in support of the ciaims m ade by Greek decision-makers 
concerning FYROM's post-Lisbon cooperative gestures.
^^ T^he letter can be found (in English), in Papaconstantinou, 1994: 429-30.
^^ ®For a  depiction of FYROM's flag, as well as for a pictorial representation of the ancient Star of Vergina, 
see  Appendix VIII See also Danforth, 1995: 163-74 for a discussion of the flag issue. A magisterial 
biography of Philip 11 is Hammond 1994. For an exciting account of the tomb's discovery by the 
renowned archaeologist Manoiis Andronikos, see his private notes published in Ta Nea. 16 October 1997: 
24-5.
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the reign of Alexander the Great's father. In Gligorov's words: 'We do not have any 
relation to Alexander the Great. We are a  Slavic people who arrived here [in 
Macedonia] in the sixth century.'^^  ^ Given this fact, FYROM's adoption of a  new flag 
was perceived by the incensed Greeks as a  serious provocation.^'*®
^^^Clted in Danforth, 1995: 46. Not ell FYROM citizens accept Gligorov's argument. For a devastating 
critique of the more ridiculous and outrageous claims concerning the Slav descendants' of the ancient 
Macedonians, see Kofos 1986. In an interview on 29 September 1997, Mr Risteski admitted that claims 
directly linking his people with the ancient Macedonians were examples of 'revolutionary romanticism' 
and 'mythology'. He then proceeded to partly accept these false claims, on the basis that they 
nevertheless constitute a real part of his people's tradition, and hence a  necessary and important 
component of their identity. This 'true lies' argument not only stretches credulity, but is also revealing 
of the degree of historical distortion, falsification and logical implausibility that is required in order to 
mount arguments whose basis is admittedly spurious. Mr Risteski somewhat qualified his position by 
stating that the ancient Macedonians are 'part of our history but also belong to the Greeks.' Mr 
Arsovski on 3 February 1997 and Mr Dimovski on 29 September 1997 m ade exactly the same point, 
which requires some elaboration. The thesis that is advanced is that through intermarriage with the 
descendants of the non-Greek barbarian ancient Macedonians, all late-comers to the region can  
make a  claim to the ancient Macedonian cultural and historical heritage. Perhaps to som eone not 
familiar with the region's history, this all-inclusive argument might seem appealing. The problem is that 
it is based on spurious and unacceptable assumptions. Although a thorough refutation would require a  
separate thesis, it is sufficient to note that given the argument's 'logic', anyone residing in geographic 
Macedonia can make equally compelling claims to simultaneously being a descendant and sharing 
equally in the history and culture of Albanians, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Jews, Pomaks, Roma, 
Serbs and Turks (to name just a few). In other words, and taken to its extreme logical conclusion, this 
'multicultural' argument collapses from its own audacity, improbability and basis on historical 
falsification.
'^’^ In an interview on 3 February 1997, FYROM's Head of Mission in Greece Mr Arsovsky also a ccep ted  that 
the adoption of the flag could have been viewed as provocative by the Greeks. Interestingly, in an 
interview on 29 September 1997, FYROM's former Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Dimovski 
stressed that FYROM's flag only contained an imitation of the Star of Vergina. An examination of 
Appendix VIII allows for an evaluation of this claim. Also, during an interview on 29 September 1997 
with the then Vice President of FYROM's government Mr Risteski, a fascinating account of former (and 
in som e cases much older) flags utilised by nationalist groups was presented. They contained a star or 
a sun, and one even had a unicorn that apparently represented Alexander the Great's horse 
Buchephalas. However, no previous flag contained the actual Vergina symbol.
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The response of the Greek government was harsh. It condem ned the action as 
a 'shameless, provocative, and unacceptable usurpation of a  Greek historical 
symbol;' '^ ’^ and most importantly on 21 August Mitsotakis announced that 'Greece 
temporarily suspends the passage of oil products towards the North.'^ '*^  yhw decision 
was supposed to end international criticism that G reece had been violating the UN 
embargo and permitting oil shipments into Serbia. In reality, it amounted to the 
imposition of an oil embargo against the new republic. Mitsotakis has explained that 
international criticism simply provided an adequate pretext for G reece to implement 
punitive econom ic measures against FYROM.^ ''^
The effects of the embargo were mitigated by oil shipments entering FYROM 
via Bulgaria.^ '*'* Nevertheless, the Greek government's attitude had b ecom e  
confrontational, a  fact that is well illustrated by the story of the labels.'^ "*® It originated 
in a  series of proposals m ade by the Commission, in order to increase the 
effectiveness of the Community embargo against Serbia.^^  ^ Based on these proposals, 
the Council of Ministers decided  that
The export to the Republic[s] of Bosnia...Croatia as well as the territory of the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of all commodities and products 
originating in or coming from the Community shall be subject to the
'^ '^Clted in Lygeros, 1992 210 fn 129. This statement was Issued after the adoption of the new FYROM flag 
and before the Imposition of the Greek oil embargo. As a  result, the claims of Ljupco GeorglevskI, 
leader of VMRO-DPNE In Le Monde Diplomatique, that 'the Greeks revolted only 8-10 months [after 
the adoption of the flag, otherwlse]_we would have chosen the lion' (cited In Tsirklnldls, 1994: 332), are 
lies.
"^^ c^ited In Tarkas, 1995: 327. This decision was consistent with the decision In Council 6774/92 (Presse 99- 
G), 4 June 1992
"^*^ MItsotakls admitted this logic behind the embargo In an Interview on 10 April 1997, as well as during a  
crucial speech to his party's MPs. See Makedonia. 27 October 1992 12
^^ "^ Part of a document that provides evidence for this fact was published In Tarkas, 1995: 331. See 
Appendix IX. This practice was also confirmed In an Interview with Mr Arsovsky on 3 February 1997.
^^^Papaconstantinou, 1994:171. See also the previously unpublished letter that Papaconstantinou sent to 
his EPC counterparts on 12 October 1992, that can be found In Appendix IX.
7^See C0M(92) 424 final, 11 August 1992
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presentation of a  prior • authiorlzotlon for exportJo be issued by ttie 
com petent authorities of the Member States/'^^
It is noteworthy that after intense Greek pressure, FYROM is merely described as 
a territory. Furthermore, the Greek government later ensured the explicit Community 
clarification that the name that was supposed to be used in all such authorisations was 
that of FYROM.748
The practical consequences of this policy would have been extreme for 
FYROM, since the republic's authorities label products with the words Republic of 
Macedonia. As a  result, strict adherence to the Community policy would have caused  
the end of all Community trade with the republic! Mitsotakis realised that insisting on 
this policy would have been both problematic and counterproductive. Thus, he did 
not object to the other Member States de facto  ignoring these p r o v is io n s . ^ ^ ^  
Nevertheless, the political capital that G reece spent on a  technical issue in order to 
su cceed  to characterise the republic as a  territory, and cause the maximum possible 
problems in its trade, is indicative of Greek policy and feelings during this period.
Meanwhile, as war was raging in Bosnia, the UK (which had assumed the 
Community Presidency on 1 July), and the UN, organised the London Conference on 26 
and 27 August 1992. More than thirty countries were represented, in what was another 
exam ple of the conference diplomacy decision-making procedure of the regime 
EPC750 jh e  dispute between FYROM and Greece was not central to the proceedings, 
and was not mentioned in any of the speeches by the representatives of the US or of
No L 266/27,129.92; emphasis added.
74%ee OJ No L 276/18.19.9.92 
"^‘‘^ See Lygeros, 1992 217.
^^°Among them were representatives from the US, Russia, and Japan, as well as the leader of the Bosnian 
Serbs, Radovan Karadzic. Ail of the speeches, statements and interventions can be found in the 
academ ic edition of David Owen's 1995 Balkan Odyssey CD-ROM  (hereafter Owen-CD). Passages 
will be cited according to the CD-ROM reference.
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the EPC member states/^^ The sam e applied to the Russian Foreign Minister, despite his 
country's recent recognition of the republic/^^
G reece was represented at the London Conference by the new Foreign Minister 
Michalis Papaconstantinou/^^ He was fluent in several languages, author of numerous 
books (several of which on Macedonian history and politics), and unusually well 
educated  for a  Greek politician. In his intervention, Papaconstantinou reaffirmed his 
country's cooperation and support for the UN sponsored arms and trade e m b a r g o e s . ^ 5 4  
In tune with mainstream Western opinion, he condem ned the use of violence and 
emphasised the importance of protecting minorities, delivering humanitarian aid, and 
ensuring that the conflict be at least contained. He also stressed that if FYROM 
complied with the Lisbon Declaration, G reece will be ready to extend its full 
cooperation and friendship to the new Republic.'^^  ^ The tone of the intervention was 
pragmatic and devoid of any references to the glorious but ancient Greek history in 
the region. It was thus characteristic of Papaconstantinou's approach to the dispute, 
though it was not inconsistent with the Greek hard-line policy on FYROM's name.
Kiro Gligorov who also participated in the Conference, m ade a  passionate plea  
for recognition.^^<  ^ He noted that FYROM was a  democratic society respecting human 
and ethnic rights, and also emphasised that
We have acquired our independence and sovereignty and we control our 
own frontiers, we have preserved p ea ce  and internal stability within the 
Republic. This situation has prevented the escalation of war...For the p e a c e  
and dem ocracy for which the Republic of Macedonia had received high
issue of FYROM's recognition was raised tiowever by Serbia's Prime Minister Milan Panic, and ttie 
Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria and Slovenia. See Owen-CD, 1995; T: LG 26/8/92 Ganev statement and T: 
LG 26/8/92 Rupel statement. Papaconstantinou ciaims in tiis memoirs that they were asked by 
Gligorov to address this issue. See Papaconstantinou, 1994: 81-2 
^^^Russia recognised FYROM as the Repubiic of Macedonia on 5 August 1992 It appears that the decision 
was m ade somewhat suddenly and whimsically by Russian President Boris Yeitsin. See Grow, 1992 
^^^Papaconstantinou who was 73 years old, was sworn as Greece's Foreign Minister on 8 August 1992 
^^^See Owen-GD, 1995: T: LG 26/8/92 Papaconstantinou intervention.
^^ I^bid.
^^<^Owen-GD, 1995: T: LG 26/8/92 Gligorov statement.
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marks by the whole international community, it has aiso gained siientiy an 
unseen punishment: i t  remained the last to await r e c o g n i t i o n / ^ ^
Giigorov used this opportunity to reject once again the Lisbon Deciaration, arguing that 
any change of name was 'insuiting' and wouid amount to his country defacing i t s e i f . '^ ^ a  
The London Conference was significant to the extent that it signaiied the UN's 
taking over the leading role from EPC as regards developments in Bosnia. However, 
EPC would remain primarily responsible for dealing with the dispute between FYROM 
and G reece until December 1992. The Greek government supported the Conference's 
conclusions which m ade no reference to FYROM.^ ^^  Thus, G reece once again  
participated in a  harsh verbai condemnation of Serbia: If ...Serbia and Montenegro...do 
not compiy [with the Conference's decisions] the Security Councii wiii be invited to 
apply sanctions ieading to their total international isolation.'^^o
On 12 September, EPC's Foreign Ministers met at Brocket Hail in England. After a  
suggestion by the British Presidency, it was decided to eniist the services of the retired 
British dipiomat Robin O'Neil, who was to undertake an initiative aiming to soive the 
dispute between Greece and FYROM.^ *^ ’ This initiative aiso represents the capabiiity of 
the intergovernmentai Presidency to provide new decision-making procedures and to 
a degree set the agenda. At any rate, it must be stressed that according to O'Neil, his 
mission was unusuai, difficuit and i m p e r t i n e n t ."^62
At the sam e time, pressure to end the Greek oii embargo against FYROM was 
mounting.763 A thinly veiled criticism was even inciuded in the 16 October 1992 
declaration of the European Council meeting in Birmingham:
^^ ®lbid.
31 ILM 1537-43 (1992). The Conference also decided that Lord Owen, a former UK Foreign 
Secretary, would replace Lord Carrington.
^'^°Cited In Silber and Little, 1995/1996: 262
•^^ S^ee Papaconstantinou, 1994:115. For G'Neil's account of his initiative, see  O'Neil, 1997.
762|bid.: 7.
•^^ I^nterview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996.
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In the light of the deteriorating econom ic situation in the former Yugoslav 
republic of Macedonia, the European Council stressed the need for 
appropriate measures to prevent this republic from bearing the unintended 
consequences of UN sanctions7<^^
While O'Neil was making a  series of trips to both G reece and FYROM, there was 
renewed talk in Athens about ending the dispute on the basis of the dual name 
formula/65 Samaras objected strenuously to such a  compromise and declared it a  
'dual theft.'^66 Faced with this opposition, Mitsotakis called on 21 October 1992 a  
meeting of New Democracy's MPs aiming to receive their backing for his preferred 
foreign policy positions.
The meeting was dramatic, lasted for seven hours and is of particular 
importance because it influenced subsequent foreign policy d e v e l o p m e n t s . ^ * ?  | f  g^o  
marked the beginning of the process that eventually led to the creation of a  political 
party by Samaras (Politiki Anixi), as well as to the downfall of the Mitsotakis 
government.^*®
*^'^ Bull. EC 10-1992 10. In Birmingham, there was also an informal meeting of EPC's Foreign Ministers, that 
discussed Greece’s dispute with FYROM. Most notably, the Danish Foreign Minister asked for the 
republic’s recognition. As expected, Papaconstantinou reacted negatively to this suggestion, and thus 
no decision was made. See Makedonia. 17 October 1992 13 and Papaconstantinou, 1994:178-82 Aiso 
based on an interview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1997.
^*5According to O’Neil, one of his most immediate problems was how to travel to Skopje. Finding train 
travel slow and uncomfortable, he eventually opted for a Greek car driving him to the border, at 
which point he was picked up by an official FYROM car. O’Neil also provides evidence of the 
consequences of the oil embargo, noting that in one of his 100 mile long trips from the Greek border 
to Skopje, he only saw three cars. See O’Neil, 1997: 2 and 4.
^**Cited in Lygeros, 1992 220 fn 139.
^*^Particularly good coverage of the meeting can be found in Eleftherotypia. 22 October 1992 1-14.
*^®0n 7 and 9 September 1993, two New Democracy MPs defected to Samaras’ Politiki Anixi, forcing 
Mitsotakis to call a general election. On 10 October 1993, a triumphant PASOK received 46,88 per 
cent of the vote and 171 seats (out of 300). New Democracy received only 39,30 per cent, Politiki 
Anixi 4,87 per cent and the KKE 4,54 per cent. Synaspismos failed to win Parliamentary representation. 
See Lygeros, 1996: 242-3 and 251
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In his speech, the Prime Minister somewhat mildly criticised Samaras for his 
handling of the 16 December 1991 EPC conditions, and supported the dual name 
formula by arguing that the republic's official UN name was what really mattered/*^’ An 
exasperated Mitsotakis stressed that to deny FYROM's citizens the right to call 
themselves for domestic purposes what they wish would confirm 'what they write about 
us [unjustly,] that we are a  paranoid country7^°
Mitsotakis threatened MPs that a rejection of his proposal would force him to 
call an early national poll. Given the government's unpopularity, this was a  serious 
threat's'll He concluded by suggesting that MPs opposing the dual name formula for 
reasons of conscience should resign their seats, in order not to jeopardise New 
Democracy's Parliamentary majority.
In his previously unpublished speech, Papaconstantinou stressed that the issue 
of FYROM's recognition had to be resolved as soon as possible.^^  ^ He revealed that 
G reece had faced  considerable hostility from the Danish Foreign Minister in 
Birmingham, and clarified that there were no indications concerning the prospects of 
O'Neil's initiative.
Papaconstantinou argued that the pressure that Greece exhorted on FYROM 
was of particular importance. Political and financial circles within the young republic 
had begun to request the normalisation of relations between the two states. 
Furthermore, FYROM had failed to secure membership in any international organisation 
and had committed an almost universally condem ned error by adopting the Star of 
Vergina on its flag. At the end of his speech, the Greek Foreign Minister warned that 
he was afraid that unless we achieve a  solution of this issue [at the upcoming
Makedonia. 22 October 1992 1,12 and 15 
770|bid.: 15.
^ i^proof of the government's unpopularity was a nation-wide poll that was released in November 1992 
Only 25,1 per cent of respondents declared their willingness to vote for New Democracy, whereas 33, 5 
per cent opted for PASOK. See Louiis, 1995: 423.
^^^See Appendix X.
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European Council meeting] at Edinburgh), we will then have to confront our own
isolation7 3^
Samaras' speech (extensive excerpts of which are published here for the first 
time), was less structured but far more dramatic and consequential/^'* He proposed that 
the dual name formula be rejected because its accep tance would imply that FYROM's 
arguments concerning the use of the name Macedonia were at least partly j u s t i f i e d / ^ ^  
There was also a  clarification of his intentions in case the proposal failed:
1 consider that its rejection will have, for me at least, direct political 
consequences. In matters of conscience, there is no room for majority. If the 
Parliamentary group has not been persuaded by what 1 have said, if 1 am [in 
the] minority, I hold my basic obligation, human, ethical, politicaLto resign 
from the office of Member of Parliament...^^^
Samaras' proposai received only four votes, the overwhelming majority of MPs 
expressing their support for 'the decision of Lisbon according to which the recognition 
of [FYROMj is only accep ted  with one name not carrying...the name M acedonia for all 
its foreign relations [sicj.'^^^
Despite the fact that the Lisbon Declaration m ade no such distinction, this was 
a victory for Mitsotakis, especially since Samaras resigned later that afternoon his seat 
as an MP. However, it was only a  pyrrhic victory for the Greek Prime Minister, given that 
the three MPs who had joined Samaras in rejecting the dual name formula sufficed to 
bring down the governments^® This was a  crucial fact that had to b e  taken into
ss3|bid.
ss^See Appendix XL Samaras also submitted three supporting documents. The first was the previously 
analysed 23 June 1992 letter that Mitsotakis sent to his EPC counterparts. The others are published here 
for the first time. For Samaras' speech, and his various exchanges with New Democracy MPs, see  also 
Skilakakis, 1995:191-2 and 194-6.
^^ I^nterview with Mr Samaras on 24 December 1997.
Appendix XL
^^ M^akedonia. 22 October 1992 1; emphasis added
^^ ®ln an interview on 24 December 1996, Samaras explained that he had specifically advised his closest 
allies not to vote with him against the dual name formula, but three of them ignored his explicit
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consideration by Mitsotakis, before any compromise was reached on the basis of the 
dual nam e formula.
On 3 November 1992, Papaconstantinou sent a  letter to his EPC counterparts 
(published here for the first time), clarifying Greece's positions.^^’ Referring to 
Ambassador's O'Neil initiative, Papaconstantinou noted that to this day, no apparent 
progress has been registered.'^®® This amounted to almost an understatement, after the 
disastrous meeting that had taken place between Papaconstantinou and O'Neil on 12 
October 1992?^  ^ O'Neil claims that he warned the Greek government that the oil 
embargo was actually hurting their aims, and that by insisting on a  hard-line policy on 
FYROM's name, they risked the state being eventually recognised as M a c e d o n ia . ' ^ ^ ^
On the other hand, the Greeks had concluded that O'Neil lacked objectivity 
and discussed arbitrarily only a  one name solution, abandoning entirely the dual name 
f o r m u la . '^ ^ s  retired British Ambassador also seem ed to ignore the various aspects  
of the 'Pinheiro Package.'^®^
An alarmed Papaconstantinou attempted to rectify these negative 
developments with the 3 November letter, in which FYROM is accused  for adopting the 
Star of Vergina flag, as well as for 'attributing to [Greece] aggressive intentions and 
territorial claims.'^ ®® The Greek Foreign Minister suggested that FYROM might have been  
under the impression that the Lisbon Declaration could be reversed in Edinburgh, and
request. Samaras argues that In addition to them, many more were in support of his position. Given 
subsequent defections to his party, this is almost certainly an accurate assertion.
^^^See Appendix XII 
7®®lbid.
^® l^nterview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996.
7®2$ee O'Neil, 1997: 6.
^®®0'Neii essentially confirms the legitimacy of this complaint. He argues that following his visits to Skopje, 
he concluded that only the names Macedonia (Skopje) or FYROM (the latter though as a  'possible fall­
back position'), could provide plausible solutions to the dispute. See ibid: 6. Both are single names 
that are incompatible with the Lisbon Declaration.
®^^ *Based on an interview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996.
^®^Appendix XIL
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recom m ended that 'we should take care that no mixed signal reach Skopje.'^ ®'^  He 
then m ade the following recommendation:
The Portuguese Presidency prepared a  "package deal* which, in addition to 
the name problem, could resolve all the outstanding issues connected  with 
recognition. This p ack age should be part of the discussions currently being 
carried out by Ambassador O'Neil.^ ®^
Papaconstantinou was not suggesting a  compromise on the basis of the nam e 
New Macedonia, which would have been contrary to the 13 April Council of the Political 
Leaders decision. The pragmatic politician was actually making an important and 
com m endable (if futile), effort to depart from the absolute focus on the nam e issue, to 
which even O'Neil seem ed to have succumbed. He was thus attempting to ensure that 
the issues of FYROM conducting hostile propaganda and making territorial claims 
against G reece return on the agenda.
Greece's Foreign Minister m ade certain cooperative gestures towards FYROM, 
by implying in somewhat unclear terms his government's support for a  dual name 
formula, and by reiterating Greece's willingness to guarantee FYROM's security. He 
clarified that given the satisfaction of certain technical conditions, oil shipments 
towards the new republic would resume. Humanitarian shipments of oil would also be  
available upon FYROM's request.^ ®® Ominously though, Papaconstantinou warned that 
'we have reached the "end of the rope."'^ ®’
Meanwhile, Ambassador O'Neil was still In search of a  compromise. In late 
November, he stated that I believe we are as close to a  solution as you can be. It is 
for the government of Skopje to take the decision.'^^o This was an entirely misleading
®^<^lbid.
7®7|bid.
®^®ln an interview on 10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantinou clarified ttiat FYROM never m ade such pj request. 
®^*^ Interview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 10 April 1997.
^^ Qpinancia! Times. 24 November 1992 4. O'Neil made this statement knowing that Giigorov was willing to
accep t the name Macedonia (Skopje). See O'Neil, 1997: 8. However, he ought to have been in a
position to guess the negative Greek reaction to such a proposal.
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statement, perticps though fitting for what was becoming an exercise in futility. As 
regards the Greek government, the most crucial meeting between O'Neil and 
Papaconstantinou had taken p lace on 22 November. The British retired diplomat 
announced that FYROM was willing to accep t the name Macedonia-Skopje. 
Papaconstantinou claims to have explained that the Greek government would not be  
in a  position to a ccep t such a  name.^’i
O'Neil delivered his report on 3 December 1992.^ 92 y^e fact that the Greek 
government had been almost entirely informed in advance about its contents, 
constitutes evidence of the principle of information of the regime EPC.'^ s^ The O'Neil 
Report provides a  somewhat lengthy account of the major EPC-related developm ents 
in the dispute between G reece and FYROM. The 16 December 1991 conditions, the 
opinion of the AC, the efforts of the Portuguese Presidency and the decisions at 
Guimaraes and Lisbon are all revisited.
Having presented this background information, O'Neil enters the more 
substantive part of his report, by arguing that FYROM is in an especially precarious 
situation: the republic's econom y is suffering from the oil embargo, as well as from 
observing the UN embargo against Serbia, and ethnic tensions with the Albanian 
minority seem  to be rising.^ ^^
Given this rather grave situation, the British diplomat informs that FYROM is 
willing to accep t a  compromise name, with the full expectation of Community 
recognition at the upcoming Edinburgh European Summit; 'The Government of
^^ ’interview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996. This point is confirmed by O'Neil. See 
O'Neil, 1997: 8.
'^^ H^is report can be found (in English) in Papaconstantinou, 1994: 431-9.
^^ I^nterview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996.
^ 4^t was estimated that 'Skopje's enforcement of UN sanctions against Serbia cost...$1.9 billion per year' 
(Perry, 1995: 44).
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FYROM...[isl...ready to a ccep t the name for the state of Republic of Macedonia (Skopje) 
fo r all international purposesP^^
This sentence contains the essence of his initiative. It is noteworthy that unlike 
the proposal presented to the Greek government on 22 November (Republic of 
Macedonia-Skopje), FYROM's proposed name in the Report is distinguished by a 
parenthesis.796 Furthermore, the clarification that this name would be utilised for 
international purposes constitutes an accep tan ce of the dual name formula. However, 
neither this formula, nor a  name containing the term Macedonia was part of the Lisbon 
Declaration. O'Neil accep ts this awkward fact, and states that this offer does not 
correspond to the positive offer expressed in the European Council declaration at 
Lisbon; 9^7 and he has also admitted that his task was to persuade M acedonia to 
change its name to something new which did not include the word Macedonia, not to 
suggest that the EC should change its mind."^ 98
By ignoring the terms of his mandate, O'Neil essentially judged that the 
arguments m ade by FYROM's officials had particular merit, and especially that 
changing their name in a  more radical way could not have achieved the required 
Parliamentary support. More importantly, by virtue of his proposal, the Ambassador 
had a ccep ted  that
The term Macedonia describes accurately the national identity of the 
majority of the population, that it describes accurately the geographical 
situation of the Republic, and that the name Macedonia has been chosen
^^^Papaconstantinou, 1994: 437; emphasis added. FYROM's government also accep ted  to change Article 
49 of the constitution. It was to contain the following language: 'The Republic cares for the status and 
rights of Macedonians living abroad, assists their cultural development and promotes link with them' 
(ibid: 438).
^^ *^ ln an interview on 23 December 1996, Mr Papaconstantinou argued that this change m ade O'Neil's 
proposal even less appealing to the Greek government. However, based on O'Neil, 1997, there is no 
indication that the originally proposed name was Macedonia-Skopje. Perhaps though, reference to 
this change might have been considered as an unnecessary and technical detail for his audience.
^"^^Papaconstantinou, 1994: 439.
798o'Neil, 1997: 4.
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and approved by all the minorities, who are not themselves of Macedonian 
stock/99
Not surprisingly, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs was Instructed on 4 
Decem ber to Issue a  brief statement noting that the O'Neil Report was not considered 
objective.®®® This suggests the bitter disappointment felt towards the British diplomat. In 
an Interview, Papaconstantinou kept repeating that 'the man [O'Neil] was biased.'®®  ^
MItsotakIs also made-similar comments and stressed that the Greek arguments were 
entirely Ignored.^^  ^ Furthermore, according to Papaconstantinou, positive Initiatives 
taken by the Greek government were only given brief mention In the O'Neil Report. Fie 
primarily had In mind the Greek-organised 12 November 1992 declaration of all 
neighbouring to FYROM countries, that they would respect the young republic's 
territorial Integrity and borders.®®®
The dispute between Greece and FYROM was discussed extensively at the 7 
Decem ber meeting of EPC's Foreign Ministers, which began with a  brief Intervention by 
Ambassador O'Neil.®®^  Papaconstantinou then gave a  lengthy, passionate and at times 
furious speech  attacking the O'Neil Report as being 'In bad faith and unreliable.'®®  ^ He
799|bid: 437.
®®®lnterview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996.
®® i^nterview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996. Papaconstantinou personally issued those 
instructions. It is also noteworthy that in his lavishly illustrated memoirs, the only photograph showing 
him grim-faced was taken during a meeting with O'Neil. In the same interview, when confronted with 
this observation, he admitted that it was done intentionally.
®®2|nterview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997.
®®®See Makedonia. 11 November 1992 1 and Makedonia. 12 November 1992 I Although somewhat ignored 
by O'Neil, this initiative of the Greek government was praised in more certain terms by the EP. See OJ 
No C 337/197, 211292, paragraph 17.
®®"^ The account of this meeting is based on Papaconstantinou, 1994: 220-44, on an interview with Mr 
Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996 and on the lengthy and important report in Makedonia. 8 
December 1992 1 and 12 It must be noted though, that EPC's official press release though, merely 
states that 'The Ministers-held a discussion on the subject [of O'Neil's Report].' See Council, 10523/92 
(Presse 235-G), 7 December 1992 
lia, 8 December 1992 I
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then presented several criticisms, focusing primarily on the fact that the retired British 
diplomat had ignored his mandate®^^ The Greek Foreign Minister communicated in 
categorical terms his country's intention to reject the O'Neil Report at the forthcoming 
Edinburgh European Council.
Papaconstantinou concluded his speech by suggesting that FYROM be named 
Vardar Republic, and also repeated the by then standard Greek offers of financial aid 
and security guarantees, given a  favourable to G reece resolution of the dispute. Faced 
with Greece's intransigence, Douglas Flurd suggested that the issue be discussed at the 
subsequent Edinburgh meeting.
Prior to the Edinburgh Council, Karamanlis and Mitsotakis sent letters to their EPC 
counterparts. The purpose of Karamanlis' 24 November 1992 letter was to avert any 
EPC abandonment of the Lisbon Declaration.®^^ The Greek statesman dismissed the 
argument that the non-recognition of FYROM may lead to the war spreading to that 
republic, and poignantly stressed that the recognition of Croatia and Bosnia produced  
no improvements but rather 'complicated [things] dangerously.'®®®
The President emphasised that his country had no interest in FYROM's dissolution, 
and suggested that financial help and security guarantees to FYROM would follow a  
satisfactory resolution of the dispute Fie then proceeded to stipulate a  grave threat. If 
the Lisbon Declaration was abandoned
In order to protect its security and national dignity [Greece would b e  forced  
to] close its borders [with FYROM] with painful results for Skopje and 
unpleasant [ones] for G reece and the C o m m u n it y .® ® 9
®®'^ See Papaconstantinou, 1994; 221-2 Also based on an Interview witti Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 
December 1996. For O'Neil's response to ttiese criticisms, see O'Neil, 1997: 8. O'Neil 'took comfort from 
ttie fact that the Greek government had, incidentally, criticised and dismissed in almost identical 
terms [the AC's opinion]' (ibid.).
®®^ it can be found in Valenakes and Dales, 1994:108-10.
®®®lbid.: 109.
®®9ibid.
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The fact that this warning was m ade by the immensely respected and 'moderate' on 
this dispute Karamanlis, illustrates the potential extent and quality of the politics of 
Greek confrontation.
In his 10 Decem ber 1992 letter, Mitsotakis reiterated Karamanlis' conditional offer 
to FYROM, but m ade no explicit reference to the possibility of closing the borders.®^  ^
He also emphasised the importance that G reece attached to EPC maintaining the 
Lisbon Declaration. In doing so, he essentially rejected the substance of the letter that 
Kiro Giigorov had sent to him on 2 December.
In this previously unpublished letter, Giigorov urged that his republic be  
recognised, since it had fulfilled all EPC conditions.® !^ Furthermore, FYROM's President 
rejected the Lisbon Deciaration and castigated Greece:
The Lisbon Declaration requires from us to erase the term M acedonia from 
the name of our country. This is a  precedent in the history of nations and  
beyond the international standards. This request by the Republic of G reece  
was being followed by econom ic pressures and blockades on the Republic 
of Macedonia.®!^
Despite this rejection and prior to the Edinburgh meeting, Giigorov ignored 
considerations of political cost and proceeded in undertaking a  major cooperative  
action.8!3 On 9 December 1992 he went to his republic's Parliament, declaring that his
®!®See Makedonia. 12 December 1992 1. Mitsotakis also warned that an abandonment of the Lisbon 
Declaration would 'cause the tragic destabilisation of our region' (ibid.). Read carefully and in 
conjunction with the 24 November 1992 Karamanlis letter, it may be argued that this phrase hints to the 
closing of the borders with FYROM. Admittedly though, it is less than absolutely clear.
®!!See Appendix XIII During my research, I have not found any proof of this letter having been published 
in any Greek or English publication. However, it has been impossible to find out whether it has been  
pubiished in any unofficial FYROM publication.
®!2|bid.
®!®That such a decision entailed political cost should not be doubted. Characteristically, FYROM's current 
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs stressed that any 'politician who agrees to a  change of FYROM's 
constitutional name could say good -b ye to his political career' (interview with Mr Dimovski on 29 
September 1997).
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government intended to a ccep t the name Republic of Macedonia (Skopje).®’^  This 
name was to have been adopted 'for all international purposes...not just for relations 
with the EC. The legal [i.e. for domestic purposes] name of the Republic of M acedonia  
would not however be changed'^i^ Giigorov warned that if this name was rejected in 
Edinburgh, he would then request UN membership under the name Republic of 
Macedonia.816 According to the then government's Vice President Mr Risteski, this 
decision was also reached as a  result of certain internal circumstances. Our country 
had not yet stabilised politically or economically, nor was it recognised yet,' he 
stressed in an interview.^i?
On the following day, a  huge demonstration took p lace in Athens. Organised 
by local administration authorities, it successfully followed the blueprint of the 14 
February 1992 Thessaloniki demonstration.®’® Some 1 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0  people assem bled in 
what was probably the largest gathering of people to ever take p lace in Greece's 
capital. The main (and somewhat misleading) slogan was Macedonia is Greek.' si9
®’"’See Makedonia. 10 December 1992 18.
®’50'Neli, 1997: 8.
®’4n an Interview on 29 September 1997, Mr Risteski explained that not having gone directly to the UN 
requesting recognition was probably a mistake on behalf of FYROM's government.
®’^ lntervlew with Mr Risteski on 29 September 1997 It should be noted that '1992 was [financially] anything 
but a successful year for [FYROM]. The gross social product decreased by 15 per cent and Investment 
by 24 per cent, while the real depreciation of salaries was 34 per cent.As a  result of Resolution 577 of 
the United Nations alone, [FYROM's] economy-suffered dam age to the extent of 1,3 billion [US] dollars. 
The dam age caused by the Greek embargo amount[ed] to an additional 1 billion [US] dollars' (Reuter, 
1999: 39). Of Importance Is also the fact that Mr Dimovski provided precisely the sam e explanation 
with Mr Risteski during an Interview on 29 September 1997. The fact that Giigorov clearly and publicly 
accep ted  a  compromise name other than Macedonia, has proved an embarrassment for FYROM's 
hard-line politicians who argue that the name Macedonia 'Is our Identity, our existence' (Interview with 
Mr Risteski on 29 September 1997), thus Implying that no compromise Is possible. The problem of 
course Is that having accep ted  once precisely such a compromise, evidence exists that the name 
Macedonia has not always been 'sacred' or non-negotlable.
®’®Prlmarlly responsible for the organisation of the demonstration was the Central Committee of 
Municipalities and Communities In Greece (KEDKE).
®’'^ For an astute analysis of the slogan's logic, problems and Implications, see Kofos 1999: 235.
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Little doubt was thus left about the passions, sensitivities and interests of the Greek 
people. The success and emphasis of the Athens demonstration probably minimised 
any room for diplomatic manoeuvre and cooperation in Edinburgh.
The political parties (except the KKE) were represented, as were most 
professional and labour unions and the Greek Church. The keynote speaker was the 
Mayor of Athens, Leonidas Kouris, who stressed the importance and Greekness of the 
nam e Macedonia, and also warned of the danger of Turkey increasing its influence in 
the region as a  result of the crisis.^ o^ The resolution that was subsequently passed  
condem ned what were perceived to be provocations by FYROM, but m ade no 
reference to a  solution on the basis of the dual name formula. Following the October 
meeting of New Democracy's MPs, that had becom e a  dangerous (for the government) 
option.
The most crucial passage of the Athens resolution, the wording of which is 
consistent with the essence of the resolution in Thessaloniki, stated the dem and that 
the three conditions of the Lisbon decision be confirmed and i m p o s e d ' ^ ^ i  However, the 
Thessaloniki resolution created considerable pressure for the non-negotiable adoption 
of the restrictive position on FYROM's name, whereas the Athens resolution merely 
confirmed stated Greek policy, though it did ensure that any bold cooperative action 
in Edinburgh would m eet with popular disapproval, and almost certainly guarantee the 
government's downfall.
At the n December 1992 Edinburgh European Council, and as regards the 
dispute with FYROM, G reece was essentially alone .^22 ^t the parallel meeting of the 
Foreign Ministers, an intransigent Papaconstantinou was the target of a  sustained 
attem pt by all EPC members to persuade him that a  compromise on the name issue
®20por his speech, see Mnkedonia. 11 December 1992 15. This point was also reiterated by the various 
other speakers. See ibid.
®2i|bid.
®22However, som e two hundred Greek mayors had flown to Edinburgh in order to demonstrate their 
support for Greece's restrictive position (interview with Mr Kosmopoulos on 5 February 1997).
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was necessary. On the following day, there was a  renewed attempt am ong the sam e  
lines. Feeling isolated and frustrated, Papaconstantinou threatened to veto the 
declaration on the former Yugoslavia that the meeting was exp ected  to produce, and 
implied that Greek non-cooperation on issues relating to Yugoslavia would be  
extended, perhaps i n d e f in i t e ly .® 2 3  His threat illustrates the importance of the 
fundamental rule of consensus of the regime EPC, and if actualised would have 
destroyed any sem blance-of EPC solidarity on Yugoslavia.
Faced with this development, Hurd asked for a  brief break and attem pted to 
persuade Papaconstantinou in private. The Greek Foreign Minister was especially  
revealing in explaining to his British counterpart why a  compromise on the nam e issue 
was not possible;
Our government will fall and that which will com e [into office] after the 
elections will not be able to follow another policy. With the people's verdict 
being recent it will be even tougher on its stance.®^^
Given Greece's intransigence, the Edinburgh declaration on former Yugoslavia 
did not include a  rejection of the Lisbon Declaration, though it m ade evident EPC's 
concern over FYROM's fate and precarious c o n d i t i o n .^25 Security Council resolution 
establishing a  UN force in the republic was w e l c o m e d .^26 Furthermore, the European 
Council stressed the need for appropriate measures to prevent [FYROM] from bearing 
the unintended consequences of UN s a n c t io n s . ' * ^ ^  This constituted a  thinly veiled  
criticism of Greece's oil embargo, as well as to the Greek attempts to prevent FYROM 
from benefiting from international organisations. Evidently, the Greek government's 
decision to release 4 0 ,0 0 0  tons of the embargoed oil prior to Edinburgh' had failed
323|nterview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996.
^^^Papaconstantinou, 1994: 231; emphasis added.
825see Bull. EC 12-1992 10.
®26jhis was UN Security Council Resolution 795, that can be found (in English) in Valenakes and Dales, 
1994:125-6.
®27buII. EC 12-1992 10.
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to assuage its EPC partners.®28 Finally, it was decided that FYROM would receive from 
the Community financial assistance worth som e ECU 5 0  million.
Referring to these decisions, Mitsotakis declared that 'we m anaged finally to 
win the battle.'®29 This was true only to the extent that there was no abandonment of 
the Lisbon Declaration. However, after Edinburgh, there were no other important EPC 
initiatives to solve the dispute between G reece and FYROM. The war' m oved away  
from Europe to New York, and the UN becam e the battlefield were FYROM attem pted  
to achieve recognition. A study of these events would reveal new protagonists and  
concerns, as well as a  Greek diplomacy acting skilfully and often brilliantiy.^^o Such an 
analysis though, belongs to a  different inquiry.
C. The Continuation of Institutionaiist Breakdown.
The period between April-December 1992 is characterised primarily by the 
politics of Greek confrontation. The Greek government insisted unfailingly on a  
restrictive position on FYROM's name, was involved in the 'story of the labels,' imposed 
an oil embargo and threatened to close its borders with the new republic, rejected the 
O'Neil Report and Gligorov's gestures after Lisbon, and even threatened to veto the 
decisions on former Yugoslavia in an EPC meeting. It will subsequently be demonstrated 
that these acts were ultimately the result of domestic and partisan considerations.
During the sam e period, a  record of limited cooperative Greek decisions also 
exists. For example, G reece continued to participate in EPC's condemnation of Serbia, 
which involved agreement to various harshly worded declarations, the adoption of
®28petkovsl<i et al, 1993: 34.
^^ M^akedonia. 13 December 1992 I
^^°When I first contacted Papaconstantinou In order to arrange some interviews, 1 explained to tiim over 
ttie ptione that my thesis would deal with events up to the Edinburgh European Council. Although he 
was in com plete agreement with this cut-off point, he commented on the fact that the UN battle 
would not be Included by saying 'This is unfortunate_this is unfortunate.'
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strict sanctions on 31 May 1992, as weil as agreement to the conclusions of the August 
London Conference. Mitsotakis explains that these cooperative actions were 
undertaken in order to persuade EPC members that G reece could be a  reasonable 
and cooperative partner.® ’^ The aim was to attempt to change the country's horrible 
reputation as nothing less than EPC's black sheep.'®®^
importantly, Papaconstantinou had adopted a different analysis of Serbia's 
strategic importance to Greece, in an interview, he stressed that
With Serbia we have nothing in common, i do not think [that we have any 
common interests]. The Serbs would not be very much interested in Turkey, 
and I do not think that it would be possible to agree [with them] on 
Albania...and after all [FYROM's citizens] and Bulgarians are also Christian 
Orthodox.®®®
This observation is significant to the extent that it lessens the value of Greece's 
cooperation in EPC's condemnation of Serbia. If the perception was that no or few 
common interests were involved, then such cooperation could not have possibly 
dam aged  national interests, and was thus much easier to be pursued.
Another cooperative gesture involved the Greek government's decision to lift 
its veto and allow Turkey to receive som e ECU 3 0 0  million from the Community's 
renovated Mediterranean policies. Mitsotakis makes it absolutely clear that this 
concession to his country's main regional rival was a  gesture aimed at pleasing the
®®^ lnterview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997. The same argument was m ade (among others) by Mr 
Tzounis in an interview on 14 April 1997.
®®2see Skilakakis. 1995:147-53.
®®®lnterview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996. The former Foreign Minister did stress 
however that Greece should have good relations with Serbia, 'as with all countries' (ibid.). 
Papaconstantinou's argument is partly based on the fact that the Eastern Orthodox Churches have 
tended to be closely associated with the state to which they belong. See Karakasidou, 1997b: 82-3. 
They have subsequently failed to act as a force limiting antagonism and hostilities among the various 
Orthodox countries. Greece and Bulgaria provide a significant historical record and illustration of 
warring Orthodox nations. Such examples are underestimated by Samuel Huntington, who in his theory 
of the 'Clash of Civilisations' talks about a Slavic-Orthodox civilisation, to which Greece seems to 
belong. See Huntington 1993 and Huntington 1996:126-7 and 162-3.
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other EPC states and altering his country's reputation as an obstinate troublemaker.®^^ 
Crucially, Mitsotakis' government was fully aware that the Maastricht Treaty would have 
allowed these monetary contributions to be m ade on the basis of qualified majority 
voting, thus ensuring the by-pass of the Greek veto.®®^  Furthermore, G reece did not lift 
its veto on the far more important Fourth Financial Protocol between the Community 
and Turkey, which involved som e ECU 8 0 0  million.®®^
Some cooperative aspects can also be found in the letter that Mitsotakis-sent 
to Giigorov on 9 May 1992, as well as in Papaconstantinou's previously unpublished 3 
November letter to his EPC counterparts. Both dem anded a  resolution of the dispute on 
the basis of the 13 April decision on FYROM's name. This lessened significantly their 
cooperative nature, despite the fact that they offered financial assistance and security 
guarantees to FYROM.
The first letter was part of the Greek attempt to achieve the Lisbon Declaration, 
while the second aimed at maintaining it. These letters were influenced by EPC's 
shadow of the future;' and both tried to achieve their goal by incorporating 
cooperative measures that would help present G reece as a  reasonable country. This 
would have reduced reputational costs and helped ensure that future EPC decisions 
were favourable to Greece.®®  ^ The sam e goal was behind Greece's 12 November 1992 
initiative to persuade FYROM's neighbours to announce their respect for the new 
republic's borders.®®®
®®4nterview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997.
®®^Aclmittedly though, at that time the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was not necessarily a  
foregone conclusion. This is because in the 2 June 1992 referendum, the Danish people had rejected 
the TEU. They subsequently reversed their decision in the 18 May 1993 referendum See Duff et al, 1994: 
54-5 and 63.
®®6$ee Makedonia. 27 June 1992 15.
®®^Based on interviews with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997 and Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996.
®®®Based on interviews with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996, Mr 
Skilakakis on 15 April 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
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It can perhaps also be argued that Greece's proposal for a  dual name formula 
may b e viewed as being somewhat cooperative. According to several key Greek 
decision-makers, it constituted a  sincere effort aiming to resolve the dispute and 
demonstrate that G reece was not part of the problem in Y u g o s l a v ia ^ 3 9  j^ e  ultimate 
goal was to reduce reputational costs and alter a  situation of relative isolation within 
Epc.840 The cooperative importance of the dual name formula was however lessened 
substantially, since it insisted that FYROM's official UN name should not include the word 
Macedonia.
On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that institutionalism can claim 
to explain a  few Greek cooperative decisions during the April-December 1992 period. 
The institutionalist emphasis on reputational concerns and on the shadow of the future' 
proved to be of som e relevance. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that these 
cooperative actions were always of limited and reduced significance. They included 
offers of financial assistance to FYROM and Turkey, and the dual name formula that 
provided for all international purposes a vindication and implementation of the 13 April 
Council of the Political Leaders hard-line decision. Furthermore, although the 
participation in EPC's condemnation of Serbia continued, the country's alliance and 
strategic importance to G reece was judged by the new Foreign Minister as of limited 
value; and at any rate, these regime-influenced cooperative actions were dwarfed in 
degree and consequence by the Greek government's politics of non-cooperation and 
confrontation, that were determined by domestic politics.
The decision to impose an oil embargo against FYROM, as well as the story of 
the labels,' illustrate the threatening quality of Greek confrontation. Both measures 
aim ed at wrecking the econom y of a  new and virtually unarmed republic, which was 
facing the possibility of war spreading inside its borders. According to both Mitsotakis
^^^Based on interviews with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantinou on 10 April 1997, Mr
Skilakakis on 15 April 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
^"*°Based on interviews with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantinou on 10 April 1997, Mr
Skilakakis on 15 April 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
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and Papaconstantinou, ttiere was continuous pressure from Greece's EPC partners to 
end ttiese confrontational tactics, as well as various hints that the Lisbon Declaration 
might be overturned.®^’ The Greek government simply ignored pressures and  
reputational concerns and refused to cooperate; and on 24 November 1992 in a  letter 
to his EPC counterparts, Karamanlis even threatened the closing of his country's borders 
with FYROM. These confrontational actions were port of a strategy of pursuing a  
resolution of the dispute, while continuing to adhere to the decision of 13 April. As was 
analysed in the previous chapter, this fundamentally important to all developm ents 
decision was the result of domestic and partisan politics.
The significance of domestic politics was also manifested in the Decem ber 
Athens demonstration, which showed that popular passions and concerns about the 
dispute with FYROM remained important. At the level of domestic and partisan politics, 
PASOK's role should be emphasised. The largest opposition party was always extremely 
critical of even minor cooperative acts. Harsh condemnations were reserved for the 
decisions to allow minor Community monetary allocations to Turkey, or pursue a  
solution on the basis of the dual name formula.
Domestic and partisan considerations condem ned the prospects of a  solution 
based on the dual-name formula. Although Mitsotakis won the backing of New 
Democracy's Parliamentary Group on 21 October 1992, the three MPs that had voted  
with Samaras against the formula sufficed to eliminate the government's parliamentary 
majority. In an interview. Samaras proudly revealed that he subsequently sent several 
m essages to Mitsotakis, explaining the implications for the government's future if there 
was any agreement based on this formula.®'’^  Eventually, he even sent to Mitsotakis a
®4nterviews with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997 and Mr Papaconstantinou on 10 April 1997. These pressures 
were also reflected in various EPC decisions. See for example Bull. EC 10-1992 10.
®'’2|nterview with Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996.
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letter on 15 Marcti 1993, wliicti is publistied tiere in Its entirety for ttie first time, ominously 
stating that any Idea of a  compromise on the Skopje Issue must b e  a b a n d o n e d . '® ' * ^
Hence, the Greek government's room for a  diplomatic compromise, or pursuit 
of significant cooperative actions, becam e extremely limited. This was the result of the 
combination of the continual adherence to the 13 April Council of the Political Leaders 
decision, popular passions, harsh criticisms by PASOK, and a  slim Parliamentary majority 
constantly threatened by Samaras and his loyalists. This situation (produced exclusively 
by dom estic and partisan considerations), meant that the accep tan ce  of Gligorov's 
post-Llsbon compromise gestures or of the O'Neil Report and hence the name 
M acedonia (Skopje), would have guaranteed the government's downfall.®'*'* As 
Papaconstantinou stressed, he was essentially 'chain bound,' and thus even obliged to 
threaten to veto the decisions of the Edinburgh EPC meeting on 12 October 1992.®'*^
In conclusion. It becom es apparent that Institutionalism falls to elucidate to a  
satisfactory degree Greek foreign policy during the April-December 1992 period. It 
only provides an explanation for a series of rather minor, peripheral and limited 
cooperative decisions. As was the case for the period between 17 January and April 
1992, dom estic and partisan politics prove more Important than Institutions, In 
explaining the politics of Greek confrontation, non-cooperation and adherence to a  
hard-line stance on the name Issue. Given this serious failure, amendments to the 
theory's conditional nature will be discussed and proposed next. They will be followed 
by som e conclusions and lessons on the often problematic nature of Greek foreign 
policy-making.
®'*®See Appendix XIV. In an Interview on 24 December 1997, Samaras explained that he had in mind any 
name or formula not strictly adhering to the decision of the 13 April Council of the Political Leaders. 
® '^*lnterviews with Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1996, Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantinou on 
10 April 1997, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996, Mr Skilakakis on 15 April 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 
1997. It must also be stressed though, that O'Neil did not assist his initiative by managing to be  
perceived by Greek decision-makers as a biased diplomat.
®Anterviews with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997 and Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996 and 10 
April 1997.
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSIONS
It was on extraordinary period of testing, but statesmen do not tiave ttie rigtit to ask to serve only in 
simple times.
-Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1982
A. The Theory of Institutionalism Reconsidered.
Ttie application of institutionalist theory required that EPC be viewed as an 
international regime. Thus, in the thesis' concluding section, this argument and its 
ramifications will be evaluated, and a  more comprehensive account of the regime EPC 
presented. However, this discussion will be preceded by an examination of the 
theoretical consequences for institutionalism, emanating from the empirical research 
that was undertaken.
More specifically, in the previously analysed case-study, the desire that the war 
raging in parts of former Yugoslavia not spread to FYROM constituted the most 
fundamental common interest that also satisfied institutionalism's conditional nature. 
Given the presence and actions of EPC, and the existence of various other common 
interests during the entire period of June 1991 to Decem ber 1992 (as presented in 
Chapter 3), the practice of cooperation could have been  ex p ected  on the basis of 
institutionalism. However, it was precisely when shared interests b ecam e more 
significant, that the politics of limited cooperation and confrontation were practised.846 
Subsequently, certain serious problems arise for the theory, though it can not be
846por example, as was explained in previous chapters, these politics took p lace when the war in Bosnia 
endangered FYROM's territorial integrity and Greece's reputation was reaching an all-time low.
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discarded entirely since it largely explains Greece's foreign policy towards former 
Yugoslavia and FYROM between June 1991 and 17 January 1992.
As was shown in Chapter 4, during these months the Greek government 
practised politics of cooperation, moderation and flexibility, signing ail EPC decisions 
on Yugoslavia and never threatening to use its veto power. Furthermore, EPC's 
condem nation and penalisation of Serbia was endorsed, regardless of the special 
Greco-Serbian relationship. G reece also agreed to the establishment of the Hague 
P eace  Conference and the creation of the Arbitration Commission, while the 
formalisation of Yugoslavia's dissolution was a ccep ted  despite grave misgivings.
Concerning FYROM, Mitsotakis' government pursued a  rather gentle' and  
m oderate policy, arranging a meeting between representatives of Greece's and the 
new republic's Foreign Ministries aimed at resolving the dispute, and perhaps most 
importantly, maintaining a  moderate and flexible position on the nam e issue. Although 
a  nam e consisting solely of the word M acedonia was clearly rejected, the option of a  
compromise nam e related to FYROM's geographical location (i.e. Upper M acedonia or 
Northern Macedonia), was consistently maintained.
In Chapter 5, it was shown that this cooperative record is explained by 
institutionalism. During this period, dom estic politics (which are ignored by the theory), 
played  only a  limited role, while concepts used in institutionalism such as reciprocity 
and the shadow of the future' proved consequential. More precisely, Greek decision­
makers were conscious of the fact that EPC would be responsible for reaching most 
subsequent decisions on Yugoslavia and on their country's dispute with FYROM—a  
realisation that m ade reputational concerns particularly acute, and hence dictated the 
concerted efforts aimed at creating goodwill and achieving for G reece a  reputation of 
a  trustworthy and responsible partner. This is how the flexible policy pursued towards 
FYROM, the accep tan ce  of the AC and the Hague P eace Conference, and the 
participation in Serbia's condemnation are primarily explained.
Reputational concerns deriving from EPC's shadow of the future' were also  
connected  to the pursuit of som e specific and significant Greek foreign policy goals
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that included accession to the WEU, monetary compensation for dam ages to the 
nationai econom y due to the Yugoslav War, and the creation of the Cohesion Fund. 
These were goods' that could only b e  provided by EPC; and the attainment of most of 
them was actuaily possible during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations which were 
characterised by high issue density and by the increased possibility of side-  
payments.®^^ Together with acute reputationai concerns, they created considerable 
(and successful), incentives and pressure for the Greek government to pursue politics 
of moderation and cooperation.
Finally, the concept of reciprocity proved important in explaining the decision 
to recognise Croatia, given the implicit agreem ent that there would b e  no EPC 
recognition of FYROM as the Republic of Macedonia, despite the AC's opinion. 
Furthermore, reciprocity explains Samaras' agreem ent on 16 Decem ber 1991 to 
Germany's positions on former Yugoslavia, since during the sam e meeting he achieved  
the three conditions on the new republic's recognition. Certain reputational concerns 
connected  with the possible wrath of Germany against a  non-cooperating G reece, 
probably also influenced the stance of the young Foreign Minister.
The decline of the politics of Greek cooperation begins with the letter that 
Samaras sent to his EPC counterparts on 17 January 1992, arguing that the word 
M acedonia had to be excluded entirely from FYROM's name. At that point, this was 
the maximalist but negotiabie position of his government. As analysed in Chapter 6, it 
b ecam e non-negotiable after the conclusion of the 13 April 1992 Second Council of the 
Political Leaders, in which all of them (with the exception of the KKE's Générai 
Secretary), espoused the restrictive interpretation of the third EPC condition.
The immediate result of this agreem ent was the rejection of the Pinheiro 
Package,' according to which the new republic would have been  nam ed New 
Macedonia. A subsequent EPC effort carried out by the retired British Ambassador
®^^These conclusions contradict Smitti 1996, wtio lias argued that EPC is not used as a  forum for making 
side payments, threatening sanctions against each other, or linking issues into p ack age deals that 
occurred in other EC policy sectors or during [Inter Governmental Conferences]' (ibid: 9).
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Robin O'Neil under the auspices of his country's Presidency, met with the sam e fate. His 
report suggested that the nam e Macedonia (Skopje) be adopted  for FYROM, and was 
thus also contrary to the 13 April decision. During the EPC meeting in Edinburgh on 12 
D ecem ber 1992, Foreign Minister Michaiis Papaconstantinou not only rejected the O'Neil 
Report, but actually threatened to veto the meeting's conclusions on Yugoslavia (and 
possibly subsequent ones as well).
The politics of non-cooperation were not limited to the issue of FYROM's name. 
As Chapter 7 showed, a  more direct confrontation was pursued with the imposition of 
an oil em bargo against the new republic in August 1992. Furthermore, the story of the 
labels' and threats of sealing the borders, illustrate the degree and quality of Greek 
confrontation which aimed at seriously damaging FYROM's already fragile econom y.
During the period between mid-January and Decem ber 1992, there were also 
cooperative decisions, though their scop e and significance were rather limited. Perhaps 
most importantly, Mitsotakis' government agreed to EPC's recognition of Bosnia, despite  
near certainty that the results would be catastrophic. As was shown in Chapter 6, this 
decision is explained by the concept of reciprocity: the aim was to procrastinate and  
thus postpone an EPC decision on the name with which FYROM was to b e  recognised. 
This ep isode reveals the fact that Greek foreign policy towards former Yugoslavia was 
being almost completely dominated by the name dispute with FYROM.
A second action of this period that can be viewed as being cooperative  
involved the proposal of the dual name formula. Its cooperative nature was lessened  
however, since FYROM's international name had to be consistent with the 13 April 
restrictive interpretation of the third EPC condition. The making of this specific proposal 
seem s to have been connected to reputational concerns deriving from EPC's shadow  
of the future.' The sam e concerns also influenced the frequent offers to guarantee 
FYROM's security and provide financial assistance, given of course a  resolution of the 
dispute that was favourable to Greece; and they also a ffected  the continuous 
participation in EPC's condemnation and penalisation of Serbia.
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Despite such partial 'successes/ institutionalist theory fails to provide an 
adequate explanation for the major developments of this period. By ignoring dom estic 
politics, it is unable to incorporate into its analysis events such as the Thessaloniki 
demonstration of 14 February 1992, or the subsequent spontaneous and popular boycott 
of Dutch, Italian and Danish products. These events, clearly belonging to the realm of 
dom estic politics, demonstrated the nature and intensity of popular passions. 
Furthermore, at the sam e time Samaras began his high-stakes campaign to force his 
government to a ccep t a  non-negotiable restrictive position, while the Leader of the 
Opposition gradually began to raise the tone of his rhetoric and to publicly converge  
with the Foreign Minister's views.
The result of these dom estic and partisan developm ents was the consequential 
decision of 13 April and the elimination of Mitsotakis' ability to achieve a  diplomatic 
compromise. The Prime Minister had to confront the opposition tactics of both Samaras 
and Papandreou, feared the overthrow of his government that was based on a  slim 
Parliamentary majority, and faced  near-certain electoral defea t in such an eventuality. 
Subsequently, Mitsotakis was pressured into endorsing the politics of confrontation and 
limited cooperation. Thus, it can be concluded that after mid-January 1992, as regards 
the causation of Greek foreign policy, almost all significant decisions are explained  
and produced at the dom estic level. EPC's influence on the country's foreign policy 
towards former Yugoslavia (which at that point had been  reduced to the name dispute 
with FYROM), can at best be judged of limited consequence.
In addition to explaining cooperation on the basis of regime influence, it was 
demonstrated in Chapter 1 that institutionalism is connected  with liberal theories and is 
severely criticised for its approach towards the issue of relative gains. As regards the 
em asculated liberalism' that characterises the theory, it can b e  argued that it proved 
of limited consequence to events.®^® The potential for mutual econom ic gains 
(analysed in Chapter 3), within an environment of relative econom ic openness that
848Long, 1995: 496.
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could have been safeguarded by EPC, did not influence in any important degree the 
quality and fervour of the dispute. Nor did the series of offers of financial aid provide 
a  solution, aithough all these factors were taken into consideration by most decision- 
makers.849 Nevertheless, these conclusions are not necessarily at odds with 
institutionalist expectations and assumptions.
Institutionalism stands vindicated in its anaiysis of the conditional nature of 
relative gains considerations. No evidence was found that concerns about relative 
gains were part of Greece's decision-making process and strategic planning.®^® An 
explanation might lie in the fact that the difference in capabilities and resources 
betw een FYROM and G reece were so immense, that it m ade almost no sense to think 
of the dispute in terms of relative gains. Hence, institutionaiist theorists seem  to argue 
correctly that relative gains considerations are conditional upon circumstances and the 
desire to exploit them.® ’^
Thus, on the basis of the case-study presented in this thesis, it can be  
concluded that institutionalism explains events between June 1991 and January 1992, but 
mostly fails to do so for the 17 January-December 1992 period. As a  result of this 
conciusion the theory con not be abandoned, though som e amendments b ecom e  
necessary. More specifically, institutionalism would retain its predictive and expianatory 
relevance if its conditionai nature was expanded. In other words, it is being proposed  
that given the combination of certain conditions in a  specific issue-area, and despite  
the existence of common interests, the application of the theory be suspended.
^^^Based on almost all of the interviews that were conducted for this thesis. Examples of Greek offers of 
financial aid for FYROM include Samaras’ 17 January 1992 letter, the 16 October 1992 European Council 
meeting, certain aspects of the 'Pinheiro Package,' Mitsotakis' 9 May 1992 letter to Giigorov, 
Papaconstantinou's 3 November 1992 letter to EPC's Foreign Ministers and Karamanlis' 24 November 1992 
letter to his EPC counterparts.
®^ *^ This conclusion is based on all EPC documents examined, as well as on most of the Interviews that 
were conducted for this thesis.
^^^See Keohane, 1993b: 283.
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The expansion of its conditional nature would require situations satisfying 
specific characteristics. They would certainly have to involve highly politicised issues 
with particular emotional relevance for the people. Such issues are firmly entangled  
with popular perceptions concerning matters of national interest and identity. They 
tend to b e  the result of traumatic historical events that m ay involve long-standing and  
possibly even  ancient disputes. The Macedonian Question with its complexities, 
controversies and conflicts that were analysed in Chapter 3, provides a  paradigmatic 
illustration. It is thus not coincidental that in interviews conducted for this thesis in both 
G reece and FYROM, phrases like 'the name is our soul' or the nam e is our identity' 
where often uttered in a  forceful manner, and were clearly expressed in events such as 
the Thessaloniki demonstration. In instances when the peop le and many of their 
elec ted  representatives judge that cooperation might address and adversely a ffect  
important interests and deeply held beliefs, the desire and scop e for the pursuit of 
cooperative actions will inevitably diminish.
The chances for cooperation as predicted and explained by institutionalism are 
further reduced, if there also exists an unstable dom estic political situation in which it is 
difficult for the government to reach important decisions. Reliance on petty personal 
and partisan calculations, coupled with the overwhelming fear of upsetting vital 
supporters or losing power, can only produce politics of timidity, delay and undue 
caution. This was clearly the case  with Mitsotakis' government that was unable to back  
the Prime Minister's preferred foreign policy positions, being hostage to Samaras and  
Papandreou and facing a  hostile electorate in the event of any significant 
compromise.
Finally, the achievem ent of cooperation is certainly not assisted when the 
regime involved is rather weak and lacks the power and tools to greatly a ffect  
outcomes. As will be discussed in the following section, EPC provides an exam ple of 
such a  regime, especially given its rule of consensus and its inability to contest 
developm ents through military means.
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Hence, it can be concluded that highly politicised and emotional issues, 
important considerations of perceived nationai interest and identity, a  rather weak  
regime and an unstabie dom estic poiitical situation, are conditions whose combination 
ought to 'trigger' the suspension of institutionaiist anaiysis. These conditions were 
present in G reece and hence influenced the country's non-cooperative and  
confrontationai foreign poiicy record during the period between mid-January and  
D ecem ber 1992. Similar conditions might perhaps be present in other p iaces iike 
Paiestine, Bosnia or Kosovo. Solutions to those disputes must first and foremost be  
poiiticai acts confronting dom estic and partisan reaiities.^^  ^ Reiying exclusiveiy or 
primariiy on regimes, or even on important common interests, will probably prove 
counter-productive and ineffective.
B. EPC os on International Regime: An Evaluation.
The breakdown' of EPC into its principies, norms, rules, decision-m aking  
procedures, scop e  and organisationai form that was attem pted in Chapter 2, provided 
certain important advantages, not least because it permitted the appiication of 
institutionaiist theory. Thus in this section, there wiii be an evaluation and eiaboration of 
the regime EPC, on the basis of the thesis' case-study.
More specifically, as regards EPC's principles, that of solidarity requires 
particular attention, especially since the agreem ent on its significance am ong the
®^2jhis lesson seems to have been understood well by the US officials who helped broker the Interim 
Agreement between Greece and FYROM They paid particular attention to the then Greek Leader of 
the Opposition and president of New Democracy, Miltiades Evert. During a  visit to the US, unusual 
arrangements were m ade for him to m eet most of Washington's foreign policy establishment. For the 
impressive list of contacts and account of these meetings, see Tarkas, 1997: 492-5. Mr Evert was highly 
praised for his moderate style of opposition on the dispute with FYROM It remained unaltered after his 
US visit.
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major protagonists of tills ttiesls' case-study is striking. FYROM's President Kiro Giigorov 
explained in an interview:
Among ttie principles that underpin the working of the European Union is the 
principle of solidarity. For this reason you [the Greeks] had behind you the 
European Union, [you] had its backing. In the recent dispute with us, if it [can 
b e called] a  dispute, you had an a c e  in you hands.®^^
In a  similar manner, former Foreign Minister Papaconstantinou stressed that
[EPC's member states] were supportive and truly saw G reece as a  friend, 
even though they mostly believed that we were wrong [on the dispute with 
FYROM]; and no one can claim that it was their [national] interest that 
dictated such a  stance. No! It was precisely solidarity.®®^
Agreeing with Papaconstantinou, Samaras expressed with certainty his belief 
that solidarity was in operation in EPC affairs, and insisted that had it not been for this 
principle, it would have been impossible for G reece to hold out on the issue of FYROM's 
name.®®® Mitsotakis also m ade essentially identical comments.®®^
Despite these assurances about the significance of solidarity, a  ca se  can be  
argued against it, since various EPC decisions were apparently reached regardless of 
any considerations of this principle. Thus, the 16 Decem ber 1991 EPC decisions were 
primarily the result of the uncompromising German position and pressure. Regarding the 
conditions for FYROM's recognition, reciprocity and possibly certain reputational
853to vim n. 29 June 1997: G4. In this passage, Giigorov is referring to events prior to the February 1994 
imposition of the Greek embargo against FYROM. This is the only interview that Giigorov has given to a  
Greek journalist or scholar.
®^^lnterview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996.
®^^lnterview with Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996.
^^‘^ Interview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997. The importance of solidarity was also stressed in 
interviews with Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1996 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997. During a  conversation 
on 9 October 1996, the current Greek Minister for European Affairs Mr George Papandreou, emphasised 
to me his firm belief that the principle of solidarity was fully operational in EPC proceedings. 
Papandreou also provided several examples that were however unrelated to Greece’s dispute with 
FYROM
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concerns seem  to have been of crucial importance. The fact that an unanimous 
decision was eventually reached was more of an attempt to preserve a  fa ca d e  of 
solidarity, than its sincere expression.
As previously explained, reciprocity was involved in the 15 January 1 9 9 2  EPC 
decision to recognise Croatia and not FYROM, despite the contrary opinions of the 
Arbitration Commission. Also, as shown in Chapter 6 , the EPC decision of 6  April 1 9 9 2  to 
recognise Bosnia was signed by the Greek government not becau se  of a  desire to 
exercise solidarity, but rather as a  way of postponing an EPC decision on FYROM s 
recognition. Furthermore, solidarity was clearly not practised by Papaconstantinou when 
he threatened to veto the EPC declaration on Yugoslavia during the 12 Decem ber 1 9 9 2  
meeting in Edinburgh.
This decision-making record and its explanation is actually a c c ep te d  by the 
ad vocates of the importance of solidarity.®^? in d efen ce  of their position though, 
certain EPC-related developments and decisions must also b e  analysed. For exam ple, 
after assuming the office of Foreign Minister, Mitsotakis had several meetings with a  
number of EPC leaders and Foreign Ministers. Despite the frustration with what was 
considered to have been the mishandling (at best) of the dispute by the Greek 
government, a  tremendous amount of goodwill and support was expressed towards 
him. It is most likely that this support was at least partly the result of the principle of 
solidarity; and at any rate, Mitsotakis is convinced that this was the case.®^®
According to Greek decision-makers, solidarity was operational and  
consequential in the declaration of the 2 6 - 2 7  June 1 9 9 2  Lisbon European C o u n c i l .8 5 9  
Although not exactly the triumph that it was then portrayed to have been, it certainly 
strengthened Greece's position. Mitsotakis, Papaconstantinou and Samaras also m ake
^^^Interviews with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996, Mr 
Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
®^®lnterview with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997.
®^* l^nterviews with (among others), Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1996, Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr 
Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996, Mr Papathemelis on 11 January 1997, Mr Samaras on 24 
December 1996 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
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an additional and crucial argument in favour of ttie importance of solidarity.®^® They 
explain that although their arguments and positions on the dispute with FYROM were 
often (and unfairly) little understood or appreciated by the other EPC member states 
there nevertheless was a  constant and mostly genuine effort by their partners to reach 
a  solution that would have been accep tab le  to Greece.®^! Without the principle of 
solidarity, Greek concerns might have received a  summary, and perhaps not even a  
polite, dismissal. An argument could perhaps b e  advanced  to the extent that the 
country's positions were tolerated because it possessed veto power over all aspects of 
EPC's decision-making. However, this argument ignores the fact that EPC states could 
have unilaterally recognised FYROM as the Republic of Macedonia. That they did not 
proceed to such unilateral and veto-bypassing actions, is probably testimony to the 
potential importance of the principle of s o l i d a r i t y .®^ 2
Thus, it can b e  concluded that the principle of solidarity constitutes a  
noteworthy parameter in understanding EPC; and viewing EPC as an international 
regime allows this principle to becom e part of the analysis of EPC actions. Despite its 
potential importance though, it is not being argued that solidarity supersedes entirely 
considerations of national interest. Nor is there an implicit recommendation that EPC 
member states should rely exclusively or even primarily on this principle.
As regards EPC's principles of information and confidentiality, they were 
generally honoured. There were few leaks, and at least Greek decision-makers were 
mostly satisfied with the degree of information that they received.®^® Characteristically,
®‘^ ^Based on interviews witti Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1997 
and Mr Samaras on 24 December 1997.
‘^^ T^his point was also m ade during Interviews wltti (among others), Mr Mertzos on 18 December 1996, Mr
Papathemells on 11 January 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
‘^^ ^interviews with Mr Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997, Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1997 and Mr 
Samaras on 24 December 1997.
®^3|ntervlews with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996, Mr Samaras on 24 December 1996, Mr
Mitsotakis on 10 April 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
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they were largely aware of the contents of the O'Neil Report, prior to its official 
presentation and publication.
Attention must also b e  given to Papaconstantinou's comm ents on the 
importance of the principle of parallel membership between the Community and EPC. 
According to the former Foreign Minister, this principle allowed his country to have  
other wings' in its dispute with FYROM.®^  ^ This is why Papaconstantinou considers 
Karamanlis (who was almost solely responsible for Greece's accession  to the 
Community), together with Eleftherios Venizelos, as the greatest Greek statesmen of 
the Twentieth Century.
Turning to the examination of EPC's norm of diluted' intergovernmentalism, it 
must be stressed that intergovernmental bodies were responsible for almost all 
important discussions and decisions. For example, it was the Council of Foreign Ministers 
that decid ed  on 16 Decem ber 1991 the consequential guidelines for the recognition of 
the former Yugoslav republics, while the European Council concluded the negotiations 
and reached all final decisions that led to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, and  
also issued the crucial Lisbon Declaration. Furthermore, the role exercised by the 
Presidency must be noted, since the Pinheiro Package' and O'Neil's initiative were 
undertaken by the Portuguese and British Presidencies respectively.
As regards the non-governmental bodies, the European Parliament had a  
distinct but not particularly consequential role. For instance, it condem ned the popular 
boycott of Danish, Dutch and Italian products, and supported prior to the Lisbon 
European Council (admittedly somewhat vaguely), the importance that G reece  
bestowed upon FYROM's nome.^^s Although the EP received information and often gave  
advice, it was never judged as significant in interviews by major decision-makers.®^* 
Finally, the role of the Commission was limited to implementing decisions regarding the
®^" l^nterview with Mr Papaconstantinou on 23 December 1996.
®*^^See pages 139 and 174-5.
®^^Based on most of the interviews that were conducted for this thesis.
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granting of financial aid and the imposition of sanctionss^^ Hence, it can b e  concluded  
that on the basis of this case-study, the analysis of EPC's norm of diluted' 
intergovernmentalism that was presented in Chapter 2 holds true.
This thesis also verifies the crucial importance of EPC's rule of consensus. All 
decisions were taken unanimously, and although the threat of veto was rarely 
exercised, such an action was always possible and thus had to be taken into 
account.®*® This was certainly the ca se  in Edinburgh on 12 Decem ber 1992, when 
Papaconstantinou announced his intention to veto EPC's declaration on Yugoslavia and 
also threatened to act similarly in future occasions.
Concerning the implications of the rule of consensus, this thesis does not 
validate the argument that it leads to decisions representing EPC's lowest common  
denominator. EPC decisions actually tend to represent, or at least approach, something 
of a  median line am ong the views of its member states. The 16 Decem ber 1991 EPC 
m eeting provides an example. Adherence to the lowest common denominator would 
not have produced any decision; and although the final outcom e was close to 
representing the German point of view and perceived interests, G reece also m anaged  
to gain som e important 'concessions,' by securing the three conditions that applied to 
FYROM's recognition.
Another illustration involves the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. Reliance on the 
lowest com m on denominator would have either produced paralysis, or a  Treaty much 
less ambitious and comprehensive than the one that was actually signed. The ca se  of 
G reece is again illustrative. The country's government realised the difficulties for the 
national econom y and society that EMU would have produced. However, the gaining of 
WEU membership and agreem ent on the establishment of the Cohesion Fund (goals
®^^The Commission played briefly a  more active role during the Spring of 1994, when it brought a  case  
to the ECJ accusing Greece tor imposing an embargo against FYROM. The ECJ eventually ruled in 
favour of Greece, it must be stressed though, that during these developments EPC was of marginal 
importance to the dispute between Greece and FYROM, whereas the UN constituted the main 
battlefield. See Tarkas, 1997: 434-9 and 483-4.
®*^ ®0n this point, see  Genscher, 1997: 803.
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that were not necessarily shared by all other member states), allowed the endorsement 
of the TEU's final draft.
It could perhaps b e  argued that given the fact that G reece maintained its 
hard-line stance on FYROM's name, EPC's decision-making on the unresolved dispute 
was actually based on the lowest common denominator. Such a  conclusion though, 
would ignore the series of important Greek cooperative actions during the period of 
June 1991 and mid-January 1992. But even afterwards, exam ples of cooperation also 
exist, and include Greece's constant agreem ent with EPC's condemnation and 
penalisation of Serbia, the recognition of Bosnia and to a  more limited extent the dual 
nam e formula proposal. The existence and evaluation of this entire cooperative record 
firmly tilts the balance towards the median line approach.
Concerning EPC's decision-making procedures, this thesis confirms previous 
practices but also reveals certain innovations. EPC issued (as usual), numerous 
declarations on every aspect of the war in Yugoslavia. Conference diplom acy was also 
practised: exam pies are provided by the August 1992 London Conference on the war in 
Yugoslavia and the Hague P eace Conference chaired by Lord Carrington.
EPC though was not iimited to the practice of declaratory and conference  
diplomacy, since on several occasions various other toois were utilised. Thus, in 
attempting to reach a  solution, EPC member states sent observers to monitor c e a se ­
fires, imposed an arms and oil embargo on Yugoslavia, as well as additional sanctions 
to the non-cooperating (with EPC), Yugoslav republics.
An innovative decision-making procedure inciuded the establishment of the 
Arbitration Commission, which was comprised by a  panel of judges and was 
responsible for addressing legal issues arising from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The 
Presidency-backed initiatives that produced the O'Neil Report and the Pinheiro 
Package' aiso represent important decision-making procedures. Their goal was to find 
a  solution to the dispute between G reece and FYROM through a  series of diplomatic 
negotiations and meetings in the two countries. Hence, it can be concluded that EPC's
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decision-m aking procedures are plentiful and at times even  innovative. However, ttieir 
potential effectiveness is restricted by EPC's scope.
The scop e  of EPC proved broad enough to cover all foreign policy issues, as 
well as the econom ic and political aspects of security. Such issues included the 
recognition of new republics, and the imposition of sanctions during the war in 
Yugoslavia. EPC's scop e clearly did not include the military aspects of security, and  
subsequently the possibility of an effective military intervention in Yugoslavia was 
never entertained or threatened. The inability to pursue such actions significantly 
reduced EPC's strength and effectiveness; and together with the rule of consensus, they 
potentially preclude the pursuit of a  coherent and influential EPC foreign policy.
Thus, on the basis of this thesis it can be concluded that the regimes approach  
is sufficiently comprehensive to incorporate into its analysis all the EPC actions that 
were described in the previous chapters. Perhaps most importantly, viewing EPC as a  
regime and dissecting' it into its principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, 
organisational form and scope, can allow the application of institutionalism to a  series 
of events (given of course the satisfaction of the theory's conditional nature).®*^ ’ this 
study demonstrated, EPC did operate as a  regime and hence the institutionalist 
analysis proved of particular relevance, especially for the period of June 1991-January 
1992. However, despite the advantages of this approach, additional empirical research 
is required in order to reach more comprehensive and sophisticated theoretical 
conclusions.
C. Lessons on the C onduct of G reek Foreign Policy.
The analysis of Greece's actions towards former Yugoslavia that was contained  
in this thesis contributes to the understanding of this turbulent period, and furthermore
regards EPC's organisational form, it can b e concluded ttiat ttie Secretariat essentially played an 
unimportant role. It was never mentioned as tiaving even minor significance in any of ttie interviews 
that were conducted for this thesis. Specific comments on its insignificance were m ade during 
interviews with Mr Papaconstantinou on 10 January 1997 and Mr Tzounis on 14 April 1997.
229
leads to som e important lessons concerning ttie conduct of Greek foreign policy. More 
specifically, ttiis study exam ined in great detail ttie series of Greek cooperative  
decisions (often contrary to perceived national interests), that included full cooperation  
within EPC and a  flexible, m oderate stance towards FYROM during the period of June 
1991 to mid-January 1992. These actions are either com pletely ignored or not sufficiently 
em phasised (and certainly not analysed) in the existing literature.^^o
In explaining this cooperative record, an original analysis of the circumstances 
and ways under which EPC influenced Greek foreign policy was presented. It was 
shown how EPC created strong incentives eliciting cooperation through high issue 
density, issue linkages, side payments, and also by institutionalising reciprocity and 
ultimately making reputational concerns more acute. This institutionalist explanation 
demonstrating EPC's potential cooperative effects is com pletely lacking from all the 
standard works on Greek foreign policy-making, and even  from more specialised  
studies of the interplay between EPC and Greece.
It must also be stressed that during the period when politics of cooperation 
were practised, a  clear hierarchy of foreign policy goals existed and was effectively  
pursued. WEU membership was of the utmost importance becau se  it was linked to 
G reece's most significant security threat, emanating from Turkey.^^z The hope was to 
receive additional security guarantees and possibly assistance in the instance of a  
conflict with the neighbouring state. The econom ic aspects of foreign policy were also 
not neglected , since compensation for dam ages to the national econom y due to the
for exam ple Gow 1997; Kotos 1999; Lygeros, 1992; Papaconstantinou, 1994; Skilakakis, 1995; Tarkas, 
1995 and Veremis, 1995.
®^Vor exam ple see Couloumbis, 1994; loakimidis, 1999; Ttieodoropoulos, 1993; Theodoropoulos et al, 1994; 
Theodoropoulos, 1995; Tsakaloyannis, 1993; Tsakaloyannis, 1996; Valenakes, 1997; and Veremis and 
Couloumbis 1997. However, EPC's socialisation effect on Greek foreign policy lias been discussed and 
analysed. See Valenakes, 1993: 268.
®^ 2por an analysis of the serious disputes between Greece and Turkey, se e  Giokaris et al, 1994. The best 
Greek studies of Greco-Turkish relations are probably Alexandris et al, 1991 and Theodoropoulos, 1988. 
See also Kouris, 1997.
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war in Yugoslavia were sought. At the sam e time, there was a  determined effort aiming 
at the creation of the Cohesion Fund which would lead to substantial monetary 
allocations for Greece.
Certain conclusions must also b e  deduced  from the period when politics of
non-cooperation and confrontation were pursued. Perhaps of the greatest significance
was that a  price was ultimately paid by Greek diplomacy. Thus, as was previously
explained, the importance of the cherished goal of WEU membership was substantially
diminished as a  result of the 19 June 1992 Petersberg Declaration which effectively
suspended the WEUs Article V in case  of a  conflict between G reece and Turkey.^^s
Furthermore, there can be no doubt that Greece's reputation within EPC lay in
tatters, a  developm ent that probably contributed to the fact that there was no final
and favourable for G reece resolution of its dispute with FYROM within EPC. The failure to
reach a  satisfying EPC agreem ent may constitute the ultimate price that G reece paid
for its confrontational stance.
On the basis of the account of the Greek politics of confrontation, ev id en ce is
also found in support of the view according to which:
Greek foreign policy can be properly be accounted for...by seriously taking 
into consideration three factors: public opinion, the role of personality and 
the interplay between personalities and society/public opinion.^^^
Thus, this study demonstrated that popular opinion and actions often proved of crucial 
significance. Consequential events such as the Thessaloniki and Athens demonstrations, 
the boycott of Italian, Danish and Italian products, as well as the consistent popular 
approval of a  hard-line non-negotiable position on the name issue, can firmly b e  
ascribed to this category.
The mass demonstrations and popular feelings and the ways in which they 
influence Greek foreign policy, deserve som e additional attention. First of all, it must be
873see p age 135.
^^Aoakimidis, 1999: 142 However, given the institutionalist explanation of the politics of Greek 
cooperation, this thesis does not argue that these are the exclusive causes of Greek foreign policy.
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stressed that such occurrences hove not been rare or unusual in modern Greek history. 
For exam ple, in a  major new study Yannis Yanoulopoulos has shown that passions and  
mass demonstrations a ffected  negatively Greek foreign policy between the years 1897  
and 1922.875 This period was especially traumatic and tumultuous since it included the 
First World War, the two Balkan Wars, the Asia Minor Campaign and the subsequent 
'1 9 2 2  Catastrophe.'876 in the coming decades, the various developm ents and  
vicissitudes of the Cyprus Issue were invariably linked to demonstrations, always 
expressing feelings of nationalism, and usually limiting the necessary flexibility that is 
required for the effective pursuit of diplomacy.877
Despite the existence of this historical record, any lessons from the interplay 
betw een popular passions and the usually not positive results for Greek foreign policy, 
seem  to had been forgotten by the time that the latest phase of the Macedonian 
Question erupted. There are several reasons for this development. First, since 1967 
almost no major demonstrations linked exclusively to foreign policy issues had taken 
place in Greece. It thus perhaps appeared plausible that such practices belonged  
firmly to the past. Furthermore, the Cold War had in effect frozen' history (and borders) 
in the Balkan Peninsula. The Macedonian Question in particular seem ed to many of 
mere historical relevance, unable to mobilise passions or elicit strong opinions.878 
Finally, any attempt to confront or criticise the expression of popular passions linked to 
national issues or issues of identity was always bound to b e  a  delicate undertaking, 
promising various political and personal costs. Perhaps this also explains the almost 
extraordinary Greek scholarly neglect to study adequately such episodes.
®^^Yanoulopoulos, 1999.
best study of Greece's entanglement in Asia Minor Is probably Llewellyn-Smltfi. 1998. For a  brief 
account of ttie Balkan Wars and ttie First World war as ttiey relate to ttie Macedonian Question, see  
Ctiapter 3.
®77see Stefanldis, 1999.
®^®Durlng an Interview on 5 January 1997, Mr Kofos explained ttiat tils colleagues In ttie Greek Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs joked (and In a sense taunted tilm) by often reminding tilm that by dealing with the 
Macedonian Issue, his professional duties were ultimately of a  purely historical nature.
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This thesis however offers som e lessons concerning the role of popular passions 
and actions In the making of Greek foreign policy. Perhaps most Importantly, and  
given the history of the modern Greek state, a  major conclusion Is that an outburst of 
popular feelings Is always possible, even If they have remained dormant for decades.
Secondly, what m akes popular passions especially potent and hence Influential 
for Greek foreign policy. Is that they are related to historical traumas. Important 
national Issues and Issues of Identity. Furthermore, popular opinions are expressed or 
encouraged by the Church, at least som e major politician and political parties, the 
mass m edia and several Intellectuals.^^^ They thus receive respectability, legitimacy 
and ultimately b ecom e more Important.
As regards the Thessaloniki demonstration that has been  analysed for the first 
time to such an extent In this thesis. It must be pointed out that It was a  moving event, 
os well as a  huge organisational success that proved to the world that the Greek 
people were concerned about FYROM's name and pollcles.88o Flowever, In terms of 
foreign policy-making, Mitsotakis should have followed the decision to hold the 
demonstration and Its Implementation more closely. O nce the decision was taken, 
there were three possible outcomes, all potentially consequential. The demonstration's 
failure would have undermined the government's negotiating power, since It would 
have shown the lack of Interest of the people on this Issue. On the other hand, a  
successful demonstration without, or at least with a  vaguely worded resolution, would 
have had In a  sense defea ted  and ridiculed Its purpose, rendering all organisational 
efforts essentially aimless. The final possibility, a  successful demonstration with a  
resolution advocating a  specific policy stance Is what actually took place; and It 
produced substantial pressure that eventually helped the adoption of a  non- 
negotlable restrictive position on FYROM's name.
Hence a  further lesson can be deduced. Unless there Is absolute certainty about 
specific goals and strategy, the holding of mass demonstrations must b e  viewed with
this point, see  especiaiiy Eleftherotypin. 10 September 1999:15 
®®°Compare for exam ple the analyses of the Thessaloniki demonstration in Kofos. 1999 and Veremis, 1995.
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caution. Encouraging or orchestrating the expression of popular passions can cause
events to get out of controi. Self-entrapment, the simplification of foreign policy
dilemmas and the démonisation of opponents may then b ecom e real dangers. Hence
efforts by a  country's political leadership must b e  m ade in order to avoid what
Yanoulopoulos has called 'our noble [self] biindness.'®®i
Turning to the interplay between political personalities and public opinion, as
was explained previously in detail it was also highly consequential. For exam ple, it
ultimately determined the decision of the 13 April 1992 Second Council of the Political
Leaders, as well as the Greek government's subsequent inability and unwillingness to
alter the official position on the nam e issue.
At this point, it should be stressed that a  foreign policy that is even  partly
b ased  on popular passions, strong personalities and their interplay will almost certainly
b e  emotional, erratic and prone to crises.882
An additional danger looms since (as Henry Kissinger has cautioned):
The public does not in the long run respect leaders who mirror its own 
insecurities or se e  only the symptoms of crises rather than the long-term  
trends. The role of the leader is to assume the burden of acting on the basis 
of a  confidence in his own assessment of the direction of events and how 
they can be influenced. Failing that, crises will multiply, which is another way 
of saying that a  leader has lost controi over events.®®^
As regards the cast of characters of this study, it can b e  argued that it 
featured som e impressive personalities, whose actions often proved fateful. Sophocles 
has written that the exercise of power reveals a  man's soul' and equipped with this 
penetrating observation, certain comments will b e  m ade about the major protagonists 
For the President of the Hellenic Republic, it can b e  concluded that he was 
im peccable in carrying out his duties.®®^  Hailing from M acedonia and having lived
®®^ This is the apt title of Yanoulopoulos' study.
®S2see Ibid: 154-9.
GB^KIssinger, 1994:136.
®®^ For another positive Interpretation of Karamanlis' statesmanship during this period, see  the analysis 
written by Mr Moliviatis and published in Svolopoulos, 1997:636-8, Vol. 12
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through most of this century's momentous events in the region, Koromaniis had an 
acu te personai probiem' when it cam e to Greece's dispute with FYR0M.885 y^e 
President attem pted to utiiise his internationai reputation and prestige by sending a  
series of letters to the leaders of various states, though it was rather unfortunate for 
G reece that health problems prevented him from pursuing personai diplom acy by 
visiting other countries. As his close aide Mr Moliviatis com m ented, there is a  difference 
betw een letters and personai contacts.'®®^
Despite his political affiliation, Karamanlis never pursued partisan goals. For 
exam ple, he allowed and chaired meetings of the Council of the Political Leaders only 
after having secured their unanimous agreem ent, and not because of pressure 
emanating from various other sources. Greece's President took his constitutional role 
and powers seriously, and by successfully managing to stay ab ove the partisan fray, 
ensured that his reputation, prestige and historical legacy  remain unscathed from his 
country's entanglement with FYROM. However, the President's powers ore severely  
restricted by the constitution, and hence although Karamanlis' influence on events was 
overall positive, its impact was relatively iimited.
Unlike Karamanlis, Papandreou was in charge of a  major party, and had to 
pursue a  more partisan role. He believed that Mitsotakis' policies towards former 
Yugoslavia and FYROM were at best amateurish, and accused  the government for 
locking a  clear, coherent and long-term vision of Greece's post-Coid War foreign 
policy goals in the region.®®^  At the sam e time, the popular concerns and passions over 
FYROM's nam e were undoubtedly appreciated by the socialist leader. Having always 
placed  importance on FYROM's propaganda and irredentist claims, Papandreou also
®^^ Ibld.: 638. It should be noted that Karamanlis was born in 1907, a  subject of the Ottoman Empire. 
®^ '^ lbid.
^®^These conclusions are partly based on interviews with Mr Papathemelis on 11 January 1997 and Mr 
Tsohatzopoulos on 3 August 1997.
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realised the domestic political importance and possible long-term regional implications 
of FYROM's name.®®®
Given Papandreou's analysis, an endorsement of Mitsotakis' actions would have  
been  tantamount to accepting a  dangerous incom petence, while to Ignore popular 
passions would have probably invited political annihilation, and would have certainly 
gon e against his populist tendencies.^^^ Hence, after February 1992 PASOK's leader 
com pletely abandoned his stance of relative restraint, flexibility and moderation, 
adopted  a  hard-line position on the name issue, and always criticised harshiy even  
minor Greek cooperative actions, occasionally utilising dem agogic language and  
rhetoric. Although it seem s that he believed in the positions that he was advocating, 
the style and manner of his opposition were not always constructive and helpful to his 
country's foreign policy-making.®’^
Contrary to Papandreou, Papaconstantinou aim ed at shifting the nature and  
tone of his country's foreign policy. A pragmatist, and one of the few Greek politicians 
with a  d eep  knowiedge of the Macedonian Question, he immediately abandoned the 
emphasis on ancient history. Lacking any further political ambition, his goal was to 
reach a  solution within EPC.®’’ Domestic and partisan politics precluded any such
^^^Interview with Mr Tsohatzopoulos on 3 August 1997.
889paponcireou’s populism was clearly demonstrated during the 1980's, a  d eca d e during which he held 
office and dominated politically. For an incisive analysis of what has aptly been called the 'populist 
decade,' see Clogg, 1993.
®*^^Casting some doubt on Papandreou's sincere ad vocacy of a  hard-line position, is his meeting with US 
official Jim Williams on 23 March 1993. If William's official account is accurate (which is not at all certain 
since it was based on memory and includes at least one inconsistency), then Papandreou had explained 
to him that a quick solution to the problem—even If It will not be a  positive one for G reece—would be  
better from leaving matters to continue as they currently are' (Tarkas, 1997:118). Despite this comment, 
PASOK's leader remained publicly committed to an uncompromising restrictive position on FYROM's 
name. See for exam ple his comments in the Greek Parliament on 27 March 1993 that can be found In 
ibid: 143-7.
®^ ^The fact that Papaconstantinou did not entertain any further political goals is also accep ted  by those 
who generally disagree with his views. See Tarkas, 1997: 57. Samaras m ade a similar argument about 
Papaconstantinou during an interview on 24 December 1996.
236
developm ent, and Papaconstantinou was even reduced to ttireatening to veto an EPC 
decision on Yugoslavia. His political gifts and experience were better demonstrated 
during FYROM's subsequent attempt for UN recognition, it was an ep ic battle, and  
contrary to expectations G reece m anaged to avoid defeat.^^z
Mitsotakis wtio is one of ttie most experienced and controversial Greek 
politicians, was ultimately responsible for ttie foreign policy pursued by tiis country 
towards former Yugoslavia and FYROM.®’  ^ Being friends witti many of ttie world's most 
important statesmen, tie b ecam e acutely aware of wtiat tie considered to b e  ttie 
ruining of Greece's international reputation; and tie also agonised about ttie relative 
neglect of vital national interests.
Ttie Prime Minister's actions extiibit pragmatism, as well as a  stiarp grasp of ttie 
problems at the international level. Above all, Mitsotakis desired an honourable and  
lasting solution to the dispute with FYROM, and most of his efforts aim ed at achieving 
this goal. Characteristically, he used the outcom e of his finest hour at Lisbon on 26-27 
June 1992, in order to secure a  compromise on the basis of the dual nam e formula.
Mitsotakis found himself in a  truly unenviable position. Having a  slim 
Parliamentary majority that was constantly threatened by Samaras and his allies, it was 
almost impossible for him to reach a  compromise and avoid the devastating political 
consequences associated with such a  decision. Furthermore, it was possible that any 
compromise would have been overturned by the subsequent government.
Whereas Mitsotakis pursued a  solution. Samaras pursued victory. The young 
Foreign Minister probably felt betrayed and politically exposed , when he realised that 
the position on FYROM's nam e that was included in the 17 January 1992 letter to his EPC 
counterparts on FYROM's name was negotiable. For Samaras, adherence to this position
Papaconstantinou, 1994: 243-416.
®93on Mitsotakis' long and controversial career, see  Diamantopouios, n.d and Dimitrakos, n.d. See also 
Loule-Theodoraki, 1996. Ttiis is a  favourable biograptiy as well, ttiat is primarily based on extensive 
interviews witti Mitsotakis, and is often revealing of Ills ttiougtits and soul in a way that was possibly 
unintentional.
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was not merely a  matter of political expediency—in his mind, it probably b eca m e a  
matter of conscience. The realisation of this developm ent is essential in order to 
comprehend his subsequent actions. Thus, in the pursuit of a  non-negotiable restrictive 
position on FYROM's name. Samaras was willing to encourage or a ccep t manifestations 
of popular emotions, pressure and attack his government, ignore Greece's reputational 
costs, propose tough measures against FYROM, and even  dam age his political career. 
His approach to politics can only be characterised as passionate.
There is an indication after conducting the interviews for this thesis that all the 
major decision-makers had good intentions. However, these do not suffice for the 
exercise of successful statesmanship. To quote a  German proverb: The road to Hell is 
paved  with good  intentions.'^’  ^ At the very least, a  hierarchy of threats, dangers and  
priorities must be established. Such an evaluation must b e  m ade on the basis of 
pragmatism, information and rational thinking, not emotions. Issues that rank low must 
not necessarily be completely ignored or abandoned. Nevertheless, an attempt must 
be m ade to allocate limited resources on the basis of a  country's true needs. Prestige, 
reputation and funds are too scarce and precious to b e  squandered away.
In the dispute with FYROM, and especially after January 1992, Greek decision­
makers should have kept under consideration that at least in the short-term, the new  
republic could not have posed a  military threat. The fact that Turkey constituted the 
greatest security threat to their country, should have dictated a  policy bestowing 
importance at least equal to FYROM, to the neighbouring large and powerful republic. 
Statesmen must ultimately pursue and safeguard their nation's most important and  
long-term interests.
These observations do not intend to suggest that G reece did not have valid 
grievances against FYROM; nor is there an implicit attempt to devalue the importance 
of the issue of the republic's name. Nevertheless, the combination of the desire to
is taken from Teiloglou, 1996. His study of German foreign policy towards the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia is tellingly subtitled 'Years of Good Intentions.' It is an excellent study, and it deserves an 
English translation so that it can reach a wider audience.
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maintain FYROM's territoriai integrity, ttie young republic's (at least stiort-term) military 
im potence, and ttie more serious ttireat emanating from Turkey, suggest that G reece  
couid have perhaps pursued a  more confident strategy towards FYROM. Compromise 
on the nam e issue should not have been a  prerequisite under any circumstances. The 
strengthening of bilateral econom ic relations though, would have probably constituted 
an integral part of such a  strategy, especially given Greece's comparative advantages  
and larger econom y.
A more successful strategy towards FYROM would have also avoided  the 
dangers of largely conflating foreign policy with domestic and partisan politics. Such a  
conflation has often produced negative and occasionally catastrophic outcom es in 
modern Greek history.®’  ^ In a  democratic society, foreign policy must b e  conducted in 
a  way that addresses the concerns, interests and perhaps even passions of a  country's 
citizens. But foreign policy must not be conducted directly by the citizens. This is why 
they e lect governments, fund Ministries of Foreign Affairs and train diplomats. Domestic, 
partisan and personai political ambitions and considerations must not constrain, limit or 
hijack the flexibility that is essential to the pursuit of a  successful foreign policy. 
Admittedly, this is a  tough and almost impossible balancing act; and it requires 
statesmanship of the highest order.
For a  variety of reasons, the Greek government and political parties failed to 
pursue statesmanship of the highest order during the period covered in this thesis. The 
result was defeat—at least for the time being. In the Balkans there is no burial of dead  
ideas.'®96 The Macedonian Question will probably resurface in the future, perhaps with 
new complications and parameters, possibly with a  different intensity, certainly with 
new protagonists. Bismarck once remarked that fools learn from experience; wise men 
learn from the experience of others.' Hence, future statesmen must study the 
experience and mistakes of their predecessors, in order to avoid repeating them. The 
complexity and limits of decision-making at the European level, as well as the perils of
Lagakos, 1996.
896BraiIsford. 1906:1
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dom estic and partisan poiitics must be fuiiy compretiended and contempiated. it is ttie 
auttior s hope that this study wiil aiso contribute towards such a  painful but necessary  
exercise.
240
TABLES
241
TABLE I
The Prisoner s Dilemma. 
Source: Axelrod, 1984: 8.
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Colum n Player
C ooperate Defect
Row C ooperate R=3, R=3 3=0, T=5
Reward for 3ucker’s
mutual payoff, and
cooperation temptation to
defect
P layer Defect 1=5, 3=0 P=l P=1
Temptation to Punistvnent for
d efect and mutual
sucker’s defection
payoff
Note The payoffs to the row chooser are listed first.
R stands for reward for mutual cooperation  and Is worth 3 points. 
I  stands for the temptation to defect, and Is worth 5 points.
S stands for sucker’s payoff, and Is worth O points 
P stands for punishment for mutual defection  and Is worth I point
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TABLE il
FYROM's imports and exports with Greece.
Source: FYROM's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate for Economic Relations,
29 September 1997.
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in m ii.S
Greece 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
impon in Grrece 27.0 18.3 41.1 37.5 35.9 49.7 62.1 
% o f totaJ imporr 4.9 3.7 6.8 5.7 5.5 4.5 5.4
49.6 12.7 14. 1 102.4
4 ^  L2 I J  &9
export from Gr. 37.2 21.1 17.7 27.6 36.6 97.6 85.4
% o f local export 4.3 2.8 2.3 3.2 3.9 6.4 6.2
52.2 23.5 29.2 77.4 
4^  ^ L6 1.7 4US
total trade 64.2 39.4 58.8 65.1 72.5 143.3 147.5
% in total trade 4.6 3.2 4.3 4.3 4.6 5.6 5.8
101.8 36.2 43,3 1 79.8 
4.5 1.4 1.5 6.5
trade balance 10.2 -2.8 23.4 9.9 -0.7 -49.9 -23.3 ■2.6 -10.8 -15.1 25.0
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MAPI
Post-War Yugoslavia (1945-1991). 
Source: Citizen's Movement, 1993: 2.
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Territorial settlements at ttie Treaties of San Steptiano (1878) and Berlin (1878). 
Source: Citizen's M ovement 1993: 9.
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MAP III
Territorial agreem ents of ttie Marcti 1912 alliance betw een Bulgaria and Serbia 
Source: Carnegie Foundation, 1914/1993: 45.
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MAP IV
Territorial settlements of ttie May 1913 London Conference and the August 1913
Treaty of Bucharest.
Source: Carnegie Foundation, 1914/1993: 70.
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MAP V
Bulgaria's conquests during the First World War.
Source: Citizen's Movement, 1993:10.
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MAP VI
The Balkan States after the First World War and the Treaty of Neuilly. 
Source: Jelavich, 1983:123.
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MAP VII
Bulgarian conquests during ttie Second Worid War.
Source: Citizen s Movement, 1992:11.
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W O R LD  W A R  II
GREEK AND YUGOSLAV PROVINCES UNDER BULGARIAN OCCUPATION (1941-1944)
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APPENDIX I
Examples of propaganda practiced by FYROM against Greece.
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la  irredentist Map Stiowlng 'Greater M acedonia' 
Source: Hellenic Foundation For Defense and Foreign Policy, 1993:15.
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lb. Examples of propaganda Implying territorial ttireats against Greece. 
Source: Hellenic Foundation For Defense and Foreign Poiicy, 1993; 13.
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V^MkO rl(-f (iirni p o s te r  (Novernl)cr lOiio) port rays  all M a ce i lo i i ia n  r e ^ o n s  a s  a n n i l l e d  sra io .  
The p o s t e r  is  adarnecl  u'iili the  A iif  ieiK M a c e d o n i a n  d y n a s t y  e t i ib le in  (W rgir ia  S o n ) .  'I'cxt o n  
m a p  reads:  "Its la te  is  in y o u r  h an d s"  (i.e. th e  la te  ol a il t t ite il  M a c e d o n ia  is  in th e  h a n d s  o f  
th e  \ 'o ters() l  th e  l à it'taer V ticos ln \ '  R eptth l ie  o l 'M a c e d o n ia ) .
At tad in ien t  5
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f 'a i  S t ick er  o n  .s;il< iii S k op je  kiosk.s , d e p ic t i n g  all th re e  M a c e d o n i a n  ret^ions a s  a n n i l l e d  
M a c e d o t i ia n  s ta le .
le. Propaganda map published in a  FYROM schooibook. 
Source: Kofos, 1994œ 28.
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Fis. 13
“ Foreign propaganda in M acedonia"
The picture speaks for itself. The students o f  this class are taught that Greece.  
Bulgaria and Serbia had predator)' intentions towards M acedonia. It is nowhere  
mentioned that these states were struggling to free their subjugated brothers in 
Macedonia and the other Christian provinces o f  the Ottoman Empire.
{G rade 9 History', general strsam.S\!.op}C  1992. page 109).
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Id. Calendar depicting the statue of Alexander the Great In Thessaloniki. The 
words: 'Alexander, Macedonian, Thessaloniki' (in the Cyrillic alphabet) are
falsely written on its base.
Source: Papaconstantinou, 1992 118.
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APPENDIX il
Letter ttiat Greece's Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras sent to tiis EPC 
counterparts on 17 January 1992. Ttie official Englisfi translation of ttiis letter is
publistied here for the first time.
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t h e  m i n i s t e r  f o r  F O R E I G N  A F F A I R S
Athens ,  17 January 1992
Dear Co l l e a g u e ,
You w i l l  r e c a l l  t h a t  on F r i d a y ,  10 Januar y ,  we. d e c i d e d  t h a t  I w i l l  
p r e s e n t  t o  you in our ne x t  me e t i n g  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  my Government  c o nc e r n i ng  
the p e t i t i o n  f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t he  Republ i c  o f  Skopje .  And, i nde e d ,  I am"com­
mi t t e d  t o  do s o .  However, I s t r o n g l y  f e e l  I shoul d  pr ov i de  you a t  t h i s  moment 
wi th a w r i t t e n  p r e l i m i n a r y  a n a l y s i s ,  p r i o r  t o  t h a t  m e e t i n g . T h i s  has become'  
i mpe r a t i v e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in the  l i g h t  o f  t he  a d v i c e  o f  t h e  A r b i t r a t i o n  Commis­
s i on  and Bulgar i ans  premature and unwarranted r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t he  Republ ic  o f  
Skopje .
Let  me immediately i n d i c a t e  t h a t  I f i n d  i t  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  comprehend the  
f a c t  t h a t ,  as  t he  A r b i t r a t i o n  Commiss ionns  r e p o r t  i t s e l f  i n d i c a t e s ,  a l l  o f  
i t s  c o n c l u s i o n s  on "Macedonia" were drawn from da t a  o r  e v i d e n c e  prov i ded  
s o l e l y  by Skopje .  ( De c l a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  Skopje  Assembly,  l e t t e r  o f  S k o p j e ' s  Min­
i s t e r  o f  Fore ign A f f a i r s ,  S k o p j e ' s  r e s p ons e  to  t h e  Commiss ion' s  q u e s t i o n n a i r e ,  
r e s u l t s  o f  t he  Skopje referendum,  t he  Skopje  C o n s t i t u t i o n , e t c ) . Documentation 
and o b j e c t i o n s  ag a i n s t  t he  r e c o g n i t i o n  r a i s e d  by e t h n i c  Al ban i ans ,  Serbs and 
Montenegrins ,  c o n s t i t u t i n g  30 - 35  per  c e n t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  po pu l a t i o n  o f  that  
Republ i c ,  were ignored.  S i m i l a r l y ,  Greek r e s e r v a t i o n s  based on t he  16 Decem­
ber 1991,  E.C.  M i n i s t e r i a l  d e c i s i o n ,  were  not  t ake n  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  
Futhermore,  t h e  A r b i t r a t i o n  Commission went  on t o  p a s s  j udgement  on a major  
p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e  - t h e  denominat ion o f  t he  Re publ i c -  w i t h o ut  s u b s t a n t i a t i n g  i t s  
view,  e i t h e r  on l e g a l  or on p o l i t i c a l  grounds .
The announcement o f  t h i s  a d v i c e ,  a l t h o u g h  in no way b i nd i ng  t o  us 
Twelve ,  had an immediate n e g a t i v e  i mpact  on t h e  r e g i o n .  B u l g a r i a  s ought  to 
c a p i t a l i z e  on t he  opport uni t y  o f f e r e d .  D e s p i t e  a s s ur anc e s  g i v e n  d i r e c t l y  t o  me 
by t he  Bulgar i an Foreign M i n i s t e r  j u s t  a day p r i o r  t o  t h e  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  the 
Badinter  r e p o r t ,  So f i a  rushed t o  r e c o g n i z e  Skopje .  I t  even rushed t o  recognizf  
Bosni a- Herzegovi na ,  something t h a t  was r e j e c t e d  even by t h e  A r b i t r a t i o n  Com­
mi ss i on  because  o f  i nherent  dangers  in premature a c t i o n .
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I must make c l e a r  t o  a l l  c o l l e a g u e s  t h a t  an Immedi ate  t h r e a t  f o r  thé  
spreading o f  t h e  c o n f l i c t  t o  the  southern Balkan r e g i o n  has  a l r e a d y  e me r g e d / "  
Old t e r r i t o r i a l  i s s u e s  and s e n s i t i v i t i e s  seem t o  r e v i v e . - A  c h a l l e n g e  t o  t he  
e xt erna l  f r o n t i e r s  ofj^the e n t i r e  re g i on  i s  a l r e a d y  p r e s e n t .  There  e x i s t ,  un->;' 
f o r t u n a t e l y ,  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s  in  t h e  n e i g hbo ur ho o d  o f  t h e  Skopj e  Republ i c  
which dream t o d a y  f o r  new t e r r i t o r i e s  f o r  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  m o t h e r l a n d s .  In . 
t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  i f  B u l g a r i a ,  by i t s  i n i t i a t i v e  t o  e x t e nd  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  hopes t o  . 
l u r e  Skopje  i n t o  a s p e c i a l  b i l a t e r a l  ar r ange me nt ,  t h e  Y u g o s l a v  c r i s i s  coul d  
deve lop i n t o  an a l l  Balkan c o n f r o n t a t i o n .  O b v i o u s l y ,  t h e  same ho l ds  t rue  f o r  ! 
o t he r  c o u n t r i e s  g e o g r a p h i c a l l y  c l o s e  to  t he  r e g i o n .  '
The s t a t e me n t  o f  t he  P r e s i d e n c y ,  on 15 January 1992,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  which 
t he  Community and i t s  m e m b e r - s t a t e s  have d e c i d e d  t o  r e c o g n i z e  o n l y  S l o v e n i a  
and Croat i a ,  s i n c e  "t here  are  s t i l l  important  m a t t e r s  t o  be addressed" f o r  the  
c a s e s  o f  B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a  and S ko p j e ,  i s  c e r t a i n l y  a b a l a n c i n g  f o r c e  on 
which we must b u i l d  t he  s o l u t i o n  o f  the  e x i s t i n g  problems .J
In a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  our  February me e t i n g  and i n o r d e r  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  a 
b e t t e r  unders t andi ng  o f  t h e  complex p o l i t i c a l  Macedonian i s s u e ,  I would l i k e  
to  f i r s t  i n v i t e  your  a t t e n t i o n  to  t he  f o l l o w i n g  o b s e r v a t i o n s  :
1, The Macedonian i s s u e  t oday  can on l y  be unders t ood i f  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  i t s  
development i s  kept  c l e a r l y  in mind.
The Macedonian i s s u e  was r e a c t i v a t e d  when Marshal  T i t o  s e t  up in  1945 
t he  " P e o p l e ' s  R e p u b l i c  o f  Macedonia".  I t  was.  a p o l i t i c a l  move f i t t i n g  the  
Yugos l av  l e a d e r ' s  h e g e m o n i s t i c  p l a n s  a t  t h e  t i m e .  The Sk o p j e  f e d e r a t i v e  
r e p u b l i c  was seen as t he  nuc l e us  - o r  Piedmont-  f o r  t h e  a nn e x a t i o n  o f . t h e  ad­
j o i n i n g  Macedonian p r o v i n c e s  o f  Greece  and B u l g a r i a .  I am s u r e  you are  we l l  
aware t h a t  T i t o ,  w i t h  S t a l i n ' s  h e l p ,  s u c c e e d e d  in  f o r c i n g  t h e  Bul gar i an  
Government o f  G . Di mi tr o v  t o  a g r e e  t o  cede  B u l g a r i a n  Macedonia  t o  Yugos l av i a  
( 1947) .  At t he  same t i me ,  T i t o  extended h i s  s upport  t o  t h e  Communist f o r c e s  in 
Greece dur i ng  t h e  Greek c i v i l  war,  in a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  a c q u i r i n g  c o n t r o l  o f  
Greek Macedonian p r o v i n c e s .  Both p l ans  f a i l e d .  When S t a l i n  e v i c t e d  Yugoslavia  
from the Cominform ( 1 9 4 8 ) ,  Bu l g a r i a  s tepped back from t h e  T i t o - D i m i t r o v  agr e e ­
ment and assumed f o r  a number o f  y e a r s  an a g r e s s i v e  r o l e  on t h e  Macedonian 
i s s u e ,  s pe ar - he adi ng  S o v i e t  expans i oni sm.  As f o r  Greece ,  w i t h  t he  t erminat i on  
o f  the  Greek c i v i l  war ( 1 9 4 9 ) ,  t he  immediate a nne xa t i on  o f  Greek Macedonia to  
Yugos lavia  was avo i de d .
Subs equent l y ,  and d e s p i t e  t h e  n o r ma l i z a t i o n  o f  Greek-Yugos l av  r e l a t i o n s  
( 1 9 5 1 ) ,  Skopje  c o n t i n u e d  f o r  40 y e a r s  t o  undermine  Greek s o v e r e i g n t y  over  
Greek Macedonia.  The Macedonian pr ov i nc e s  o f  Greece  and B u l g a r i a  were viewed 
"as not  y e t  l i b e r a t e d " ,  w h i l e  t he  "Pe opl e ' s  Republ i c  o f  Macedonia",  pr oj ec t e d  
i t s e l f  as t h e  o n l y  " f r e e  part" o f  Macedonia,  and t h e  "Piedmont" f o r  the  
u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  a l l  Macedonian r e g i o n s .
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During t h e  same 4 0 - y e a r  p e r i o d  and in o r d e r  to b e s t  s e r v e  i t s  expan-.': 
s i o n i s t  p l a n s ,  Skopje at tempted to a p p r o p r i a t e  and monopol i ze  t h e  Macedonian',  
name. To a c h i e v e  t h i s  g o a l ,  Skopje found i t  n e c e s s a r y  to usurp Greek hi s tor i -h . .  
cal  and c u l t u r a l  h&,ritage in Macedonia from a n t i q u i t y  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t .  Thus,:  
Alexander  the  Great  and A r i s t o t l e  have been added t o  the Skopjan pantheon!  So 
have t he  Greek a p o s t l e s  to  the  S l a v s ,  Cyr i l  and Methodius ,  . -simply because  they  
were born i n  T h e s s a l o n i k i !  Even t he  v i c t o r i e s  o f  t he  Greek army d u r i n g ' t h e  
1940-41 war were a t t r i b u t e d  to  the  s o - c a l l e d  "Macedonians"\of  Skopj e ,  onl y  be­
c a us e  a Greek army d i v i s i o n  was named Macedonia a f t e r  t h é  name o f  t h e  Greek 
pr ov i nc e !  T h e s s a l o n i k i ,  whose c u l t u r e ,  l anguage  and t r a d i t i o n s  have been Greek 
for  2300 y e a r s ,  i s  p r o j ec t e d  as the  c a p i t a l  o f  t he  f u t u r e  "uni t ed  Macedonian 
s t a t e " .
E v i d e n t l y ,  by mani pul at i ng  a g e o g r a ph i c a l  term (Macedonia) ,  Skopje ex-,  
p a n s i o n i s t s ’ sought  to c onver t  t h i s  term i n t o  an e t h n i c  name f o r  a S l av  nat ion.
In t h e  p r o c e s s ,  t h e y  o b v i o u s l y  a t t e m p t e d  to  deny t he  Greek p e o p l e  t h e i r  
l e g i t i m a t e  r i g h t  to  a major par t  o f  t h e i r  c u l t u r a l  i d e n t i t y .
Thus,  f o r  45 y e a r s ,  t he  Macedonian name became t he  major v e h i c l e  f or  
t e r r i t o r i a l  and c u l t u r a l  e x p a n s i o n i s m e n c r o a c h i n g  upon Greek t e r r i t o r y .  Be­
c aus e  o f  t he  c o n t i n u e d  use  and abuse  by Skopje  o f  the  h e l l e n i c  c i v i l i z a t i o n  
and t r a d i t i o n s  in order  to  promote e x p a n s i o n i s t  aims,  any f u r t h e r  use  o f  the  
Macedonian name by ah i nde pe nde nt  s t a t e  would i p s o  f a c t o  i mply  t e r r i t o r i a l  
c l a i ms  a g a i n s t  Greece.
2.  In v i e w o f  t he  h i s t o r i c  i m p l i c a t i o n  and t he  n a t i o n a l i s t  f o r c e s  behind  
t h i s  i s s u e ,  the  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  a Yugoslav Republ i c  as an independent  "Reoublic  
o f  Macedonia" would be a c on s t a n t  t h r e a t  to  peace and s e c u r i t y  in South East ­
ern Europe now and f o r  many years  t o  come.
As I have e x p l a i n e d ,  B u l g a r i a  c l a i m s  h i s t o r i c a l  and kin t i e s  wi t h  the  
Skopje  r e g i o n  and i t s  S l a v o n i c  p a r t  o f  t he  p o p u l a t i o n  and has  a l re ady  
pr oc e eded t o  r e c o g n i z e  t he  i nde p e n d e n c e  o f  t he  R e p u b l i c .  Moreover ,  very  
r e c e n t l y ,  r e c r i m i n a t i o ns  between Bu l g a r i a  and Serbi a  were exchanged and mutual  
a c c u s a t i o n s  f o r  important  troop movements were a l s o  hur l ed at  each o t h e r .  We 
a l l ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  know t h a t  the  area o f  t h e  Republ i c  o f  Skopje  has h i s t o r i c a l l y  
al ways  been t he  t a r g e t  o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s ,  due t o  i t s  mos a i c  o f  d i f ­
f e r e n t  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  (Al bani ans ,  B u l g a r i a n s ,  Serbs ,  Turks,  Greeks,  Roma e t c ) .  
Un f o r t u n a t e l y ,  19th c e nt ury  images o f  "Greater Bulgar i a",  "Greater Serbia" and 
"Greater Albania" are s t i l l  haunt i ng  t oday  the  r e g i o n  o f  Skopje ,  a wa i t i ng  the  
s i gn a l  o f  i t s  "independence" to  s t a k e  t h e i r  c l a i m s . . .
More onimous f o r  t he  f u t u r e  i s  t h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  a Bu l g a r i a n  n a t i o n a l  
r e v i v a l  among Skopj e ' s  S l av  p o p u l a t i o n .  For 45 y e a r s  Bulgar i an e t h n i c i t y  has 
been out lawed and i t s  s upport e rs  p e r s e c u t e d .  A c l a s h  between "Macedonists" and 
pr o - Bul gar i ans  w i l l  become i n e v i t a b l e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  S o f i a  emerges in the
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r o l e  o f  a "big brot he r"  f o r  t he  young R e p u b l i c .  Al low mei f o r  I n s t a n c e ;  to  
r e f e r  to the  two VHRO p a r t i e s  that  o p e r a t e  under t he  same name in both Skopje  
and S o f i a .  In f a c t ,  t h e  VMRO i s  p r e s e n t l y  t h e  m a j o r i t y  p a r t y  i n  t he  Skopje  
par l i ame nt ,  w h i l e  t h e i r  a c t i v e  Bulgarian c o u n t e r p a r t  p r e s e n t l y  o p e r a t e s  as â 
n a t i o n a l i s t  Bu l g a r o -  Macedonian" movement .  Both VHROs a r e  commi t t ed  t o  e x ­
t r e m i s t  n a t i o n a l i s t  g o a l s ;  g o a l s  a imi ng a t  t e r r i t o r i a l  e x p a n s i o n i s m .  May I 
a l s o  remind you t ha t  in a very recent  NATO document the VMRO Skopje  part y  was 
q u a l i f i e d  as a " t e r r o r i s t "  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  ' y:
A more s e r i o u s  and immediate c o m p l i c a t i o n  coul d d e v e l o p  as  a r e s u l t  o f  
i n t e r - e t h n i c  c o n f l i c t s .  A l r e a d y ,  the  e t h n i c  A l b a n i a n s ,  c o m p r i s i n g  a l mos t  a 
t h i r d  o f  the  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  the R e pu b l i c ,  have r e g i s t e r e d  t h e i r  o p p o s i ­
t i o n  to  t he  Skopje Government by demanding s e l f - r u l e .  The i r  r e c e n t  p l e b i s c i t e ,  
al though conducted a g a i n s t  Government o b j e c t i o n s  and a r b i t r a r y  p o l i c e  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n s ,  was a c l e a r  s i g n  o f  t r ou b l e s  t o  come.
I t  i s  ob v i o u s  t h a t  in the  l ong  run S k o p j e ,  an e c o n o m i c a l l y  n o n - v i a b l e  
and e t h n i c a l l y  a n t a g o n i s t i c  e n t i t y ,  s ur r ounde d  by c o mp e t i n g  " s u i t o r s ” and 
" p r o t e c t o r s " ,  c o u l d  be open to m a n i p u l a t i o n s  by s t r o n g e r  powe r s .  The p o s ­
s i b i l i t y  o f  opening a Pandora' s  box o f  Balkan i n t r i g u e s ,  g u e r i l l a  warfare  and 
armed c o n f l i c t  i n v o l v i n g  ne i g hbo ur i ng  s t a t e s ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  i n t e r - e t h n i c  
s t r i f e s  in Skopje i t s e l f ,  could s imply i g n i t e  t h e  whole Balkan area and become 
a major d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n  f a c t o r  for  the  whole  o f  Europe.
Greece w i l l  be d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t e d  by such deve l opment s .  On t he  one hand,  
t he  economic and s o c i a l  r e v e r b e r a t i o n s  o f  a p o s s i b l e  armed c o n f l i c t  w i l l  be 
immediately f e l t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in nort hern Greece  ( tour i sm,  t r a d e ,  movement o f  
p e o p l e ,  p o l i t i c a l  and economic  r e f u g e e s ) .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  a t t e mp t s  at  
changing the  e x t e r na l  borders  o f  the  Skopje  Republ i c  w i l l  u p s e t  ba l a nc e s ;  The 
"domino e f f e c t "  we are  e x p e r i e n c i n g  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  Yu g o s l a v  R e pu b l i c s ,  
w i l l  contaminate  ne i ghbour i ng  s t a t e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  Greece.  Let  me remind you that  
a l mos t  60% o f  t he  t o t a l  Greek e x p o r t s  ar e  e x p o r t e d  from n o r t h e r n  Greece  v i a  
Yu g o s l a v i a  t o  Cent ra l  and Western Europe .  The c o n s e q u e n c e s  would t hus  be 
d e v a s t a t i n g  f o r  the Greek economy.
I t  g o e s  w i t h o u t  s a y i n g  t h a t  t h e  pr ob l e ms  b r i e f l y  enumerated above are  
not  new. However,  t h e y  now ac q u i r e  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  a c u t e  c h a r a c t e r  a f t e r  
Skopj e ' s  r e que s t  to  become an independent  s t a t e .  I f  in t he  p a s t ,  Sk o p j e ' s  rush 
a c t i o n s  and propaganda a c t i v i t i e s  have been underaken w i t h i n  t h e  framework o f  
Y u g o s l a v i a ,  one can i magi ne  t he  kind o f  d a n g e r o u s  a d v e n t u r e s  i t  w i l l  embark 
upon were i t  t o  become an independent  s t a t e .
3.  In the  i n t e r e s t  o f  avo i d i ng  p a s t  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  e x p e r i e n c e s  and promot­
ing permanent peace  and s e c u r u t y  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e ,  the  p r e r e q u i s i t e s  f o r  the  
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t he  i ndepe nde nc e  o f  S k o o i e .  as  endorsed bv t h e  Twelve in the  
"Declarat ion on Yugos l av i a" ,  must be f u l l v  r e s p e c t e d .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t o  t h i s  
dat e ,  the a u t h o r i t i e s  o f  Skopje have f a i l e d  t o  implement t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s .  
Indeed: :
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These  r e f e r e n c e s  in t h e  preamble  make i t  o b v i ou s  t h a t  t e r r i t o r i a l  i r -  
r e d e n t l s m  and f u t u r e  e x p a n s i o n i s m ar e  v e r y  much pa r t  and pa r c e l  o f  t h e  new 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . Such a p o l i t i c a l  model i s  o b v i o u s l y  i nc ompat i b l e  wi t h  t he  CSCE 
s p i r i t  and fundamental  p r i n c i p l e s .
This  I s  why we c o n s i d e r  t h a t  t h e  amendments to  a r t i c l e s  3 and 49 o f  the  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  are s imply mean i ng l e s s  and i n any way,  not  o f  nature  t o  a l t e r  i t s  
main ph i l o s o p h y  and i t s  b a s i c  t h r u s t .
-The Gl i g o r o v  Government ,  has  been e ngaged In a wor l dwi de  "g o o d - wi l l  
campaign" t o  impress  on wor l d  l e a d e r s  and p u b l i c  o p i n i o n  t he  Image o f  a new 
Re p u b l i c  d e d i c a t e d  t o  pe ac e  and f r i e n d l y  n e i g h b o u r l y  r e l a t i o n s .  The l e t t e r s  
s e n t  by Skopje  o f f i c i a l s  t o  t he  A r b i t r a t i o n  Commission served a s i m i l a r  pur­
po s e .  Yet ,  In p r a c t i c e ,  h o s t i l e  propaganda a g a i n s t  Greece c o n t i n u e s  unabated.
' For example,  Skopje l e a d e r s  dur i ng  r e c e n t  months have p u b l i c l y  spoken 
about  t e r r i t o r i a l  c l a i ms  a g a i n s t  Greece .  Al l ow me t o  c i t e  j u s t  two o f  them:
t h e  m i n i s t e r  f o r  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s
-They have not  o f f e r e d  s u f f i c i e n t  g u a r a n t e e s ,  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  or  o t h e r /  | 
to  ensure  t h a t  t hey  w i l l  have no t e r r r i t o r i a l  c l  aims
-They c ont i nu e  c a r r y i n g  h o s t i l e  propaganda,  even at  t h i s  c r i t i c a l  mo­
ment.  p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  r e c o g n i t i o n .  ' ' = .
-They have made no at tempt  to  f i n d  a s u i t a b l e  denominat ion f o r  t h e i r  f u ­
t u r e  i ndependent  Republ i c .  -
■ - Gr e e c e  has spared so f a r  no e f f o r t  t o  f i n d  f a i r  and e q u i t a b l e  s o l u ­
t i o n s .  But ,  d e s p i t e  Greek o b s e r v a t i o n s  and s u g g e s t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  v a r i o u s  
p r o v i s i o n s  in t he  c o n s t i t u t i o n  r a i s e d  d i r e c t l y  w i t h  t h e  Skopj e  d e l e g a t i o n  
which v i s i t e d  Athens f o r  t a l k s  on t he  I mpl e ment at i on  o f  t he  E.C. d e c i s i o n  on 3 
January,  t h e r e  has so f a r  been no c o n s t r u c t i v e  r e s p o n s e .  -
As you know, t he  preamble o f  S k o p j e ' s  c o n s t i t u t i o n  s t a t e s  t h a t  the  new 
Republ i c  r e s t s  upon "the s t a t e h o o d - l e g a l  t r a d i t i o n s  o f  t he  Krushevo Republic"  
( 1 903 )  and t h e  " h i s t o r i c a l  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  A n t i f a s c i s t  As s embl y  o f  the  
P e o p l e ' s  L i b e r a t i o n  o f  Macedonia" (ASNOH), p a s s e d  In 1944.  Let  me e x p l a i n :
The e v e n t s  o f  1903 and 1944 h i g h l i g h t e d  t h e  a t t e mp t  by t h e  S l a v s  o f  
Macedonia t o  e s t a b l i s h  r e s p e c t i v e l y  an autonomous o r .  an Independent  
Macedonian s t a t e .  A s t a t e  which would absorb t h e  whole  o f  Macedonia,  I nc l u d­
i ng  t h e  Macedonian p r o v i n c e s  o f  G r e e c e ,  B u l g a r i a ,  and A l b a n i a .  Inde e d ,  the  
Krushevo M a n i f e s t o ,  o f  2 August  1903 ,  was an appeal  t o  t h e  p e o p l e  t o  "come 
beneath t he  f l a g  o f  autonomous Macedonia", w h i l e  t he  ASNOM Communist- T i t o l s t  
M a n i f e s t o  o f  1944,  I s s u e d  a l s o  on t h e  2nd o f  Augus t  f o r  s y m b o l i c  p u r p o s e s ,  
proc la i med the  "j us t  and unique demand f o r  u n i t i n g  a l l  t he  Macedonian people  
wi t h  the r i g h t  to  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n " .  I t  f u r t h e r  s t a t e d : "  l e t  t h e  s t r u g g l e  o f  
t he  Macedonian Piedmont i n s p i r e  y o u . . .  i t  a l o n e  l e a d s  t o  freedom and union o f  
a l l  Macedonian p e o p l e . . .  Let  t he  a r t i f i c i a l  boundar ie s  which s e p a r a t e  brother  
from b r o t h e r . . .  be swept  away"
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- - Va s i l  Tupurkovski ,  t h e  Skopje r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t o  t he  Yu g o s l a v  Pres idency,
has r e p e a t e d l y  spoken about the u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  a l l  t h e  Macedonian lands.  
Thus,  on 20 January 1991,  whi l e  on t he  "Macedonian H e r i t a g e "  TV program 
in Toronto,  he, was asked " i f  Macedonians s houl d s t r u g g l e  f or  cul tural  
and s p i r i t u a l  u n i t y  r a t h e r  than t e r r i t o r i a l  u n i t y " .  Tupurkovski  repl i ed;  
" I t h i n k  t h a t  our  n a t i o n a l  i d e a l  c a n n o t  be l i m i t e d ;  t h e  t e r r i t o r i a l  
u n i t y  i s  a l s o  par t  o f  i t " .  Al s o ,  in December 1990,  i n  a r ad i o  interview  
at  Perth ( A u s t r a l i a ) ,  he s a i d  t h a t  t h e  "new Macedonian s t a t e  w i l l  have 
as i t s  pr i mary t a r g e t ,  t he  l i b e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  e n s l a v e d  Macedonians"and
the  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  t he  wider Macedonian r e g i o n ” .
- - P r e s i d e n t  Kiro G l i g o r o v  in an i n t e r v i e w  t o  NIN m a g a z i n e ,  (Belgrade 1
Feb.  1991) spoke o f  "segments o f  t he  Macedonian p e o p l e  i n  Serbi a ,  Greece 
and B u l g a r i a  which were d i v i d e d  and s u b j u g a t e d  a f t e r  t h e  Balkan wars" 
and r e v e a l e d  t ha t  t h e  l ead i ng  "Macedonian" n a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t i e s  aim at a 
"Great Macedonia" and do not hi de  t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n  t h a t  " t he  Macedonian 
power w i l l  redraw t he  borders o f  Greece and Se r b i a"!
Skopje has not  c e a s e d  r e f e r r i n g  t o  Greek Macedonia as  “Egejska (Aegean)  
Makedonija",  a term used t o  imply t ha t  t he  whole  o f  nor t he r n  Greece i s  part  o f  
a wi de r  S l a v  t e r r i t o r y .  Only a few days  ago ,  a c o n f e r e n c e  was organi zed  in 
Skopje  d e a l i n g  w i t h , l i n g u i s t i c  q u e s t i o n s  o f  "Egej ska  Make doni j a" .  In f a c t ,  
"hate l i t e r a t u r e "  c o n t i n u e s  to appear in p u b l i c a t i o n s  both i n  t he  Republic and 
abroad.  A r e c e n t  t y p i c a l  example i s  prov i ded  on a 1992 c a l e n d a r  wi th maps on 
which Greek a l ong  wi th Bulgar i an and Albanian Macedonia ar e  shown as part  o f  
"Great Macedonia".  Those  c a l e n d a r s  were  m a i l e d  in  t h o u s a n d s  o f  c op i e s  
throughout  Greece;  a c l e a r  s i gn  o f  what one s houl d e x p e c t  a f t e r  the r e cogn i ­
t i o n  o f  independence .
As f o r  t he  d e n o m i n a t i o n . Greece has  had t he  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  anal yze  in 
d e t a i l  t o  the  Skopje  d e l e g a t i o n  why t h e  term "Macedonia",  i f  used in the  
denominat ion o f  t he  Skopje Republ i c ,  i s  un a c c e p t a b l e  as i t  c o n t a i n s  by i t s e l f  
an e x p a n s i o n i s t  n o t i o n .  Indeed,  as I have e a r l i e r  e x p l a i n e d ,  in order to best  
serve  i t s  e x p a n s i o n i s t  p l a n s ,  Skopje usurped t he  Macedonian name and purpor­
t e d l y  c onve r t e d  i t  i n t o  an e t h n i c  name f o r  i t s  S l av  n a t i o n .  This  becomes a l l  
t he  more br az e n ,  when one t a k e s  i n t o  ac ount  t h a t  t h e  g e o g r a p h i c a l  reg i on  o f  
Macedonia extends  ac r os s  f our  borders:  in Greece (51%), Bu l g a r i a  (9.5%). Al ­
bania fO.5%1 and Yugos l av i a  (39%).  Thus,  t he  adopt ion o f  t h e  Macedonian name 
for  t he  f u t ure  Republ i c  c a r r i e s  the  c l e a r  message t h a t  t h e  Re publ i c ' s  j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n  extends  over t he  Macedonian p r o v i n c e s  o f  a l l  ne i g h b o u r i n g  s t a t e s .
I t  should not  be f o r g o t t e n ,  dear  C o l l e a g u e ,  t h a t  t h e  Macedonian name was 
gr ant ed  by T i t o  a t  a t i me  when Moscow was s e e k i n g  an e x i t  t o  t he  Aegean,  i t  
w i l l  be an i r on y  i f .  y e a r s  a f t e r  t he  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  Cold War, the  com­
munity would o f f e r ,  a p o s t e r i o r i ,  a h i s t o r i c a l  l e g i t i m a c y  t o  such c laims.
4. D e s p i t e  a l l  the  dangers  I b e l i e v e  t h e r e  i s  s t i l l  t i m e ’ to  f i nd  an equi ­
t a b l e  s o l u t i o n :  one t h a t  may open t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  r e g i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  and 
c oo pe r a t i o n .  Greece i s  t he  only  ne i ghbour i ng  count ry  which harbours no claims  
aga i ns t  Skopje .  I f  an unders tanding i s  reached on t he  b a s i s  o f  the  E.C. terms
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for r e c o g n i t i o n ,  Greece i s  prej^ared to h e l p  c r e a t e  a r e g i o na l  arrangement to 
meet the s e c u r i t y  needs  o f  Skopje,  as we l l  as t h o s e  o f  i t s  n e i ghbour s .  Thus, 
mutual s u s p i c i o n s  between Skopje and i n d i v i d u a l  ne i ghbour s ,  as we l l  as between 
ne i ghbour i ng  c o u n t r i e s  compet i ng  for i n f l u e n c e  or  dominance on Skopje  would 
s t e a d i l y  e v a p o r a t e ,
In a d d i t i o n ,  Greece  c o u l d  extend t o  t h e  new R e p u b l i c  s p e c i a l  economic  
p r i v i l e g e s ,  open p r o s p e c t s  f o r  an al l  round economic c o o p e r a t i o n ,  and s e t  in 
motion the p r o c e s s  f o r  a s o l u t i o n  to a l l  b i l a t e r a l  i s s u e s .  :/
In c h o o s i n g  a name f o r  the new Re publ i c ,  former a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  denomina­
t i ons  o f  t he  r e g i o n  coul d  probably provide  a l o g i c a l  and a c c e p t a b l e  s o l u t i o n .  
I t  shoul d  be no t e d  t h a t  p r i o r  to T i t o ' s  d e c i s i o n  t o  a s s i g n  t o  Skopje the  
Macedonian name, no such denomination had e v e r  been used i n  t he  p a s t ,  e i t he r  
as a s t a t e  or- as an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d e n o m i n a t i o n  f o r  t h a t  r e g i o n .  I t  i s  a 
denomi nat i on  t h a t  was a r t i f i c i a l l y  i n t r o d u c e d  t o  advance  t e r r i t o r i a l  c la ims  
and has no h i s t o r i c a l  or  c u l t u r a l  v a l i d i t y .
I t  i s  more than obv i ous  that  the e s t a b l  i shment’ -o f  good r e l a t i o n s  between 
Skopje and Greece ,  i s  o f  paramount importance f o r  both t he  new Republ ic  and 
the whole  Balkan r e g i o n  . F i r s t ,  i t  w i l l  a l l o w  t h e  Skopjan R e pu b l i c  to  s u r ­
v i v e .  S e c o n d l y ,  i t  w i l l  d e f l a t e  the a s p i r a t i o n s  o f  o t h e r  powers  a t  i t s  own
expense and w i l l  thus  c r e a t e  the  neces s ary  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  peace  in t h i s  highly  
s e n s i t i v e  ar e a .  »
In t h i s  l i g h t ,  i t  i s  a matter o f  urgency  t h a t  par t ne r s ,  impress  upon the 
a u t h o r i t i e s  o f  Skopje  the  need to implement f u l l y ,  by deeds  r a t h e r  than mean­
i n g l e s s  d e c l a r a t i o n s ,  t h e  E.C.  m i n i s t e r i a l  d e c i s i o n  o f  16 December and to 
d e s i s t  from any i n i t i a t i v e s  t h a t  may i nf l ame  t he  r e g i o n .
I f  and.when Skopje d e c i d e s  to abide  b y - t h e  E.C. terms f o r  the  r e c ogn i ­
t ion.  o f  i t s  i ndependence ,  I sugges t  t h a t ,  a t  t h a t  t i me ,  an agreement  be con­
c lude d  between t h e  E.C. . . and Skopje p r o v i d i n g  g u a r a n t e e s  f o r  t h e  proper im­
pl e me nt at i on  o f  t he  t erms’ s p e c i f i e d  by t he  Community.
Dear C o l l e a g u e ,  .
This  i s  c e r t a i n l y  not  thel^Ume to  c r e a t e  new problems .  I t  i s  the  time to 
t r y  and f i n d  l a s t i n g  s o l u t i o n s .  I am c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  our  p r o p o s a l s  w i l l  meet  
with your approval  and t h a t  the Community amd i t s  member- s t a tes  w i l l  cont inue  
to act  wi t h  the  same s p i r i t  o f  s o l i d a r i t y  as m a n i f e s t e d  in Maas t r i ch t .  Af ter  
a l l ,  i t  i s  our  common goa l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  p e a c e  and s e c u r i t y  in South-Eastern  
Europe by e l i m i n a t i n g  any source  o f  f r i c t i o n  or c o n f l i c t .
S i n c e r e l y  yours
Andoni s  C. Samaras
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APPENDIX III
Founding declaration of the Macedonian Committee that was issued on 17
January 1992.
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Guov :<ci to v  ôiE&'/cv; cvcr tr fia to ; to v . yi avto  
Cl io io i x a t ’ açxtp/ A  c o i  x a i rtçorciGtco; ;  Evç-u- 
aa ïx f; Kci% ctr,ta c-çeEvov'/ va t a  .•tçoxàocv-/ jr,- 
iiEOC y ia  va  p.r; GEÇcvtsvovv zoxÀ à ÔE'.vôtEca 
ave 1 0 . .Avto rtoàttov'uc s v s i;  w ; xci
Éxcvus triv TiçELirj b^p ciôtrita , u ;  .to x its ;  t ; ;  Ev- 
c-ùtrr; ô t i  a v to  Sa z o ô ç s i  n K oivôtrjta  yic. oxcv; 
to v ;  c v ç v r ta ïx o v ;  A a c v ;  x a i x a t 6  SEGuixr,v ati- 
taytiv tri; t o v ;  A a c v ;  tri; EOK. Tovto gvvi- 
Gtc Gtoixs'-côôrj . to ô v c ia  rrocxq-U-'EO); x a i evicxv’GE- 
w ; Yio :o  E vcvvtcixô avatriLia a o ç o x ^ ia ;  yEvivd. 
oJ'Aâ cvtotsJvsi x a i cvuE atixri vttoxoéaxrr; oJO.ri- 
XE'f;VT|; Y'-o tT|V K o iv ô tr jta  z o o ;  t a  u£sr, tr,;. 
ÎToxv “ EÇiGGûtcOO uôÀ.Lcrta ô ta v  r| Xoivotr;ta. ce 
c-futcôo a'/oztv% scv; tc w  ZECUpEoeuvv tr,;. Éxsi 
GvuôxT]6Ei EvSÉax x a i  Sa e^œ-cox'ovSEi vc gvu- 
g é x x s ta i zox).or[xcô; pc trp/ sÀxrivixfi xci%otixTi 
nEOicpÉOEia tri; M a x s ô o v ic ;  - A vatoxixri;, Ke- 
vtQixTÎ; x a i A vtix fi;.
4. K ©EGGaÀovixri fxa; Eivai ezl ôvo tovxcx'.- 
Gtov xiX iôôs; ovp/£xf| x p ô v ia  (xéxpi x a i Gti.usça t] 
zotütsvovG a tri; M c:<sôovia;. Y z ô  to s ;  aVxri/x)- 
ô id ô o x s; zoxvEÔ'/ixÉ; A v to x c a to o is ; .  Püjugïxti, 
B v;avtiv fi x a i O Sioiiavixfi, plxQ i azExsvSÉ- 
çvoGfi tri; to  1912, vztiççe elotivixtî Y^qrcca t iw  
po/.xavixôjv A acw , K rrto ix f | ÏTvxri tri; Evç-cüzti;  
GtTiv A'/Gtoxri, yôviLio; o t ib o ;  z v E v u a tix w  qev- 
Lidtcvv x a i zoxiti:-uvv iôecw, z v s v ^ t i x ô ;  ç c ç o ;  
try; B oxxavixft;. aXXd z o t é  Ô£*v É%aGE tov  s/Ariyi- 
xô z o x it iG tix c  x a i L ütooixô x occo ttn ça  tri;, ovts  
dJ'AcvotE apicpiG^ritTÎSrnxs'azotEXsGu.atLxd n tcv tô -  
trftd tri;. Ef|p.sça, ava ô e ix w o u iv T j x a i zd x i ce 
otoatTr/viô oixovouL xô (Ttavoc-ôoôuL tcw  Boxxa- 
v i w ,  oo'/avixri TÎôri zôxri x a i x iu d v i tri; Evçxo- 
z a ïx f i;  k o iv ô tT ]ta ; x a i a z o o to x f i;  avoixtf] ce 
ôxe;  t i ;  EiOTivixé; ô^aotrjOiôtTitE; ô À w  t w  
A awv, ô.tto; dlxXcvcrtE |ia o tv ç £ i x a i q AieS-tTi; 
E:ASEGti tri; xaS' ô x o  to  é to ;  x c i  xdSs Etc;, orco- 
tc3.£i. x(7pi; Ota uvri(X£La tri;, év c  a z ô  ta  .iir/a- 
À vtcça Z 'W tavd  M ovoE ia tri; XQiotiav(vcrj"/Ti;,
-eæ-
rnç 3\J?;avTivf|Ç 'céxvnç xa i tod eAÀrp/i-
xo-ù rcoÀ.LtujpLO-ù OE ù^ EOTi cTùvÔEcrri xai ï^ixovç'fi- 
xÔTTTca fXE to  Aytov 'Oçoç |iGvaôi.xTi otov Kôofxo 
MovacrtixT^ noXiteCa triç OixoupÆvtxtK: O080&)- 
çCaç. LIE XTp/ néXXa KcKJuoxçùxELoa d/ÂoxE n:o<jj- 
xew u oa  xoxj Mri'dXov AXeÇàvôooi;, xttv Beçyi- 
va .açKÎrcTi rcoorcrùoxxja xai ' vEx^rto^ri xcr/ 
MoxE&ôvwv BàotXicüv xai \ie xo ACov leçà nôÀ.Ti 
xojv Max£Ô6vürv ctxu; utccüçeieç xq-u OÀ.X'VL-xotj, p.u- 
0txf| xa0É6o a  xa^v Acvôexa Oecirv xcru eàAlivixoù 
-tavOécnj. ELvat, Xoutôv, aôi.avÔT]X7i yia xûOe rco- 
XLXLOLLévo àv6ç<jxto, u5iatx£ça E-uç<jLCxaLo, xci 
d-vai qnjoei oôvvaxTi loxoçixü q jxoÀixixfi (uxÔJXEi- 
ça  va X7]ç acpatoeGeC p£ pxdv oaôcpacrn - xa i clxô 
rcotovç; - t] î;üL>oa EJil xiAletleç eAàtîvixti xaircôxT]xà 
XTiç, E'fxijpE>ve(, ôpxo<; ao^oçcrùç, oçaxcrvç xai 
(iuEao-uç xivôvvoxiç yta xxrv c7xa0eçôxT]xa xcuv 
BaÀxavicLrv xat XT^g Evçoj.Triç xûOe xéxoui cuxo- 
.■XEtça, XTjv orcoia evxéXEt etfxacrxe onoqpaGUjpÉvoi 
XCL Lxavo( va avxifLExarxiacrup^.
5. Me xéxoto xctç<i5<tf^a, xéxoto xrtô^G ço xai 
xéxotav anooroA.!^ ei^fpaiç, cruvaôeÀcpaxruvnç xwv 
Aaojv xat zoXitiopicru, ti crûyxQOvxi éeoo<üxy\ixT], 
axpAî;cruaa xwoa ev eifuGeçia oxttv yEüxrtoA.txixTi 
axrcfi 0éo“n, eçydaGxpte orxoôoxixd xai aacpoXôx; 0a 
owExtaet va eçydÇexaL yia xx| atrvEçyaoia, xt]v 01- 
xovop.LXTi avcL'xx'uÇTi, XO ôteOvé; epjxôoco xai xeXt- 
xd xov nioXiXLopd ôXcüv xwv Aawv, xvolwxeoc xwv 
yeixovixwv. Auxfi elvai e^ dXXcru t] !;wf| xai q ev- 
Tvxia XT|Ç. Txou pjxoooôv EXev0Eoa xai jioÉJxei va 
cruuuEOioOovv 6/.01 01 yECxoveg. k a i  avxd éxofuiv 
rcaXaLÔXEça, aXXd xat xaxd xa xeXEvxaia xçdvia. 
Me ôeôouévov axrcôv xov Eprcçdxxwg orcc&EÔELy- 
pivo -Tçooçujpd Ti 0 EaoaXovCxTi xat, oaô avrfp/ 
XT^v Z-L^ijxçürxrûcruad xtiç, ôXr| t] EXXdca ZLOXEikL 
axçaôdvxcDg ôxi 01 erxiXoyÉg xt]ç TryeaLug xwv 
IxorxCwv xat xt]Ç aTip.eçtvf|Ç PovXyoçixîy; x-bfeç- 
vT^ OECog, j'to'u ajXTTXcrûv xaxd xov eraELxéoxEoo xc- 
çaxxTiÇLopd éfxpioveç, cOJA rcoXv erxixCvôweç 
E0vixiaxixéç jxçoXfppEig xai Exgqxxixd xaxdXouxa 
evôg xaxoôixaofiévox; artô xnv ruçww-taïxfi IcrxoçLa 
xat ojxox-uxnpivoa gxt]v jXQd^ T] Tjyefioviapx)0, pXd- 
.Txoxrv e^atçexLxd avxovç xovxouç xouç Aaodg 
xouç jxçog xouç otoIo-uç Ep^tç 01 Maxeôdveç 
axevOuvôfleGa axôp.Ti p.ia cpopd p^ ôeôtiXw^iivn 
EfLTtçdxxwg aXATiXeyyvTi xai eiXixçtvrî cpiXta, yui 
va xovç xxn:ev6Tjp.UjovfA£ ô,xl dçujxa yvwçlgow e^ 
idCojv: T] avytçyaoia xouç p^ xt]v EXXdda otoxeXel 
yi' a-uxoGç ^ovôôçop.o ELçfpa]ç. aaqpaXeCaç, eXev- 
deçixxç xat jxçodôot;. To jxoxdpti ôev yuçtgei jtCow. 
K at xo piXXov elvai pjxçooxd. AjxeXExrOeçoDOeixe 
ajxô xouç qpavaxixouç xou pte'faXo'iÔEaxiap.oû. Aev 
vExçavaaxaCvexai oûxe éxei xtç uXtxéç xçoiExoOÉ- 
OELÇ va vexQavaaxTi0EL, otXXd pjxoçeC va oxoxaxjet 
ôoa xoXXd, çcoxLxd xat pdvipa paç evwvouv axov 
xotvô ôçôpx) Jxçoç XTTv Evcopivri Euqwieti. K at 
jxooEtôojxotoÛLiE: crxXnodv kooc xévxoa XaxxlÇeiv.
Airxô xo yçojxxô p.f|vupa Et^ ffVTcç, etjGvvtiç xat 
oXXTTXeyyvTiç p^xacp^up^ ajxo ofip^ça, px ôXeç 
xtç eveçyéç ôuvdp^tç xwv tpoçéwv xtiç OeaoaXovt- 
xTiç xat xorv x’-^i'dôwv ext ptéçouç cruXXoyixwv 
oçydvüjv xçwxo^a0p.Cwv oçyavwoEwv, EJXtxetçf|- 
aeojv, cruvôtxdxüjv, tôçup.dxwv xat x^oowztwv 
pEXwv auxf|Ç XT]ç crniiEÇtvftç SuveXetùgecoç, ox ' eu- 
0e(aç jxpoç xov ^cruXyaçtxd Aaô, xooç xov jxoX-ue- 
0vixd jt\ri0uaptô XTIÇ Anp-oxpaxlaç xcav Zxojxlwv 
xat xçoç XT]v Euçcüjxatxf) Koivôtrixa xat xa piXTi
XTIÇ EUÇWXaïxflÇ OtXO'i'EVEtaÇ. ' Exooxoç ECp' OJ 
Exdx0n K at auçtov  0 Kôaptoç 0a Etvat aaqpaXwç
XoXÙXEOOÇ.
6. TèXoç epxlç 01 MaxeAdvEç ax£vOwôu£0a 
xooç XTTV Ku^vTioYi paç xat xtç TrreatEÇ ôXwv 
xwv xoXtxixwv x ô p ^ x ù jv  yta va excpçdooupte XT(v 
^ 0€td txavoxolno^ p.aç, xou elvoi xa t txavo- 
xoiTiOTi oÀaxXfiçou xou eJU-rp/iavLOu, yta nyv evoxti- 
xa xat XTTV avxxxoxu>OT]XT| oxo<paataxtx6xTTxa pÆ 
XTT-' 0x0 ûi uxeoaoxÙ;ovxai xa uxéçxaxa aupEPéço- 
vxa xou eJU.if/txoù 'EBvouç, xcùv ^oXxavixwv 
Aadrv xat xtiç Eugwxriç. To p.f|vupd paç xooç xo 
T 0VOÇ 0X0 xov x'ooxETXojçiipivo xgop.a%wva xt|Ç 
M axEt^vtaç paç Elvat: evOxTTxa. vnqxiA.tdxT|xa xat 
ôgdcrn.
OeacKiÀovtxTi IT Iavouaçtou  1992
O Afipooxoç BeaooÀovCxriç 
Kcuv. KoopAxouXoç
AgtcrxoxéÀeto navexioxfjjtto ©EaooXovtxTiç 
O noûxavTiç 
Avxomiç TgaxaxéA.riç
riavEXtcrxTip.to M axeôovtaç 
O ngûxovTTÇ 
rtdwTiç Toexoûçaç
ExatOEÎa MaxeAovtxwv Zxouôwv 
O Ilçdeôgoç 
KaOrryTrcTy; Kwv. Baôoûaxoç
lô g u p a  MeÀ£Xü)v Xeçoovfiaou xou Alpou 
O nçdeôçoç
Ka0Tf[TTxf|Ç Avxcüvtoç - Atp.LX.toç Taxtdoç
ZwpiaxEto "Oi qpiXot xou Moxxjetou 
xou M axeôovtxoû Ayorva"
O ngdeôçoç 
AniifTXÇTiç Z d w a ç
E pxoçtxd x a t Btop.TTXCivtxô ExtpEXiTxfiçto 
©eaooXovlxTiç 
O nçdedçoç 
navxEÀfiç KtuvaxavxtviÔTiç
EgyaxodxaAArpltxd Kévxgo OeaooXovlxTiç 
O rigéeôgoç 
HÀCaç KovxôxouXoç
SûvEÔeopoç Btop.TTxavtojv BoçeCou EXlddoç 
O IJQÔeôçoç 
BaatXriç navoûxoç
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H ELEX PO  A.E. Aif6vTi(; "Ex6€cm 'Evüxrn ZevoôAxtw 0 caoaXov(xTiç
BeaooXovtxriç 0  nçAcAçoç
0  riçôeôçoç Boa. MxçA^aç
AXé^avôçoç MrcoxataéXoç
Ivvôeovtoç E^jtoçlxxvv AvtutQoooncw
A ixrr/oçixôg I-uXloyo; ©eaaaX.ov(xTiç Boçetov ElÀdôcx;
0  n.çôeôçoç 0  riçAeôçoç
Xaç<iXa^.tcx; NûoÀxtç PéfLTiç X axJ;T iod^(;
laTÇixôg ZiiXAcr/cx; OeaoaÀovixriç EÀÀTTAxfi Exai^eCa Auhxt|OE(vç ErtixELçfîOECjav
O riç<î)e6çoç 0  riçôe^çoç
NixôÀjacx; AyreXlÔTiç nàçTiç TooxrxaXdç
■Evoxjti Z w toxT or/ H^ X£ÇTi0ùirv EqrnjieçLÔorv namxax£Ôovutf| 'Evüxtt) EXXùôck;
Max£Ôovüiç - ©oûxTiç 0  AvxuiçAoüJJtoç
O riçôeôço; EÀcuOéçwx; XcLÀ^t^i^ç
A vtam iç Kotjotttç
K évtço Artoôfijiùjv MoxEÔdvcov
Texvixô ErTLfL£A.TiTfiçco EÀJuiôoç 0  AiÆvûwifig
Tfxfin-a Kevtçixfiç Mox£ÔovCaç KüJV. nvo^;aç
O Ilçôeôçoç
Aôçéaç Kcn;ç(b<Tiç 2 vXXoyo<; Moxeôovo^dxarv xai Arcoydvar/ 
”0  riavXoç MêAAç”
ErtOYYeX^TLXÔ E.-rifxeA.iTCT^ to 0 eaaaXovixT]ç 0  AvTurrçdcrüxrrcK;
0  n çô eô ço ; X q. nojiaÇacpei^tov
redjçyux; Taévtoç
'Evuxrn AscooxQàxœy AçixojiaxixüA'
BwcEXvixô ErcLfxeXTTcfiQLO ©eaooÀovixriç BEaCKl)wOvCxT|Ç
O riçéeôçoç O nçdeôçoç
Atim-tVcqick; navéçaç rEtôçyvoç Adtovoç
OôcnrcuiTQtxA; ZijXXoyoç OeaaaXovîxriç ZvXÀcr/cx; AjtooTçdxcüv A^ui>fuitixa>v Ixqaxov
O A vtutçôeôçoç Boçeiov EXXdôo<;
ZtéXux; MjiaxaTGÉlcx; 0  riçdEÔçoç 
Nix. KoxXtôaç
«iHiçfiaxruxixôç Z-ûXXoycx; 0EaoaXovixT]ç
O riçôeôçoç AÉoxn EXXdvtw KaTaôçojxicjv
Avacrcdaïoç KaçayxovvTiç 0  nçdeôçoç
Kcw. AvXOXQCUpCXTlÇ
EnJtoçücôç Z-ûXXoyoç GeoooXovtxTiç
0  riQdeôçoç NtxdXaoç ZoçxLvlÔTiç
Korv. rço^dvTjç xécoç vjiovçyôç
EJiiTQOJifi E&vixürv 0€^dTQjv to-u Afipicru ZXÉXlO  ^ nCL’taÔEJlEXT^
0  nçôeôçoç; ZwTfjçiiç KojieravÔJtcruXcx; ^vXEVXfiÇ 0EOCKlXovCxT)Ç
nçô èô ço ç  xov Arifxoxixov Zvp^ovXLov xÉwg vrtovçydç M gcxeôovCoç - SçdxTiç
ATi t^fjxçTiç <î>atovço<; rwüçyoç T^it^LXüxrcaç
KoÔTriTTxfiÇ navEitujTTiiikru, ôti^ lotixA; ^ovXruxfiç BeooolXovCxtiç
ovu^ovXoç, piXoç xiTÇ EjiiXQOJif|<; xéox; virovçyôç M axeôov(aç - OçdxTiç
Ivvôeo^oç Tovçurctxürv Ilçaxtôoojv
M oxeôovta; - GçAxtiç AYCi|iin.vürv P x ^ x ^ io ç
0  nçéeôçoç EJilxi+ioç AçxTîYÔÇ PE E 0A
AçyvçT]ç Aovxaç
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ATmTiTQux; navTEç^ioAng 
Ka0TiYTTtf|Ç navE-turnintov
NlxAXock; Moircoôj'tO'uX.oç 
KaGîiYTTCTÎç nave-tLOTTipLCou
StéÀLCK; N éo x ü jç
ÔLXTl'/ÔÇOÇ
N . I. MÉOT^o;
ÔTi|xooiOY^cpo<;
AoujtoxéXTiç BçitaLCx; 
KaBrn'TTtfiç Ilav&rcicn:Tip.Lcru
6£ .^Lcn:oxXTiç K.o-u'ip.-c^ f|g 
Ka&TTfTTCTiç nave.-tLOtrip.LOTj
lüxiwTiç Toolo-uxLôrig 
en:LxeiçTi[iatlaç
Z w tftçT ig  K lô o tiç  
Fev. ALevOwtTV;
OçYavLajxoTJ ALfxévoç ©eoooÀovLXTiç
cî>LXutttoç nartaôAn:ovXo<; 
A L £ a 6 w tf tç  tn q  negicpeoELO xfig ALOLxfjaecüÇ 
Boçeiou EXXdôcx;
XTjÇ Eôvixftç Tça.-téî;Tiç triç EXX66og
«iHiîôojv Floyxlô^tiç 
ÔTip.ooLOYçAcpo<;
Açtiç AXe^ lov
EttixELQ-niiatLag
F. cî>LXüutOTj - BaXXfjÇ 
Pto^Lfixavoç
F lAwtiç ScpevôôvTiç 
açx^''^éxtüüv
APPENDIX IV
Previously unpublished Address that was deiivered by Greece's Foreign Minister 
Antonis Samaras to his EPC counterparts in Lisbon on 17 January 1992.
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ADDRESS
OF FOREIGN MINISTER ANDONIS SAMARAS 
(Lisbon 17 Feb.  1992)
I have come here to d i s c u s s  an i s s u e  t ha t  may at  a casual  g l a n c e  seem to be 
a nat ura l  outgrowth of  the breakup o f  t h e  Communist wor l d— t he  d e s i r e  o f  a 
Yugoslav Republ ic  to e s t a b l i s h  i t s  own i d e n t i t y  in the  wor l d .  But up c l o s e  
where we a r e ,  we can see  that  i t  i s  an i s s u e  t h a t  can c aus e  g r e a t  f r i c t i o n ,  
wrenching d i v i s i o n  and open c o n f l i c t  in our r e g i o n .
Whether t h a t  happens or not depends t o  a l a r g e  degree  on what d e c i s i o n s  we
make on how t o  respond to t h i s  d i f f i c u l t  i s s u e .  S i nc e  we have l i v e d  wi th
eve ry  a s p e c t  o f  i t ,  I want to take  a l i t t l e  t ime to  i n d i c a t e  where the  
dangers  l i e ,  how to avoid them, and what measures might  be adopted to
promote c oope r a t i on  and peace in t he  Balkans r a t h e r  than d i v i s i o n  and 
c o n f 1 i c t .
The i s s u e ,  o f  cours e ,  i s  t he  d e s i r e  f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  a par t  o f  Yugoslavia  
t h a t  was known as the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  re g i on  o f  Vardar Banovina u n t i l  i t  was
renamed "The Pe opl e ' s  Republ ic o f  Macedonia" in 1945.
The person who gave the region i t s  new name was Marshal l  T i t o  and the  reason 
he di d  s o  was to  use i t  as a nuc l eus  f o r  t h e  annexat i on  o f  t ho s e  parts  o f  
Bu l g a r i a  and Greece that  were once t he  Macedonia o f  Al exander  the  Gr e a t . You
may remember t hat  T i t o ,  wi th S t a l i n ' s  h e l p ,  f o r c e d  t he  Bulgar i an government
i n 1947 t o  agree  to cede Bulgarian Macedonia t o  Yu g o s l a v i a .  You may r e c a l l ,  
t o o ,  t h a t  T i t o  a l s o  t r i e d  to  grab Greek Macedonian p r o v i nc e s  by persuading  
Greek Communist f orc e s  in the l a t e  1940 's  t o  promise him t hos e  areas in
exchange f o r  h i s  support  o f  t h e i r  i n s u r r e c t i o n .
%
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F o r t u n a t e l y ,  both plans  f a i l e d .  When T i t o  broke wi th S t a l i n  in 1948,  
Bu l gar i a  broke the  agreement to cede i t s  Macedonian pr ov i nc e s  and indeed 
assumed an a gg r e s s i v e  pos ture  toward Macedonian areas  in Y u g o s l av i a .  As for  
Greece ,  t he  de f ea t  o f  the Communist i n s u r r e c t i o n  in 1949 ended the  immediate  
t h r e a t  o f  annexat ion o f  Greek Macedonia.
I have gone i nto  a b r i e f  h i s t o r i c a l  r e v i e w to remind you t ha t  the  
r e - i n v e n t i o n  o f  Skopje as the "Republ ic  o f  Macedonia" i s  very r e c e n t ,  was 
accompl i shed s p e c i f i c a l l y  to advance t e r r i t o r i a l  ambi t i ons ,  and,  in the  case  
o f  Greece ,  to  do so by promoting armed c o n f l i c t .
The name "Republic o f  Macedonia", t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  not  a phantom f e a r  f or  us.  
It  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th immense pain and s u f f e r i n g  by the Greek pe op l e  and 
l i nked wi th  a d e l i b e r a t e  plan to take  o ve r  pa r t s  o f  our t e r r i t o r y  t h a t  have 
had a Greek i d e n t i t y  f or  more than 2 , 5 0 0  y e a r s .
I can a n t i c i p a t e  you s ay i n g ,  "Yes,  y e s ,  a l l  o f  what happened was 
u n f o r t u n a t e ,  but you should put i t  behind you and move on.  These are
d i f f e r e n t  t imes  and c i rcums tances . "
We coul d  put i t  a l l  behind us ,  and we would,  i f  t he  t e r r i t o r i a l  ambi t ions  
T i t o  s e t  in motion in 1945 ended wi t h  our c i v i l  war a few y e a r s  l a t e r  or 
even wi th  t he  cold war more r e c e n t l y .  BUT THEY HAVEN'T.
For a l l  o f  the  47 years  s i n c e  T i t o  c r e a t e d  "The P e o p l e ' s  Republ i c  of  
Macedonia",  i t s  l eaders  have never  s topped t r y i n g  t o  undermine our 
s o v e r e i g n t y  over Greek Macedonia,  which t h e y  c a l l  Aegean Macedonia and
port ray  as "occupied" t e r r i t o r y  t ha t  one day w i l l  be " l i b e r a t e d " .
During t h e  same pe r i od ,  they have p u b l i s h e d  and c i r c u l a t e d  t hroughout  the
r e g i on  and abroad c o u n t l e s s  books ,  a r t i c l e s  and pamphlets  i d e n t i f y i n g  l arge
areas  o f  Greece as part  o f  "Great Macedonia",  and l i s t i n g  T h e s s a l o n i k i ,  the  
second l a r g e s t  c i t y  in Greece,  as i t s  f u t u r e  c a p i t a l .
Onjy a y e a r  ago the Pr e s i de nt  o f  t he  Re p u b l i c ,  Kiro G l i g o r o v ,  gave an 
i n t e r v i e w  t o  a Yugoslav magazine in which he spoke o f  "subjugated"  
Macedonians in Greece,  Serbi a  and Bu l g a r i a  and acknowledged t h a t  the  l eading  
n a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t i e s  in Skopje vow t ha t  "Macedonian power w i l l  redraw the 
borders  o f  Greece and Se r b i a . "  At about  t h e  same t i me ,  t he  r e p u b l i c ' s
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r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t o  the Yugoslav presiden^cy, Va s i l  Tupurkovski ,  t o l d  a radio  
aud i e nc e  in P e r t h ,  A u s t r a l i a  t hat  "the new Macedonian s t a t e  w i l l  have as i t s  
primary t a r g e t ,  the l i b e r a t i o n  o f  the  e n s l a v e d  Macedonians and the  
u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  t he  wider Macedonian r e g i o n . "
Now, as t he y  pursue  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  the l e a d e r s  o f  t he  Republ i c  r i d i c u l e  the  
concern such e f f o r t s  have aroused in us by a s k i ng  how a country o f  10 
m i l l i o n  p e o p l e  l i k e  Greece t ha t  i s  a member o f  both NATO and the EEC could 
f e a r  a s m a l l ,  weak s t a t e  o f  2 . 1  m i l l i o n .
Let me t e l l  you r i gh t  now, that  I have n ' t  come here  to urge you to move 
s l o w l y  and c a r e f u l l y  in c o n s i d e r i n g  r e c o g n i t i o n  f o r  Skopje ,  because  the 
Greek p e o p l e  f e a r  i t .  We d o n ' t .  But we know, t h a t  i f  i t  i s  g i ven r e c o g n i t i o n  
on i t s  own terms i t  w i l l  be encouraged t o  pursue  i t s  misguided ambit ions  at  
every  o p p o r t u n i t y  and w i l l  c r e a t e  g r e a t  i n s t a b i l i t y  in the  r eg i on .
We know, t o o ,  t hat  i f  Greece does not  r e c o g n i z e  and support  i t s  
i ndependence— and t hat  we cannot  do u n t i l  i t  f o l l o w s  the  example o f  other  
communist  s t a t e s  l i k e  Russ ia  and c o m p l e t e l y  abandons i t s  p a s t — i t  w i l l
become a t e mp t i n g  t a r g e t  f o r  o t he r  c o u n t r i e s  in t h e  r e g i o n .  That w i l l  bring 
the  kind o f  c o n f l i c t  t o  the  Balkans t ha t  we h a v e n ' t  seen in d e c a d e s .
I want t o  s t a t e  c l e a r l y  t ha t  Greece i s  not  a g a i n s t  the  r e c o g n i t i o n  of  an 
i ndependent  s t a t e  to  r e p l a c e  the former Yugos lav " S o c i a l i s t  Republ ic of  
Macedonia." S i n c e  Yugos l avi a  has unr ave l ed ,  we a c c e p t  the  emergence o f  a new 
i ndependent  Republ i c  on our northern bor de r s .  I t  i s  in our i n t e r e s t  to have 
a s m a l l ,  but  t r u l y  independent  s t a t e  as a ne i ghbor  than a big and powerful  
one.  Such a s t a t e  would s e r v e  our conc e rn ,  and t h e  concern o f  t he  Community,  
f or  s t a b i l i t y  in t he  r e g i on .
Greece ,  however ,  w i l l  not  endorse  a rush t o  r e c o g n i t i o n  t hat  has the
p o t e n t i a l  t o  t r i g g e r  open c l a s h e s  among t he  v a r i o u s  e t h n i c  groups in t h i s  
s ma l l ,  mos a i c  o f  a s t a t e ,  and to r e v i v e  o l d  t e r r i t o r i a l  ambi t ions  that  are 
c e r t a i n  t o  send t he  Balkans t o  the  v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t s  o f  the  p a s t .
Independence under t hos e  c i r c u ms t a n c e s ,  w i l l  put  Skopje  at  r i s k  o f  f a l l i n g  
e i t h e r  i n t o  t h e  embrace o f  Bu l gar i a ,  which has always  c ove ted  the  region and
c o n s i d e r s  most  o f  i t s  pe opl e  B u l g a r i an s ,  or  under the  dominance o f  i t s
powerful  no r t he r n  ne i ghbor ,  Se r b i a ,  as many in t he  r e p u b l i c  f e a r .  I f  e i t h e r
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happens,  Greece cannot  remain i n d i f f e r e n t ,  and s t a b i l i t y  in the Balkans wi l l  
become a memory.
The onl y  way to c l e a r  a s a f e  path to r e c o g n i t i o n  f or  Skopje i s  through the  
procedures  we adopted by unanimous d e c i s i o n  on 16 December 1991.  I quote:
"The Community and i t s  member S t a t e s . . .  r e q u i r e  a Yugoslav r e pub l i c  to 
commit i t s e l f ,  pr i or  to r e c o g n i t i o n ,  to  adopt  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
guar ant e e s  ensuring  that  i t  has no t e r r i t o r i a l  c l a i ms  towards a neighbouring  
Community S t a t e  and that  i t  w i l l  conduct  no h o s t i l e  propaganda a c t i v i t i e s  
versus  a ne ighbouring Community S t a t e ,  i n c l u d i n g  t he  use  o f  a denominat ion,  
which i m p l i e s  t e r r i t o r i a l  c l a i ms . "
Let us l ook then at  how the Republ ic  and i t s  l e a d e r s  have responded to the 
t hr e e  major requirements  in the d e c i s i o n  we took l a s t  December.
For the  pa s t  two months,  Skopje has launched a w e l l - f i n a n c e d ,  c a r e f u l l y -  
o r c h e s t r a t e d  campaign in Europe and the  Uni ted S t a t e s  t o  por t ray  i t s e l f  as a 
p e a c e f u l ,  democrat i c ,  unarmed s t a t e  wi th n e i t h e r  t he  power nor t he  d e s i r e  to 
t hr e a t e n  any o f  i t s  neighbors .  Thei r  p r e s i d e n t  has t r a v e l l e d  to  most o f  the  
major c a p i t a l s  to g i ve  hi s  personal  a s s ur anc e s  o f  t he  r e p u b l i c ' s  good 
i n t e n t i o n s ,  and i t s  parl iament  has passed two ammendments to the  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  t hat  i t  says g i ve  l e ga l  b i ndi ng t o  t he  a s s u r a n c e .
But both t h e  s tatements  and the  ammendments are onl y  window d r e s s i n g  to  
conceal  t h e  real  goods i n s i d e .
The ammendments,  passed with t he  e a s e  and speed o f  a s i mpl e  government  
d e c r e e ,  do not  a l t e r  the subs t anc e  o f  t he  o r i g i n a l  a r t i c l e s  or o f  the  
preamble.  Let me e x p l a i n .  In a r t i c l e  t h r e e ,  t hey  have added an ammendment, 
which d e c l a r e s  t hat  Skopje nurtures  no t e r r i t o r i a l  c l a i ms  a g a i n s t  i t s  
ne i g h b o r s .  This i s  obv i ous ly  accepted  CSCE language .  But in the same 
a r t i c l e ,  t hey  maintain the p r o v i s i o n  t ha t  wh i l e  t h e i r  t e r r i t o r y  remains  
u n v i o l a b l e ,  t h e i r  borders may, n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  be changed in accordance  with 
t h e i r  c o n s t i t u t i o n !  The inherent  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i s  e v i d e n t .  A l s o ,  whi l e  new 
language has been added saying t ha t  the  r e p u b l i c  "wi l l  not  i n t e r f e r e  in the  
i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r ?  o f  other  s t a t e s " ,  i t  i s  m e a n i n g l e s s ,  because  the  
c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  l eaves  i n t a c t  A r t i c l e  49 ,  which says  t h a t  t he  s t a t e  w i l l  "take  
care  o f  t he  s t a t u s  o f  the r i g h t s  o f  the Macedonian pe op l e  in ne ighboring  
count r i  e s ."
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Now a l l  c o u n t r i e s  f ee l  ob l i ge d  to look a f t e r  the r i g h t s  o f  t h e i r  c i t i z e n s ,  
when t r a v e l l i n g  abroad,  but no na t i on  we know about g i v e s  i t s e l f  
c o n s t i  t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  to be a spec i â"l a r b i t e r  o f  the s t a t u s  o f  c i t i z e n s  
o f  n e i g h b o r i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  A r t i c l e  49 empowers,  indeed compel s ,  pr e s e n t  and 
f u t u r e  governments  o f  the republ i c  to do e x a c t l y  t h a t .
What use  do you think that  an u l t r a - n a t i o n a l i s t  party l i k e  V.M.R.O. ,  which 
was i d e n t i f i e d  as a t e r r o r i s t  o r g a n i za t i on  in a r ecent  NATO document,  wi l l  
make o f  t ha t  a u t h o r i t y ,  i f  i t  comes to power in the r e pub l i c ?  While you are 
c o n s i d e r i n g  t h a t ,  l e t  me t e l l  you that  V.M.R.O. c u r r e n t l y  has the  l a r g e s t  
number o f  s e a t s  in Skopje ' s  parl iament  and t h a t  i t s  1990 e l e c t o r a l  pl a t f orm,  
i s s u e d  j o i n t l y  wi th another e x t r e mi s t  p a r t y ,  the Democrat ic  Party for  
Macedonian Nat i onal  Uni ty ,  dec lared that  "e l ements  o f  the  Macedonian nat i on ,  
which l i v e  under occupat ional  rule  o f  Greece ,  Bulgar i a  and Albania are not  
an e t h n i c  m i n o r i t y  but j u s t  occupied and e n s l a v e d  part s  o f  the  Macedonian 
n a t i o n . . . " .  The pl at form a l s o  s t a t e s  t hat  "the V.M.R.O. party  d e c l a r e s  i t s  
r e a d i n e s s  to  conduct  t a l k s  wi th ne i ghbour i ng c o u n t r i e s  f o r  the u n i f i c a t i o n  
o f  Macedonia".
Even more t e l l i n g  i s  the f a c t  t hat  t h e  preamble t o  the  Republ i c ' s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  has been l e f t  i n t a c t ,  and i t  i s  in preambles  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  
t h a t  t h e  ph i l o s op hy  o f  s t a t e s  i s  r e f l e c t e d .
The preamble t o  Skopje ' s  c o n s t i t u t i o n  s t a t e s  t h a t  among t he  p r i n c i p l e s  on 
which t he  new r e publ i c  w i l l  be b u i l t  are  t he  " l egal  t r a d i t i o n s  o f  the 
Krusevo Republ i c  and the h i s t o r i c a l  d e c i s i o n s  o f  the  A n t i f a s c i s t  Assembly of  
t he  P e o p l e ' s  L i be r at i on  o f  Macedonia." Both t h e  Krusevo Republ i c  o f  1903 and 
t he  A n t i f a s c i s t  Assembly held by Ti to in 1944 proclaimed e x p a n s i o n i s t  goal s  
b e s t  r e f l e c t e d  in the  Assembly' s  d e c l a r a t i o n  c a l l i n g  f o r  " u n i f i c a t i o n "  o f  
t he  Greek and Bulgar ian provi nces  wi th t he  " P e o p l e ' s  Republ i c  o f  Macedonia."
In v i ew o f  t he  i n t e n t i o n s  embodied both in t h e  preamble and in the  a r t i c l e s  
o f  t h e  r e p u b l i c ' s  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  you can s e e  why we don' t  f e e l  reassured by 
t he  ammendments r e c e n t l y  enacted by S k o p j e ' s  government to  enhance i t s  
c hances  f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  and why they do not  c o n s t i t u t e  "guarantees  a ga i ns t  
t e r r i t o r i a l  c l a i ms " ,  as required by the  unanimous d e c i s i o n  o f  the Community 
o f  l a s t  December 16.
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The second requi rement  on Skopje o f  that  d e c i s i o n — to d e s i s t  from " h o s t i l e  
propaganda" a g a i n s t  Greece— has mere ly ,prompted a l e t t e r  by the  Re publ i c ' s  
Foreign M i n i s t e r  to t he  A r b i t r a t i o n  Commission p l e dg i n g  t h a t  i t  w i l l  not 
carry  out  such a c t s  a g a i n s t  us .
In p r a c t i c e ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  wi th s trong t i e s  to the R e p u b l i c ' s  p o l i t i c a l  
l e a d e r s h i p  have been mo b i l i z e d  both at  home and abroad to  i n t e n s i f y  h o s t i l e  
propaganda a g a i n s t  Greece.
I can c i t e  numerous examples  o f  what they have done in j u s t  the  two months,  
s i n c e  the  Community asked Skopje to end i t s  h o s t i l e  propaganda,  but wi l l  
l i m i t  m y s e l f  to  three-  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  examples to save  t ime .
— Two weeks ago,  immigrants from Skopje demonstrated o u t s i d e  our Copenhagen 
Embassy and pinned a map and a proc lamat ion o u t s i d e  the door .  The map shows 
Greek Macedonia under o c c upat i on  and the proc lamat ion i s  f i l l e d  wi t h  s logans  
c a l l i n g  f o r  i t s  l i b e r a t i o n .  What i s  most important  about t he  p r o t e s t  i s  that  
the  group t h a t  or gani ze d  i t  i s  an a f f i l i a t e  o f  the  e x t r e m i s t  V.M.R.O.  
p o l i t i c a l  par t y  I ment ioned e a r l i e r ,  t hat  has the  most s e a t s  in Skopje ' s  
p a r i i  ament.
— Early in February,  anot her  demonstrat ion was or gani ze d  r i g h t  at  our border  
wi th Y u g o s l a v i a .  P r o t e s t o r s  shouted o b s c e n i t i e s  a g a i n s t  Greeks on the  other  
s i d e ,  pas s e d  out  hat e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  and c a r r i e d  p l a c a r d s  c a l l i n g  for  
independence  and " u n i f i c a t i o n "  o f  a l l  o f  Macedonia under S k o p j e ' s  r u l e .
— On January 15,  1992,  a pu b l i s h i n g  f irm in Skopje i s s u e d  a s e t  of
"souvenir" banknotes  wi t h  t he  most famous landmark o f  T h e s s a l o n i k i ,  the
White Tower,  p i c t u r e d  on the  no t e .  Indeed T h e s s a l on i k i  i s  shown wi th a
S l a v i c  name as So l un.  Another banknote ap p r o p r i a t e s  Bu l gar i an  h i s t o r y ,  
d e p i c t i n g  t he  medieval  Tsar Samuel as a "Macedonian".  Ap pr opr i a t i n g  the
h i s t o r y  o f  ne i g hbo r i n g  c o u n t r i e s  seems to be a popular  o c c u p a t i o n  in Skopje  
t h e s e  days .
Lest  anyone t h i n k  t h a t  such e f f o r t s  are p r i v a t e  i n i t i a t i v e s ,  or  the  work of  
e x t r e m i s t  emigre  groups ,  l e t  me po i nt  out  t h a t  the  government  o f  Skopje has 
hi red  Amer i ca ' s  b i g g e s t  p u b l i c  r e l a t i o n s  company, "Hi l l  and Knowlton",  to 
conduct  i t s  l obbyi ng  in the  United S t a t e s .  I have i nc l ud e d  a copy o f  i t s  
c o n t r a c t  wi t h  "Hi l l  and Knowlton",  in the  mat e r i a l  in your  f o l i o ,  so that
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you can see  that  part o f  i t s  perscribed d u t i e s  i s  to  promote the in t e r e s t s  
o f  "Macedonians" in neighboring countr ies .
By t he  way,  one o f  t he  f i r s t  i n i t i a t i v e s  o f  t he  l o b b y i s t s  was t o  publ i sh  
data s h e e t s  on "The Republ i c  o f  Macedonia." One o f  them d e s c r i b e s  the  
c l i m a t e  o f  t h e  " c o a s t a l  areas" o f  the r e p u b l i c  as "mild Medi t t eranean".  A 
l ook a t  any map o f  t he  reg i on  makes c l e ar ,  t h a t  Skopje  i s  l andl ocked  and the  
c l o s e s t  c o a s t a l  areas  are around Thes s a l on i k i  and t he  Ch a l k i d i k i  Peni nsul a  
on G r e e c e ' s  nor t hern  Aegean c o a s t .  It  w i l l  f u r t h e r  amuse you and g i v e  you an 
i n s i g h t  i n t o  t he  t r u e  aims o f  Skopje,  to know t h a t  we have j u s t  r e c e i v e d  a 
c a b l e  s a y i n g  t h a t  the  l andlocked Republ ic unanimously  adopted a law a few 
days ago c a l l i n g  f o r  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  an army, an a i r  f o r c e ,  and a . . .  navy!
I t  i s  o b v i ou s  then t h a t  h o s t i l e  propaganda,  both mi ld and s e v e r e ,  c ont i nues  
unabated a g a i n s t  Greece and i t  i s  organized and d i r e c t e d  by Skopje .  The aim 
o f  t h i s  propaganda i s  t o  spread f a l s e  i n f or mat i on  about  t he  e t h n o l o g i c a l  
c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  Greek Macedonia,  to  undermine t he  exemplary human r i g h t s
record o f  Greece  and c r e a t e  f e e l i n g s  o f  h o s t i l i t y  a g a i n s t  our country  
abroad,  t o  d i s p u t e  t he  Greek c u l t u r a l  h e r i t a g e  o f  Macedonia and to usurp the  
Macedonian name in order  to  j u s t i f y  c la ims  on Greek Macedonia.
In v i ew o f  t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  a t t a c k s  on us ,  i t  i s  obv i ous  t h a t  Skopje has no
i n t e n t i o n  t o  meet  t he  community's  second requi rement  f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n  and end 
h o s t i l e  propaganda a g a i n s t  Greece,  but i s  o n l y  t r y i n g  t o  make us b e l i e v e  i t  
w i l l .  As much as we may want t o ,  the e v i dence  makes c l e a r  t h a t  we c a n ' t .
We now come t o  t h e  t h i r d  and f i n a l  requirement  t he  Community adopted l a s t
December f o r  g r a n t i n g  r e c o g n i t i o n — the s t i p u l a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  Republ i c  should 
not  adopt  a name t h a t  i mp l i e s  t e r r i t o r i a l  c l a i m s .
I submit  t o  you now, as I did in the  l e t t e r  I s e n t  e a r l i e r ,  t hat  the  
denomi nat i on  "Republ i c  o f  Macedonia" not  o n l y  i m p l i e s  t e r r i t o r i a l  c laims  
becaus e  i t  was g i v e n  t o  Skopje 47 years  ago f o r  t h e  e x p r e s s  purpose o f  
t ak i n g  o v e r  p a r t s  o f  Greece and Bu l gar i a ,  but  a l s o  p e r p e t u a t e s  them because  
i f  a c ount r y  e x i s t s  wi t h  t ha t  name t he  i mpr e s s i on  i s  g i v e n  t h a t  areas  in 
o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  bear the  same name must be l ong  t o  i t .
Dear C o l l e a g u e s ,
;
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The name i s  t he  game i t s e l f .  Were i t  ^ot  f or  the  use  o f  the denominat ion  
"Macedonia";  which Skopje at tempts  to monopol ize ,  they would have no bas i s  
t o  put  forward any cla im whatsoever  on o t her  s t a t e s '  t e r r i t o r i e s .
Equal l y  i mpor t ant ,  the name i mpl i es  not only  t e r r i t o r i a l  c l a i ms  aga i ns t  
Greece but  r e pr e s e nt s  an a s s a u l t  on o u r : H e l l e n i c  c u l t u r a l  h e r i t a g e .  The
c u l t u r e  and h i s t o r y  o f  Macedonia i s  part  o f  the Greek h e r i t a g e  and has no 
c o n n e c t i o n  t o  the  Slav p e o p l e ,  who now want t o  c a l l  t he ms e l ve s  "The Republ ic  
o f  Macedonia."
As C o n s t a n t i n e  Karamanl is ,  the  Pres i dent  o f  Greece ,  who is. h i m s e l f  a 
Macedonian,  wrote  in a l e t t e r  to a European p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r ,  Skopje has
" a b s o l u t e l y  no r i g h t ,  e i t h e r  h i s t o r i c  or e t h n i c ,  to use the  name Macedonia.
No h i s t o r i c a l  r i g h t  because  the  S l a v s ,  who make up the  maj or i t y  o f  the 
R e p u b l i c ' s  p r e s e n t  po p u l a t i o n ,  f i r s t  appeared in t he  h i s t o r y  o f  t he  region  
in t he  s i x t h  century  A. D. ,  t h a t  i s  some 1 ,000 ye ar s  a f t e r  the  p e r i o d ,  when 
Al exander  t h e  Great e s t a b l i s h e d  Macedonia as a s i g n i f i c a n t  part  o f  t he  Greek 
wor l d .  And no e t h n i c  r i g h t ,  because  the  pre s en t  po pu l a t i o n  o f  t h i s  Republ ic  
i s  made up o f  S l a v s ,  Al bani ans ,  Gypsies  and o t he r  e t h n i c  groups ,  a l l  o f  them 
r e s p e c t e d ,  o f  c o ur s e ,  but none wi th any connec t i on  t o  Macedonians."
D e s p i t e  t h e  l ack  o f  any real  e t h n i c  or c u l t u r a l  t i e  between the  present  
r e p u b l i c  and anc i e n t  Macedonia,  t h e i r  l e a d e r s ,  by us i ng  i t s  name over  the 
p a s t  47 y e a r s ,  have been a b l e  to  f o s t e r  the  impress ion t h a t  they are the  
nat ur a l  i n h e r i t o r s  o f  P h i l i p  and Alexander and the  land they  once r u l e d .
We a r e  not  so  n a t i o n a l l y  n a i v e ,  as to  be annoyed onl y  because  o f  a f i x a t i o n  
on our a n c i e n t  h i s t o r y .  The s t rong  r e a c t i o n  o f  t he  Greek pe opl e  i s  not  due 
t o  a s t e r i l e  anc e s t o r  worshi p .  I t  i s  due to  the  f a c t  t h a t  f o r  almost  h a l f  a 
c e n t u r y  t h e  name Macedonia has been used as a weapon f o r  t he  promotion of
e x p a n s i o n i s t  aims.  The use  o f  the  name i s  not  independent  o f  the  d e s i r e  to
s e i z e  and c o n t r o l  Greek t e r r i t o r y .  I t  i s  an i ns trument  o f  a g g r e s s i v e  p o l i c y .
And, o f  c o u r s e ,  i f  a l i e  i s  bi g  enough and i s  repeated enough t i m e s ,  i t  w i l l  
s t i c k .  A f t e r  47 years  t he  l i e  about the  s o - c a l l e d  "Republ ic  o f  Macedonia" 
has t aken r o o t .  There i s  no b e t t e r  proof  o f  t ha t  than t he  f a c t  t ha t  t h i s  
group o f  Western European n a t i o n s  i s  c o n s i d e r i n g  r e c o g n i z i n g  a s t a t e  wi th a
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name i t  was g i ven  at  the he i ght  of  the  c o l d  war as a par t  o f  a communist  
s t r a t e g y  t o  t ake  over l arge  areas o f  one* o f  i t s  members.
While t he  r e p u b l i c ' s  c la im to  l i nks  wi th a n c i e n t  Macedonia i s  unsupportable  
at  any l e v e l  and i t s  ambit ions  to expand i t s  t e r r i t o r y  i s  u n j u s t i f i a b l e  for  
any r e a s o n ,  t he r e  i s  ample e v i dence ,  i n c l u d i n g  t he  s t a t e me nt s  I have c i t e d ,  
t ha t  t h e s e  d e l u s i o n s  are deeply  imbedded in t he  long term p o l i c i e s  o f
Skopje .  These p o l i c i e s  w i l l  not be abandoned,  i f  Skopje i s  g i ven  
u n c o n d i t i o n a l  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  even though some o f  i t s  l eader s  are now
d i s c l a i m i n g  a connect i on to anc i ent  Macedonia in hopes o f  i nc r e a s i n g  the  
chances  o f  winning i t .
There i s  no o t he r  c onc l u s i on  to reach,  i f  t he  r e p u b l i c ' s  l eader s  i n s i s t  on 
c a l l i n g  t h e i r  s t a t e  Macedonia,  s i n c e  i t  i s  a name to  which they have no
c o n n e c t i o n  and was imposed as a v e h i c l e  to  promote expans i on i nto  the  
t e r r i t o r y  o f  ne ighboring c o u n t r i e s .  Russ i a  s topped c a l l i n g  i t s e l f  the
"Sov i e t  Union",  when i t  abandoned i t s  Communist and e x p a n i s i o n i s t  p a s t .  Why 
does Skopje  i n s i s t  on keeping a name a s s o c i a t e d  wi t h  e x p a n s i o n i s t  ambi t ions  
in t he  Balkans  unl es s  i t  s t i l l  harbors t ho s e  aims?
I know t h e r e  i s  a f e e l i n g  among some o f  you t h a t  t he  name o f  the  Republ ic  
should not  be a cardinal  i s s u e ,  that  Greece ' s  i n s i s t e n c e  on a d i f f e r e n t  name 
i s  e mo t i o n a l ,  and that  t here  are no r a t i on a l  reasons  t o  r e q u i re  a change.
But w i t h i n  t h e  world community,  i t  i s  unprecendented f o r  a s t a t e  to use the  
g e o g r a p h i c a l  name o f  an area ,  whose g r e a t e s t  par t  l i e s  o u t s i d e  i t s  borders .  
As you may be aware,  the  t e r r i t o r y  o f  t he  Republ i c  ex t e nds  over  39 per c e n t  
o f  t he  ge ogr aph i c  region o f  Macedonia,  w h i l e  Greek Macedonia covers  51 per  
c e n t  and Bul gar i an  Macedonia 9 per c e n t .
I f  t he  name o f  a geographic  region i s  a l l owed t o  be monopol ized by a 
p o l i t i c a l  e n t i t y ,  which c o n t r o l s  only 39 per c e n t  o f  t h e  t e r r i t o r y ,  the  door  
i s  l e f t  open f o r  c laims  in p e r p e t u i t y  f o r  the  remai ni ng  61 per  c e n t .  This i s  
not  s c a r e  t a l k .  The whole e x i s t e n c e  o f  t he  s o - c a l l e d  "Macedonian" n a t i o n ,  
s i n c e  i t s  c r e a t i o n  by Ti to  i s  based on t ha t  as s umpt i on .  Once r e c o g n i t i o n  i s  
as s u r e d ,  n a t i o n a l i s t  f or c e s  in the r e pub l i c  w i l l  use  t he  name as a s t r ong  
weapon f o r  c u l t u r a l  and t e r r i t o r i a l  a g g r e s s i o n .  While t hey  w i l l  be waving a 
powerful  s l o g a n — "Free Macedonia!"— a g a i n s t  us ,  we w i l l  be l e f t  wi th the  
i m p o s s i b l e  t a s k  o f  t r y i ng  to  e xp l a i n  s u b t l e  nuances about  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  the  
re g i on  o v e r  t he  pas t  2500 y e a r s .
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Some o f  you may s t i l l  f e e l  t hat  i t  would be presumptuous f o r  the  Community 
to ask a s t a t e  t o  change i t s  name. But we have be f ore  us a p e t i t i o n  f o r  
r e c o g n i t i o n  by t he  government o f  a s t a t e  under c r e a t i o n ,  an e n t i t y  t h a t  has 
ne ve r  been recogni zed  as a Republ ic under i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law.  I t s  name was 
a s s i g n e d  t o  i t  by a Communist regime f o r  i t s  own e x p a n s i o n i s t  a ims ,  a regime  
t h a t  no l onge r  e x i s t s .  So in examining the c r e d e n t i a l s  o f  a c a n d i da t e  s t a t e ,  
we have e v e r y  r i g h t  to requi re  that  i t  should not be i d e n t i f i e d  wi t h  a name 
and a h i s t o r y ,  which i s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th t e r r i t o r i a l  c l a i ms  a g a i n s t  a member 
s t a t e  o f  our Community.
Let us remember t hat  the Macedonian name a l re ady  e x i s t s  and i s  in use as a 
name f o r  a l a r g e  h i s t o r i c a l ,  geographic  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e g i o n  o f  Greece.  
In T h e s s a l o n i k i  t he re  i s  the "Ministry or Macedonia-Thrace",  t he  "Macedonian 
U n i v e r s i t y " ,  t he  "Soc i ety  f or  Macedonian S t u d i e s " ,  t he  "Macedonian Press  
Agency",  t he  "Macedonian Conservatory",  the  "Macedonian Ai r por t  o f  
T h e s s a l o n i k i "  and c l o s e  to 2 . 5  m i l l i o n  pe opl e  o f  Northern Greece ,  who c a l l  
t h e ms e l v e s  Makedones! I f  Skopje i s  g i ven t he  r i g h t  not  o n l y  t o  usurp but ,  as 
an i ndependent  s t a t e ,  to monopol ize  t ha t  name, i t  w i l l  u n l e a s h  o l d quarre l s  
and new c o n f l i c t s  in the whole region on a wide s c a l e .
The c a s e  i s  c l e a r .  I f  we do not  remove t he  root  o f  t he  problem,  t ha t  i s  the  
name, we would merely i n v i t e  t r o u b l e .  And we w i l l  a l l  come t o  r e g r e t  i t .
I d o n ' t  t h i n k  we are being a l a r mi s t s  or  r e a c t i n g  any d i f f e r e n t l y  than you 
would in s i m i l a r  c i r cums tances .
In f a c t ,  we have a recent  example showing t h a t  Central  Europeans are j u s t  as 
s e n s i t i v e  about  such i s s u e s .  Last  Oct ober ,  t he  Re publ i c  o f  S l o v e n i a
p u b l i s h e d  a new banknote,  bear ing a watermark o f  t he  h i s t o r i c a l  symbol of  
the  o l d  p r i n c i p a l i t y  o f  Car i n t h i a .  Although i t  was a temporary banknote,  i t s  
p r i n t i n g  r a i s e d  a stormy r e a c t i o n  among Car i nt hian A u s t r i a n s ,  who accused  
S l o v e n i a  o f  f u e l i n g  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  c l a i ms  f o r  C a r i n t h i a .  A f t e r  a heated
de bat e  in t he  l oca l  par l iament ,  the f eder a l  government in Vienna was asked 
to,  i n t e r v e n e  wi t h  Slovenian a u t h o r i t i e s ,  who f i n a l l y  gave  a s s ur a nc e s  that  
t h e y  have no c l a i ms  on the prov i nce  and agreed t o  s u b s t i t u t e  t h e  banknote.
I d o n ' t  need t o  dfaw p a r a l l e l s .  But i f  Aus t r i ans  re ac t e d  as  t he y  did about a
watermark,  you can imagine Greek s e n s i t i v i t y  a f t e r  having been s u b j e c t e d  to 
47 y e a r s  o f  pr o v o c a t i o n s .
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The f a c t  i s  t h a t  the  end o f  the cold war has un l e a s h e d  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  f orces  
t ha t  are  c a p a b l e  o f  c r e a t i n g  h o s t i l i t y  and c o n f l i c t  anywhere in the  wor l d.
To c r e a t e  a new s t a t e  c a l l e d  Macedonia in t he  Balkans  i s  t h e  s u r e s t  way to 
r e v i v e  a l l  t h e s e  c o n f l i c t i n g  c laims  and t o  p l a n t  h o s t i l i t y  in the  region  
t ha t  i s  c e r t a i n  to  reap a whirlwind o f  t r o u b l e s  in t he  f u t u r e .
For t he  s t a b i l i t y  o f  the  re g i on ,  f or  the good o f  Skopje  i t s e l f ,  and f o r  the 
peace  o f  mind o f  a l l  o f  us here ,  the be s t  c o u r s e  f o r  t he  Republ ic  i s  to 
adopt a s u i t a b l e  name. There are many good o p t i o n s .  P r i o r  to  the Communist 
e r a ,  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  name o f  the r e g i on ,  as I have ment i oned,  was Vardar 
Banovina.  Immediately be f ore  t h a t ,  during t he  l a s t  phase  o f  Ottoman r u l e ,  i t  
was known as Skopje- Sanjak.  The Slav i n s ur g e n t s  o f  1903 proc laimed i t ,  the  
"Krusevo Republ i c" and t he re  i s  much in t he  name t o  u n i t e  i t s  i nh a b i t a n t s  
wi t hout  d i s t u r b i n g  i t s  ne i ghbors .
I am aware t h a t  the  Ar b i t r a t i on  Commission recommends r e c o g n i t i o n  as 
Macedonia on t he  b a s i s  o f  assurances  provided by Skop j e .  But t he  Commission,  
which based i t s  recommendation on j u r i d i c a l  r e a s o n s ,  f a i l e d  to  observe  a 
b a s i c  l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e :  "audiatur  e t  a l t e r a  pars" (Hear t he  o t h e r  s i d e ) .
Not  o n l y  d i d  i t  d i s count  our e v i d e n c e ,  i t  di d not  l i s t e n  t o  t he  o b j e c t i o n s  
r a i s e d  by e t h n i c  Al bani ans ,  Serbs and Montenegri ns  i n s i d e  Skopje to 
r e c o g n i t i o n .  I know you are aware t ha t  l e a d e r s  o f  t he  Albanian mi nor i t y  in 
t he  r e p u b l i c  have s e nt  a l e t t e r  to t he  "Twelve" p r o t e s t i n g  t he  Commission's  
recommendat ion.
I t  i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  we cannot  f o l l o w  t he  Commiss ion' s  a d v i c e  on Skopje e i t h e r  
because  i t  f a i l s  to  take  i n t o  account  t he  p o l i t i c a l  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  o f  
r e c o g n i t i o n  and t he  c o n f l i c t  i t  w i l l  unl eash in  t he  Bal kans .
Let us l ook  b r i e f l y  at  t ho s e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  both in Skopje  and on i t s  
n e i g h b o r s .
Skopj e ,  i t s e l f ,  i s  a mosaic o f  c o n t en t i o u s  e t h n i c  and r e l i g i o u s  groups .  In 
Skopje  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  e t h n i c  gr o u p s - - A l b a n i a n s ,  Bu l gar i ans  and Serbs — f ee l  
s t r o n g  a l l e g i a n c e  to c o u n t r i e s  j u s t  a c r os s  the  border and they  yearn to  
u n i t e  w i t h  them.  On top o f  t h a t ,  r e l i g i o u s  h o s t i l i t i e s  t ha t  have been 
brewing f o r  y e a r s  are reaching a b o i l i n g  p o i n t  in t he  Re publ i c .  Albanian  
Moslems— a t h i r d  o f  the  po pu l a t i o n— r e s e n t  Orthodox C h r i s t i a n s ,  who make up 
al mos t  h a l f ,  f o r  t r y i ng  to  dominate them ove r  t he  pa s t  s e v e r a l  de c ade s .  The 
C h r i s t i a n s  i n  turn s e e  the Moslems as symbols  o f  c e n t u r i e s  o f  Ottoman
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s u b j u g a t i o n .  I t  i s  only a matter  o f  t ime b e f o r e  t he  R e p u b l i c ' s  Moslems r i s e  
to demand t h e i r  own independence and e vent ua l  union wi th  Albania which is  
pr e domi nant l y  Moslem.
For i t s  p a r t ;  Albania has not t r i e d  to h i de  i t s  i n t e n t i o n s .  The Albanian  
Fore ign M i n i s t e r  has made i t  c l e a r  that  Tirana s e t s  two c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  the  
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  Skopje .  F i r s t ,  that  the Skopje Republ i c  should r e c o g n i z e  an 
i ndependent  "Republ ic  o f  Kossovo" and, s e c o n d ,  t h a t  Skopje e x p r e s s e s  i t s  
w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  aknowledge an autonomous s t a t e  f o r  i t s  predominant ly
Al bani an we s t er n  d i s t r i c t s .  Once autonomy t s  a c h i e v e d ,  t he  pres sure  w i l l
s t a r t  f o r  u n i f i c a t i o n .
On S k o p j e ' s  e a s t e r n  border s tands  Bu l gar i a ,  Al though i t  became t he  f i r s t  
count r y  t o  r e c o g n i z e  the r e p u b l i c ' s  i ndependence ,  t h e r e  was no j u b i l a t i o n  in 
Skopje  becaus e  i t s  people  s u s p e c t  B u l g a r i a ' s  i n t e n t i o n s .  The day a f t e r  
B u l g a r i a  rushed to  re cogn i z e  the  r e p u b l i c ,  S k o p j e ' s  l e ad i ng  newspaper,  "Nova 
Macedonia",  which i s  l inked t o  Pr e s i de nt  G l i g o r o v ,  pub l i s he d  an a r t i c l e  
s a y i n g  t h a t  S o f i a ' s  quick r e c o g n i t i o n  may mask pl ans  to  p l ay  the r o l e  o f  
"p r o t e c t o r "  or  " l i b e r a t o r "  o f  the  new s t a t e  and u l t i m a t e l y  absorb i t .
The Gl i g o r o v  newspaper has reason to worry becaus e  in r e c o g n i z i n g  Skopje,  
B u l g a r i a  made i t  c l e a r  t ha t  i t  r e c ogn i z e s  a s t a t e  but not  t he  e x i s t e n c e  o f  
a Macedonian n a t i o n .  In o t he r  words,  i t  r e c o g n i z e s  t he  name o f  the land but 
not  t h e  i d e n t i t y  o f  i t s  people!"
S o f i a  c o n s i d e r s  t he  major i ty  o f  peopl e  in t he  e a s t e r n  h a l f  o f  Skopje e t h n i c
Bu l g a r i a n s  wi t h  a f i x e d  d e s t i n y — union wi th  B u l g a r i a .  That was made c l e a r  by
a s t a t e me nt  made j u s t  t we l ve  days ago by t h e  former Prime Mi n i s t e r  o f  
B u l g a r i a ,  Di mi t ar  Popov,  at  a meet ing o f  t h e  "Independent  Publ i c  Committee 
f o r  Et hni c  Quest i ons" in S o f i a .  "The d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  Yugos l av i a" ,  he sa id  
w i l l  undermine e x i s t i n g  t r e a t i e s  and a l l ow Bu l g a r i a  "to s e e k  i n t e r na t i o n a l  
s upport  t o  undo the  h i s t o r i c a l  i n j u s t i c e  done t o  her as regards the  
B u l gar i an  we s t e r n  pr ov i nc e s . "  By western p r o v i n c e s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  he means 
p a r t s  o f  t he  Republ i cs  o f  both Skopje and S e r b i a .
As f o r  S k o p j e ' s  northern ne i ghbor ,  Se r b i a ,  i t s  government has i n d i c a t e d  that  
Be l gr ade  w i l l  not  oppose the Re pu b l i c ' s  independence ,  but S e r b i a ' s  l eaders  
have a l s o  made i t  p l a i n  t hat  they w i l l  not  t o l e r a t e  Bulgar i an domination of  
t he  Republ i c  and w i l l  act  to  prevent  i t .
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Of a l l  i t s  ne i g h b o r s ,  Greece i s  the onJy country  t ha t  has no de s i g n s  on i t s  
t e r r i t o r y .  There are tens  o f  thousands o f  Greeks in the  Republ i c  o f  Skopje.  
We can make t e r r i t o r i a l  c la i ms  o f  our own on t h e i r  behal f .We have n o t ,  and
we are  the  onl y  country in the region t hat  h a s n ' t .  I n s t e a d ,  being the  only
s t a b l e  democracy in the area and the only  member o f  the  Community,  we are in 
a p o s i t i o n  t o  he l p Skopje most to safeguard i t s  s o v e r e i g n t y  and s t r e ngt he n  
i t s  economy.
I f  Skopje  i s  granted r e c o g n i t i o n  on the b a s i s  o f  the  December 16 Community 
d e c i s i o n ,  which inc ludes  a change in name, Greece w i l l  do e ve ry t h i ng  
p o s s i b l e  t o  he l p  the  Republ i c .  We have a l ready  worked out  propos a l s  and
p r o j e c t s  t o  prov i de  fundamental  a s s i s t a n c e  to  Skopj e ,  because  we b e l i e v e
t h a t  t h e  Community has a key r o l e  to play in the  r e g i o n .  They i nc l ude  two 
recommendat i ons , one on arrangements f o r  r e g i ona l  s e c u r i t y  t ha t  embrace
Skopje ,  and t he  o t he r  on economic development o f  t he  Vardar-Axios  V a l l e y .
On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  i f  Skopje i s  granted r e c o g n i t i o n  on i t s  own t erms,
i n l u d i n g  t he  name" Macedonia",  Greece w i l l  not  be a b l e  t o  he l p  the  r e publ i c  
in any meaningful  way and w i l l  have to  take  measures t o  p r o t e c t  i t s
i n t e r e s t s .  To e x p l a i n  why, l e t  me d e s c r i b e  to  you t he  f e e l i n g s  o f  the  Greek
pe o p l e  about  t h i s  i s s u e .  As your own mi s s i o n s  in Greece may have al ready
re por t e d  t o  you,  no i s s u e  in decades has inf lamed Greeks as much as the
p o s s i b l e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  Skopje as Macedonia.  P as s i on s  are  p a r t i c u l a r l y
s t r o n g  in Northern Greece,  in Greek Macedonia.  Our Makedones number 2 . 5  
m i l l i o n ,  roughl y  one quarter  o f  our po p u l a t i o n ,  t h a t  i s  more peopl e  than
t h e r e  are  in a l l  o f  Skopje.
Al l  Greeks f e e l  the  same anger over t h i s  i s s u e .  P e t i t i o n s  s i gned  by 
o f f i c i a l s  o f  l o c a l  governments ,  t rade  un i ons ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l  and bus i ne s s  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ^ ;  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c o o p e r a t i v e s  and s t u d e n t  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a f f i l i a t i o n s ,  are f l o o d i n g  my o f f i c e .  Local and 
r e g i o n a l  r ad i o  and t e l e v i s i o n  s t a t i o n s  are c a r r y i ng  d a i l y  re por t s  and 
de b a t e s  on t h e  i s s u e ,  and groups throughout  Greece are  meet ing  to d i s c u s s  
ways t o  show t h e i r  op p o s i t i o n  to the c r e a t i o n  o f  a s t a t e  c a l l e d  Macedonia.
Only t h r e e  days ago,  on February 14, t h a t  r e s o l v e  was dramat i zed by the  
b i g g e s t  demonstrat ion ever  held in Greece.  You can s e e  t he  p i c t u r e  in your  
f o l i o  and j udge  f or  y o u r s e l v e s .  An. e s t i mat e d  one m i l l i o n  pe opl e  r a l l i e d  in 
T h e s s a l o n i k i  t o  demonstrate  t hat  Greeks w i l l  not  t o l e r a t e  any f ur t he r
1)
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encroachment  upon t h e i r  c u l t u r a l  h e r i t a g e  or  any c l a i m s ,  s t a t e d  or i mpl i e d ,  
a g a i n s t  t h e i r  t e r r i t o r y .
What a l l  t h i s  means i s  t ha t  t o  grant  Skopje r e c o g n i t i o n  as Macedonia i s  to  
make i t  p o l i t i c a l l y  i mpos s i b l e  f or  any Greek government ,  now or in the  
f u t u r e ,  t o  he l p  t he  Republ i c  s ecure  an accepted  p l a c e  in the  r e g i o n .  Without  
Greek s u p p o r t ,  i t  w i l l  f a l l  v i c t i m to  encroachment  from one or more o f  i t s  
o t h e r  n e i g h b o r s  sooner  or l a t e r .
To gr ant  Skopje  r e c o g n i t i o n  on i t s  own terms t he n ,  w i l l  not  be doi ng  i t  a 
f a v o r  but  a s s u r i n g  i t s  eventual  dismemberment.  Morever,  such r e c o g n i t i o n  i s  
c e r t a i n  t o  become an apple  o f  d i s c or d  in the  whole  r e g i on  and t r i g g e r  
h o s t i l i t i e s  and c o n f l i c t s  in the  Balkans f o r  y e ar s  and decades  to  come.
Let us f o r  a moment p r o j e c t  our minds i n t o  the  f u t u r e .  As p o l i t i c i a n s ,  we 
must be a b l e  t o  look ahead.  Is t he r e  anyone in t h i s  room, who can guarant ee  
t h a t  Democracy w i l l  remain a l i v e  in t h i s  v o l a t i l e  Balkan r e g i on  in t he  ye ar s  
t o  come? Can anyone exc l ude  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a temporary or even a
permanent r e v e r s a l  o f  t he  democrat ic  pr oc e ss  in any one o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  in
t he  g r e a t e r  area?
That i s  why,  my f r i e n d s ,  i t  i s  a b s o l u t e l y  i mpe r at i ve  t h a t  t he  Community 
t ake s  i t s  t i me  t o  c o n s i d e r  every  a s pe c t  o f  t h i s  i s s u e  very c a r e f u l l y  and to
come up wi t h  a process  f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  i s  f i r ml y  anchored in i t s
d e c i s i o n  o f  16 December 1991.
Now i s  t h e  t i me ,  l e s s  than 10 days s i n c e  t he  o f f i c i a l  s i g n i n g  o f  the  
M a a s t r i ch t  documents ,  f o r  t he  Community t o  c l o s e  ranks on t h i s  i s s u e ,  to  
show i t s  s o l i d a r i t y  wi th  one o f  i t s  members d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d ,  and t o  
s a f e g u a r d  peace  and s e c u r i t y  in Sout he as t e r n  Europe f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  a l l  
t he  p e o p l e s  in t he  r e g i o n .  We have agreed on t he  t h r e e  s p e c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  
I f  t he y  are  not  met in s u b s t a n c e ,  then t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  community w i l l  g e t  
t he  message  t h a t  the European Union does not  r e a l l y  mean what i t  s a y s ,  and 
t h a t  t h e  v i t a l  i n t e r e s t  o f  i t s  s ma l l e r  members are  not  g i ve n  the  same 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  as t hos e  o f  i t s  most prominent .
To make our s tandards  and our de t er mi nat i on  a b s o l u t e l y  c l e a r ,  I would l i k e  
t o  make t h e  f o l l o w i n g  propos a l s  concerning  t h e  Community's p o l i c y :
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— We must p r e s e n t  a uni t ed  f ront  t ha t ' * i s  a b s o l u t e l y  s o l i d .  We have s e t  a 
common p o l i c y  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  a Very important  t e s t  c a s e  f o r  t he  Community.
The f i r s t  s t e p  toward European Union and common i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e s  
cannot  be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by u n c e r t a i n t y  and l ack  o f  s o l i d a r i t y .  The r e f or e ,  we 
must f i r s t  r e a f f i r m  our De c l a r a t i o n  o f  December 16,
We must then t ake  the  measures to e x e r c i s e  p r e s s u r e  upon t he  l e a d e r s  o f  
Skopje and c o nv i nc e  them t h a t  i t  i s  t o  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  t o  comply wi th  our 
t hr ee  p r e r e q u i s i t e s  f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n  because  they  o f f e r  t he  b e s t  way to  
s e c u r e  both t h e i r  s u r v i v a l  and"peace in t he  Balkans ,
I f  we a l l  a g r e e ,  I would s ugge s t  t ha t  t he  Pr e s i de nc y  conveys  to  the  
l e a d e r s h i p  o f  Skopje a c l e a r  message:  we are  ready not  on l y  to  r e c ogn i z e  
t h e i r  i ndependence  but to g i v e  them a l l  n e c e s s a r y  guar ant e es  f o r  t h e i r  
s e c u r i t y  and economic development  provided t hey  meet t h e  c o n d i t i o n s .
I t  w i l l  be up t o  Skopj e ' s  l ea d e r s  t o  grasp t he  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  Greece and the  
Community are  prepared t o  o f f e r ,  i f  t hey  w i l l  accomodate t he  concerns  o f  
t h e i r  n e i g h b o r s .  But whatever  they do,  t he  Community must s tand f irm for  
s t a b i l i t y  and order  in our d i s q u i e t i n g  wor l d .  Any ha s t y  move now wi l l  help  
turn t h e  Balkans  as we reach t he  end o f  t h e  c e n t u ry  i n t o  t h e  kind o f  v i o l e n t  
and t u r b u l e n t  reg i on  i t  was a t  the  beg i nni ng  o f  i t ,
I am an o p t i m i s t  and I dream t ha t  wi th  p a t i e n c e  and r e s o l v e ,  we can turn the  
Bal kans ,  which a prominent  magazine r e c e n t l y  c a l l e d  " H i s t o r y ' s  caul dron",  
i n t o  an example o f  how ol d r i v a l r i e s  can be f orged  i n t o  new o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
f o r  c o o p e r a t i o n ,  p r o s p e r i t y  and peace ,
*
Thank you f o r  your  a t t e n t i o n  and f o r  your  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  concerns  o f  my 
c ount r y .
T .
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APPENDIX V
Letter that US Secreotcry of State James Baker sent to Greek Foreign Minister 
Antonis Samaras on 5 March 1992. It is published here in its entirety for the first
time.
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March 5, 1992
Dear Àndonis:
In the aftermath of the Bosnian and Montenegrin 
referenda and the Security Council decision to begin-the 
process of deploying a UN Peacekeeping Force in Croatia, 
we clearly face a new situation in Yugoslavia, a situation 
replete with both opportunities and dangers. President 
Bush has asked me to propose that I meet, while in 
Brussels for the NACC Ministerial, with you and the other 
EC foreign ministers to seek at that time to develop a 
common approach to dealing with this new phase of the 
Yugoslav crisis.
From the outset, the United States has strongly- 
supported the efforts of the Community to resolve the 
crisis, and we highly appreciate the role the Community 
has played in this effort. If we are able to reach an 
agreement on March 10 regarding further steps, I believe 
this will be the best assurance available that the crisis 
in Yugoslavia can be successfully managed.
In our view, the changing circumstances in Yugoslavia 
put a particular premium on moving ahead quickly on two 
fronts. To begin with, we believe we must do all we can 
to expedite the deployment of the UN Peacekeeping Force, 
and we hope that the advance party currently on its way to 
Yugoslavia will be able quickly to obtain the information 
necessary to refine the cost estimates and enable the 
Council to take the necessary decision. Secondly, the 
February 29-March 1 referenda in Bosnia-Hercegovina and 
Montenegro have completed the process in which most of the 
Yugoslav people have expressed a preference as to the 
future. More urgently, the Bosnia-Hercegovina referendum 
has created a situation in which we believe rapid action 
is needed to prevent a serious threat of unrest and 
destabilization in that republic. Already, we see efforts 
by Serbia, using Serbian organizations in
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Bosnia-Hercegovina, to destabilize the situation, and we 
have sent a strong warning to President Milosevic to cease 
these activities or run the risk of adverse consequences 
to Serbia's future relationship with the United States. 
Likewise, the threat of a breakdown in the ceasefire in 
Croatia'is always present. Finally, we are increasingly 
concerned about the economic crisis in all the Republics 
of Yugoslavia. Continued deterioration in the economic 
situation will mean not only greater instability and 
privation for the Yugoslav people but also a greater 
burden for our countries in supporting the inevitable 
recovery programs.
With these thoughts in mind, I would propose that we 
meet in Brussels following the NACC Ministerial orr 
Tuesday, March 10 to determine whether we can agree now to 
move ahead together in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis.
As before, we would see the Community taking the leading 
role, with the United States firmly supporting and 
assisting that role. In this connection, we would like to 
seek agreement on March 10 to complete the process of 
recognizing the independence of those Yugoslav Republics 
that have requested it. This would mean for the United 
States recognition of the independence of Croatia,
Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia. For the 
Community, this would involve recognition of the 
independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia. As, I am 
sure is true for you, we have wrestled with the question 
of whether recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina ' s 
independence would contribute to stability in that 
delicately-balanced republic or encourage, efforts by the 
large Serbian minority to destabilize the situation. We 
have concluded that while there obviously is no external 
influence that can guarantee the stability and territorial 
integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina, we can best contribute to 
that objective by a collective recognition of that 
Republic's independence and warning against efforts from 
within or without to undermine its integrity.
In addition to the question of recognition, we would 
also need to agree on how to deal with Serbia and 
Montenegro. Our preliminary thinking would be to agree to 
recognize those two republics as a common Yugoslav state, 
provided that satisfactory arrangements can be worked out 
with the Yugoslav successor states on the many legal and 
financial issues that would ensue inevitably from the 
disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation. One key 
condition we should insist upon with all the Yugoslav 
Republics is mutual respect for the territorial integrity
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of all the nev states.- We should also consider carefully 
hov we can best maintain pressure on the Serbian 
leadership to extend to national minorities in Serbia, 
particularly in Kosovo, the same protections that Belgrade 
seeks for Serbs in Croatia.
We are, as friends and allies, very sensitive to your 
concerns about Macedonia, as you described them to me at 
our meeting here in Washington on January 2 2 .  Obviously, 
we have made clear publicly and privately, including to 
the President of Macedonia, that any effort by that 
country to call into question the frontier between Greece 
and Macedonia would be totally unacceptable to the United 
States and other members of the world community. We have 
also sought to encourage the Macedonians to take steps 
that would eliminate any legitimate concern on your part 
regarding their intentions. In this connection, Presicenc 
Gligorov's public statements here on January 2 9 following 
his meeting with Deputy Secretary Eagleburger were 
encouraging. Ke stated that Macedonia has no territorial 
claims against any neighboring state, considers the border 
of those states inviolate, and is fully committed to the 
values and principles underlying the CSCE and the 
EC-sponsored peace conference chaired by Lord Carrington.
As Ambassador Sotirhos has told Prime Minister Mitsotakis, 
we will be prepared to continue our efforts, together with 
your partners in the Community in order to find a 
mutually-acceptable solution.
At the same time, I must tell you that it is cur 
judgment that failure to recognize what is now known as 
Macedonia in a reasonably timely fashion will contribute 
to instability and encourage other Yugoslav elements to 
adventurism which could rapidly escalate to open 
conflict. This, surely, would not be in the interest of 
Yugoslavia's neighbors, the European Community, or the 
United States.
Obviously, a key point in any solution must be a 
successful conclusion of the peace conference organized by 
the Community under the presidency of Lord Carrington. As 
before, we are prepared to give all our support to Lord 
Carrington and use whatever influence we have with the 
parties to assist him.
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Given the urgency of the situation I hope it will be 
possible for us to meet in Brussels next Tuesday and to 
reach a common position on how we should deal with the 
crisis in Yugoslavia. As I said, I think we face a 
significant opportunity, working together, to resolve the 
crisis, but I also fear that time is:not on the side of 
those who wish for a peaceful and constructive end to the 
Yugoslav tragedy.
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APPENDIX VI
Previously unpublished list by Greece's Ministry of Foreign Affairs containing 
projects aimed at developing econom ic relations between G reece and FYROM.
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Proj ec t s  o f  development  o f  r e l a t i o n s  wi th  ^kopje
The Greek government  i s  exami ni ng  p o s i t i v e l y  number o f  spheres  o f  
c o o p e r a t i o n  wi th the  Republ i c  o f  Skopje  a f t e r  the  l a t t e r  c omp l i e s  wi th the  
terms s a t  by the European Community f o r  i t s  r e c o g n i t i o n :
a) Greece i s  ready to n e g o t i a t e  wi th Skopje  s e c u r i t v  and conf idence  bui ld  
ino measures in the s p i r i t  o f  CSCE and the  documents o f  Vienna,  1992.
b) Granting s u b s t a n t i a l  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  in the  form o f  gr ant s .
c)  F a c i l i t i e s  to be granted to  Skopje in t he  port  o f  T h e s s a l o n i k i .
d) J o i n t  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  Vardar-Axios  v a l l e y .  There i s  a l ready  an important  
UNDP f e a s i b i l i t y  s tudy which shoul d be brought  up to  d a t e .
This  p r o j ec t  i nc l ud e s  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  e l e c t r i c a l -  power s t a t i o n s ,  i r ­
r i g a t i o n  p l a n t s ,  e c o l o g i c a l  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  the  w a t e r s ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  e t c .  
Finance could be provided,  a l s o  by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .
e) J o i n t  p r o j e c t s  f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  the  environmment ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in 
border areas .  Such p r o j e c t s  c ou l d  be f i n a n c e d  by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .
f)  Skopje c ou l d  be i n c l u d e d  in t h e  Balkan c o o p e r a t i o n  p r o j e c t s  or o t h e r  
reg ional  cooperat i on schemes and b e n e f i t  from the c o o p e r a t i o n  to  be deve loped.
g) Skopje could b e n e f i t  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  a s s i s t a n c e  in know-how e tc  wi t h i n  the  
framework o f  the "Phare" and G-24 p r o j e c t s .
h) Greece w i l l  support  a p o s s i b l e  r e q u e s t  o f  Skopje  to  s i gn  a cooperat i on ,  
and l a t e r  on an a s s o c i a t i o n ,  agreement wi t h  the Community.
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APPENDIX VII
Previously unpublished telegram that Greece's Prime Minister Konstantinos 
Mitsotakis sent to various Greek Embassies on 15 May 1992.
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A e v  E L v a i  a i r ^ n  5 1 ŒT T p a Y p a x  e u t  l  k ü É G q  T r ) ç  K u p s p v q a E w c ,
d C T T I p a  O^OK^T^POU TOU E ^ ^ q V L K O Ù  ^ Œ c O  .
E C t e  a p é c E i  G T o u ç  e x a C p o u ç  p a ç  r| \ 3 é o r |  a u T ^  e Ct e  6 % i  
a i r o T E ^ E C  p C a  i rpcrypccTt .  k ô t t i t c : , é v a  n o ^ L T i K ô  y e y o v ô ç  ttou t o Oç k q ^ e C 
v a  P Y & ^ o u v  T a  a u p T T s p â a p a T d  t o u ç .
H t t C e o t ]  TTpoç  TT | V E ^ A A S a  y ^<^ a ^ ^ a y n  o t A g e c o ç  6 %( -  p ô v o  5 e v  
É%EL T q v  n a p a p i K p ^  E ^ n C S a  v a  E n L T û % E L  a ^ ^ ' E v ^ x E u  c o p a p o O c  
K L v S ü v o u ç  KGL y t a  T q v  E J ^ 6 8 a  K a i  y L a  TT| v  K o L v ô T q T a .  A l ô t i  p  L 6
G U p P u P a G T L K q  / ^UGLÇ 6 a  E ^ ^ G ^ d ^ L ^ E  E L ç  TO S u q V E K E q  T q V  E V a V T C w G L V  
T o u  E ^ ^ q v L K o û  ^ a o û  T r p o ç  T o  p ô p c p t i j p a  T o j v  E k o t t Co j v , t o  o t t o Co v  
TTEp  L o T o  L X  ^G p é  v o  V , ÔTTCüç s C v a i ,  a i T Ô  x p c c T r )  E n o c p 6 a 2 p i  o O v T a
p a K p o x p o  V c u ç  i r j v  a < £ p a i ô T r ) T d  t o u ,  o e v  q p n o p E Û  v a  s m  p l  c û g e  l c c v e u  
Tr)ç unoGTripC^Ecjç Tqg E a ^ d S o p .
A c p ' E i é p o u  T| S q p L o u p y l a  L G x u p c î i v  a v T  i  k o  i  v o T  l < ü v  kœl  
UTTEp E f l V L  K L G T t  KCJV p E U p d T W V  TTOU p T To p E C  v a  o S q y ^ G E l  G £
a TTOGTa â  EpOTTO C T^ GT^  6% L p p v o  TT| q  E ^ ^ d S o Ç  C ^ ^ d  KG L O ô  K fjp T]Ç TT^Ç 
T T E p L OX ^ Ç ,  S C v a i  KG L G U T ^  CCTTÔ T O U Ç  E p ^ G V É G T E p o U q  K l V S O v o UÇ TTOU 
e ^ ^ o x e û o u v .
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3 )  Attû i n  O T L Y P n  Tro u d a  a u  v s  i. 5 r| t o t t o  l r ^ c o u v  o i E x a C p o ' .  piaq  
ÔTL n TTCear) r r p o ç  x r j v  E ^ / l â S a  0% i j j ô v o  a v c r T r o i E ^ E a p L a i L  Kq e C v q u  a / l / l d
KŒL E T T L K C v S u v q  \  l  Œ TO O Û V O À O  T q C  K o L V Ô T q T O Ç  S S V  Œ n o p É V E L  ŒA^OÇ  
S p ô f j o ç  ŒTTO i q v  TTC s a q  TTpOC r q v  I I / ^ E U p â  TWV E k o t t l w v  w c t z  v œ
E Y K Œ T Œ A s C y o U V  TO T l T O L K Ô  TTŒpE^âÔV TOUÇ KŒL VŒ KOL TCi q OUV TTpoÇ TO
p é ^ 3 o v ,
A l ÔTL ELVŒL Œ V a p c p L Œ Ô q x q T O  CTL p E X P t  TO 3 ' r Î Œ Y < Ô a p L G
n Ô ^ E p O  O U S e Cç  L O T o p L K Ô Ç  ŒVCCpÉpEL X q v  ÛTTŒpÇr|  ( J Œ K S S o V L K o O  é i 3 VQ\ J Ç,
H A q p o K p Œ T L Œ  a \ J T q  œ t t o t e / I e C o q p  l o O p  Y q p c c  t o u  T i T c C a p o O  
T q ç  J X Œ ^ L V L K q g  E n o % q g  k œ l  e Cv œ l  t o  t e ^ e u t œ Co K Œ T d ^ o L r r o  t o u  
ŒTŒi ^LVLKOÛ OUŒXq p ŒTOÇ O T q v  EupUJTTq .
E x o u p e  E H Œ V Œ ^ d p E L  KŒXd KÔOOV ÔTL TO K p Œ X C S l O  ŒUTC
KŒTŒŒK E U d a â q K  E p E  CU Y K £  K p  L p  é  V E q O K O TT L p ô  T q  T E C ŒTTÔ TO V T C T O  KŒL TO V 
Z T d A l V .  0  L a K O T T L p Ô T q T E Ç  Œ U T Ê q  £  C XCCV OŒV é V ŒUC p Œ T q v  ETTL^ETLKH 
CpL^OOOCpCŒ XOU K O p p o U V L Œ p o O  £  L q  p d p o q  TOU T Ô T £  £ ^ £ U Ü É p o U  K Ô O p C U
KŒL T q v  U ^ O T T o C q o q  TWV £TT£K TŒT L Kt üV n p o Ü É O E W V  X O U .  H E ^ 3 d q ,  ŒTTO XO
B ' F l Œ Y K Ô a p L o  H ô ^ s p o  a u v ô p e u £  p E  t œ  K Œ T ' E ç o x q v  c k  ^ q p o i r u p q v  l Kd  
K O p p O U V  LOT L Kd KŒÜEOTWTŒ KŒL ŒTTEXé ^EOE TTpOTTÛpY'-O XOU NATO Œ X q v
Œ V T C x p O U O q  TOU K o p p o u  V L a p o u  . 0Œ qTŒV T p Œ y L K Ô ,  T q  Œ T i y p q  TTOU O
K o p p O U V L O p Ô q  £ ^ O U 5 E T E p Û < 3 q K  £  , o  L OÛUp ŒXOL  KŒL E TŒC p OL  pŒq VŒ 
£T7L T p é \ | J o u v  x q v  E T T L B C u o q  TOU t e ^ e u t œ C o u  ŒUTOU UTTO ^ e  c p p Œ T o q  T q q  
O T Œ ^ L V L K q q  L S E O ^ o y C Œ q  ÉVŒVT L  T W V  K U p C w v  E i 3 v L < W V  OU p WE p ÔV X WV  XP,q
E a a d S o q .  A u T q  e Cv œ l  p C Œ S i d a x a a q  x q v  o h o Cœ KŒppCŒ E ^ 3 q v L K q
_ ^ g . K P Y . q o q  6 E V _ J Œ _ p T T o p Q p . q . g _ Y . Œ  . E ^ q  y qCE.L C T O . Y _ £ A A q . V L K . Ô _ i l a Ô _________ __________
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v'-V'
4 )  Y t t ô  t o  c puç  Tc j v  a v c j j T é p c j  c v c j a é v o u p E  œ t t ô  t o u ç  E x a C p o u ç  p c r ç  
ô T i  i3a O T a ô p C a o u v  x q v  a o p a p ô T q x a  x q ç  K Œ X Œ O x â G E w g  k œ l  ô œ  J s ^ f j c o u v  
v a  a a < q a o u v  x q v  s n i p p o q  x o u g  T r p o ç  x a  E k ô t t l œ  w o x E  v a  S s x ^ o O v  x o  
a O v o ^ o  TCJV d p u v  n o u  é x s i .  ^ é a e u  q  K o L v ô x q x a  a r r o  t l ç  1 6  A s x E p G p C  o u  
KdL E n a v E ^ a p E  a x L ç  2  M a C o u  a x o  G U I H A R A Z 3 .
A e v  ŒpKEC v a  y C v o v x a L  S u a K q p O Z s L ç  p £  ô p o u ç ,  n p Ê n E i  v a  
a o K q â s C  K a i  e y  t o l ç  i r p d Y p c c a L  TTLEoq  y u a  x q v  a T T o S o x n  t ü v  6 p w v ,  
T T p d y u a  TTOU S e v  É x s i  y C v s i  p é x p t -  x û p a .
5 ) H  E ’j u c p c j v C a  x o u  M A A S T R I C H T  ^ e g t t C ^ e l  x q v  K O L v q  s Ç c j X E p L K i ^
TTO^ (. X L K f) . E l v œ L  y vCJGTÔ ÔTL q  E ^ j ^ d S c  S i a c p C J V o O O E  p £  X L Ç aiTÔUJELÇ 
d A ^ t j v  E x a C p c j v  x q ç  a u v a c p û ç  p E  x q v  < p C a q  a x q  E l o u  y K o c r ^ a p  C a , < p C a q  
TTOU e Cx £  x a i  é x E L  o q p a v x  L K É ç  ett l tttcjoe  l ç  y  L a  x q  x ^ p c c  u a ç  . î î o x ô a o ,  
0 X 0  T T ^ a C o L o  x q ç  v é a ç  cdl / \ o a o c p C a ç  x q ç  E u p c j n a  l k f j ç  é v c j o q ç  S s x ^ A ^ c c u E  
v a  o u v x a x â o u p E  p s  x o  E u p w n o L K ô  c o n s e n s u s .  A v x C o x p o c p a  ô p w ç ,  é x o u p s  
x q v  a i r a C x q a q  ol  E x a C p o u  p a ç  v a  r r a p a i c o ^ o u 5 A c r o u v  x q v  E ^ ^ q v u K q  
E H L X E L p q p a x o J o y C a  o e  é v a  J é p a ,  x o  o t t o Co  -  i T L O X E u o u p E  é x E L  y C v E L  
a v x L ^ q r r x ô  -  a n o x E ^ E C  p e l ^ o v  e 3 v l k ô  i S é p a .  A l ô x l  a u x A  a û x q  q É v v o i a  
x o u  c o n s e n s u s  a n a i X E C  a e ô a o p ô v  r r p o ç  x a  ^ c j x i K d  a u p c p é p o v x a  tcjv 
E x a C p c j v  i caL L E p d p x q o i v  x c j v  a v x  l x p o u o p é v c j v  cttôi vecjv  e l ç  x a  T T ^ a C a i a  
x q ç  ttoA l t l k A ç o u v E p y a o C a ç . A ^ A w ç  q e t tCx e u ^ C ç  x o u  i3a a n s x é ^ E L  
p o v ô S p o p o v  a p ^ L p ô ^ o u  a Ç C a ç .  E C v c l  S e  c p u o L x ô  ô x l  é ^ ^ E L ^ j q  
J J T T o o x q p  C ç E c j ç  _ p a ç  ..aTT.ô x o u ç  . e x œ C  p o u ç . .  p a ç .  . â a . . S q p  L .o u p .y .4 a £ .i_____________________
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CTTSUKTaC o u ç  TTpoP-^riijiaT LQjjoOç Trig x o l v i ^ ç  yv wpHS é v a v T L  Tqg TTcpsCaç  
KŒl. xriç 0 <OTTI. pàTT)TOÇ l ŒÇ K O l v q ç  £ T £p l. < Tro^LTLKHÇ TrjÇ
K o  v ô T q T o ç  .
M H T Z O T A K H E
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APPENDIX VIII
The flag that FYROM's Parliament adopted on Tl August 1992 and an ancient 
representation of the Vergina Star.
Source: Hellenic Foundation For Defense and Foreign Policy, 1993:11
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C.o ldcn  la n i  AX h e a r in g  Kin g PlùUp's  rel ics .  C o v e r  d e c o r a l e d  w i th  th e  M a c e d o n ia n  d y n a s t y ' s  
c iu h lc i i i .  a  1 (h ra y  s u n .
[Ai;gnc. Macedonia. Greece.  4t/t ceninnj 13.C.)
m m > r n
S k o p je ' s  n e w  n a t io n a l  Hag, u s u r p i n g  th e  a n c ie n t  M a c e d o n i a n  d yn a .s ty 's  c ii ihlerii  
(SkoijJc. 1902 A.n.)
APPENDIX IX
Previously unpublished letter that Greece's Foreign Minister Michoiis 
Papaconstcntinou sent to his EPC counterparts on 12 October 1992.
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t h e  m i n i s t e r  f o r  f o r e i o n  a f f a i r s
Athens, October 12, 1992
I am writing to you with some urgency to express my 
Prime Minister's as well as my own serious concern at the 
following developments today with respect to the issue of 
Implementary Regulation 2725/92.
We are informed that at a meeting earlier this 
morning of the Working Group "Mediterranean", the Commission 
made known to the members of the Group that Skopje have 
refused to accept use of the seals "F.Y.R. Macedonia", as 
agreed by the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg (5-6 
October) , unless two additional conditions that they have set 
are met.
Further, we are told that the representative of the 
Presidency, on behalf of eleven member-states of the 
Community, appealed to the Commission to proceed to a 
modification of the Implementary Regulation.
What is more disturbing however, and indeed 
disappointing, is that the position taken by the Presidency is 
tantamount to a reversal of the agreement reached by ourselves 
in the General Affairs Council last week.
In view of the above, and to the extent that we 
consider our agreement in the General Affairs Council of 
critical importance, I would urge you to reconsider the 
position adopted by the Presidency at the Working Group level 
and allow the Implementary Regulation to stand as adopted by 
the Commission and published in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities (JO L276/18 of 19 September 1992).
Michael Papaconstantinou
The Rt Hon. Douglas Hurd, CBE, MP., 
Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs,
London.
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APPENDIX X
Previously unpublished speech that Greek Foreign Minister Michoiis 
Papaconstcntinou gave during the crucial meeting of New Democracy's 
Parliamentary Group on 21 October 1992.
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AGnva, 20 OxTw&puou 1992
S H M E I A  n A P E M B A Z E O Z
E H E A I E E I E  E T O  0 E M A  T Q N  E K O n i n M
H e u H p e u o T n c  x n c  ( % \ ) a .Y \ 'w p L O E w c  x n c  A n u p H p a T u a c  xcov  
E k o r c u c ü v  6 e v  u t i o p g l  v a  Ô L a p x E O G L  a n d u n  s t t l  u a k p o v .  H u n o -  
u o v n  x w v  G x a C p w v  u c : q  ô E L x v e u  o x u  H d u n x e x a u  . Y r x d p x e u  k I ' v -  
6 u v o c  G o x c j  u a u  a v  o x o  E 6 l u 0 o u p y o  6 e v  x p o n o n o u n S s u  n a n o p a o n  
x n c  A L O c a G c o v o Q ,  o p L c r u é v o L  e x a u p o u  v a  e t x l ô u c o E o u v  v a  Ô L a o n d -  
o o u v  x o  c o n s e n s u s .
Kai  a n d  e X X n v u H r i Q  n X e u p d Q  d X X p c x e  e x o u u s  e r t a v e u X n u -  
u é v a r ç  u n o y p a u u L O E L  o x L  e i v a u  a u B i i L u n  n  a v a y v c o p L o n  x w v  E k o -  
T i L P v  x o  x a x u x E p o  ô u v a x d v .  Y n o  x o u c  o p o u Q  0 E 0 a L ü ) ç  n o u  s x o u v  
o e x G e u  o l  12 o x l q  16 A e k e u G p l o u  1991 u a u  o x n  E u v o ô o  K o p u p n c  
x n c  A L O o a B d  v o c -
r i L O x e o u u e  o x l  n a v a ^ v d p u o n  n p e n s L  v a  e n e X B e L  x o  x a x u -  
X E p o  OXL ÔLOXL ô u a p a u v o v x a L  U u v ô u v o l  n o X e u L H h c  E X p n E e c o g  o x o  
E O P x e p L u b  x o u  E ô d p o u g  a u x o u  n S u a o n a o x L H E g  x d o E t g  n a x B u n  
K u B e p v n t l u H  a n o o x a S E p o n o L H P O  • H a ' O a Y v d p L c r i  E L v a u  a v a y x a C a  
a p e v o g  ? L a  v a  n a u o E L  a u x n  n  a v d u c t X n  x a x d o x a o n  o u u p p v a  u e  
TO A L s G v É g  A L x a L O  x a L  a p E T s p o u ,  x u p C w g ,  c j o t e  v a  ô o G e l  n 
ô u v a T O T T i g  O T o  K p a T L Ô L O  a u T o  v a  a v T L U G T c o n C o e l  TL g  E n i B o X s g  
n o u  U E O o n p o B E O u a  n  u a K p o n p o B E o u a  E n w d C o v x a L  e l  g  B d p o g  x o u .  
H E X X d g  B a  n p s n c L  v a  E n L Ô L w x E L  x n v  E n L B u w o n  x a u  x r i v  s o w -  
T E p L x n  o x a B E p o T n x a  x o u  x p a x L Ô L O U  d o T E  v '  a n o x E X e c E L  é v a  
U Y L G C  K u x x a p o  o x a  B a X x d v L a .
H  B p E x a v v L x n  n p o E ô p L a  x a x a B d X X E L  n p o o n d B E L s g  d o x E  v a  
B t o u u s  a n d  x:o a Ô L É l ' î p ô o -  K L V E L x a L  En C x r i c  o p B n c  B d o E w g ,  
E p a p u o x n c  XT!g  A n o p d o s w g  x n c  A L O o a B d v o g .  A x d u a  6 e v  u n d p -  
x o u v  a n x d  o x o L X G L a  -y L a  x o  x l  B a  a n o ô d o E L  n n p o o n d B s L a  x o u  
n p é o B u  X .  O ' N q X .  B p l o x e x c l  o '  E n a p n  UCcCu u a g . T o u  y v w -  
o x o n o L o u u G  u s  e n L x a o n  x l ç  E X X n v L x s g  B s o E L g  o e  d , X L  a p o p d  
x n v  o v o u a o C a  ( x o l  x n v  a v d y x n  E p a p u o y n g  d X w v  x w v  o n u s L O J v  
x o u  n a x E x o u  r i L V G L p o ) .
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Arco nXeupdc Tou x . HURD UETÉgepe xau auToc To ocooto 
xXCuct TnC KPLVOTHTac otov X. GLIGOROV. Tputo G%GL Lôuau-
x s p n  o n u c t o C a .
Eto npoocpaxp xolvotlxo Ysuua tcjv YHES oxo Mnépui.VYXxctu, 
oxav o Aavoc YUEH enavécpEpe dxalpa xau dxo^^a xo 0éua xriC 
avŒYvcjpLOScjc éXa0e xriv ôéouoa arcdvxriari xoco and xov BeXyo 
ouvdôeXcpd uou doo xau and xov Bpsxavvd npdsdpo. GéXcj va ncj 
as auxd dxL napd pplougvsc evxunwoELG nou ôCôovxaL and xov 
T u  no OL GÀAnVLXGG 0GOGLC GXOUV 0GPUOUC ■ UnOOXriPLXXGQ. 0X0 
nAauoLO xcjv 12.
T o  0 G u a  x n c  X P n O L u o n o L n o G c j c  x c j v  o c p p a x L ô c j v  o u u p œ v a  u e  
x o v  ExxgIgoxuxo K a v o v L O u d  x n c  COMMISSION x a x ' o u ô É v a  x p d n o  
ÔGV n p G n e u  v a  0 G C J P n 0 e L  d x  u a n o x G l e  l  n p d x p u u c t  Y u a  xn '^  e n u l u o n  
x o u  0 G u a x o Q  x n c  o v o u c i O L a c -  A n o x G X s u  é v a  XGx\>o :<PP' ' ' : i -^P  n p d  -  
0 X n u c t .  x o  o n o L o  o n u e p a  G n u X u G x a L  L x a v o n o u n T L x d  Y ( . a  x u c  e X X n -  
VLXGC and^GLC.
Y n G v 0 u u C C w  d x L  n  E X X d c  a n o c p d o L O G  v a  a v a o x G t X G L  x n  p o n  
n c x p G X a u o u  n p o c  xlc Fl o u Y n o o X a p  l xgc A n U P x p c t X L G C  o X L  c a v  
u e x p o  x a x d  xcjv E x o n C c j v  a X X d  n p o c  e f l a o c p d X t o n  oxl ol A n u o  -  
x p a X L G c  a u x G c  ô G v  0 a  é o n a Y c i v  xlc xupcjoglc e v a v x L  x n c  v é a c  
f L O U Y > t o p X a 0 L a c . Au xcS  x o  X E X c u x a L  o  o n u s u o  s n p e n G , x a x d  
x u p L O  X d Y O ,  v a  e Ç a o c p a X i o 0 e l a n d  xn^J K o L v d x n x a .
E x o u u e  G n a v G L X n u u é v c j c  ô n X c j O G L  d x L  n  E X X d c ,  o x o  n X a C o L O  
x n c  ( p L X o o o c p C a c  n o u  n p o a v é p e p a ,  o u ô é n o x G  0 é X n c e  v a  a v a c x G L -  
Xgl a v 0 p c j n L O X L x n , . e n L O L X L O X L x n  n d X X n  B o n G s u a  n p o c  x a  
E x d n i a ,  a x d u a  n a i  x n  a w E p y a a C a  u e  x n v  E OK  n p o c  u n o o x n p L & i  
x n c  hXuôcjvlC o u é v n c  O L x o v o U L a c  tcjv E x o n C c j v .  AocpaXcJC ô e v  
e L v a u  UE T o v  o L X O v o u L x d  o x p a Y Y c t X L c j u d  n o u  0 a  n e C o o u u E  x n v  
S x o n L a v n  n ï s o L a  v a  gvôcjogl o x a  Ô L x a L a  e X X n v L x d  a  L x n  u c L x a .
0a npénsL va onUELCJOcj dxL n eupuxepn noXuxuxn uocc 
évavxL XCJV ExonCcjv gxel apxCoGL v' anoôCôGL xapnouQ, axduo- 
xaL 0X 0  eocjxGpLxd xou xpaxLÔLOU auxou.
npensL va ouvGLÔnxonoLnPOPUE xl enunxcjoGLC éxGL n no-
XLXLxn uac 0X0 GOCJXGpLxd XCJV ExonLCJv. Agv npénGL va napa-
/ . /
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3XénouuG T L c rLuéosLC o l  o u o l s c  aouoü\)TaL ottiv nïsoLa t o u  
KpaXLÔLOU KŒL XqU oXp aTUOOpaLpa eUTOVWV [U^WOEWU TIOU on- 
UELwvovTaL. Kœl auxn n Txxuxn- éxsL LÔLaLTepn onuctOLa xnv 
onoua 6ev Rpéneu v a  riapauePL Couuè eàv 0éA.ouus va exouue 
uua oXoKXnpcouévn euxova rnc ôuvaULxnc nou 0éA.ouuG va ônUL- 
oupxnoouue•
A p X E T O L  KUXXOL O L X O V O U L X O L  X a L  R O À L T L X o "  0SOJPOUV
avayxaCa trv enCXuon to u Cnnnuaxoc Tnp ovouaauac coote 
V ' ap%Lpouv ou.aA.Gc o l x o v o u l x g c  ôoooXn^LSC US nriv EA.A,d6a 
os TGTOLO oriuELO udXuoTa (üOTS o LÔLOC O GLIGOROV va xaTOY- 
X G L A.S L ooouc npogdXXouv t r v avdxxn napaxwpnOGwv upoQ
G $ G U P G O n  A,UOGCi) C .
Z u x x p o v w c  u e  T T | v  ô p a o T n P L a  r c a p s u B c t a r i  T n c  6 l r c X c J u a T L x n c  
u u n p G O L a c  G x e u  a n o p s u x G c L  n  g l o o ô o q  t c o v  I x o r l c d v  o g  ô u d p o -  
p o u Q  Ô L G 0 V G L C  O p x a v L a u o u Q . n p o o c p a x a  u d A - L O x a  n  s X X n v L x n  
U G 0 o 6 G U o n  G L x e  o a v  a R O T É A - G O u a  o  M A L E S K I ,  A , G x 6 u e v o c  Y O E S  
T WV  Z x O R L W V ,  v a  u n  Ï L V S L  Ô G X T O C  G T O  N A T O ,  O R W C  G L X e  C n T n P E L .
T a  S x o R u a  o u v a t a 0 d v o v T a u  0 A.0 x a u  rgploootepo x n v  a u o -  
u o v w o n  O T n v  O R o C a  tous x a T a ô L x d C o u u e .  n p o o R a 0 n o a u e  v a  gx- 
U G T a A . A . G U 0 o u u e , 6 0 0  u n o p o u u e , T a  a x o R n u a x a  x n s  E x o R u a v n s
6l R A w U C t T i a S  - ETOL , gxel X L V S L  XOLVn R E R O L 0 n C r i  a v a  T n v  
u c p n X u o  OTL T a  S x o R L a ^  R a p d  n a o a  n Q t x n  ôgovtoXoy C a ^  x a R n A . s u -  
0 n x a v  T O V * Ü X L O  T n s  B S p X L V a s "  2 T 0  OnUE LO ROU x a L  a U T O S  o  
X . MALCOLM ROU G x p a ^ s  to yvwotô d p 0 p o  oto S P E C T A T O R  R a -  
p s ô s x Ô E L  ÔTL n a R Ô p a o n  clutô n x a v  a v ô n x n  x a L  s a c p a A . u É v n  x a L
ÔTL TO VMRO é x E L  ÔVT W S ÔLaTURCOGGL S Ô ac p L X G Q  Ô L G K Ô L X n O E L Q
GvavTL T n s  E A . A . d 6 o s *  B s g a L w s  ôGv s C v a u  ôuvaxôv v a  ôsxGoôuE 
O ’*^HA.los Tns BspxLvas"va RapauELvsL ws sBA-nuct Twv Sxorlwv.
M a s  U É v o u v  A . L Y W T G P O  a R Ô  6 u o  u n v s s  U É x p i .  T q  S u v o ô o  K o -  
p u w n c .  TOU E ô L u B o u p Y o u .  K a x "  a u x ô  0 a  rpsrgl v a  0pg0gl X u c n  
Y (.a TO ô v o u a  x a L  s v  ouvsxELa x q v  a v a x v w p L o n  x w v  Sxorlcjv. 
H'  a u T Ô  TO U L x p ô  Ô L d o x n u a  a n a L T s C x a L  n  r t A , n p n s  o u v o x ô  T o u  
x ô u u c i T o s  a A . X d  x a L  x o u  roA.ltlxou c p d o u c t T o s  x n s  E A . A . d ô o s  r e p o s  
G R L T G u E n  TOU o x ô x o u  u c i Q . E R a v a X a u B a ^ w  ôtl c p o p a u c t L  ôtl a v
/ . /
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OTO E 6 l u 0 o u p y o  ô£\>  e r l t ù x o u u s  T n v  S T i u X u o n  TOU,  C h t h u o t o c  
0 a  a v T L U G T c o a C o o u u s  n X é o v  T n v  ô u x n  u a g  a i x o u o v c o o n  •
To YIIES avTLUGTûjrtu Cs L ouYKewpuuévec xau noXuriA.eupcc
G v é p Y G L G C  WOTG T n V  n U G p O U H V L a  O U T n  VŒ G%OUV 6 n U ^  OUPYTlQe  ^
ô X s Q  a i  H a r d X X r i X e Q  o u v B t i k g c  c j j o t g  t o  G é u a  v a  X v é e C  x a u  v a  
X u O e C  o u u p c j v a  u e  t o u q  o t o x o u q  r t o u  é x e u  0 g o g l  n  K u 0 G p v n o n :  
Ôn^CLÔn T n v  a v a Y V W P L O n  TCOV EKOTILCOV 6 o T G  n Ô L G 0 V n C  T a U T O T n -  
Tci  T O U S  v a  u n v  R G p u G x e u  t o v  o p o  M a K G Ô o v C a .
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APPENDIX XI
Previously unpublished excerpts from Antonis Samaras' speech and supporting 
documents that the former Greek Foreign Minister presented at the 21 October 
1992 meeting of New Democracy's Parliamentary Group.
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 ^ l“l w. Cu  ^ V> • /I r\ P < ci j V —- ^
^  A . l A M A P A I  ; K u p i c  f l p ô e ô p e ,  u i A n a a x e  p i a  w p a  < a i  <7-7.0, Gd- ;  c x p e x e
n 6  K i d  u o u  £ i , < ô v a .  Mt t c o u j .  . v a  i rw o x i  e i v a i  e v e :  p u v y z c  £ t t i  ï ï p g c o j ï ï i i c o ' j  
0 £ u c i . .  K a i  c i v a i  ï ï o A u  g a p c i d  n c G u v n y i a  u é v a  c n u E p a ,  a y o c T T r i x o i  c u p i o i  
: P u v d ô c A & o i .  E y d  o i c L ï ï n a a  < a i  o e  a x i y u é ç  x o u  a < 6 u a  0  < a 0 £ v a ç  0 a -  u x c p a -  
o x i ^ E  x o v  e a u x o  x o u . - A x ô u a  < a i  a e  a u x n  x n  B d p B a p n  6 i a 6 i K a a i a ,  r n v  O T r o i a  
5 c x 9 n>xc:  y  I a  v a  & u y w ,  y  i  a  v a  a w o n c ^ ^ G w  a i r  6.  t o  u r T O u p y c i o  x q j v  E Ç o ü X O p i c d v  
) c a  I a i d x n o a  u o v o  y i a  x o  x r a A o v  x o u  p G v k o u  G É u a x o ç .  M e x d  x n  o n u E p  i  v n  • 
a v a ^ o p d ,  x n  o u v c x n  a v a ( t > o p d  o c  u e v a  x o u  < u p i o u  f l p o j G x o u p y o u  o c  y s y o v o x a  
x o u  x G c g ,  a u u v o u c v o ç  o x w ^  ^r-i'pou. ■ u x o x p c w u d v o g  0 a  x o j  u o v o v  A i y a  c x i  A o t c x i i c d  
a x o  a u x d  x a  o x o i a  o a v  y c y o v o x a  x p o c d A c o a v  x n v  T r o A u K e ô a A n  a x o ^ j a o n  x o u
O K O U .  u o u  a T T O K E ( t ) a A l O U O U .
A v a ( t ) é p o u C L  I T T p d x a  j x  i  g  1 6 . 1 2 .  Z x  i  g  1 6 . 1 2 , x p i o n u i o v ^  x o  x p w i  Ç u x v n o a  
X O V  f l p u j G u x o u p y o  < a i  x o u  a v a . < o  i v w o a  x n v  u s y a A u x s p n  e x i x u y i c t  x o u  u x o p o u o e  
v a  u x d p ^ E  I ,  % x n v  x i 6  OK A n o n  d p a ,  6 u o  x o  x p w i  , u x o x p d o j o a  é v ô s K a  o u v a Ô ê  A ( t o u ^  
c v o p c  I  x o j v  c Ç e A i Ç s o j v  tï]Ç ô i d A u o n Ç  x n ç  F i c u y K o o A a 0 l a ç  v a  S c y G o u v  w ç  a v x i -  
o x d G u i P U C c  x o u  6 i K o u  u a g  S e x o  x o  Ô K a ï o j u a  n  E A A d ô a  v a  Qé a e i  x o u g  3 ô p o u g . 
 ^ O p o u g  K a x d  x o  A u  < a  A u x c p o u g  x w v  o p w v  x o u  Y x o u p y i K O u  Z u u B o u A i o u  < a i  e Ç n -  
y  o u  u o  i  a u é o c o g .  T i  A é c i  x o  Y x o u p y  K O  Z u u B o u  A 1 0  ; N a a A X d C c i  x n v  o v o u c t o i a  
M a K E Ô o v i a  n  o x o i a  c y E i  y c w y p a 6 i < n  u x o o x a o n . A u x ô ^ A é e i  0  N x e  M i K c A i g .
0  N x e  M l  K É  A i  g^ÿd^i  x o  : K u p i o  Z a u o p d ^ x n  A é C n  M a K c ô o v i a  O K É x n  w g  6 v o u a  x n  
S y d ç o u u E -  M a . K c ô o v i a  X(v\ ;  Z k o x I ü j v ,  M a K P Ô o v i a  x o u  B a p ô d p n  c  i  v a i  y o c u y p a ( t ) K n  
u x  S a x a a n ^  x p é x e  i  v a  x n  G c y G c i g . T i  A é c i  n  a x 6 ( j ) a o n  x n ç  1 6 n g  A e k e u B p i o u ;  •
N' a  u n  x p n o i  u ^ 0 E I o v o u c t o i a  x o u  v a  u x o v o e i  E 6 a 4 > i K É g  ô i e k 6  k f i o e i g  . O v o -  
u a a i a  x o u  v a  u x o v  o e i  c S a c l ) i K c g  6 i E K Ô i < n O E i g  E i v a i  < a i  n  o v o u c c o i a  u e  
y E ù j y p a 4) i K r i  É v v o i a .  K a i  a u x d  x o  ^ c K a G d p u r a  a x o A u x w g . K a i  E i x a  x d x E  0 x 0 /
N x e  M i K E A i g , x o v  0 x 0 1 0  a x o  ÉÇüj  x e p i u e v e  0  k .  T o  ' x o u p K o d O K i  x w v  Z k o x i w v ,  
x w g  e i v a i  o n U E p a  x o  ô v o u a  x n G  M a K E Ô o v l a g  x n g  A E y d u E v q g  x o u  A e x e  E O E i g '  
Z o a i a A i a x K n  A n u o K p a x i a  x n G  M a K E Ô o v i a g .  f l o u  e i v a i  n  E Ô a d K n  , Ô i e k 6  i K n c r n  î 
' O x I  P x o  Z o o l a A I P X i K n ,  d y i  a x o  A n u o K p a x i a ,  a x o  M a K E Ô o v i a  E i v a i  n  E Ô a ô K Ô  
5 i  E K Ô  i K n a n  • K a i  K d 0 £  x i  x o u  d x E i  p y d o n  u e  M a K o d o v i a  5 n ’U ’- o u p y e i  E Ô a d ) i K n  
5 i  E K Ô  i  K n o n  . A u x d  w g  r . p o g  x n v  l 6 n  A e k o u B p i o u .
\ x 6  K a i  x c p a  0 e A w  v a  x w  ô x i  6 e v  E i v a i  6 x 1  0 1 C É v o i  n ^ a v  6 e v  n^^GV
: v n u E p w u É v o  i  . O l  Ç e v o i  e i x a v  x A n p n  y v w a n  x w v  ô i k w v  u o u  G e p e w v  w g  a p u o -  
) i  o u  x ^ ^ P ^ ‘^ ' ’^ o u  A f x o u p y  o u  x w v  E Ç w x e p i k w v . O i  Ç é v o i  6 e v  E i y a v  x n  y v w a n  
r p o g  X i g  G é a E i g  x t g  E x i a n u & & ^ u B E p v n a E w g . K a i  x o  x o i d g  x p o p x d G n G E  K a i  
• x é u E i v E  v a  B y E i  n  A o Ç n  M a K E Ô o v i a  a x o  o x o i a ô n x o x E  a x d & a o n  o v o u a o l a g  E i v â i  
d x  i  x o  0 x 0 1 0  u n o p w  x p o p w x i K Ô  v a  x o  a x o Ô E i C w . k a i  x i p x e u w  6 x 1  E i u a i  e k e i -  
o g  o  o x o i o g  p u u o u A K n a a ,  u x o x P É w a a  x n v  K u S é p v n a n  x Ô x e  p x n v  x s A i K n  G É a n  
o u  x i y p E  K a i  x o  x A n p w a a ,  K u p i o i  P u v d Ô E A ( f ) 0 1 , K a i  e i u a i  u x E p n d a v o g  x o u  x o  
A n o w a a .
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A t t o  € < € i  < a  i népa cyd) ô e v  i r p ô < £ i T a i  v a  a v a # c p @ w  oc o n u ^ i a ,  oe  O T o  i %c  i  a  
t a  O T T O i a  0 a  u î T o p o u o a v  v a  i r p o K a A c a o u v  g a G u T a i a  T p a u p a i a . yi-o^ i r a p a x a C n .
A g v  8 a  n  9 G À a  v a  p i A p o w  y i a  i n v  a u v a v i n o n  m ç  6 n Ç  M a p i i P u u G  t o v  <.  
n p o j B u T T O u p Y O , T O V  - < .  M o A u B i d i n  < c c i  p o v  k: . T c o u v n ,  a A A d  é y i v G .  A g v  0 a  
n S c A a  v a  p i A n o w  y i a  t o  a v  E i y o  H Ô G v  e i y o .  e v x o A n  a r o u ç  C g v o u ç  o r a v  p c  
p w T a y a v G  T k g v p g p ,  H i v g i p o ,  M t t g V c g p ,  p ^ o p G i s  Z a p a p d  v a  p a ç  t t g i ç  C G < d -  
8 a p a  x q  A é ^ n  M a K G Ô o v i a  ü j ç P u v 8 G X 0 ô v o p a  xn o é x ^ a a i  n x q v  a x o p p L x x G i g j  
K a i  é X e y c L  e y u  x q v ’ c c x o p p  i  x x l ü  , a A A d  i r p é n e i  v a  y i v G i  a u p B o u A i o  a p x q y w v .  K a i  
Ô G V  8 g A ü j  v a  p i A q a o j  y i a  t t o i ô  A ô y o  x p A i c d  c y i v e  a u p B o u A i o  a p x q y d i v  Ô i o x i  c i y a  
q ô q  7r a p a i x q 8 G i  ô i a  G x i o x o A q g  a x o v  r i p a j B u T r o u p y ô  a v  ô g v  e x a v G  x o  Z u p B o u A i o  
a p x n y d ) V  w G X E  v a  < ^ G K a 8 a p i O G  i  q 8 G o q  ô i o x i  i r q y a i  v a  a x o  g Ç ù j x g p i i c o  i c a i  ô g v  
G i  8 G P q  y  i  a  x o  8 G p a  x q ç  o v o p a o i a ç .  E y o )  G i y c c .  H i c u B é p v q a q  ô g v  E i y c .
K a i  ç q x o u a a  i l t t o  x o v  H p w ô u i r o u p y o  q  o u p t t A g u o x g  p a ç i  p o u  a v  G x w  c y w  ô i i c a i o ,  
q ô i o j Ç x G  u G -  a v  G x w  G y w  d Ô K O .  A g v  g x £ ^  x o  ô i K c d u p a  v a  p q v  G y o u p G  0 £ a q  K a i  
v a  G i p a a x G  a x o v  a ç p a .
K a i  a u x ô  G y i v e  x q v  x i ô  K p i o i p q  t t g p i o ô g  t t o u ^  A u x d p c L ' .  K U p i G  A a p î r p i a ,  a A A d  
Ô G V  x q v  y v c p p i Ç G X G  a u x q  x q v  ï ï G p l o ô o .  K a i  ô g v  x q v  y v o j p i Ç G i  c a v G v a ç  a u x q  
 ^ x q v  T T G p i o Ô o  ô i ô x i  Ô G V  p i A a y a .  A u x ô  o j ç  x r p o ç  x q v  x p w x q  T T a p G v 8 G o q .
E x p Ô K G i x o  v a  p i A q a o j  o x q  v  ï ï p o q y o u p G v q  K o  i  v o B o u  A G U x i i c q  O p d Ô a  y  i  a  x o  8 £ p a  
x q ç  ô i x A q ç  o v o p a o i  a ç , a r q v  o x o i a  x c A i c d  ô g v  p i A q o a  o t t c o ç  y v o j p i Ç G X G .  K a i  
G X G i ô q  8 £ 0 ) p q a a  x o  0 G p a  G T i e i y o v  a a ç  x A q p o ^ o p w  ô x i  x q v  G i r o p G v q  q p G p a .  x q ç  
x p o q y o u p G v q ç  K o i v o B o u A g u x i K q ç , x q A c O w v q o a  a x o v  T g v i k o  P p a p p a x c a ^ a x o v  < -  
Z q p a  1 0 ( t ) o p  i  ô q ^  < a i  x o u  G i i r a  ô x i  G c w p w  x P H O i p o  E v o ^ J G i  x w v  ô a w v  A É y o v x a i  
y i a  ô i i r A q  o v o p a a i a  o  H p w 0 U 7 T o u p y ô ç  v a  < d v e i ,  q  K u B c p v q a q  v a  i c d v G i ^ p i d  
ô q A w a q  6 x 1  Ô g v  ô É x E x a i  < d x i  X E X O i o . j O  k .  Z q p a i o < j ) O p l Ô q ç  p G  B e B c t i w O G  6 x i  
x q v  l ô i a  p é p a  x o  p E X G & G p G  a x o v  U p a j B u i r o u p y d . B e B a l w ç ,  ô g v  i r q p a  < a p p i a  
a i r d v x q a q  < a i  G i v a i  d A A w a x G  y v w a x o  6 x i  o  H p w B u i r o u p y o ç  a x o  M ï ï G p p i y x a p  Ô g v  
i r q p G  < a v  G K G i v q - x q v  a n o ^ a o q  UTrôi i^q t t o u  G i x û t p G  i r d p G i  w ç  K o i v o B o u A g u x i < q  
O p d ô a ,  x q v  x c A o u x a i a  i r p o  x o v  -ô x a K o x r w v . o g  G p w x q o q  x o u  k  .  A q p a  i r o u  É A c y  G 
6 x 1  a v  G i v a i  v a  u x d p ^ G  i  p i d  a A A a y q  oe  o x i ô q i r o x G  a x q  a x d a q  p a ç  y i a  x a  
Z < 6 T r  l a  q  y  l a  x q  ô i x A q  o v o p a o i a  8 a  a u v G  A 0 G i  q  K . O .
A g v  0 a  a v a c t ) G p 6 w  G y w  a x o  x p w x o ^ a v G Ç  a A a A o u p  < a i  a x q  a u y x U ( A q  q  o i r o i a  u i r q p C ^  
a ) c 6 u n  < a  i  o x q v  K u B É p v q a q  p G O a  p £  x a  y c y o  v 6 x a  x o u  M T r é p p i y x a p -  0 a  a v a 4> G p 6 w  
o x q V  o u a l a  x w v  ô a w v  a u v c B q a a v  .
E y w  7 r p o a 7 r a 8 w  v a  a x d a w  x o  8 a p x 6  x ç d p ^ ^  x q ç  a u y x v a q ç V v a - ô o u p G  t t w ç  g x ^ I -  T O  
9 G p a  X O U  TTGp { ô q p o u  K a v c / i a p o u  x q ç  E O K x o  a x ^ x i x ô  p g  x i ç  G p x o p K G Ç  a x é a c i ç
x w v  A w Ô G x a  U G  x a  Z i c o x i a .  l a y u p  i  ç  G x a  i  o  f l p w G u x r o u o y c ç  6 x i  ô g v  u x o x w p q a a p G ^
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A<; u i ï û S c a o u u e  6 i i  6 c v  i o u < ^  t o  < ; n T c i u c .  T n u a i o c i  a u x 6  o i l  ï ï p c ï ï c i  
v a  T O U S  x G P i o o u u c  c u e  ( s ,  0 1  G i y o u c v o i  a i r o  T n v  u w o 8 c o n  a u x n ,  t o
C O u T C p l K O  T O U S  o v o u a  C K  T W V  T T p O T C p o J V ,  O T O V  Ô T I  G U T O
0 a  C l  v a  I M a x e ô o v i a ;  F i a T i  t o  6 n A w v o u u c  a u T O  < a i  T o i d  a n o ^ a o n  t o  
C T T i B d x ' ‘c i  v a  T O  ô n A o j o o u u e ;  K a  i  y i a T i  t o u s  c c x w p o u u c i  t o  . p c ^ c & z o a c s
o n X w C G i s  T O  Ô D c a i c ü u a  a u T o  x n s  6 i i c n s  t o u s  o v o p a a i a s  O T O  e a o j x c p K O
X w p i s  c K o u a  v a  c x c i  c ^ a p u o a G c i  n  a n o ^ a o n  A i o a g o v a s ;  F i a x i
a u r n  n  B i a a u v n ,  y i a x i  o ï ï c û ô c i  n  E A A d s ,  ô n A a ô n  a u x n  i r o u  c x ^ i  < d 0 c  
a u u ^ c p o v  v a  u n u  o v o u a o G o u v  x a  a x o u c  a u x d  w o u G c v d  M a ) c c 6 6 v e s ;
f i a x i  a x c û 6 r ç i  n E A A d s  ô i x o t o u g i  a x n u  o u a i a  x n u  a x o ^ a u n  x n S
A i o a B o v d s }  f i a x l  v a  x c B c i  < a v  9 c u c  v a  x o u s  ô c u o o u v  o i  1 2  a u x 6  u o u  
6 c  V T T p o B  A c T T c x a i  a x o  x o u 0 c . v a ,  ô n A a ô n  x o  c o w x c p i K O  x o u s  d v o u c c j  
f i a T i  v a  ô i a i p c o o u u G  c u e ( s  o x a  6 u o  x n v  o v o u a o i a  x o u s ;  T i  c i v a i  ' . 
a u T O S  0  v c o s  o p i G u o s  x o u  6 i < a i c L u c t x o s  v a  a u x o a x o K a A o u v x a i  
o i  S c o x i a v o i  0 X0 c o w x c p i c o  x o u s  u c  i c d x i  x o  5 i a 6 o p e x i < 6 ; T i  9 a  
a u x o a x o x :  A n 0 o u v , i c u p i e  x p 6 c 6 p c , ‘ I c p B o i ;  M a < c 6 6 v c s  8 a  a u x o a x o < a  A o u v x a  i  
< a i  x o  y  v ü j p  I s o u  V .  ) < a  I x n  v  w p a  x o u  c c ô i c d s c x a i  a u x n  x n  o x i y u n  
u c a a  o ' a u x n  x n ' ^  c u p u x c p n  x p o o x d G c i a  x o u  a o ô a A w s  x n v  < d v c i  i c a i  t o  , 
u x o u p y c i o  E ^ w x c p i c w v ,  a o ô o A w s  x n v  K d v c i  < a i  o  x p w G u x o u p y o S ;  t n v  
d > p a  x o u  c K ô K d ç c x a i  n  6 i c 8 v n s  x o x o G c x n o n  x n s  x ^ P ^ ^ s  )*i u n ^ o o n  x n s  
X w p a j c a x d  x o u  o ô  é x c p i o u o u  x o u  o v o u a x o s  x n s *  M a < c 6 o v i a s  a x o  x o u s  
Z c o x i a v o u S j  ^ L a x i  c x o u u c  e u c C s  x n v  a v d y x n  a u x n  x n  o x i y u n  v a  
a  v a < o  I v i u o o u u c  x n v  c o o j x e p i i c n  J ^ p f j o q  x o u  o v o u a x o s  o c  c v a v  P c A i y K o p w #  
x o u  x e p i x o u  u a s  < d v c i  < a i  x o v  a v u x o x o j p n t o ^  Z x a  u d x i a  x o u  
r < A l y K Ô p o j ô  y i v a u e  a u x o c A n x o i  o u v n y o p o i  x n S  e o w x c p i i c n s  x o u  o v o u a -  
d i a s .  K a i  c i u a i  o l y o u p o s  o x i  B c w p c i  o  r c A i y c o p w ^  n ô n  o x i  c x c i  
a x o K x n o c i  e v a  < a i v o u p y i o  K c p ô o s -  E y w  s n t d o j  x o .  6 i i c 6  u a s  u o v i u o  
K c p 6 o s . % % 6  x n p a u c  a x o  a u x n v  X n v  x c p d o x  i  c c  u x o x w p n o n j  I x d p x c i  
c d x o i o  d A A o  a v x d A A a y u a  c o x u  v a  6 c x 8 w  o x i  x n p a u c  x o u  v a  ô i K a l o A o —  
y e i  a u x n  x n  ô n A w o n ;  E y w  x i o x c u u  o x i  K a x a o x p c ^ a u c ,  6 c v  ^ Ô u v a u d i o a u c  
xn^;^ a x ô ô a o n  x n S  A i o a B o v a s  x : a i  a ô a i p c o a u c  a x o  x a  u d x i a  x n S  A i c G o u s  
K o i v ô x n T a s  x n v  o u o i a  x n S  c A A n ^ i c n s  c v o x a o n s  < a x d  x n S  x c i p a x a a s  
x o u  o v o u a x o s .  K a i  o i  E u p w x a i o i  a x o  ô o j  x a i  x c p a ,  i c a i  x o  y v w p i p w  
a u x o ,  0 a  t c o i x d v c  u c  u d x i  a v a B c w p n o n s  x n  A i o a B o v a .
A A A d  c i x a x c  < a i  x d x i  d A A o ,  x p w x o ô a v c s ,  < u p i e  x p o c ô p c ,  o x o  Z d x x c i o ,
O x  I u o v o  x p o  o A i y c ü v  n u c p w v  x c 0 n < c  o x q v  E A A d ô a  x o  x p o B A n u a ,  o x n v  
E A A d ô a ,  x o  x w s  0 a  a u x o a x o K a A o u v x ^ ^  o i  E . < o x i a v o (  c T r o  c o w x c p i c o  x o u s .
M a  a u x o  6 e v  c y o u v e  < d v c i  c p y o  S u j n S  o i  Z K O x i a v o i ;  E x i  5 0  x p o v i a
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c i r r o p p é o u v  . y i a .  ôXouç touç  A a o u g .  K a i  c a v e  i  ^ 6 c  v  u t t o p c i  va rrdci
. v a  T T u p o 6 o A n a c i  o i o  a i ô u a  < g : ï ï o i o  Ü K O T r i a v o  o  o i r p i p ç  0 a  c ï ï i u é v c i  va
A c y c i a i  Mq k c ô c L v  o ( 6 i o g .  f l o i é  ô e v  c i n a u c  a u t o .  A A A d  m ô i ^ n  o o u
â é o n  t n v  ï ï p o o ô  l o p  i ç  T r p d j i a  u e  c v a  6 % i  d i a p c c f a ç ,  u c  p l a  u o v i u n  
a v p î % t n  £ v o T a o n - < c : T a y y c  A { a  a i n v  a T r d x n  t o j v  E c o w i a v w v  u c  t n  y v w o n
6 x 1  c t a i  xc i  ü A A i w g  x a  2 / 3  c t i r ô  a u x o u < ^   ^ B e u  A y a p o  i  x c a i  A A B o c v o  e x  i  9 u -
u p u v  6  I C O  x o u g  o v o u a ,  E o u A y a p i a  n  A A g a v i a .  Me  x n v  a x o ^ a o n  v a
u n  x o u s  x & p i o o u u p  x o x c  u £  x c x o i c s  o n A o i o c i t ,  XX v i n u  I i i o x o  L n o n *
o r p  c ^ a y o u c v o  c a o j x c p i c ô  x o u s  ’i » c u 6 d j v u u ^ . I 6 ( w s  x w p a  x o u  ç n t d v c x x n
ô i £ 0 v n  x a u x o x n t a  y i a x i  x o  v ô u i u o  < a c 6  4^ e u 6 d » v u u o  Qcl ô i o i s c i  c u c o A a
x o  xaXô  o v o u a  a x o  x n  6 i a ô i c a o ( a  x o u  c 0 i P u o u  c a x  u é c a  a x o  x n
u o v o x A c u p n  X P n c J n  o x w s  o u u B a C v c i  c a i  a x a  o i c o y o u i c d  u c  x o . c a c o
X P n u c  x o u  ô i . d ) x v £ i  XO c a A ô .  K a i  c ô w  c ( v a i \ u c y d A n ^ u a s  5 i a 6 o i v i a ^ '
x c a i  c 6 ( 6  c i v a i  n  u c y d A n  u a s  S i a ^ o p d .  E y w  v o u l ç w  6 x i  c y c i  y i v e i
1 c O c u p c o n  x o u  x o A c u o u  y i a  v a  a c c x a o x c i  ^ c v a  c A ï u a  t c i ô A a s
c v ô e x ô u c v o u  p o S o u ,  a u x o s  o  a u u B i S a a u ô s  ô i x A n s  o v o u a c i a ç . E y w
o a ç  A c w ,  c u p i c  x p o c ô p c ,  6 x i  u c  a u x n  t n  ô . i a ô i c a a i a  x o u  a c o A o u 9 n 6 n < c
u c y p i  t w p a  6 c v  6 a  c a x a p c p c x c  v a  u x d p C c i  c a v ,  x o u A d y i o t o v  a x o
x p o a c y É s  U c A A o v ,  v c o  o v o u a  a x o A u x w s  6 c x i < 6  y i a  x n v  E A A d ô a  u c  x a
i K Ô x i a .  f i a x i ;  A i d x i ,  c u p i e s  < a i  c u p i o i  a u v d ô c A p o i ,  ■' n - ' a x o p a a n
x n s  A i a a B ô v a s  x p o B A c x c i  6 x i  a v  c i v a i  v a  u x d p Ç o u v  6 a 6 x i a i a  u c
v c o  o v o u a  y i a  x a  Z c ô x i a ^ Ô a  x p c x c i  a u x o  x o  v c o  o v o u a  v a  x o  o c y S o u v
, < a i  x a  Z c ô x i a  < a i  n E A A d ô a .  K a i  c a p  p w x d w ,  a ; . d ' - ' T n  ' o t i y u n  x o u
x o u s  S y d A a u c  a x o  x o  c k o v o u k o  d y y o s ,  a x o  x n  a x i y u n  x o u  a u x ô c A n t a
a x o  c o w x c p i c ô  x o u s  x o u s  ô w a a u e  x i a x o x o i n t i c o  M a c c ô o v i c n s
y v n a i ô x n t a s  v a  a u x o a x o c A q B o u v  o x w s  c c c i v o i  S c A o u v ,  a u x o i  ô c v
/
0 a  a u v a i v é o o u v  x o x e  o c  v c o  o v o u a  n  o  A ô c A n p o ’’ x u n u a  x n ^
' X c Ç n Ç  M a c c ô o v i a ,  y i a  v a  u n v  c a p  x w  x n v  x c i p i P t n  c c ô o y n ,  v a  u c i v o u -  
u e  x c A i c d  u c  x n  M a c c ô o v l a  a x o  e a w x c p i c o  c a i  x o  x p w n v  F i o u y c o a A a B i -  
K n  A n u o c p a x i a  x n ç  M a c c ô o v i a s  P t o  ô n B c v  c a i v o u p y i o  x o u s  o v o u a .  ' O A a  
a u x d ,  o u w s ,  a n u a i v o u v K a i  c d x i  d A A o .  Z n u a i v o u v  B a p u x a x n  u c i w a n  
x o u  K u p o u s  u a s  0 X 0  c Ç w x c p i < 6  c a i  l ô i a i x c p a  a x a .  B a A c d v i a ,  x n  a x i y u n  
u d A i a x a  x o u  a u v ô u a a u o i  ô u v d u c w v  a x n  y c i x o v i d  u a s  c x i ô i w c o u v  x n  
M s r y d A n  A A B a v i a  c a i  x n  M c y d A n  B o u A y a p i a .
K a i  a c o u a  y p d i | ; x c  . < a i  a u x o :  0 a  c y o u u c  ô w a c i  c u c i S  t o  ô i c a i w u a  a t a
E c o x i a  v a  a v a B c p u d v o u v  x n v  x p o x a y d v ô a  x o u s  y l a  x n v  u x a p ^ n  ô n B c v
B A a B i c n s  u c  l o v o x n t a s  a x n v  E A A d ô a ,  a p o u  c u c i s  o  •- l ô i o i  0 a  c y o u u c
ô n u l o u p y n o c  i  , G u u n G c i x c  u c ,  M a c c ô ô v c s  t o u  c o w x c p i c o u  c a i  M a c c ô ô v c s
x o u  c C i û X C p  i c o u . M i A d w ,  A o i x o v ,  y i a  x n  u c i w a n  x o u  c G v i c o u  c u p o u s  •
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E % w  < a i  u i a  d / X A n  ïï A n p o ( i ) o p  i  a . Zz  l e A e u x a i c t  a u v d v T n c n ^  < a i  a u x n  
a ' T T o ô t :  I \ j u e x a  I , < a i  b z v  u i A d w  y i a  x n A c y p c ^ n w c x a  e i ô i c o ü  x c i P i o u o G ,  
< u p i c  x p o c ô p c ,  un^ j l 6.z-'V--'Z<zi o  v o u g  a a ç ) ,  o c  x c A c u T d t a  o u v d v x n o n  
7T0 U c i X G  0 j j j x O ' O p Y O Ç  X(jjv E Ç w x c p i c ü v ^  0 < .  f l a x g i c a j a x a v x i ^ Q U , j j c  x o v  . 
o x p a x n y o x f o v  Z K o o u < p @ # T p x n v  A u c p i c n ,  a v a c t c p e r p c g ^ - c r l f i a r i u c c  x c p (
u x o x w p n o c w g  x n ^  E A A d ô o ç  u e ^ _ j U V - - ô ^ r f f X n  o v o u a o i a .  ' O x w g
g  A c t t c x c  c ^ ^ n r - ^ n  y i v c i  & ' é x n î ' ' 5T a T r p a y u a x e u a r i ' S  w c  x o v  x i o  G c c d G a p o
x p o x o  x o  e é u c i  xnç  ô i i r A n Ç  o v o p a o i a g .  A A A d  6 a  oaç  Ô i a S d o o j  c  v a  
c y y p a & o  x a v x c A w ç  a ô l a g d G u n x o . x o u  p x o p c t  v a  x o  g p c i  o  x p w x o s  
i c A n t n p a ç ,  t o  o ï ï o i o v ; . - € r f w i  é A i o - - ^ j U i G a x o  x o v  l o u X i o  x o u  
< .  T ç o û v n -  E a i  \ i z i  yO c . T ç o u v n < :  \^Kc c v x o A q  x o u  x p u S u x o u p y o u  
ç n t n c J c  v a  ^ e i  x f c v  Ï A y y A o  x p c a g u  x c p a ,  y i a  v a  ù ' e x a t j j c p e i  o p i o p c -
v a  x p q y u a x a  o x o v ' X i H M ^ j p y o — i  a v d y i c r i  o  kc .  X e p v x  v a  p c x a Ô w -  
o c  i  f x r i  o c o x i a v n  x A c u p d  < a x d  x n v  o c c i  c x ( o < c ^ n  t o u  ô t i  n  E A A d ç »  
c y E i  t c d v c i  n ô n  u c y d A n  x a p a x w p n o n  u e  t n v  a x o ô o y n  t o u  ô i x A o u
o v o u c t o g .  K a i  o j ç  c k  t o u t o u  o  < .  F k A i y x o p o x t )  x p c x c i  v a  x p o g c i
/  /  /
0 € a v a y i c c t i e ç  T r a p a x w p n O £  i ç  k œ i  a u T o g .
' E v a  o n W E i o  a K o u a :  E i x e  o  x p w G u x o u p y o ç  y i a  x n v  x c A c u t a i a  o u o < c ^ n  
x o u  c i x G  s y w  P C  x o v  Î I i v c V p o ,  K a i  x o  u c t c ^ c p c  o w o t d ,  1 n  A x p i A i o u ,  
C K c i  x c p a  c i x c w E  K c p ô i o c i  x o A A d  x p d y u a x a .  I T p d j t n  p o p d  a v a O c p G n K C  , 
t o  8 c u a  c ô ù j .  E y d )  ô e ' v  c i x o c  p i A n a c i  x o x c  o ù t e  y i a  a u t d .  A v a ^ c p G n c c  
o n U E p a  K a i  e u x a p i o t d )  x o v  x p ô e ô p o .  A A A d  Ç c x a a e  v a  x c i  K a i  c v a  
t c t a p t o  9 c u a  x c p a v  a x o  t n v  a x o ^ a o n  t n ç  I 6 n s  A c K c u B p i o u  x o u  
K a v ô v i a a  t o t c  w c  t o v  l ï i v é ï p o ,  ô n A a ô n  o A c g  c i  g o n G c i c g  o i  K o i v o t  i r  
K c g  x p o g  t a  E k ô x i a  v a  x c p v d v c  a x o K A c i a t i K d  a x 6  t n v .  F A A d ô a .  K a i  
0 a  n S c A a  v a  x A n p o ^ o p n G w ,  K u p i c  x p o c ô p c ,  ô A c ç  a u t c g  o u :  a n u a v x i K c ^  
K a x a K t n c J C  i  x o u  8 c A w  v a  x i a t e u c u  ô x i  u x d p y o u v  a K o p a ,  t  (  y i v e t a o :  
a u x n  t n  4) o p ^ y "  T i  a x c y i v a v ;  f l o u  g p i O K o v t a i ;
K u p i c  x p o c ô p c ,  y  l a  v a  u n v  c x a A n G c u t w  y i ' a u x o  x o u  e i x c t  x c  i  4 ) C u y o v - .  
x a < ;  a x o  t o  u x o u p y c i o  t w v  E ^ w t c p i K w v ,  ô n A a ô n  t o  v a  u n  g a ^ t i o o u u E  
x o  a u u S i S c t o u o  o c  c x i x u x i a ,  y i c  u é v a  d p o n  x o u  a u u B i B c t o u o u  K a i  
x a u x ô x p o v a  x p ô x a o n  u o u  o n u E p a  c i v a i  n  c S n s .  K a i  c u x o u a i  v a  x o  
k " * X ) . t d C E x e ' X ^  E i v a i  A o y i K O  v a  t o  ô e y Ô E  1 t c ^  x a p d  x a  o o a  c i x a x c  ô x i  
ô c v  x p Ô K C i t a i  v a  K o u v n G c i x c  c v a  i w x a  a x o  t n  o n U E p i v n  o a ç  o t d o n *
N a  y i v o u v  ô u o  ô n A w o c i ç  c x i o n u E ç  < a i  u i c t  Ô c o u E u o n  t o u  x p u G u x o u p y o u .  
A n A ü j o n  6 x 1  o x o y o  u a ç  c y o u u E  x n v  o A o K A n p w u É v n  c & a p u o y n  u x c p  t n ç  
X w p a ç  u a ç  X ü j v  a x o ô d o c u v  x n ^  EOK K a i  x n ç  l o n ç  A c k c u B p i o u  K a i  
g c g a i w ç  t n v  a x o & a o n  t n ç  A i o a g ô v a ç  j K o p u ^ a i a ,  u i a  o A o K A n p u u É v n  
c & a p u o y n  a u t w v  x w v  a x o ^ d o c w v  x c g ^ y K u p i o  o t o y o  c y o u v  v a  u n v
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a v a c t ) £ p £ T a i  n o u 8 c v a  ) c a i  u £  o t t o  L o S n T r o x c  i p o T r o  o x r i v  o o o u c t o i a  x o u  
UTTO a v a y v w p i o n  < p a x i 6 i o u  n X c Ç n  0  n a p a y w y o  x n<^ X é ^ n s  M a K T s ô o u i a .  
Z  d X J X O  c i w a i  G c g a i o s ,  x o  c i x c  o  r r p ô e ô p o ç ,  o g u  u x o p y c i  ( C a i i ' u x a T C T x ' a u x c u  
a u x i p n o n -  X p e i d ç e i x a i  < a i  u i a  ô c u x e p n  o n X o j o n ,  s E c d u a p n  n p o s  x n \ ;  EOK^  
6 x 1  n  E X X d ô a  Ô c v  a v a y v o j p i ç c i  x o  o i < a i o j u a  x o j v  Z < o n i w v  v a  a u x o a x o -  
K a X o u v x a i  w c  o x o i o  o v o w a  c k c i v o i  c x i S u u o u v .  A i o x i  c i < ^  x n v  c x i o x o X n  
Ï Ï OO x n v  c % w  c X X q v i c d  n  G y y X i i c d  . x o u  < .  x p w G u x o u p y o u x p o s  x o u s  
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EIAIKQTEPA, K. YilOYPfOI ETON I IE'OTI EAAHNIKH KYBEPNHIH EXE 1 
EnilHMA, AHMOIIA KAI KATHFOPHMAT IKA &HAOZEI OTI EAAAI OYAENIA EXE! 
EAAOIKH AIEKAIKHIH ENANTI ''A.M.'' KAI OTI E 1 NA I ETOIMH-NA BOH0HIEI 
KAI NA ITHPIEEl KAO'OIONAHnOTE TPOHO THN NEA AHMOKPATIA, ME lYNAVH 
no IK I AON lYMOONlON, HAPOXH OIKONOMIKHI ENIIXYIEQI KAI AKOMH E m Y H I H  
TON lYNOPON THI. YHO THN HPOYHOOEIH OTI H IKOHiANH HfEIlA 0A 
IYMMOPOO0EI nPOI TOYI OPOYI THI TNOITHI KO I NOT!KHZ AHOOAIEOI 
AIIIABQNOI.
EE AAAOY,T#!^KC YHOYPFOI/EEEOPAIE AHOrOHTEYIH K. HPQOYnOYPrOY 
AI OTI n n ^ ^ N EXOYN MEN ANAFNOPIIEI THN --"A.M.", AAAA, ME THN 
ITAIH T M ^ . E N 0 A P P Y N O Y N  OYIIAITIKA TON GLIGOROV NA ElNAl 
AA I A A A A f ^ B ^ K A I  ZHTHIE OHQI ADMINISTRATION AIKHIEI E H ’AYTOY OAH 
EniPPOH THI, QITE EHlAEEEl ENA ONOMA TIA THN AIE0NH YHOITAIH THI 
XQPAI TOY, TO OnOlO AEN HPOKEITAI, BEBAIQI, NA TOY EHIBAAEl H
II £ AAA r , » 6 « Q i? B T O Â e r û E 6 M $ ® 9 m a o j B g im ï B m a m
K Y P i o i  Y n o Y P r o r  e o e i h m a n e , a k o m h , a i a o a i n o m e n o y i  k i n a y n o y i
H E P I O X H  X O Z Z Y O O H E A I O Y  KAI Y O E r P A M M I Z E  AHOYH KAI E K O n i M O T H T A  
E T K A I P H I  A M E P I K A M I K H I  H A P E M B A I E O Z  HPOI A n O T P O H H  A N A O A E Z E O Z ,  
n P O I 0 £ T O N T A I  OTI E A A H N I K H  K Y B E P N H I H  Y n O I T H P I Z E I  H A P O X H  E Y P E I A I  
A Y T O N O M I A I  I T O Y I  K O I I O B A P O Y I  AAAA 0X1 A l K A I Q M A T O I  A Y T O i I A 9 E I E Q I  HOY 
OA D i H E H I E l ,  A N A H O O E Y K T A ,  ITHN E N O H A H  lYPPA E H .  ITO 1610 HAAIIIO, K. 
Y n O Y P r O I  E Z E f P A I E  A H O Y H  OTI PANIC E M P A N I Z E T A I  HIO n P A E M A T I I T H I  KAI, 
Q Z  EK T O Y T O Y ,  H P O I T E P E I ,  I IO@t KAAH E Y K A I P I A  T i A  NA 6 1 AMOP«(30OYN 
A N A A O r E I  l E P B I K E I  0 E Z E I I ,  HOY HHA 0A HPEHEI E N 0 A P P Y N O Y N  .ME E H I P P O H
ï TPJ Tn r OZ : : !  r v - ; \ T I  r F '  l <J  :F d .'r:T :?0
':! : T . ^ ! Î : ,  r ! : ! % ; T S : :  - A V . I < j ' '  OTI H H
ï l ^ ^ h l u T A l  n O A Y  ;Y L ! < ^  (/F4Y ÔY i P a T n F T I : )  F jA^TI E A A H ^ j X O N  3FIFJ\,
: :-[YXOY- T.;:-: ri. <! A V O I T A ^ E S O T C I H I ^ ^ I  < A T 4 [ T A L F J Z
rr  - .  IF j : L !  ] : ^ 3 v ,  : i ^ T T p ; ' , T A i
A / ? I 2 T A I F Z  ^4T_  i L l c  \ A!  i Fx^l  - ; j l CY :ÂZ'10Y i XOni AXOE HVETHI FxEl  
AY^ u TC' THTFÏ  < A|  n F P | 3 ü P l A  I X A ^ O T O I H I F J I  F A A n X I K H l  A H A I T H l E O r ,  X 3 P I I  
x l l A Y ^ O  A ^ T I K A T A Ï T A I F O I  TOY AOO AKPOI  A X P A | a  KAI P I Z O [ n A [ T I K A  
Î T O I X F I A .
AYPICI Y-|0YPrOI FnaAFAAEF ITOr, ITPATnrO S:0"CP0FT, OnClûE 
^^FZEtPAlF FAHlAA OTI ?A FZFYPFOFI A^OISAIA IXANOnOlHTlXH AYZH, OTI 
<. n P o o Y n o Y p r c i  oA z n i o Y o o Y i F  o n o z  npoEaPOZ s u s n  n i F i E i  GLiGOPOv 
H A^TanüKPIOEI ITH\ FïXATH YHOX^PHZH EAAHNIKHZ HAEYPAI KAI EHlAEZEl 
ONO/U XOPAI TOY nPOI AIEONH XPHIH, EFKATAAEIMONTAI OPO 
/ ''MAKEAONIA'' nOY YMOAHAOI E4A3IKEI AlEKAlKHIElI KAI MOY, AN 
AIATHPH0EI, 3A AnOTEAEIEl MONIXO IHMEIO MEAAONTIKHI TPIBHI KAI 
ENTAIEOI ITHN HEPlOXH, FNO TYXON AlEY3ETHIH MPOBAHMATOI 3A 
EZHITAAIZE ITHN NEA AHMOKPATIA YMOITHPIZH, lYMMAPAITAlH KAI alAlA 
EK MEPOYI EAAAAOI, ANAENOPIIH AMO EOK, ME OAEI IYNAK0A0Y3EI 3ETIKEI 
lYNEMEIEI KAI KATOXYPOIH EIPHNHI KAI ITA3EP0THT0I.
T E A O I ,  K. Y M O Y P r O I  E H E I Y P E  M P O I O X H  l Y N O M I A H T H  TOY I T H N  A H O O A I H  
E A A H N I K H I  K Y B E P N H I E Q I  F I A  M P O M H Q E I A  40 A E P O I K A O O N  F - 1 6  KAI Z HTHIE 
AMO I T P A T H F O  S C O W C P O F T  O T ^ I  A M E P I K A N I K H  K Y B E P N H I H  A l A T H P H I E l  ITHN 
3 E I H  T O Y  A M E P I K A N O  l Y N T O N l I T H  K Y M P I A K O Y  K. L E O S K Y ,  MEXPI KAI TON 
n P O I E X O N  A I K O I N O T I K O N  l Y N O M I A l O N  N . Y O P K H ,  A O F O  M A K P A I  E M H E I P I A I  TOY 
ITO O EMA. I T P A T H F O I  S C O W C P O F T  A H H N T H I E  OTI EXE! H A H  A M O O A I I I O E I  
O n O I  K. L E D S K Y  H A P A K O A O Y O H I E I  01 A NO l Y N O M l A l E I  Y H O  l Y M B O Y A E Y T l K H  
l A l O T H T A . ^ ^
2. EE  À & A O Y  K. Y H E Z  I Y N A N T H 9 H K E ,  I H M E P A ,  X O P I I T A  ME H P O E A P O  
Y H O E n i T P O R A Z  E Y P O M H I  - N. A N A T O A H I ,  E n i T P O H H I  E Z O T E P I K O N  Y M O G E I E O N  
B O Y A H I  A N T i n P O I O n O N ,  B O Y A E Y T H  K. H A M I L T O N  KAI ME O M O F E N H  
F E P O Y I I A I T H  K. S A R B A N E S ,  ME O H O I O Y I  l Y Z H T H I E  O A A  TA 01 A N O  Z H T H M A T A  
l A l A l T E P O Y  E A A H N I K O Y  E N A I A O E P O N T O I  KAI O H O I O Y I  E Y X A P I I T H I E  FIA 
Y M O I T H P I E H  n O Y  E K A I T O T E  H A P E X O Y N  I T I I  9 E I E I I  M A I  KAI H O Y  K.
H A M I L T O N  E Z E 0 P A I E ,  EK N E O Y ,  E H O O E A H G E I I  E Y K A I P I A I  I X E T I K H I  
l Y Z H T H I E O I .
,W X Ç A k ' l ï 7
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9EMA : Em! ox. G il" I. r orn v  Aônva Avan An pojToO Ü'nouoYOÜ F^'Oiac u .V .C h u r k in ,
1 2 . 8 . 1 9 9 2 . -
fîpojLvn ouvdvTnor) OTO YnoupYELO EEwTEpLxdv ue Ypuncupyô KupCa
B .T a o u ô e po O ,  napouai. 'a, u ô v o v  , exaT^pojOcv ITpéaBecüv u . x . r o ù v a p n
KQL M i k c l a e n k o ,  cLpa 1 0 . 0 0 .
fCOpLO Oeua ouCnx'noGGaç : M aueôov lk6 .
Msxd ouvnOcLC pLAoppovnoELC, K. C h u rk in  E géd eoe  xa eEns:
Yv c .pxn , Guns,  da  oaç  cCnu x i 6ë v n p o x L d e x a i  va  ncd^EL Pwoua 
rd npdapaxî i  avayvd puon  Anuonpaxi!aç M a x e ô o v u a c ;
fa) Aév da en L ô lcT)Eouu£ a v a y v d p i o r i  AniucKPo x ôag auxnc ano xp u xec  
xojpeç ,  o ù x e  da nooAoûu-e ae  OLaôqnoxe e v é p y e L a  npog  xaxeuduvon a u x n .  
EpüJxduevoL da r.Enyoùue anAwc X dyou s  e v e p y e t a c  u a g , %wpa - • ■ wdoôpe o u -  
voui.  Anx^C uap axoAoudnoPuv n a p d o e t y u d  u a s .
(6) AÉV da aneùaouuG a n o K x n a o u u e  6 unAcJuaxL kés c x / o e i s  E x c n i a  
OxexLKÔ ô c d x a y u a  P léAxolv npogAeneu u é v , e x x 6 s  a n o  avay vdp loti , kcl e y x a -  
v-'Aoxaari 6 lnAcouax tucLv o x É o e u v ,  x^pCp ôucjjç v a  d é x e i  xpovLxd nepadupuo y i c  
a u x É s -  rxExuxÉs  o u v e v v o n a e  L s u n o p o û v  v a  x p a x d o o u v  noAu x a ip ô  )cai ôÉv ■ 
n p o B A e n e x a i  anoAnSouv u a x a  xo npo&Aenxô uÉAAov.
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f2 t o  orjusilo auTO, Kuo^g Y c u —ouoYÔc epcjxrioe e d v  noav yvojo to l  
^6you Y LO. ortoCou^ K . G l i c o r o v  enLaxéTCTCTau 26cptg "y<-cl va  avaxocvwcEL  
xdxL a o 0 a p 6 " . K .C h u r k in  e l tx e  c r u  6 é v  e yvo jp lC e  n a i  napETnpnoe OTL 
ExOTiLavou ELxav npocTKaAéaE l - r  l ^ A t p l v  t o p c  EnLPKEcpOeC rtpd ôuacTxéUjecoc 
AOVÔ C VOU . . • ;
Z u v E x /C o v T a g  a v d A u c ii r o u ,  P o x jo c  e n L o n u o c  ÔLCuxpLVLCE o t l  art6(paari 
avaYV 'w pC oecjûs ô é v  eot^uc^uve u a u  ô é a e c o ç  urcép U l o c  nkEUpdC/ n p o o d é -
r o v r a s  o t l  Edv u^pr) eùpL crxav  a n o  k o l v o u  x d n o i a  A u o n , %wpa t o u  0 a  rr iv  
gne ôÉXGTO c u x a p C o r w c . M daxa ducjQ ô e d p n o E  o t l  ô é v  t I tov  crxdiTLUn iia p d T a -
or) eKKpEUÔTnTOÇ XOL OTL,  UETO ALOOa^WVa, ExOTILaVOL GLXCtV IXepLEkdEL OE
a ô L é g o ô o ,  rtou xa0LOTOuoE o n o L a ô ^ n o T E  EnOLXOôounTix^ 6 LanpaYUdTguor, uc.- 
Cl TOUS a ô u v a T q .  A vayvdpLO n,  o x d n e u e  eriLOTiEUOri ÀûoEug, Y L '
auTÔ KOL TOUS au oT n oau e  ôlgA oyo  uo-C C c a s ,  o n o C o v  auTÔC ôév  anÉxXcLoav  
OÙTE xaL Y La TO ô v o u a .
p  0 a  t i r t o p o u o a T E , o u v s x L G E  k  .  C h u r k i n , v a  Ô E X 0 ^ ? E  x d n o L a  p d p ^ o u A a ,  t i o u  
0 a  A E P L E L X C  TO ô v o u a  " M a H E Ô o v L a ” n  é v a  a n o  T a  n a p d y w Y d  t o u ;  A c p o ù  Ô é x ^ -  
o d e  0X7} "ôLTiAi i  À ù o r i "  t h  x p t ^ c j h  T O U  ô p o u  " M a K E Ô o v L a " ,  t o û t o  o r i y a u v E L  o t l  
ô é v  TOV a n o p p L T i T E T E  t e A e l c j c .  N q n w c  ô é x E O 0 E  x d n o c a  c p d p u o u A a  ô c  T t . x »  
" N Ô T L a  B a A x a v L x n  A n u o x p a T L a  M a x e ô o v L a c " ;  6 a  u n o p o u o a T E  v a  a p x * ^ 0 ‘E T E  ■ ■ . 
Ô L d A o Y o  a c p n v o v T a ç  n p o a o j p L v d c  t o  6 v o y . a  x a T a  u é p o ç .  ' O t o v  L x a v o n o tr iô o u v  . 
L'a A oL nd  CLTnuaTd o a c ,  T t , x *  arcapaB  CaoTO c r u v d p c o v  x A n . , 0 a  lin o p o u o e  T)
PaxTLa TOUS ennPEdoEL xaL n p o g  xaT E Û 0uvon  ovôuaTOS • ndvTw s , Zxdnua ô é v __
ô é x o v T a L  AOcrri A L O oa& dvos. HapaxaA w  ô e l ê t e  e A a o T L X Ô T T i T a .
AnavTwvTaS/ KuoCa T oou ôE O O u, acpoü napaT^pqoE otl sAAnvLxd n A eup d  
G^EnAdYn a n o  aLcpvCôta avaYvcoptcr i  / unEYpâuuLOE s E n c  ôûo onUsCa:
1 .  A v a y v d p L o r i  é ï L v e  x w o C s  n p O E l ô o n o C n o n  x a i  x w p C s  u a s  6 o0 e l  e u -  
x a t p t a  c a s  E E n .Y n o o u u e  o t l  t i m i n g  h t o v  A d O o s .  E u x a u e  oacpeC s e v ô e l E e l c  
OTL E x é n i a  cx d m iT O X /T O ^ S T d  a n ô c p a c r n  A L O o a g w v o s  x a i  o t l  u n n p x e  e A n t c
Y La xdnoLO a u u 0 L 3 a o u 6 .  AvaYvcùOiori o a c  T^ pc TtLeOT) KCtL ôLGKodc momen
Y L auTÔ xaL EEEnAdYnUcv • E l v o l  xpCya otl ô e v uas sÔwoaTE euxaiPLa oaC 
eSnvéiaouue ôAa aura, ô l ô t l n napéu&aon cas, apYÔTcpa, 0a cCxc locos 
XprjOLUÔTnTa. 2. YnoAoYLCouuE o t l c  pLALxés oag npo0éosLS nai etil nAéov 
éxouuE xoLvd ouupépovTa oxa Ba^&dvLO. H EAAdg EnéôGLEc lidn
APPENDIX XII
Previously unpublished letter that Greek Foreign Minister MlchoHs 
Popaconstantlnou sent to his EPC counterparts on 3 November 1992.
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Athens, 3 November 1992
Dear Colleague,
Following the Declaration of December 16, 1991 and the 
Lisbon Declaration of 27 June 1992 on the proposed recognition 
of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the British 
presidency has undertaken to convey to Skopje the contents and 
the substance of the position of the "12". Ambassador O'Neill 
has informed me on the results of his two visits to Skopje. To 
this day, no apparent progress has been registered.
On the contrary, there is a hardening of attitudes and an 
escalation of hostile propaganda against my country of the 
nature cited in the December "Declaration on Yugoslavia". More 
precisely. President Gligorov has publicly tried to discredit 
Greece by attributing to her aggressive intentions and terri­
torial claims. In an obvious act of provocation, the Skopje 
Parliament passed a resolution to adopt the emblem of King 
Philip’s ancient Greek Macedonian dynasty — a 16-ray sun found 
in excavations at the royal tombs of Vergina in Greek Macedo­
nia—  as the emblem of the flag of the new Slav Republic of 
Skopje.
Such acts, at a time when recognition is still pending 
not only undermine efforts toward good-neighbourly relations 
but could well inflame passions across borders.
Various reports reaching my office attribute the intrans­
igence of leading circles in Skopje to the belief that the 
Lisbon Decision is likely to be reversed in Edinburgh. They 
are encouraged in this stance by certain writings in major 
European and American journals. In addition, they appear to 
interpret the eagerness of European governments for humanita­
rian aid and interest in medium and long-term economic coope­
ration as support for their position on the recognition issue.
We should not allow such gestures to be wrongly inter­
preted by the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. If we wish Ambassador O ’Neill's mission to succeed, 
we should take care that no mixed signals reach Skopje.
The Portuguese Presidency prepared a "package deal" 
which, in addition to the name problem, could resolve all the 
outstanding issues connected with recognition. This package 
should be part of the discussions currently being carried out 
by Ambassador O'Neill.
I would urge all partners to convey to President Gligo­
rov, in no uncertain terms, our will, as Community and as 
member-states, to stand firm by our December Declaration and 
the Lisbon Decision. And that his early compliance with it
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will not only prevent calamities of the nature he has repea­
tedly implied over the past two months, but will open the way 
for the safeguarding of the territorial integrity of his 
Republic and for peace and security in the region. Greece 
would be the first to join in such constructive steps.
On behalf of my Government, I would like to re-emphasize 
that Greece has made a serious effort toward a solution. We 
have discussed proposals and ideas that have already caused 
much concern and apprehension in important segments of the 
Greek public and the political parties. The parliamentary 
group of "New Democracy" recently approved unanimously a 
resolution insisting on the terms on which a viable solution 
of this problem should be found.
Following the official publication of Regulation No. 
3031/92, Greece stands ready to resume oil supplies to the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia immediately and without 
limit as to quantities, provided of course that the provisions 
of the Regulation are fully adhered to. This means that the 
authorities in Skopje must conform with the Regulation by, 
inter alia, using seals with the denomination "F.Y.R. Macedo­
nia" for this territory as agreed in the General Affairs 
Council on 5 October last.
Additionally, we have said that we are prepared to send, 
if and when requested, aid to Skopje for humanitarian pur­
poses, including oil for use in schools and hospitals, without 
any formalities whatsoever from any side. This offer of ours 
has never been taken up.
We have reached the "end of the rope". There are propo­
sals on the table that if accepted will leave no one humilia­
ted. We need and support the independence of the neighbouring 
Republic and we firmly believe that, through Greece, that 
Republic will be rendered politically and economically viable. 
But we cannot accept a decision, which will be a cause for 
constant irritation, quarrels over borders and instability in 
the wider Balkan region. In one word, we cannot accept to see 
the reopening of the "Macedonian Question" of the early deca­
des of this century. Such an eventuality will cause terrible 
havoc and additional suffering in the Balkan.
I need not go over the points which speak for upholding 
the Lisbon Decision again. I hope you will agree that the "12" 
will see it advisable to communicate urgently, through any 
proper means, to President Gligorov our unswerving support for 
our common position.
Yourfe sincerely
lael Papaconstantinou
APPENDIX XIII
Previously unpublished letter that FYROM's President Kiro Gligorov sent to Greek 
Prime Minister Konstcntinos Mitsotokis on 2 December 1992.
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PRESIDENT
OF THF RFPU0LIC OF MACFOONIA
Skopje, 2 Dr'.r^mber,1992
Dear Mr. MitsotaJcis,
My inlenlion lo address you at this crucial moment for my country and people, Immcdia 
prior to the meeting of (Jje European Cbmmunily Council m Hdinburph, has been Urgc<
by a 8ing1e_nira: it is the ultimate hour for the Ourop^n C.Qimuuitily_io_rcc<;gnise
^ p u b lic  of Mflc^douia! ' "
A ll condiliocn for  the internadorul recog ru'üon o f  Ou: R epublic  M ûccdunia, which
achieved its indépendance by peaceful and legitimate m e th o d s  and preserved üic peace thus 
becoming a barrier to the escalation of war in the Soudi of the Balkans, arc fulfilled.
You arc familiar with the Golgotha passed by my country on iJie road to its constitution and 
international affirmation at a time o f  calaclisms in the aiea o f former Yugoslavia. Wc arc 
happy to bave achieved preserving Macedonia from Uic war. The transition towards 
democracy has been carried by peaceful political means ils well as Inter-ethnic and inter­
denominational tolerance. For all that we bad, only through our efforts, to resolve extrcracly 
complex économie and social problems which are still seriously pressing us.
Determing our future and development as an independent, sovereign and equal member of 
tltc international community; we have built the highest principles of the United Nations 
Charter and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the foundalion.s of 
our stale. W_e have cho_se_n_ jhc_ Huropean_option and the policy o f good-neighbourly relations 
and cooperation as priorities. On diat base we have Joined the efforts of the international 
"commünifÿ~ in overcomming the Yugoslav crisis. We have fully .supported..and__mei_ihe 
Europe^ Community criteria for the establishment of new states, which has been confirmed 
by Dr. Badintcr's Arbitration Commission Report.
1 would lake the liberty to remind you this, since there is unanimous feeling in the Republic 
of Macedonia that the European Community has not found strength and way for a Just 
assessment of the elements according to which, the Republic of Macedonia should have 
been granted the widest international recognition so far. Y oil arc_jiQW_facing_YCl another 
possibility to rectify this unjusliccjn a prmcip[cd manner ..and prcvcntivelly, maybe in
ihFTast moment, for preventing a new focus in the Balkans.
The flame of war is seriously threatening-to expand from Bosnia Herzegovina towards the 
"areas in whichlhc" Republic of Macedonia is located, uxi. The history is warning of the 
terrib le  repercussions o f such an eventual war esoaJaticm over the wiiolc Balkan-area. On 
account of that aJT__urgcn  ^ rcc^wulion of our country is of a decisive
"slgmHcancc Torlhclt&lHty^and peace in this region.
339
In îhe. present con di t ions  w c  arc fflced with  grc:\t d i f n c u l l i c s  in I b c  e c o n o m i c  aa well  a.s 
other iields of life. You k n o w  o f  ihc addit ional_difri .culgc,s._our_ov.u.gtry,  suffersjpccausc of the 
i m p^ t_ _^ _th e_ i n l er na ( jo na l  J s ^ i ^ i o n s j i g n i n a t  F R  Y u g o s l u v i «  emd_bccauac u f  tiio b lockades
on the supply of petrol impoaed on us by _ neighbouring Ôicccc. Tlie international
r c co g n iU o n  by  the Europ ean  C o m m u n i t y  m c m b c r - S a i c s  as w e l l  ms by  other countries  and 
international organisations and insl i iutut iona,  w c  arc sure w o u l d  represent  the best way for 
a w a y  out f rom  the present  unfavourable  s i t uat ion ,  for (he p en ce  iu the Balkajis  and for tlic 
t r iumph o f  the principles  on  whicl i  the Eu ro p ea n  C o m m u n i t y  is based .
__J>unng-pa5t-c lcven-m on(h3-w 'c  have-undertaken .a  scries_o.f_p(inticaI steps aimed at. assuring 
the Jdiropean Community' (hat we mainLain a policy of good-ncighbourlines and frTen'dsFiip," 
peace, cohaFitanon Trnhe”Balkans. Unfortunately, The Lisbon Declaration reqiurcs from 
iTs to erase the term îvlaccdômn from the name of our country. This is a precedent in the 
history of nations and l>cyond the international standards. This request by the Republic of
Greece was-being .followed .by .economic—pressures -and -blockade;-on-lhe-Republic o f
Ma’ccdonla. In spite of all this, however, the ‘Republic of Macedonia, facing great losses and 
difficulties, started a great number of initiatives for a [>caceful and right solution of the 
international problems.
I am calling upon you, again, on behalf of the citizens of tire Republic of Macedonia, its 
legitimate bodies and in my own name, with an appeal for showing full understanding for 
arguments put forward. In the name of a good future between our countries and nations, 
in the name of peace and the principles the European Cummuniry is based on, I__ara asking 
you to undertake immediately the intcrnational__rccognition o/jhe_Repu_bIic jofjylaccdonia 
b ylb ë European Commuoity, _^d_by your honoured country in particular.
. lî would be a real expre.ssion of rcsj)ect of the right of a small nation to self-determination, 
a support for the peace and stability in the region and a rcril step of a preventive activity 
against the threats of a new Balkan war.
Please r e c e iv e -M r .  Prim e-M in istcr ,  'cxpres.slon.s“Of my h ig h e s t 'c o n s id e r a t io n s .
K ij^G H goi^y— ■ - -
M i i f ' " ' " '  "1
of the Republic of Macedonia
H.E. Mr. Constantin Mitsotakis 
P rim e M inister o f  the H ellen ic  Republic
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APPENDIX XIV
Letter ttiat Antonis Samaras sent to Konstantinos Mitsotakis on 15 Marcti 1993. it 
is publistied tiere in its entirety for the first time.
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.  I l
Ov .’:■ Kuvaxuv r. [ vo MqxoozcKU 
pôiôpp Kudcp’^ r/jqq 
xyapo Me: L;. ou
A9/1VQ, 15 MaptCou 1993
I 'C C i ia u  ()C\: r o  ô u v a i ô v  o û v z o ï i o q .
Ddyuax^  il •{'.vo’ n z a  -ppv ÔCV a ^ e i e X c C  pr(Lnpi.)<ri  i T ir .p x n X a v r j a r } -  p r t o p E t
J9CCÀWC V L ac  c u a C c S q r e c  wptic; o p p r z v T L K n  Y '-^  %cr o u p q j f p o v i a : ; . !
:iç ïïcclpCo'-''. •p’-'C. A/.ACT ic%L noXûiLpn Y TO aOp'.o rn*; o l^ h ç  p a t ; . T iapdxaÇqç'/J. 
lOpévciiÇ, .':.v;v r .p o o /w p q cc ic  -ôïïûic vcXeutûrCû 5r^Aioatc- a i q v / \ a ^ C ç ' ^^KavT'. 
wYKOfLÔcnn; a u x : j r  t r j r  cv 6 zr\zaz, , o i j i c r Â ' r i e ,  £ a i ( i  KiZL ^ - n O u a x e p q p c v a ,  yu%  x o  .' 
inXÔ Kn'Xn x - ’f''--'*.' T:"'-» K é ; ; ;m % o c  -et » : â v c x c  x q v  c v ô c q x c r  c u x q  ï ï p a Ç n *  - ' ' ' '  :
t  ' ,'îc Sc: xr'i' k o . c x c  , 6xccv ovx'f"."/qocxE cr:  c l  o o ^ p é q -  jOuzçwvCeq-
î; os c" . cl .r.A\ -oA-.i-.r./j.;. o LKOvop , KOLvuvLxnq '
:'RiO0qOLa':. kcil • \ c  .pvjq;, xoo ô r ^ o o io u  ^^ '■' ot^ciX ovtcL  -omjq
•oîTpooavaxLXlcl'-KC l.qX^ CA'T.r. ce  oqOcv ôlki^ pou "cLpcXLKq" ouxSeoq,.^üX X c.  
nCScxa riivâCouv uqv CLDvvO^q SZoq pou ê v c v x i  iljv cpxwv xnQ'TvapdxaÇqq-;. 
•ji xou npoyp<xpp:(: • . • ••-• KÔ;,pcrc< nçu éxcL ofjpcpoc oxc5<5v Çcxctcxs C... f ;y 
^ ■ ' . ' . T -
ppcvur. ÜCOC a;, n %- :...v ouCjjAviilv cCcXCB u.; v '.o tq  xwpcç.
îÀoyiKoCi :à:a% ov U;UL i tqe 1 0 :: iitrq, ip o x :  :vu :  y Ka Cpuq :-% L<; : . # ( n ç  +3:'
. : ••  0 ; .  j
î îO L p e q  O ' . i f S w c x  i. , T.q% K u P ' p v q ; . K . ' ; q  l o X - . X ' - K n C  ' /  i ; Ÿ  ' -
1: ' .
.iüxov, v u , rywT.aXcLipv5cC KâSc i^ta aup3i(îc:opoij 
îû ï ïO L qSL i.  ' i v c p a n  ô X u v  x w v  c X X q v u K û v  5 E0 p e u a p w y = ÿ  
£XX«5a  6 x v  o ê x & x a L  k c l  o c v  S a  S c x S G L i i o j j É y p w '
To 'cCivLKÔ 6npo4;rj(fLOpa, ïïou . ip o x e C y c ÿ
KXcCpqpa- t p c L c p a  . c T t a v a x o ï ï o S ^ x q a q q -  r b û j s ê l i o î o ç
••.•••• ■ • .. ■ ‘ pel'll-
KCOO
342
g o v ,  . . v ' a K u p w S o ü v  4  v =  OXCÇ
°  5nXnTnpu35(i<: SiSpuBoi; « x i ,  g  TxpoBXrjpa-CLapôç-^^^^^ffi
"°3«pâ xnv KapdtaÇn KkL yUMC 'S c v ' c f f i f f i g ^ ^ ig B S ^  
•j|5  jYuPipvnon tn c  ^ S c p a n ç  «  «v«K P»u(gq x»«po««<;
: ^ 5 c e w v  «v« vK6p<Jvotvo KôpKa, àPK  ro  p«ç, pc t o v 'k^ ' ' t e y x S g ^ ^ T ^
TftCtov, va Katcu8üv8et 0 outovopta npo^ tqv av&rtuÇn wtv tnv .CuaCcSlKI^fel
:jgo|3Xn>w w v  aoatvtoxEpuv tOLvwviKwv xâÇcwv.Kat tou EUnva
.ïc3cC KùcLzAnKiiKil apcpoynvCa oxn XLtûxqxa* •-•
ÎÉAo'ç, vcc ï ï £ p L û p L a 3 c L  S p o r c r r t j c à  kc? l  ccKozeXcqjazLKà q u ï ï c p ^ o X l k ô ç  
jC c:oxpG T T L(.K 6q  ricr to Kôppa “ ^ ( I X o p "  twv crv3pû7ruv tou i T G p L ^ A A o v t C q  c<zq.
iivai ÂOûnôv oapcp, KÜpLc ripécSpe, 6 t i  ro kàclÔC rqç cvôzqvxç ppCoKctaCox^v.' 
ïïp5,u2 tou  ouvôXqu auTiHv xwv ao(iapûv SiayxuvL^Sv, Nv: cCozz zirCaqq p lp^ ioç-ôV L  : 
àç"; cr:rdil/t:^ p autcp ouvurcQypàqiCL q auvxplttxuk:^  rcXc Loi|iq(fCa xwv Oïïa5wv’~--xau !' 
'jfi'f^ ûrzôç pcrp. Av X olitôv  TTLOxcOerc oxnv evd tn xa , (5ttu<; X^ te SqpCOLG:, eCvûtl axo 
1pi caç vs toX^id<^ct£.
4 5pwp \ c \ i K d  5çv xo TTp<SÇet£, t6x£ 9& xpdïïCL v'arravxn^eC oiRÔ. xqy. :C5
: . •• :-K •!> •, -.•■;'•{■
'^raÇrj, TTOudc e< xwv ÔOo -cocCq n cyw- eCpûOtS Vïïcp fj Kprcd 
i^ pokpcrc û:fC,.
/ f /
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